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ABSTRACT 
 
The pension fund industry affects an enormous proportion of the world population and 
consists of more than $20 trillion of assets globally. Hence the performance of pension funds 
has major effects. This thesis investigates the performance of personal pension funds in the 
UK, one of the leading pension industries in the world. It identifies two important factors that 
are largely overlooked in the related literature: fund’s age and management outsourcing. 
Based on the ‘career concerns’ argument by Holmström (1999), it tests whether fund 
performance is age dependent, and in particular, whether funds perform better when they are 
young than when they ‘mature’. Moreover, one of the major features of the pension fund 
industry has been the enormous growth in management outsourcing. This thesis addresses 
this issue and tests whether there are differences in the performance between outsourced and 
internally managed funds, and investigates potential determinants of the decision to 
outsource. It argues that a ‘fashion to outsource’ may be partially responsible for the trend. 
 
Given that a CAPM-APT based analysis is not appropriate for the data at hand, the thesis 
employs three alternative performance measures, two of which utilise fund-specific 
benchmarks. The results show that risk-adjusted returns are statistically insignificantly 
different from zero but funds significantly outperform their benchmarks. Performance is 
found to change with fund’s age but this relationship is more complex than a simple ‘career-
concern’ argument would predict. Risk-adjusted returns of the internally managed and the 
outsourced funds are both indifferent from zero but the outsourced funds are better at 
outperforming their benchmarks. Lastly, there is some evidence of a ‘fashion to outsource’. 
 
This research is novel in several ways. It provides the first detailed investigation of the 
performance of the UK personal pension funds. It is the first to address the question of 
potential factors (other than managerial characteristics) that may explain fund performance. It 
discusses the rise of outsourcing in the industry and analyses differences/similarities between 
performance of the outsourced and the internal funds. Finally, it is the first to investigate 
whether the rapid increase in outsourcing is due to ‘fashion’. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
There is undisputed evidence that the world population is ageing. The median age in the 
OECD area is projected to increase to 46 years in 2050 (compared to 30 in 1970) by which 
time there will be two pensioners for every worker.
1
 This is expected to have an immense 
effect on public finances and as a result, a worldwide wave of pension reform was triggered. 
The World Bank, one of the most vocal proponents for reform, has advocated the 
replacement of the unsustainable Pay-As-You-Go state pensions with a multipillar funded 
pension system and spent an astounding $13.2 billion in the years 2002-2007 supporting 
reform in 56 countries. Unsurprisingly, the reform in many countries followed the Bank’s 
model by introducing funded occupational and personal pensions. Through this change 
pension funds have emerged as a powerful institutional investor accumulating assets of more 
than $19 trillion in 2010 in the OECD area alone. As a consequence, pension funds are able 
to support economic growth, improve corporate governance, and promote financial 
development particularly in emerging economies.  
 
However, a new trend has emerged following this ‘first’ wave of reform, namely a change in 
the structure of pension benefits. Most types of funded pensions had been set up with a 
defined benefit (DB) structure according to which pension benefits are predetermined and 
independent of investment performance of pension funds. The new trend is a shift toward 
defined contribution (DC) benefits where pension benefits depend on fund’s performance. 
Although this may seem only a subtler change, it is decisive for the pension income and, 
therefore, for the suitability of the funded sector to replace state pensions.  
 
Since this shift from DB to DC is relatively recent there is still very little evidence whether 
DC pension funds are up to the challenge. First reports coming from the US indicate that this 
is not the case. DC plans are found to be rather inadequate to replace income at retirement. In 
view of the widespread change toward DC pensions this is disquieting particularly as there 
are very few studies on DC funds’ performance. 
 
                                                          
1
 Own calculations using data from the “World Population Prospects: The 2008 Revision”, United Nations.  
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The main purpose of this thesis is to address this gap in our knowledge. In order to do so, it 
identifies the UK personal pension sector as an exemplary case of a DC system. The British 
personal pension sector has a relatively long history, which allows a meaningful analysis of 
the past DC funds’ performance. Indeed, the UK is distinctive as it is one of the countries 
where pension reform has been introduced much earlier than in the rest of Europe. As a result 
its funded pension sector is one of the largest worldwide (in terms of assets) and has become 
more important than the state for pension provision. Therefore, studying the British industry 
provides a unique and valuable lesson on the characteristics and performance of DC funds. 
 
Although much of the development of the UK pension industry is due to the early reforms of 
the Thatcher government in the 1980s, an overview of the regulatory change shows that 
funded occupational pensions have a very long tradition in the UK going back to the 18
th
 
century. Personal pensions are more recent, initially organised for the self-employed in the 
1950s and then introduced as an alternative pension arrangement for everyone in the 1980s. 
Occupational pensions have been traditionally DB but employers have been gradually 
replacing them with DC schemes. However, the most important change came from the Brown 
government in 2008 that introduced the ‘personal accounts’ that have been rebranded as 
‘National Employment Savings Trust’ (NEST) accounts and are available from 2012. What is 
characteristic for these accounts is that they are DC and thus, they may significantly increase 
the number of employees that are covered by such schemes (there is some recent evidence 
that people opt out of these schemes finding them unattractive). This stresses even more the 
need to study the performance of personal pensions that are DC by definition. 
 
The primary objective of this thesis is exactly this, i.e. it studies the performance of the UK 
personal pension funds. This is made possible by the creation of a new database by 
Morningstar Direct
TM
 which was launched in 2008. The thesis makes use of monthly fund 
returns from January 1980 till December 2009 as well as information on the funds’ providers, 
their investment style, and management type for almost all funds. Downloading and 
organising the data was a very time-consuming and labour intensive task. It took over a year 
to complete it as it required a manual collection of additional information on pension 
providers and fund-specific benchmarks.  
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There are two principal foci in this thesis. The first one is the relationship between fund 
performance and fund’s age. Generally, previous research on performance has indicated that 
managers of mutual and pension funds do not outperform given benchmarks. There is also 
evidence for short-term performance persistence and some selection skills but the results also 
show that managers cannot time the market. Moreover, researchers have examined whether 
factors such as manager and fund family characteristics can affect fund returns. Among these 
approaches in fund performance assessment fund’s age has received very little attention. 
However, this thesis hypothesizes that fund performance changes with fund’s age. The 
reasons lie within agency theory and particularly in the work of Fama (1980) and Holmström 
(1999). Fama argues that reputational concerns can work as managerial incentives 
particularly if little is known on managerial ability. This idea is formalised by Holmström 
(1999) who presents a model where managers are incentivised to work hard at the beginning 
of their career in order to signal their ability and as the market learns about it new 
information becomes less valuable, and so there are fewer incentives to work hard. The 
theory that information loses its value the more of it is available is the premise of the first 
hypothesis in this thesis. If this theory is applied to fund’s age it should be expected that 
when there is little information on young funds any performance news is important. As a 
result, managers will try hard to present the best possible picture in order to attract 
contributors and as the funds become older there is less need for managers to do so. Although 
managerial effort is unobservable it can be approximated by fund performance and assuming 
that effort changes with fund’s age, fund performance is expected to change with fund’s age 
as well. 
 
The second focus of this thesis is the increasing use of outsourcing the fund management of 
personal pension funds in the UK. It is reported that fund management outsourcing has 
boomed in recent years in the US mutual fund and Dutch pension fund industries. A similar 
development is observed in the UK personal pension industry where within a decade 
outsourcing has become the prevailing management practice. The proportion of funds being 
outsourced in the market was only 8% in 1980 and gradually increased to 18% in 2000. 
However, by the end of 2009 this proportion had increased to almost 60%. Despite this 
development there is very little evidence on the effect this has had on fund performance. 
Research on US mutual funds has indicated that outsourced funds underperform those that 
are run in-house. Assuming that competition will eliminate either type of management in case 
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of persistent underperformance, the second hypothesis in the thesis is that there is no 
difference between the performances of internally and externally managed UK personal 
pension funds. Moreover, it is expected that the performance of both management types 
changes with fund’s age since internal managers need to attract contributors for young funds 
and external managers more clients-providers.  
 
Furthermore, this thesis studies what are the possible reasons for this outsourcing boom. 
Related research has identified a number of factors but has neglected the possibility that 
outsourcing has simply become a ‘fashion’ although there is anecdotal evidence to this effect. 
The third hypothesis in the thesis is that fashion is at least one of the drivers behind this ever 
growing trend to outsource management in the UK personal pension industry. 
 
In the process of addressing the three stated hypotheses, a number of methodological issues 
arise. The most important relates to the way fund performance is assessed. It is argued for the 
particular sample that a CAPM or APT based analysis is not appropriate and thus, alternative 
performance measures are applied. Moreover, the question of benchmark selection is solved 
by adopting fund-specific benchmarks as provided by the Morningstar database, but as the 
analysis will show there are questions on how these benchmarks are selected in the first 
place. Finally, several control variables are created based on related literature and analysis 
shows that indeed, they have explanatory power over fund performance. 
 
The thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 describes the background of the thesis. The first 
part discusses pension reform and the shift from DB to DC. The second part explains in detail 
why the UK is a special case and poses a valuable case study. The chapter concludes with a 
description of the dataset and an overview of the subsequent analysis. Chapter 3 addresses the 
first focus of the thesis, i.e. the relationship between fund performance and fund’s age. It 
starts with a literature review on fund performance and argues why fund’s age is important. 
The second part dwells on the methodological issues that evolve around performance 
measurement and benchmark selection. Much of the methodology from this chapter is also 
applied in Chapter 4. The third part describes the regression analysis which includes the 
identification of the explanatory variables as well as the presentation and interpretation of the 
results. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the main results, limitations, and 
10 
 
contributions and points out directions for future research. Chapter 4 examines the 
relationship between fund performance and outsourcing. It opens with a literature review and 
continues with a description of the development of external management in the UK personal 
pension industry. The regression analysis follows with a presentation and discussion of the 
results. The final part summarises the main points that emerge from the analysis, discusses its 
contributions and limitations, and proposes points for further research. Chapter 5 investigates 
the determinants of the outsourcing boom and posits that ‘fashion’ may have been one of 
them. The first part discusses related literature and states the hypothesis. The second part 
discusses the methodological issues in measuring the factors that are identified as possible 
determinants of outsourcing. The last part describes and interprets the results of regression 
analysis. The chapter concludes again with a discussion of the main results, the contributions 
and limitations of the analysis and suggests objectives for future research. The thesis 
concludes with a brief summary of the main results. 
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CHAPTER 2: BACKGROUND AND DATA 
 
This chapter describes the context of this thesis and positions it within related research. It 
contains three subsections. The first subsection sets out the general background and defines 
the main issue that is addressed in the thesis. The second subsection explains the motivation 
for choosing the particular industry and country as means of addressing this issue. Finally, the 
last subsection describes the dataset which enables the analysis of the chosen industry. The 
chapter concludes with a brief statement of the main objectives of this thesis. 
 
2.1. Background 
 
There is already substantial evidence that the world is ageing. According to United Nations 
data the average median age in the OECD area is projected to reach 46.2 years by 2050. At 
the same time, there is an observable shift in the balance between pensioners and working 
population. A measure that captures this shift is the old-age dependency ratio which shows 
approximately how many people of pensionable age there are for every hundred workers.
2
 
The average old-age dependency ratio in the OECD area is expected to double in the next 
forty years and reach almost 47% by 2050 which means having roughly one pensioner for 
every two workers.
3
 Interestingly, both developed and developing countries face this 
demographic change which is expected to have multiple effects in their economies (Davis, 
2002a).  
 
There is extensive research documenting the possible effects ageing population may have on 
both financial markets (e.g. Schieber and Shoven, 1994; Turner et al., 1998; Poterba, 2004) 
and public finances (e.g. Hagemann and Nicoletti, 1989; Roseveare et al., 1996). Particularly 
the latter has been the subject of intensive discussion as state pensions worldwide have been 
operating on a PAYGO basis. This means that workers’ pension contributions are channelled 
into payments for pensioners’ state pensions, thus making unfunded pension systems 
financially unsustainable in the long-run.  
                                                          
2
  The United Nations calculate the old-age dependency ratio as the number of people aged 65+ divided by the 
number of people aged 15-64. 
3
  Own calculations using United Nations population projection data.  
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The expected strain on public finances has triggered an international wave of pension reform 
introducing pension funds and promoting private pension provision which has been strongly 
advocated by the World Bank. Indeed, the Bank has been one of the leading organisations 
promoting funded pension systems by engaging in a wide range of activities from research 
funding to technical assistance since the early 1980s.
4
 
 
In the period between 1984 and 2001 the World Bank approved 154 loans to several 
countries planning pension reforms which amounted to $5.5 billion. The purpose of the loans 
was primarily to cover the transition costs after a major pension reform. In the financial years 
between 2002 and 2007 alone it financed 112 pension-related projects in 56 countries. The 
amount loaned reached $13.2 billion, which accounted for 10.3% of total World Bank 
lending in the same period. 
 
The primary goal of these loans has been to support mainly developing economies with their 
pension reform efforts. At the same time, developed, high-income countries have been 
reforming their pension systems as well. According to the OECD all G10 countries have 
introduced minor or major reforms since the 1980s.
 5
  
 
Despite criticism of the Bank’s recommendations (e.g., Singh, 1996; Kotlikoff, 1999) most 
undertaken reforms, at least in the OECD area, seem to closely follow the World Bank’s 
funded, multipillar model (Schwarz and Demirguc-Kunt, 1999). Many countries have been 
compelled to create funded systems in order to protect the financial solvency of their public 
pension provision (Bonoli, 2003) and in the case of the transition economies of Eastern 
Europe (Impavido, 1997) and Latin American countries (Roldos, 2007) there have been high 
expectations that a funded system would also help develop the financial sector.  
 
Numerous papers stress the importance of the creation of a funded pension industry for 
economic development and shaping the financial sector.  It has been argued that pension fund 
                                                          
4
  “Pension Lending and Analytical Work at the World Bank: FY2002-07”, The World Bank, 2008. 
5
 The Group of Ten (G10) countries are Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, The Netherlands, 
Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. OECD Financial Market Trends, “Ageing and 
Pension System Reform: Implications for Financial Markets and Economic Policies”, November 2005. 
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growth can affect financial markets in several different ways (Blommestein, 2001). Indeed, 
there is evidence that pension funds can encourage capital market modernisation and 
financial innovation (Bodie, 1990; Vittas, 1996) but also impact on asset prices and returns 
(Gompers and Metrick, 2001; Boyer and Zheng, 2002). Furthermore, empirical evidence 
supports the connection between pension fund assets and stock market growth, however, the 
direction of causality remains ambiguous (e.g. Catalan et al., 2000; Harichandra and 
Thangavelu, 2004).  
 
Overall, research indicates a positive relationship between pension fund growth and capital 
market development, in terms of both financial innovation and stock market growth. 
Moreover, there is evidence that stock market and economic growth are positively correlated 
(Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 1995; Calderon and Liu, 2003; Beck and Levine 2004; 
Claessens et al., 2006). Thus, pension funds can contribute to economic growth through their 
positive impact on the financial markets’ development.  
 
The above empirical evidence is based on studies of developed markets and mainly the 
United States. Nonetheless, research seems to support the connection between pension funds 
and financial market growth for emerging markets as well. Research has shown that pension 
reform can lead to stock market growth through asset accumulation (Roldos, 2004) although 
there is no indication that it could happen through better governance practices due to pension 
fund activism (Catalan, 2004). There is also indication that savings accumulation after 
pension reform is beneficial for worker productivity (Davis and Hu, 2004) and for economic 
growth, especially for emerging countries with more macroeconomic stability (Walker and 
Lefort, 2002). 
 
Interestingly, a cross-effect between pension funds’ size in developed countries and stock 
markets in developing countries does not appear. On the contrary, empirical research has 
shown that institutional investors’ cash flows may negatively affect the development of 
emerging stock markets and big investors may destabilise emerging markets (Aitken, 1998; 
Frenkel and Menkhoff, 2004; Chan-Lau, 2005; Zalewska, 2006). 
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Apart from the overall positive effect pension fund growth can have on capital markets and 
economic development, research has shown that there is also another subtler change. The 
emergence of pension funds as large shareholders is argued to have improved corporate 
governance (Davis, 2002b; Catalan, 2004). Particularly due to their size they are considered 
to be more successful in their activism than individuals (Gillan and Starks, 2000). Indeed, 
there is evidence that pension funds are strong vocal activists (Woidtke, 2002), however, the 
benefits of this activism on adding firm value are not confirmed by empirical results 
(Romano, 1993; Wahal, 1996; Faccio and Lasfer, 2000). Nevertheless, as active investors 
pension funds are generally found to influence corporate strategy and operations by 
promoting innovation (Hoskisson et al., 2002), international diversification (Tihanyi et al., 
2003), and social performance (Johnson and Greening, 1999; Cox et al., 2004).  
 
On the whole, research indicates that the creation of funded pension systems has been 
beneficial for world economies in several aspects. In this respect, this wave of pension reform 
may be deemed an improvement. However, with time some features of the funded system 
have been revisited, and particularly the structure of pension benefits. The above literature 
concentrates on occupational funded pensions whose benefit structure has been almost to its 
entirety defined benefit (DB). This means that the pension benefits are predetermined and 
depend only on the amount of contributions paid into the pension fund. If the fund is in 
surplus at the time of retirement, due to good investment performance, the employee receives 
the predetermined pension and the employer keeps the surplus. In case the fund is in deficit 
due to bad performance then the employee will still receive the predetermined pension but the 
employer has to cover the deficit. Thus, the employer carries the risk of low investment 
returns. The main alternative benefit structure is defined contribution (DC) where the 
employee’s pension depends not only on the contributions made but also on the fund’s 
investment performance. In case of poor investment returns the pension benefits are adjusted 
correspondingly downwards and so the employee carries the investment risk.  
 
After the initial wave of reform which had introduced funded pensions followed a second 
wave of reform which has been reshaping the overall funded sector from DB into a DC 
structure. This ranges from changing unfunded state pensions into notional personal account 
DC systems as in Italy and Sweden (Börsch-Supan, 2005) to shifting the occupational 
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pension benefit structure from DB to DC (Kruse, 1995; Ross and Wills, 2002; Broadbent et 
al., 2006; Whiteford and Whitehouse, 2006), and to introducing new forms of personal DC 
pensions (Even and MacPherson, 1994; Ippolito 1995).  
 
Researchers have discussed in detail possible reasons for this shift. In the case of 
occupational pensions, the DB structure has been getting more expensive for employers due 
to increased longevity of their retired employees and volatile stock markets (Ross and Wills, 
2002; Aaronson and Coronado; 2005; Banks et al., 2005). Furthermore, regulatory change 
has made DB plans costlier to administer (Kruse, 1995; Brown and Liu, 2001; Ross and 
Wills, 2002). At the same time, increases in workforce mobility have made portable pension 
schemes more desirable than the classic DB plan which requires staying with the same 
employer till retirement (Bodie et al., 1988; Aaronson and Coronado, 2005). 
 
This DB to DC shift in the funded pension system has several implications for plan members. 
The main advantages are increased pension scheme portability and lower dependency on the 
employer. The main disadvantage is that members bear the entire investment risk (Bodie et 
al., 1988; Banks et al., 2005; Broadbent et al., 2006). It has been argued that this 
disadvantage is counterbalanced by the fact that DC members have the right to engage 
actively in the asset allocation of their fund’s portfolio (Broadbent et al., 2006). However, 
evidence suggests that members do not receive enough information and even if they are well 
informed they are not likely to become involved in the fund’s investment strategy (Ross and 
Wills, 2002; van Rooij et al., 2007). 
 
Despite the general discussion on the causes and implications of this major shift there is very 
little information on the performance of DC schemes. Simulation analyses have indicated that 
although DC schemes may provide on average higher benefits than DB schemes (Samwick 
and Skinner, 2004) they are likely to disadvantage low-income groups or members with 
discontinued working patterns (Even and MacPherson, 2007; Poterba et al., 2007). 
Researchers have also applied simulation analysis to predict whether DC schemes can 
generate a retirement income that is comparable to the income while in employment. The 
results are mixed with some results predicting an ‘adequate’ retirement income (Brady, 2012) 
to others being rather low (Cannon and Tonks, 2009).  
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Apart from the simulation analyses there is very little empirical evidence on how DC plans 
have been performing. The first indications from the personal DC pension schemes in the 
USA is that they underperform DB plans (Munnell et al., 2006) and generate income that can 
hardly cover 25% of the income enjoyed in employment (Browning, 2011). Considering that 
the whole funded pension system is being restructured towards DC in many countries around 
the world, this rather alarming news. This thesis will address this gap by investigating the 
personal pension industry in the UK which has been DC from its inception and is old enough 
to allow a meaningful analysis of its performance. 
 
2.2. The funded pension sector in the UK 
 
The funded pension sector in the United Kingdom poses a special case in Europe and 
worldwide. The UK has been promoting the development of the private sector for pension 
provision from early on even though it has one of the least dismal population ageing 
projections.
6
 According to Blake (2003b), in the early 1980s, the conservative government 
under Margaret Thatcher was the first among developed countries to deal with the possibility 
of a state pension crisis. It was also among the first to introduce funded pension schemes and 
limit the role of the unfunded PAYGO system. Personal pensions, in particular, took an 
organized and regulated form in the late 1980s. At that time most countries, especially in 
Europe, had not started reforming yet.  
 
The reforms of the Thatcher government have made several key contributions into shaping 
the UK pension system. First, they set up a regulatory authority for the occupational pension 
sector making it more reliable and trustworthy. Second, they introduced the option of making 
lower contributions for state pension if an employee was covered by an appropriate private 
scheme, thus, presenting private pension provision as a clear substitute for state pension. 
Third, they established the personal pension sector, which was the first organised form of 
private pension provision in the UK that was independent of an employer. The latter enabled 
employees to withdraw from their occupational schemes and opt for another form of private 
pension.  
                                                          
6
 The UK has a 2050-projected old-age dependency ratio of 38% compared to the OECD-average of 46.8%. 
Own calculations based on United Nations population projection data. 
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There were considerable defects however, such as a lack of control over the conditions under 
which employees made the change from occupational to personal pension provision, and 
absence of restrictions on charges imposed by personal plan providers. These led to the mis-
selling scandal in 1993 and to personal pension schemes that were not widely affordable.
7
  
 
Nonetheless, these reforms created the foundation of private pensions in the UK and 
although, the later Labour government under Tony Blair focused more on resources 
redistribution, it continued with the task of promoting private pension provision. The 
probably most important input has been the introduction of stakeholder plans as a more 
affordable alternative to the personal pension plans contrary to other countries having a third 
pillar “aimed at catering for the needs of more sophisticated investors” (Impavido, 1997). 
 
This relatively early promotion of private pension provision is what has made the UK a case 
study of pension fund success with high levels of employee coverage and accumulated assets 
(Davis, 2001). In terms of coverage, almost 60% of the working population was covered by a 
private pension in 2007.
8
 In terms of accumulated assets under management, private pension 
assets in the UK had reached $1.9 trillion in 2010. To illustrate how this compares against the 
other OECD countries Table 2.1 documents the size of accumulated pension fund assets in 
2010. 
 
In terms of pension fund assets, the UK has by far the largest private pension sector among 
the European country members of the OECD. The Netherlands that come second in Europe 
have almost half of the assets of the UK, and Switzerland in the third place, has less than one 
third. 
 
 
                                                          
7
 Blake (2003a) reports how personal pension providers used aggressive sale techniques and persuaded 500,000 
employees between 1988 and 1993 to switch over to personal schemes. The majority would have received a 
more generous pension had they stayed in the occupational scheme. He mentions that “as many as 90% of those 
who transferred had been given inappropriate advice”.  
8
  See Figure 2.4. 
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Table 2.1. Total pension fund assets in the OECD countries, 2010 (measured in USD trillion). Source: Pension 
Markets in Focus 2011 – OECD. 
 
Country Pension Fund Assets  
(in USD trillion) 
 United States 10.59 
 United Kingdom 1.94 
 Japan 1.39 
 Australia 1.09 
 Netherlands 1.06 
 Canada 1.02 
 Switzerland 0.55 
 Finland 0.20 
 Other OECD 1.35 
 Total OECD 19.18 
 
 
However, when the size of the economy is taken into account, countries with mandatory 
private pension systems are ahead of the UK. Table 2.2 lists the pension fund assets as a 
percentage of the GDP in OECD countries in descending order. 
 
The UK is the third largest in Europe after the Netherlands and Iceland. Of these two 
countries, Iceland has a mandatory occupational pension system, whereas the Netherlands 
have established collective, industry-wide agreements that extend coverage to more than 75% 
of the working population.  
 
Nevertheless, what the UK system has achieved is to develop such a large private sector 
without making contributions to it mandatory, something that the World Bank has strongly 
advocated. This implies that in relation to the economy, the UK has the largest voluntary 
pension system in Europe. 
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Table 2.2. Total pension fund assets as a percentage of GDP in the OECD countries, 2010. Shows how many 
assets have been accumulated in private pension systems in the OECD area relative to GDP. Measured in %. 
Source: Pension Markets in Focus 2011 – OECD. 
 
Country Pension Fund Assets 
 (% of GDP) 
Netherlands 134.89 
Iceland 123.91 
Australia 90.95 
United Kingdom 86.55 
Finland 82.12 
United States 72.61 
Weighted average 71.62 
Chile 66.97 
Canada 60.93 
Denmark 49.71 
Ireland 49.05 
Israel 48.95 
Japan 25.25 
Poland 15.79 
Hungary 14.62 
New Zealand 13.80 
Mexico 12.58 
Portugal 11.43 
Spain 7.90 
Norway 7.75 
Slovak Republic 7.41 
Estonia 7.38 
Czech Republic 6.33 
Austria 5.25 
Germany 5.18 
Italy 4.57 
Korea 3.96 
Belgium 3.77 
Slovenia 2.49 
Turkey 2.35 
France 0.18 
Greece 0.02 
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The advanced level of private pension provision in the UK is also reflected in the relatively 
low replacement rate. The OECD reports two kinds of rates: 
 
-gross replacement rate: the ratio of gross pension entitlement divided by gross pre-
retirement earnings.  
-net replacement rate: the ratio of individual net pension entitlement divided by net pre-
retirement earnings. Personal income taxes and social security contributions are taken into 
account.
9
  
 
Therefore, a replacement rate measures in effect to what extent the projected income in 
retirement will “replace” the income enjoyed during employment. To estimate the income in 
retirement, OECD takes into account all mandatory sources of pension. These normally 
include the state pension (since contributions to it are mandatory in all OECD countries) and 
any private pension if there is compulsory participation in either occupational or personal 
schemes. Figures 2.1 and 2.2 show the gross and net replacement rates in the OECD countries 
for a worker of average earnings. 
 
The UK has the lowest gross replacement rate for an average earner in OECD at 30.8%. This 
implies that the expected state pension (which is the only mandatory source of retirement 
income) will be only 30.8% of the income earned during employment. Should an employee 
wish to keep the same income level in retirement as the one enjoyed while employed, more 
than two thirds of it can be provided solely by the private sector. 
 
In terms of net replacement rate, the UK has the fourth lowest in OECD at 40.9%, meaning 
more than half of net retirement income can only by covered by private pension in order to 
retain the same net income level received in employment. 
                                                          
9
 The definitions are taken from the publication “Pensions at a Glance 2009: Retirement-Income Systems in 
OECD Countries - OECD © 2009 - ISBN 9789264060715”. 
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Figure 2.1. Gross pension replacement rates for an average earner in OECD countries. The rates reported refer 
to men workers and are the same for women in all countries except Italy (women replacement rate is 52.8%), 
Mexico (29.9%), Poland (44.5%), and Switzerland (59%). Measured in per cent. Source: Pensions at a Glance 
2009: Retirement-Income Systems in OECD Countries - OECD © 2009. 
 
Figure 2.2. Net pension replacement rates for an average earner in OECD countries. The rates reported refer to 
men workers and are the same for women in all countries except Italy (women net replacement rate is 58.1%), 
Mexico (31.5%), Poland (55.2%), and Switzerland (65.3%). Measured in per cent. Source: Pensions at a Glance 
2009: Retirement-Income Systems in OECD Countries - OECD © 2009. 
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As Antolin and Whitehouse (2009) point out, it is not a coincidence that the UK has a big 
private pension fund sector and a low replacement rate. This is the result of the regulators’ 
systematic efforts to reduce state pensions and establish private pension provision. Thus, they 
have motivated employees to opt for the private sector without making contributions to it 
mandatory, which highlights the large degree of responsibility the private sector has now for 
pension provision. 
 
Regulatory development has ensured that the private sector can step up to this responsibility. 
In the UK private pension provision in the form of occupational pensions has had a longer 
history and tradition than public pensions. Indeed, the first type of state pension in the UK 
was organised in the early 1800s for civil servants and, as such, the scheme created was more 
occupational than state pension. In order to illustrate the place and role that the private sector 
has for pension provision in the UK the next part describes in more detail the regulatory 
development of the two sources of private sector pension provision: occupational and 
personal.  
 
2.2.1. Occupational pension schemes
10
  
 
In terms of definition, the OECD classifies a pension scheme as occupational when the 
membership is linked to an employment relationship between the scheme member and the 
scheme sponsor. It is voluntary for employers to set up a pension scheme and, as of 2012, it is 
voluntary for employees to participate in it. The size of the company affects the employer‘s 
decision to organise such a scheme. Mayhew (2001) points out “around 70% of large 
organisations (with 20 or more employees) make pension provision for employees whereas 
only 36% of smaller organisations (less than 20 employees) do so.”  
 
Early forms of occupational pensions date back in the 13
th
 and 14
th
 centuries. Funded forms 
of occupational pensions have existed since the mid-1700s and schemes that are closer to 
what is today recognised as occupational pension were introduced in the 19
th
 century by 
                                                          
10
 The next parts of section 2.2 are based on Blake (2003a) and the “Pension Trends” publication by the Office 
for National Statistics. Any other sources are quoted in the text. 
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individual companies, e.g. East India Company, London and North Western Railway 
Company etc.  
 
The legal framework for occupational pensions was organised for the first time in the 1834 
Superannuation Act. The 1921 Finance Act introduced tax relief for contributions towards an 
occupational pension which made it affordable to a wider population range (Mayhew, 2001). 
Nonetheless, what has really shaped occupational pensions during these ‘early regulation’ 
days was the 1927 Superannuation and Other Trust Funds Act. It set up most schemes in the 
UK as pension trust funds. As of June 2012, occupational schemes still have trustees and are 
governed by Trust Law. 
 
The next significant regulatory contribution came with the 1959 National Insurance Act 
which introduced the first additional state pension GRAD. Although it didn’t affect directly 
occupational pensions, it effectively presented them as a substitute to state pension. This was 
achieved by means of the contracting-out option, which was further established by the 1975 
Social Security Pensions Act. Employees who opted to keep an occupational pension instead 
of the additional state pension were in a way rewarded by paying lower national insurance 
contributions. This represented an incentive to shift from public to private pension provision 
and has very effectively promoted the development of the private sector. 
 
Another milestone for the development of occupational pensions has been the establishment 
of a supervision system protecting scheme members.
 11
 The 1973 Social Security Act created 
the Occupational Pensions Board (OPB), which was the first form of a supervisory authority 
in this sector. Its main responsibility was to control individual schemes to ensure that they 
provided equal access to employees, fulfilled the contracting-out criteria, and early leavers 
didn’t lose out on benefits.  
 
However, the Maxwell Affair demonstrated that tougher regulation was needed. In response 
to this scandal, the 1995 Pensions Act set up the Occupational Pensions Regulatory Authority 
                                                          
11
    See Gilling-Smith (1973) for a discussion on the importance of the 1973 Social Security Act. 
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(OPRA) which took over the responsibilities of the OPB and was given more wide-ranging 
powers. Trustees were placed under the full supervision of OPRA that could now appoint, 
suspend, or completely remove them. Every pension scheme has since been obliged to 
employ an auditor and an actuary. 
 
The 1995 Pensions Act also introduced the Pensions Compensation Board. The main purpose 
was to protect occupational pension scheme members by organising compensation 
procedures in case of employer bankruptcy or embezzlement. This board was replaced in 
2005 by the Pension Protection Fund, according to the 2004 Pensions Act. The same act also 
replaced OPRA with the Pensions Regulator. 
 
Occupational pension coverage is quite widespread in the UK. According to the Office for 
National Statistics (ONS) there were approximately 27.7 million members of occupational 
pension schemes in 2008.
 12
 In terms of membership status, 9 million were active members, 
i.e. employees who were making contributions through their work at the time. Another 8.8 
million people were already receiving a pension. Last, 9.9 million were members with 
preserved pension entitlements - also known as “deferred members”. This category includes 
former employees who have pension rights within a scheme and don’t receive any pension 
yet as well as dependent persons.  
 
The ONS provides membership information according to the economy sector as well. From 
the 27.7 million members in 2008, 15.3 million were from the private sector whereas 12.4 
million were from the public sector. Total membership increased from 22.2 million in 1991 to 
27.7 in 2008. This increase is rather attributed to the expansion of the public sector 
membership. For the same time period there was a 44.2% increase in membership of the 
public sector compared to the more modest increase of 12.5% in the private sector.  However, 
there has been little variation in total occupational pension scheme membership in the 2000s. 
This is additionally supported by OECD information according to which around 47% of the 
                                                          
12
   Occupational Pension Schemes, Annual Report 2008 - ISBN 9781857747003. 
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employed working population was covered by an occupational pension in 2006.
 
In 2000 this 
was 46% of the employed population.
 13
 
 
Although occupational pension scheme coverage has changed only slightly, contributions to 
occupational pension funds increased by almost 70% from £36.7 billion in 2001 to an 
astounding £62.1 billion between the years 2001 and 2008. This is rather attributed to the 
high increase of contributions paid by employers, which almost doubled from £26.6 billion in 
2001 to £47.5 billion in 2008. Employee contributions increased by 44%, reaching £14.6 
billion in 2008, having stayed at around the same level since 2006. 
 
Apart from coverage and contribution, one of the biggest changes in the sector involves the 
benefit structure of occupation pensions. As it was briefly mentioned earlier, one very 
important characteristic of occupational schemes is the way pension income is calculated and 
this depends on whether schemes are offered on a defined-benefit (DB) or a defined-
contribution (DC) basis. In a DB scheme in the UK the pension depends on the years of work 
and the salary received, adjusted for inflation. This can refer to the final salary, the average 
salary throughout one’s career etc. depending on the terms of the scheme. The pension 
benefits are predetermined and independent from the return of the fund. As such, members 
can at any point calculate their pension benefits, while the employer carries the risk of low 
investment returns. 
 
With a DC scheme on the other hand, the pension received cannot be calculated before 
retirement. The contributions are invested in a fund and at the time of retirement the proceeds 
from the fund are used to purchase an annuity that will provide the pension income.
14
 As 
such, the pension depends on the amount of contributions made, the return of the fund, and 
the type of the annuity. Therefore, the employee carries the risks of poor investment 
performance and low annuity rates if such occur.  
 
                                                          
13
   Pensions at a Glance 2009: Retirement-Income Systems in OECD Countries, OECD 2009.  
14
   Although purchasing an annuity is the most common option, members have the option to keep the fund and 
withdraw capital as needed. This is known as an unsecured pension or pension drawdown. It is not possible after 
the age of 75. 
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The shift from DB to a DC pension structure has been markedly pronounced in the UK 
occupational pension sector. Figure 2.3 shows the proportion of DB and DC occupational 
pension schemes that have been founded within each of the last three decades. A remarkable 
67% of open DB schemes opened before the 1980s, whereas only 4% opened during the 
2000s. Similarly, more than half of closed DB plans were founded before 1980. On the other 
hand, only 1% of open DC schemes opened before 1980, with almost half opening in the 
2000s.  
 
Figure 2.3. Occupational pension schemes by foundation date and type, 2007. Measured in per cent. Source: 
Office for National Statistics, Pension Trends, Chapter 6: Private Pensions, June 2009. The particular figure is 
based on Figure 6.2.  
 
 
This trend has been continued in the years following 2007. The ONS reports that 56% of 
active DB members joined schemes that opened before 1980 whereas 95% of active DC 
members joined schemes that opened after 1980.
15
 This is a very clear shift in the balance 
between DB and DC schemes in this sector and there are concerns that this may lessen the 
importance of occupational pension provision (Neuberger, 2005). Even so, more recent 
reforms are expected to make this shift permanent and increase DC membership even further. 
 
                                                          
15
 Pension Trends, 2011, Office for National Statistics. 
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The 2008 Pensions Act established a ‘personal accounts’ system that is essentially a trust-
based DC pension system where each eligible employee has an account. Contributions are 
paid into this account by both the employee and the employer but the main advantage is that 
this account is fully portable and not connected with any employer. Consequently, it is a 
hybrid of occupational and personal pension. The target group are employees that do not have 
any type of occupational pension. This system, which has been renamed National 
Employment Savings Trust (NEST), will be introduced in 2012 and will spread the coverage 
of DC private pensions even further. 
 
In view of this significant development in the occupational pension sector it becomes 
essential to put together what is known about the operation of DC schemes. The personal 
pension industry is particularly suitable as it operates in the same environment. As it is one of 
the first personal pension sectors to be organised in Europe there are valuable lessons to be 
learnt. 
 
2.2.2. Personal pension schemes 
 
Compared to the long history of occupational pension schemes, the second component of 
private pension provision is relatively young. Personal pension schemes offered by insurance 
companies have been available to the self-employed since 1956. However, it was not until the 
1980s that they were considered as an option for the wider public.  
 
The first type of personal scheme was the Personal Pension Plan (PPP), introduced in 1988. 
The second type was the Stakeholder Pension Scheme (STK), which was introduced in 2001. 
They are provided by institutions such as insurance companies, friendly societies, and banks. 
Both types operate on a defined-contribution basis. Hence, any risks associated with fund 
performance and annuity rates are carried by the scheme member.  
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Participation to a personal pension scheme is voluntary. Although the coverage is not as 
extensive as that of occupational schemes, there were already 5.3 million people enrolled in a 
personal scheme in 2004.
16
  
 
Personal pension plans (PPP) 
 
Personal pension plans were set up by the 1986 Social Security Act and became available in 
July 1988. All operations concerning personal pension plans are supervised and regulated by 
the Financial Services Authority. As already mentioned, employees of appropriate 
occupational pension schemes were given the option to contract-out of additional state 
pension. Members of personal pension plans had this possibility as well. Consequently, 
personal plans were presented as substitutes to additional state pension, same as occupational 
schemes. Half a million policies were sold within the first three months after the PPP 
introduction. By 1999 there were approximately 7 million policy-holders.  
 
In effect, PPP replaced the Retirement Annuity Contract (RAC). RAC was a type of pension 
plan introduced by the 1970 Income and Corporation Taxes Act available to the self-
employed and those who didn’t have access to an occupational pension scheme.17 The 
purpose of RAC was the accumulation of a large sum that would finance a person’s 
retirement income in two ways: receipt of a lump sum at retirement and purchase of an 
annuity. Sale of these contracts seized in July 1988, right before PPPs became available. 
However, people already in possession of a RAC could continue making contributions.  
 
The principal advantage of personal pension plans is their flexibility as membership is not 
linked to employment. Members can also invest in different funds or control the investment 
decisions themselves. Despite the flexibility they offer, there have been concerns on the 
administration fees of these schemes. To encourage participation in personal pensions the 
Blair government has introduced less costly personal plans, called stakeholder pensions. 
 
                                                          
16
    Private Pensions Outlook 2008 - OECD © 2009 - ISBN 9789264044388 
17
    They are also referred to as “section 226 contracts” because they were defined in section 226 of that act.  
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Stakeholder pension schemes (STK) 
 
Stakeholder pension schemes were introduced from April 2001 by the Welfare Reform and 
Pensions Act 1999. Part of their regulation was also set up in “The Stakeholder Pension 
Schemes Regulations 2000 - SI 1403”. They were designed as a more affordable version of 
personal pension plans and, as a consequence are very similar to them. A stakeholder pension 
can also be used to contract-out of the second state pension.  
 
The difference between STK and PPP lies principally in management fees and contribution 
limits. Personal pension plans face no regulatory restrictions on charges or penalties they can 
impose and have full flexibility in determining the level of minimum contribution. It is up to 
each individual to accept the conditions of each provider. Stakeholder schemes, on the other 
side, are subject to regulatory restrictions. In detail an STK has the following conditions: 
- there is a maximum management fee charge at 1.5% of the fund value per year for the first 
10 years and 1% afterwards; 
- there is no penalty on altering or stopping contributions and transferring benefits to another 
scheme; 
- contributions are flexible; 
- the minimum contribution cannot exceed £20 in any period.  
 
According to these conditions, a stakeholder scheme is actually a personal pension plan that 
accepts small contributions and imposes low management charges. The purpose of 
introducing this type of personal pension was explicitly to attract low-earners to the private 
sector of pension provision. As Jarvis (2001) points out: “The target group for the new 
pensions are those in the workforce on moderate earnings who do not have access to good 
occupational schemes and for whom personal pensions are poor value, largely because of 
their high charges.” 
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Stakeholder schemes are available to any UK resident aged below 75. Policy-holders can start 
receiving pension benefits at any time between the age of 55 and 75. The regulation of STK 
is divided between the Pensions Regulator - previously known as OPRA - and the FSA. The 
former oversees the application for and registration of new stakeholder schemes. The latter 
regulates their sale and promotion. 
 
An interesting point that describes the dynamic between PPPs and STKs is made by Tonks 
(1999). He argues that the establishment of personal pension plans in the late 1980s 
weakened the importance of the second state pension. However, he comments that the 
introduction of stakeholder schemes could in their turn, diminish personal plans. STK look 
like “a superior alternative to personal pensions, and are likely to drive the more complex and 
expensive personal pensions out of the market”. 
 
Group pension plans 
 
Although it is not a ‘distinct’ form of personal pension, for employers group pensions are an 
alternative to occupational schemes. Employers can enter into an agreement with a financial 
institution to provide personal pension to their employees. It is a collective agreement and the 
personal pension can be either PPP or STK. As such, group personal pensions are usually 
organised and sponsored by the employer. Nevertheless, the legal contract exists only 
between the financial institution that provides the pension and each individual employee. Due 
to the collective character of this procedure economies of scale can arise for the pension 
provider, resulting in lower costs. Employees could benefit from this, as lower costs for the 
provider could imply lower charges.
18
 
 
Any employer who has more than five employees is obliged to offer some form of pension 
provision to the employees. The options are membership in an occupational pension scheme, 
a group personal pension, or access to a stakeholder pension plan. Figure 2.4 shows the 
percentage of employees in the UK covered by different types of private pension provision in 
2007, as reported by the OECD. 
                                                          
18
    Complementary and Private Pensions throughout the World 2008 – ISSA/IOPS/OECD © 2008. 
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Figure 2.4. The percentage of UK employees covered by a pension provided by the private sector in the year 
2007. The coverage is reported for occupational schemes, personal schemes, and total private sector. The 
number for total private sector is free of double-counting employees covered by an occupational and a personal 
scheme. Measured in per cent (%). Sources: Pensions at a Glance 2009: Retirement-Income Systems in OECD 
countries - OECD © 2009. 
 
 
According to this figure, 59% of all UK employees had a private pension in 2007. Almost 
half of all employees participated in an occupational pension scheme, whereas one in five 
was contributing towards a personal pension. 
 
In conclusion, the private pension industry in the UK poses a special case study. The private 
sector is characterized by long history and tradition. Replacement ratios indicate that the 
private sector plays a bigger role than the public sector in replacing income in retirement. 
Additionally, regulation itself has been developed according to past experience thus helping 
to establish a strong funded system. An important feature has been the promotion of the 
personal pension sector with efforts to maintain personal pensions at an affordable level. 
Other countries undertaking pension reform can learn from the UK experience in several 
ways. These can relate to regulatory development and reform, particularly when introducing 
new DC schemes or to the overall performance of the personal pension industry. The 
investigation of the latter is the main purpose of this thesis. Using a new database by 
Morningstar Direct
TM
 this thesis is going to address several questions that will allow a better 
understanding of the characteristics of this DC industry.  
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2.3. Data 
 
This part describes the data that is going to be used in this thesis and reports some initial 
statistics that illustrate the development of the personal pension fund industry in the UK as 
well as what it has to offer to potential members. 
 
The data is provided by the UK Life and Pension database which was launched by 
Morningstar Direct™ in 2008. This database provides data on pension funds offered by 
private institutions (e.g., insurance companies, friendly societies) in the UK since 1968. The 
pension funds covered by the database serve personal and stakeholder pension plans for 
private individuals, group personal, or stakeholder plans for employers to offer in lieu of 
occupational pension. These funds are organised by financial institutions and are available to 
any individual independently of employment status. They should be clearly distinguished 
from the ‘classic’ occupational pension schemes, which are organised by the employer and 
are offered only to employees.  
 
By the end of December 2009, i.e., when the data used in this dissertation started to be 
collected, the database consisted of an unbalanced panel of 12,307 pension funds.  Although 
the database has been updated frequently there may be occasional delays in reporting newly 
launched or closed funds, so some funds that are available in the market may not be 
immediately included. However, the number of missing funds from the above panel is 
estimated to be less than 4% of the total number of funds reported.19 Thus, the sample covers 
almost the entire market of available personal pension funds.  
 
For each fund the following information is available: a fund’s name, provider’s name, 
inception date, and the investment sector a fund belongs to according to the Association of 
British Insurers (ABI) classification. Quarterly and yearly returns on the portfolios are 
available since 1972 and monthly returns on the portfolios are available since January 1980. 
Fund allocation data, such as asset allocation, regional exposure, industry sectors etc., are 
provided both at a cross-sectional level and as time-series. The time-series are observed 
                                                          
19
     According to Morningstar information there are less than 500 missing funds from the panel. 
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monthly from December 2002.  
 
The data collection was a challenge in itself. The data was downloaded over a period of four 
months. As the Morningstar database is frequently updated to include newly opened funds the 
sample had to be cleared off any observations starting from 2010 which was done in a month. 
A further six months were required for the formatting of the downloaded data due to the large 
sample size. The main characteristics of the industry were identified during this period. This 
included the classification of funds according to their investment style (see below) and the 
identification of the pension fund providers for which information on origin, founding date, 
past mergers and acquisitions was collected manually from each corporation’s website. All 
statistics that are presented below (and some from Chapter 4) were calculated during these six 
months as well. A further three months were used to gather information on the fund-specific 
benchmarks and calculate their corresponding returns (see section 3.2.2 in Chapter 3) 
 
At the end of 2009 there were 63 pension providers in the personal pensions market. 
(Appendix A provides their names, entry year, and the total number of funds each of them 
was managing, as of end-2009). Almost half of these institutions started offering funds in the 
1980s and in the early 1990s forty-five out of these sixty-three companies were already 
active. Figure 2.5 shows the number of new providers entering the market in the period 1968-
2009. It shows that the 1980s were the years of the greatest activity with at least 2-3 new 
providers entering the market each year. However, this frequency of entry declined 
significantly in the 1990s and became almost non-existent since 1999. 
 
However, the decline in the number of new providers is not associated with a decline in the 
number of new funds offered to the public. On the contrary, as Figure 2.6 shows, although 
almost all providers had already started operating in the UK by 2000, the number of new 
funds that have been incepted after this year has increased dramatically.  
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Figure 2.5. The number of providers entering the market in each calendar year for the period 1968-2009. 
Source: Own calculations using Morningstar Direct
TM
 data. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.6. The number of pension funds incepted each year in the period 1968-2009. Source: Own calculations 
using  Morningstar Direct
TM
 data. 
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Approximately 76% of all funds have opened since 2000. An unprecedented number of funds 
(1,157) opened in 2000. The following years followed with a bit more modest numbers of 
new openings but still every year from 2001 onwards there were more new funds opened than 
in any year before 2000. 2008 was another record year with 1,708 funds incepted in that year 
alone. However, the distribution of these openings was rather uneven with just a handful of 
providers contributing to this record figure. In summary, nearly 70% of all funds have been 
opened since 2001 and approximately 50% of all funds have been incepted after 2004.  
 
It is interesting that the increase in the number of portfolios is highly correlated with the 
change in the investment style (Appendix B describes the investment style classification 
based on each fund’s ABI category and provides the definitions of the ABI categories). A 
small proportion of funds provided by Morningstar Direct
TM 
are not classified, but these with 
classification are presented in Figure 2.7. 20 This figure shows the number of funds that were 
opened each year over the period 1980-2009 classified within the following broad investment 
sector categories: allocation, equity, and fixed income. Category ‘other’ includes the other 
four broad investment sectors: money market, real estate, protected, and specialist.  
 
Figure 2.7. Number of funds per broad investment sector, opened in 1980-2009. ‘Other’ includes money market, 
real estate, protected, and specialist funds. Source: Own calculations using Morningstar Direct
TM
 data. 
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It should be explained at this point that funds classified as ‘allocation’ can invest in equity but 
it is optional to do so. Typically, there are restrictions on what proportion of the fund can be 
allocated in equity as the primary investment focus of the allocation style is to provide a 
‘mixed’ portfolio. However, as it is probably correct to say that allocation funds typically 
exercise their right to invest in equity, we can also say that in every calendar year the number 
of new funds investing in equity was higher than the numbers of funds restrained from equity 
investments. Moreover, the proportion of new equity funds to the total number of funds 
opened in each calendar year has increased dramatically since 2000. 
 
The high proportion of equity funds is even more visible when we measure the number of 
funds over the entire sample that have been classified within one of the seven broad 
investment sectors. Figure 2.8 shows the total number of funds per sector. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.8. Total number of funds per broad investment sector as of December 2009. Source: Own calculations 
using Morningstar Direct
TM
 data. 
 
 
Since many funds in the allocation category include equity investments, the vast majority of 
portfolios is sensitive to stock market fluctuations. Figure 2.9 makes this point clearly visible 
using a more narrow investment sector classification. Here the four least numerous 
categories, i.e., money market, protected, real estate and specialist, are dropped, but the three 
biggest categories are further expanded. Figure 2.9 shows that in the allocation group the 
largest subgroups are those with a potentially high percentage of equity exposure. Allocation 
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100, Allocation 85 and Allocation 60 (all together 2,058 funds) are more numerous than the 
Fixed Income group (1,550). 
 
 
Figure 2.9. Total number of funds per narrow investment sector as of December 2009. Source: Own calculations 
using the Morningstar Direct
TM
 data.   
 
 
 
 
The above statistics show that the private pension sector has grown substantially over the last 
ten years. Although the number of providers has hardly changed, the number of funds 
available to the public has ballooned. Moreover, these new funds are predominantly equity 
and fixed income oriented. Figure 2.9 shows that over 89% of all fixed income funds invested 
purely on the UK domestic market. Although this statistic refers to the overall sample, the 
proportion has been more-or-less constant over the years. The equity funds were more 
balanced, with only 39% of them investing purely on the UK market (allocation funds are 
excluded from this statistic). Similar to fixed income funds, the proportion of UK equity 
funds to international equity funds has not changed significantly over the last thirty years. 
However, one significant change took place in the international equity group, the UK pension 
funds started to invest in emerging markets. While in the 1980s and 1990s there were nearly 
no funds specialising in emerging markets, this has changed after 2000. Nearly 300 funds, or 
over 92% of the emerging equity funds, have been incepted after 2000.  
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The next chapter discusses fund performance research and shows that the results of the 
related literature would suggest poor performance for these funds. However, due to the nature 
of the benefit structure, investment returns are crucial for the members’ retirement income. 
Chapter 3 deals with the first objective of this thesis which is to investigate the performance 
of this sector using an innovative methodology of performance assessment. Additionally, it 
posits that fund performance is connected with the fund’s age and stipulates on the nature of 
this connection. Chapter 4 addresses the second objective of this thesis which is to examine 
the ever-growing trend of outsourcing the management of these funds to external wealth 
management companies. As it is demonstrated later, outsourcing has important implications 
on the return-risk profile of the fund, and thus, more importantly on its performance. Chapter 
5 studies the possible causes for the boom of fund management outsourcing by looking at 
different factors that affect the decision to delegate fund management to an external firm 
which is third and final objective of this thesis. 
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CHAPTER 3: PERFORMANCE AND FUND AGE 
 
This chapter examines whether the performance of the UK personal pension funds is related 
to fund’s age. The first section opens with a review of fund performance literature and argues 
that fund’s age has not received enough attention, although there are strong arguments on 
why it should matter. It posits that age is a potentially important factor in explaining 
performance. The second section discusses the methodology used to assess fund performance 
in this study. It demonstrates that applying a CAPM or APT framework may not be 
appropriate for the analysis of fund performance and proposes three alternative measures. 
Descriptive analysis shows that on average funds outperform their benchmarks. Subsequent 
regression analysis explores factors that are potentially important in explaining fund 
performance both individually and interactively with fund’s age. The final part reports and 
interprets the results. The chapter concludes with a discussion on the limitations of the 
analysis and points out possible directions for further research. 
 
3.1. Literature review and hypothesis statement 
 
Fund performance is a subject that has been researched systematically and in great length. 
Questions like whether funds outperform certain benchmarks or whether there is any 
consistency in fund performance are approached repeatedly and from different angles.  The 
results are fairly consistent. Funds – of any type – underperform their benchmarks, their 
performance shows some short-term persistence, managers have some selection but poor 
timing skills and it pays off to employ highly educated managers. An extensive but not 
exhaustive part of this literature is discussed below followed by the development of a new 
angle to assess fund performance.
21
 
 
The early work on fund performance concentrates on mutual funds in the United States and 
documents the absence of abnormal returns (Sharpe, 1966; Jensen, 1968). This result is 
confirmed by subsequent papers (Henriksson, 1984; Davis J.L., 2001). More recent literature 
                                                          
21
 The literature discussed here focuses on mutual and pension funds in the United States and the United 
Kingdom. 
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based on samples covering most of the years between the 1960s and the 1990s finds that 
funds significantly underperform given benchmarks (Elton et al., 1993; Carhart; 1997; Bollen 
and Busse, 2005) and particularly so when management fees are accounted for (Daniel et al., 
1997; Wermers, 2000).
22
 The evidence on mutual funds from the UK is very similar. In the 
period 1972-1995 Blake and Timmermann (1998) find that mutual funds significantly 
underperform multi-index benchmarks whereas results from a sample ranging till 2002 show 
negative but insignificant abnormal returns (Cuthbertson et al., 2008). Absence of abnormal 
returns is also found for mutual funds in a group of European countries during the period 
1991-1998 (Otten and Bams, 2002).
23
  
 
The performance results of pension funds are similar to those of mutual funds. Research on 
US pension funds finds that they significantly underperform allocated benchmarks and this 
result seems robust over time (1977-1983 in Ippolito and Turner, 1987; 1983-1989 in 
Lakonishok et al., 1992; 1993-1996 Ambachtsheer et al., 1998). Underperformance is also 
documented in several countries for a sample that extends until the mid-2000s (Antolin, 
2008).
24
 Evidence for UK pension funds is mixed with some results indicating clear 
underperformance in the period 1986-1994 (Blake et al., 1999; Blake et al., 2002) and others 
showing no significant abnormal returns for the period 1983-1997 (Thomas and Tonks, 2001; 
Tonks, 2005). 
 
Another strand of literature investigates whether fund managers demonstrate selection and 
timing skills. The results on selectivity are rather varied. For US mutual funds there is 
indication that managers manifest on average positive selectivity which disappears when fees 
are considered (Daniel et al., 1997). However, Bollen and Busse (2005) show that only top 
performing managers have good selection skills (Bollen and Busse, 2005). Managers of US 
pension funds present some good selection skills (Coggin et al., 1993) whereas UK managers 
show neither positive nor negative selectivity (Blake et al., 1999).  
 
                                                          
22
 Elton et al. (1993) have a sample in 1965-1984, Carhart (1997) in 1962-1993, Daniel et al. (1997) and 
Wermers (2000) in 1975-1994, and Bollen and Busse (2005) in 1985-1995. 
23
 The sample covers domestic equity mutual funds in France, Italy, Germany, the Netherlands, and the UK. 
24
 This sample covers pension funds in Argentina, Australia, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Hungary, Japan, 
Mexico, the Netherlands, Poland, Sweden, the UK, and the US. 
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The results on timing skills approximated with the Treynor-Mazuy and the Merton-
Henriksson factors (Treynor and Mazuy, 1966; Henriksson and Merton, 1981) seem more 
homogeneous. Managers of mutual funds are found to have no timing skills both in the US 
(Henriksson, 1984; Daniel et al., 1997) and the UK (Cuthbertson et al., 2008). For pension 
funds the results are somewhat bleaker. Pension fund managers are found to have negative 
timing skills both in the US (Coggin et al., 1993) and the UK (Thomas and Tonks, 2001). 
 
Performance persistence and whether there is any consistency in the returns achieved by fund 
managers is another theme that often features in fund performance literature. There is 
evidence of short-term persistence for US mutual funds. This is attributed to funds tracking 
the S&P 500 (Brown and Goetzmann, 1995) or to the momentum factor explained in 
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) (Carhart, 1997). This persistence is found for both the top and 
bottom performers (Carhart, 1997; Davis J.L., 2001). Bollen and Busse (2005) find some 
consistency only for the top performers while Daniel et al. (1997) find no persistence 
whatsoever. In the UK short-term persistence is found for both the top and the bottom 
performers (Blake and Timmermann, 1998). More recent work indicates that there is some 
consistency only for the bottom performers (Cuthbertson et al., 2008). No performance 
persistence is found for European mutual funds (Otten and Bams, 2002).  
 
Evidence from the pension fund industry in the UK exhibits slightly mixed results. Brown et 
al. (1997) find short-term persistence only for top performers whereas Tonks (2005) show 
that although there is some persistence at both ends of the distribution, persistence net of fees 
remains only for the bottom performers. The period covered in these two cases extends 
roughly from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s so the slight difference in the results can be 
explained by the difference in either the sample size or the performance measurement 
method.
25
  
 
Overall, these results show that if persistence exists it is only short-term. Bessler et al. (2010) 
study the lack of long-term persistence in US mutual funds. They find that it can be explained 
                                                          
25
 Brown et al. have a sample of 409 funds and assess performance with the CAPM model controlling for timing 
whereas Tonks has a sample of 2175 funds and uses the CAPM, Fama-French and Carhart models. 
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by two ‘mean-reverting mechanisms’, (i) change of fund flows, and (ii) change of manager 
after a period of good or bad performance. 
 
Finally, there is a considerable amount of literature devoted to the explanation of factors 
affecting fund returns. One part of it investigates to what degree personal characteristics of 
the fund manager are connected with fund performance. Golec (1996) and Chevalier and 
Ellison (1999a) show that for US mutual funds managers with an MBA degree perform 
significantly better than those without MBA. Another part focuses on how the characteristics 
of ‘fund families’ affect fund performance. Findings indicate that large families have funds 
that achieve higher performance than small families (Chen et al., 2004). Moreover, funds 
from large families show stronger performance persistence at the top than funds from small 
families (Guedj and Papastaikoudi, 2003). 
 
It is important to note that among all these different questions surrounding fund performance 
one particular factor has been treated with less care and attention. This factor is time and, in 
particular, how performance changes with fund’s age. Fund performance literature includes 
fund’s age among other control variables only occasionally and finds no effect, for instance 
Carhart (1997), Ter Horst et al. (2001), and Chen et al. (2004) for US mutual funds or a 
negative relationship is found by Otten and Bams (2002) for some European mutual funds 
and Liang (1999) for US hedge funds. Despite these findings no concrete hypothesis is stated 
as to why fund age should be included in the analysis or what the expected outcome is.  
 
The only exception known to the author is Blake and Timmerman (1998) who consider 
fund’s age as one of the factors explaining reasons to close down UK mutual funds. They 
argue that funds close due to continued bad performance whereas new funds are expected to 
have high performance. In particular, they argue that “new funds […] may attempt to attract 
investors by offering initial discounts and by attempting to establish an early strong track 
record”. Therefore, they expect performance to change throughout the funds’ operation. 
Indeed, they find that there is clear underperformance before closure but, more importantly, 
that newly opened funds underperform their benchmarks in the first month of operation, then 
outperform during the first year and this outperformance fades away afterwards. Although 
their analysis of fund age is descriptive and does not go into detail, the rationale behind their 
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argument and the intuition behind their findings are consistent with the central hypothesis in 
this chapter (stated at the end of this part). There are concrete reasons to expect that fund 
performance changes with time and these are based on agency theory.  
 
Agency theory is founded on the assumption that the assigned manager (the agent) doesn’t 
act in the best interests of the investor (the principal).
26
 Investors foreseeing this can engage 
in monitoring or set up contracts that align the manager’s interests with theirs. A fundamental 
way to achieve this alignment is to connect managerial compensation to performance. 
However, Fama (1980) argues that reputational concerns can be as effective in incentivizing 
managers as compensation packages are. He points out that information on past performance 
is an important factor when determining future remuneration. Therefore, when there is little 
information about their skills, managers are motivated to work harder in order to signal their 
ability to the market, build up their reputation, and secure future compensation. Since the 
amount of available information increases with time Fama argues that managerial incentives 
change with time as well.  
 
Holmström (1999) develops a theoretical model which formalises Fama’s ideas. He shows 
that when little is known about managerial ability any piece of new information is important 
for their evaluation and, therefore, managers  work hard at the beginning of their 
career/appointment due to ‘career concerns’ – same as Fama describes it. However, as time 
goes by the market creates a picture of the manager’s skill and becomes less sensitive to new 
information. Thus, managers become less motivated to work hard to prove to the market how 
good they are. This theory is corroborated by empirical results for the mutual fund industry in 
the U.S. Golec, (1996) and Chevalier and Ellison (1999a) show that the age of fund managers 
covaries negatively with the fund’s risk-adjusted performance, i.e.,  younger managers score 
significantly higher performance than older managers. 
 
The same logic of information losing value with time can also be applied to fund’s age. 
Indeed, there is evidence to suggest that investors are more sensitive to performance news of 
young funds than to those of old funds with fund flow levels changing more radically for 
                                                          
26
 Eisenhardt (1989) provides a detailed review of agency theory. 
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young funds (Chevalier and Ellison, 1997; Jylha, 2011). Moreover, Chevalier and Ellison, 
(1999b) and Brown et al. (2001) find that the probability of fund survival after a period of 
poor performance is significantly lower for young funds.  
 
Overall, both theoretical and empirical work indicates that when little information is available 
any new information is very valuable and indeed, the market reacts more strongly to new 
information. Therefore, it should be expected that when a new fund opens and there is no past 
performance information any news on performance is crucial. Anticipating this, managers 
will apply all their efforts and skills to make sure that the first news about this fund’s 
performance is the best possible in order to attract contributors. Over time as the market 
forms their opinion on the quality of the fund the pressure on delivering the best possible 
results may decline.  
 
Since managerial efforts cannot be measured directly, they are proxied by fund performance. 
Consequently, based on the assumption that the value of new information diminishes with 
time, fund performance should be expected to be higher early in the fund’s life. It should be 
noted that this hypothesis does not predict how long the period of high performance lasts or 
when the settling-down takes place or by how much the initial performance will be higher 
than the one later. What it predicts is that the settled-down level of performance will be lower 
than the performance level during an initial period of fund operation if career concern is the 
driver of fund performance and there are no offsetting forces. 
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3.2. Methodology and descriptive analysis 
 
3.2.1. Performance measures 
 
The first and most important methodological issue is how to measure fund performance. 
Early work is more descriptive in nature and used simple risk-adjusted return measures such 
as the Sharpe and the Treynor ratios (Sharpe, 1966; Treynor, 1965). Jensen introduced a 
measure of abnormal returns known as ‘Jensen’s alpha’ (Jensen, 1968). This alpha measures 
the difference between an asset’s realised returns and that of its expected returns according to 
the Sharpe-Lintner CAPM model (Sharpe, 1964; Lintner, 1965). However, the unrealistic 
nature of the CAPM assumptions triggered a discussion on the model’s validity and 
usefulness (Jensen et al., 1972; Modigliani and Pogue, 1974; Blume and Friend, 1975). This 
culminated in Roll’s critique who demonstrates that any mean-variance efficient portfolio 
could satisfy the CAPM model assumptions and, therefore, it would be impossible to identify 
the one true market portfolio (Roll, 1977). As such, testing the model’s validity would not be 
feasible since it could not be discerned whether the model was invalid or the proxy used as 
the market portfolio was improper. Further work emphasizes the importance of using the 
mean-variance efficient market portfolio in order to assess the validity of the CAPM (Roll 
and Ross, 1994). 
 
In response to these issues, another model was developed based on the Arbitrage Pricing 
Theory (APT) which has more flexible assumptions (Ross, 1978; Roll and Ross, 1980). Fama 
and French develop one particular form of the APT which proved to be very popular due to 
its ability to explain most of the variance in returns (Fama and French, 1993). This model is 
also found to account for many of the market irregularities that were previously unexplained 
by the CAPM (Fama and French, 1996) but its methodology is nevertheless criticized (Ferson 
et al., 1999).  
 
Research on fund performance uses predominantly single and multi-index CAPM models 
(Jensen, 1968; Elton et al., 1993; Brown and Goetzmann, 1995; Blake and Timmermann, 
1998) or CAPM models with higher moments (Thomas and Tonks, 2001; Blake et al., 2002; 
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Gregory and Tonks, 2004) or the Fama-French APT model with other factors such as 
momentum (Fama and French, 1993; Carhart, 1997; Otten and Bams, 2002). Few exceptions 
compare directly fund return to that of an assigned benchmark (Lakonishok et al., 1992; 
Blake et al., 1999) or measure performance in terms of risk-adjusted added value 
(Ambachtsheer, 1998).  
 
Alongside the question of fund performance measurement researchers repeatedly stressed the 
importance of benchmark assignment. As funds hold diversified portfolios that invest in 
different asset classes, the use of one index possibly excludes asset types that are in the fund 
portfolio. At the same time, choosing one index as a benchmark for all funds is probably 
inappropriate as funds have distinct investment styles. Previous literature demonstrates in 
detail that the results of fund performance assessment relative to a benchmark depend to a 
large extent on the chosen benchmark (e.g. Elton et al., 1993; Dor and Jagannathan 2005; 
Chan et al., 2009).  
 
The methodology in this thesis involves the use of fund-specific benchmarks. The 
Morningstar Direct
TM
 database provides information on what the pension fund provider has 
declared to compare the fund’s performance against. This is called “Primary Prospectus 
Benchmark” (PPB) and besides serving as benchmark it also has informational value as it is 
part of how the fund is marketed. The use of these fund-specific benchmarks allows the 
assessment of each fund’s performance against benchmarks chosen by the provider and is not 
subject to individual judgement. For comparison purposes, the performance of equity funds is 
also measured against the FTSE All Shares index.  
 
However, the question of how to measure fund performance against the PPB remains open. 
As described in the previous chapter, the funds in this sample have very diverse investment 
styles. Funds are classified into 32 distinct ABI sectors. Although this allows for a very 
narrow investment style classification across funds, it does not fully describe each fund’s 
portfolio allocation. The definition of the ABI sectors in Appendix B implies that in almost 
all cases as much as 20% of the fund’s assets can be invested in any other asset class. The 
application of a single or multi-beta CAPM model would be (with a high probability) 
incorrect because any constructed benchmark would not guarantee that all assets constituting 
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a fund’s portfolio would be included in the PPB. This raises the issue of the mean-variance 
efficiency of the market portfolio proxy. Moreover, a multi-factor APT model is not feasible 
as it would have to account for all asset classes and this would create technical issues relating 
to the choice and correlation between the variables.  
 
Due to the impracticality of applying either a CAPM or an APT type of analysis, three 
alternative means are employed. The first one is the Sharpe ratio which is argued to be more 
comprehensible than other performance measures for investors and has widespread 
application in fund industries (Goetzmann et al., 2007; Eling, 2008). The other two measures 
employed here assess fund performance relative to a benchmark. The first of the two is the 
simple difference in returns, i.e. the return of the fund Ri minus the return of the benchmark 
RB, 
                                                                  (1).  
This is a very raw measure and simply shows by how many percentage points the fund return 
differs from the benchmark return. This measure is adopted as a means of comparison with 
the last performance measure which adjusts for risk. This is the M2 measure introduced by 
Modigliani and Modigliani (1997). The M2 adjusts the fund’s return to the benchmark’s risk. 
It involves the formation of a new portfolio that consists of the fund’s portfolio and the risk-
free asset. By borrowing or lending the latter the new portfolio can be brought to the same 
risk level as the benchmark portfolio. This allows the direct comparison between the new 
portfolio’s return to the benchmark’s return as they are both on the same risk level. Appendix 
C explains how this measure is calculated. Although the M2 is not without criticism itself 
(Goetzmann et al., 2007) it serves well as a measure of risk-adjusted performance over the 
assigned benchmark without creating problems of benchmark portfolio identification and 
market risk calculation. 
 
3.2.2. Descriptive analysis 
 
The sample from the Morningstar Direct
TM
 database consists of 12,307 funds out of which 
10,086 report monthly returns. The period of observation is from January 1980 till December 
2009. Most of the funds opened at some point during this period so their return observations 
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start at different points. This results in an unbalanced panel. The fund returns are reported as 
the per cent change in the fund portfolio price on month-end. All return observations are in 
GBP and are expressed as percentages (i.e. not decimal points).  
 
Additionally, there are 8,933 pension funds with PPB information. In total there are 515 
different benchmarks of which 389 are individual indices and 126 are composite benchmarks, 
i.e. they are weighted averages of specified individual indices (weights are provided). Returns 
of these benchmarks have been calculated based on data collected from DataStream. Due to 
insufficient benchmark information in the database and lack of data in DataStream, returns on 
276 individual benchmarks have been collected. This group consists of 212 individual indices 
and 64 composite benchmarks. Overall, benchmark returns have been collected for 6,073 
funds. Combining funds with both fund and benchmark return information reduces the 
sample 5,421 funds. 
 
Another technical issue to be addressed is the frequency of the observations in the sample. 
Using monthly observations in a panel structure increases considerably the complexity of the 
analysis. The reason is that monthly returns are found to have strong time-series properties 
(e.g. long memory) which raise a new range of technical problems such as stationarity 
concerns. In order to minimise econometric issues the frequency is reduced from monthly to 
yearly, i.e. time-series properties of the variables are smoothed out.  
 
This technique is similar to a moving-average smoothing (which is recommended if the long-
term properties of a variable are to be explored) but avoids any observation overlapping. 
Average return and risk are calculated for each calendar year from 1980 to 2009. The average 
return is calculated in two ways: 
- the arithmetic average of the monthly returns of fund,     ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅  (
 
 
∑     
 
   )      , 
- the average cumulative monthly return,      [(√∏         
 
   
 )   ]     ,  
 
where Ri,t is expressed in decimal points. 
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The calculation of the average cumulative monthly returns is also applied in Porter and Trifts 
(1998). The same procedure is applied to the calculation of the benchmark returns. These two 
averages produce almost identical fund returns and outperformance series. The correlation 
coefficient between arithmetic average and average cumulative monthly return is 0.9998. 
This is also the case for the corresponding outperformance measures. All the analysis 
presented in this and the next chapter is based on the average cumulative returns but the 
results are practically identical when the arithmetic average is used. The risk of the fund is 
calculated as the standard deviation of monthly returns in the corresponding calendar year.  
 
The vast majority of yearly calculations is based on n=12, i.e. all twelve monthly 
observations in the calendar year are included in the calculation of the average return and 
sigma. However, in some cases, i.e. when funds opened sometime during a year, there are 
fewer than 12 observations for the first calendar year. Ignoring these observations is not an 
option since the first months of operation need to be accounted for in order to test the main 
hypothesis and identify the exact form of the connection between fund performance and fund 
age. To address this, a restriction is imposed that at least six monthly observations need to be 
available for a calendar year to qualify as the ‘first’ year of the fund. This reduces the sample 
even further to 4,909 funds and a total of 28,586 observations. Out of this reduced sample 
approximately 94% of the funds and of the observations fall under the category of allocation, 
equity, or fixed income funds. There are 320 allocation funds and 705 fixed income funds. 
Equity funds are by far the largest category accounting for around 73% of the sample’s 
observations with 3,571 funds. Although the analysis that follows is applied to the total 
sample and these three investment style categories separately, equity funds are explored in 
more detail due to their relative size.  
 
Out of the three performance measures, the Sharpe ratio and the M2 have some severe 
outliers. These are cases where the fund sigma takes values close to zero and as both 
measures are calculated with the fund’s standard deviation in the denominator the overall 
ratios are inflated beyond proportion. Instead of removing these outliers both measures are 
winsorized (Wilcox, 2005). The winsorizing method applied here adjusts 0.5% of the 
distribution, i.e. 0.25% from each distribution tail of the Sharpe ratio and M2.  
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Figure 3.1 shows the histogram of fund returns for all 4,909 funds in the sample across all 
years in the 1980-2009 period. There is an obvious divergence from the normal distribution. 
Fund returns have a negative skewness of -0.64. Moreover, their distribution is more 
leptokurtic with a kurtosis of 4.6. It is important to note that almost 50% of the observations 
are concentrated in the 0%-2% interval, so approximately half of the fund returns are small 
positive numbers. With the exception of very few values the entire distribution is within the [-
5%, +5%] interval. Figure 3.2 presents the histogram of the corresponding PPB returns. 
There is again a notable difference from the normal distribution but it is more pronounced 
than for the fund returns as PPB returns are more widely spread. They are also negatively 
skewed with skewness of almost -0.7 and have a kurtosis of 3.7. Nevertheless, it is interesting 
to notice that here too around half the observations are in the 0%-2% area and almost all of 
them are within the [-5%, +5%] range.  
 
 
Figure 3.1. Histogram of fund returns. Funds of all investment types are included. The total sample is 4,909 
funds with 28,586 return observations. It includes a reference line at 0 on the X-axis and one line for the normal 
distribution. 
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Figure 3.2. Histogram of PPB returns. PPBs for funds of all investment types are included. The total sample is 
4,909 PPBs with 28,586 return observations. It includes a reference line at 0 on the X-axis and one line for the 
normal distribution. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3 shows the distribution of the difference-in-returns. This distribution is more 
symmetric than the fund and PPB returns distributions but has also a negative skewness of -
0.45. There is a high concentration around 0 but there are clearly more observations in the 
positive area. This suggests that on average fund returns are higher than the PPB returns.  
 
The distribution of the M2 is shown in Figure 3.4. Fund returns are on average higher than 
PPB returns on a risk-adjusted basis. Note that the winsorized points are clearly visible in 
both tails. M2 is more skewed than the difference in returns with a skewness of -0.54. Since 
the average is in both cases positive, this implies that the risk-adjusted performance is higher 
than the not risk-adjusted one which in turn indicates that there is a difference between the 
fund’s risk and the PPB’s risk.  
 
This is confirmed by the summary statistics provided in Table 3.1 which shows the average 
return, sigma, and Sharpe ratio for funds and their PPBs. Funds are also separated into the 
subcategories that are investigated further in the regression analysis. The principal feature is 
that although funds have on average both higher return and sigma than their PPBs, the 
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difference in returns is higher than the difference in risk. Thus, funds manage to have on 
average higher Sharpe ratios than their corresponding PPBs.
27
  
 
Figure 3.3. Histogram of difference-in-returns. Funds of all investment types are included. The total sample is 
4,909 PPBs with 28,586 return observations. It includes a reference line at 0 on the X-axis and one line for the 
normal distribution. 
 
 
Figure 3.4. Histogram of M2. Funds of all investment types are included. The total sample is 4,909 PPBs with 
28,586 return observations. It includes a reference line at 0 on the X-axis and one line for the normal 
distribution. 
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 Note that the Sharpe ratios for both funds and their PPBs have been winsorized by 0.5% from both tails. 
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Table 3.1. Summary statistics for fund and PPB returns. 
Sample Category Variable Mean St. Deviation Obs. 
All Funds 
Fund 
Return 0.404 1.841 
28586 
Sigma 4.362 2.390 
Sharpe 0.038 0.416 
PPB 
Return 0.226 1.710 
Sigma 4.252 2.400 
Sharpe 0.004 0.367 
Allocation  
Fund 
Return 0.372 1.418 
1579 
Sigma 3.428 1.626 
Sharpe 0.080 0.385 
PPB 
Return 0.167 1.330 
Sigma 3.504 1.951 
Sharpe 0.015 0.359 
Fixed Income  
Fund 
Return 0.442 0.952 
4380 
Sigma 2.038 1.247 
Sharpe 0.001 0.397 
PPB 
Return 0.188 0.788 
Sigma 1.944 1.073 
Sharpe -0.165 0.380 
Equity  
Fund 
Return 0.407 2.020 
21072 
Sigma 5.041 2.165 
Sharpe 0.066 0.367 
PPB 
Return 0.238 1.881 
Sigma 4.881 2.192 
Sharpe 0.019 0.334 
Emerging Equity  
Fund 
Return 1.059 3.496 
714 
Sigma 7.210 2.706 
Sharpe 0.205 0.435 
PPB 
Return 0.950 3.224 
Sigma 7.328 2.576 
Sharpe 0.165 0.392 
International 
Equity  
Fund 
Return 0.413 1.905 
11611 
Sigma 5.335 2.190 
Sharpe 0.049 0.339 
PPB 
Return 0.259 1.706 
Sigma 5.185 2.216 
Sharpe 0.013 0.298 
UK Equity  
Fund 
Return 0.346 1.995 
8747 
Sigma 4.473 1.873 
Sharpe 0.076 0.392 
PPB 
Return 0.153 1.941 
Sigma 4.279 1.881 
Sharpe 0.015 0.368 
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These conclusions are also corroborated by the results of t-tests reported in Table 3.2. There 
are two groups of t-tests in this table. The first group tests whether there is a significant 
difference in the means of fund and PPB returns, sigmas, and Sharpe ratios. The null 
hypothesis is that the means are equal and so their difference equals zero. The t-test is carried 
out assuming different standard deviations and the difference is calculated as the return, 
sigma, and Sharpe ratio of the fund minus that of the PPB. The second group tests whether 
the two performance measures, difference in returns and the M2 are significantly different 
from zero. The null hypothesis for this group is that the corresponding performance measure 
is not significantly different from zero. The t-statistics are reported for a 5% significance 
level.  
 
The principal feature of this table is that with only a couple of exceptions, the differences 
reported in Table 3.1 between the funds and the PPBs are statistically significant. The main 
pattern is that fund returns and sigmas are significantly higher than those of PPBs and the 
mean difference in returns is larger than the mean difference in sigmas. Thus, funds have 
significantly higher Sharpe ratios than the PPBs. This is reflected in the fact that both 
difference in returns and the M2 are significantly different from zero but the average M2 is 
larger than the difference in returns. Therefore, on average funds have outperformed their 
PPBs in raw terms, and even more so in risk-adjusted terms. 
 
It is to be noted that emerging equity funds don’t have significantly different returns and 
sigmas from their PPBs but they have a higher Sharpe ratio at the 10% significance level. 
This ratio difference is significant due to the fact that emerging equity funds have on average 
higher return and lower sigma than their PPBs. 
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Table 3.2. Results of t-tests on the difference of mean return, sigma, and Sharpe ratio between fund and PPB 
(unequal variances) and of t-tests on mean difference-in-returns and M2 equalling 0. 
 
 
Sample Null Hypothesis Variable Mean St. Error t-statistic p-value 
All Funds 
Difference in Means=0 
Return 0.178 0.015 11.945 0.0000 
Sigma 0.110 0.020 5.509 0.0000 
Sharpe 0.034 0.003 10.499 0.0000 
Mean=0 
RFund-RPPB 0.178 0.005 36.430 0.0000 
M2 0.222 0.005 47.041 0.0000 
Allocation  
Difference in Means=0 
Return 0.205 0.049 4.187 0.0000 
Sigma -0.075 0.064 -1.180 0.2382 
Sharpe 0.065 0.013 4.880 0.0000 
Mean=0 
RFund-RPPB 0.205 0.019 10.646 0.0000 
M2 0.287 0.019 15.105 0.0000 
Fixed Income  
Difference in Means=0 
Return 0.254 0.019 13.578 0.0000 
Sigma 0.094 0.025 3.784 0.0002 
Sharpe 0.166 0.008 20.010 0.0000 
Mean=0 
RFund-RPPB 0.254 0.013 19.485 0.0000 
M2 0.260 0.011 23.431 0.0000 
Equity  
Difference in Means=0 
Return 0.169 0.019 8.877 0.0000 
Sigma 0.160 0.021 7.522 0.0000 
Sharpe 0.047 0.003 13.702 0.0000 
Mean=0 
RFund-RPPB 0.169 0.005 31.641 0.0000 
M2 0.223 0.005 43.465 0.0000 
Emerging Equity  
Difference in Means=0 
Return 0.109 0.178 0.611 0.5414 
Sigma -0.118 0.140 -0.843 0.3993 
Sharpe 0.040 0.022 1.826 0.0681 
Mean=0 
RFund-RPPB 0.109 0.032 3.412 0.0007 
M2 0.292 0.033 8.844 0.0000 
International Equity  
Difference in Means=0 
Return 0.154 0.024 6.482 0.0000 
Sigma 0.150 0.029 5.196 0.0000 
Sharpe 0.036 0.004 8.702 0.0000 
Mean=0 
RFund-RPPB 0.154 0.007 21.067 0.0000 
M2 0.195 0.007 27.762 0.0000 
UK Equity  
Difference in Means=0 
Return 0.194 0.030 6.506 0.0000 
Sigma 0.195 0.028 6.863 0.0000 
Sharpe 0.061 0.006 10.612 0.0000 
Mean=0 
RFund-RPPB 0.194 0.008 24.132 0.0000 
M2
 
0.256 0.008 33.275 0.0000 
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3.3. Regression analysis 
 
This part starts with a definition of the explanatory variables that are used in the regression 
analysis and describes the expected outcomes for each variable. It continues with a discussion 
of the technical issues that arise from the dataset structure and the methods used to correct 
them. This part concludes with a detailed description of the regression results.  
 
In the first instance, the three fund performance measures are regressed on only the constant. 
The purpose for this is to test the significance of the average performance with more robust 
standard errors and get a confirmation of what the descriptive analysis has shown. This 
specification is extended to include explanatory variables as required in order to test the 
stated hypothesis and also variables that been shown by previous literature to have had an 
effect on performance. These are described in the following section. 
 
3.3.1. Explanatory variables 
 
Fund Age 
The age of fund i at year t is the principal explanatory variable (      ). It is a continuous 
variable measured in years elapsed from the day of the fund’s inception till the 31st December 
of each calendar year in the sample. It takes only values larger than zero. The regressions are 
run on the following functions of fund age:  
 (      )  
{
 
 
 
 
      
            
√      
 
√      
 
 
For the logarithmic function age is scaled by adding 1 to each observation. If the stated 
hypothesis is true then fund performance has a convex relationship with fund’s age where 
there is high performance at the start which settles down at a lower level as age increases. 
This implies that the sign in front of           will be negative for all functions. Because the 
shape of the relationship is predicted to be convex, the linear function is expected to have a 
worse fit than the other functions as it implies that performance decreases at a constant rate 
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the older the fund gets. Additionally, dummies are created that represent the fund’s year of 
operation and they are used as an alternative measure for fund’s age. The dummy for the first 
year of operation equals 1 if funds have been in operation for at least six months by the end 
of the corresponding calendar year. All subsequent operation year dummies are defined based 
on the first one. Dummies for each of the first ten years of operation are included in the 
regressions, i.e.                                                                                 . 
There is a last dummy which equals 1 for operation year being 11 or more and this is left out 
for multicollinearity reasons. In particular, 86% of the funds do not have more than ten years 
in operation and, therefore, adding operational year dummies beyond the 10 year cut-off 
point increases multicollinearity substantially. 
 
Market Conditions 
The question of market conditions is approached in several ways in past literature. Research 
on fund performance focuses primarily on fund managers’ timing skills, i.e. shifting the 
portfolio allocation to take advantage of a changing market environment (e.g. Treynor and 
Mazuy, 1966; Henriksson, 1984; Kao et al., 1998; Cuthbertson et al., 2008) or on ways to 
‘condition’ the single-index alpha and beta parameters with variables relating to market 
conditions such as dividend yields and interest rates (e.g. Ferson and Warther, 1996; Otten 
and Bams, 2002; Cuthbertson et al., 2008). Another strand of work distinguishes explicitly 
between bearish and bullish periods when assessing performance using the CAPM or the 
APT (e.g. Fabozzi and Francis, 1977 and 1979; Capocci et al., 2005; Hibbert and Lawrence, 
2010) and finds very little difference in the performance during these periods. However, 
Klein and Rosenfeld (1987) demonstrate that performance is upwards biased during a bull 
market and downwards during a bear market. They also show that this bias doesn’t appear 
when performance is measured using a single-index model such as CAPM. This suggests that 
since the performance measures in this analysis are calculated outside the CAPM-APT 
framework controlling for market conditions may be important. 
 
Controlling for market conditions presupposes the identification of the appropriate ‘market’. 
As there is no detailed information on the exact portfolio allocation of each fund, the PPB is 
considered as a proxy of the market in which the fund invests most of its assets. 
Subsequently, the factors that characterise a bear and a bull market need to be formalised. 
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Early work defines bull and bear periods by the sign of the market index return where a 
positive return would signify a bull market and a negative return a bear market (Fabozzi and 
Francis, 1977). This method is implemented in similar ways in later work (e.g. Klein and 
Rosenfeld, 1987; Chordia et al., 2001; Hibbert and Lawrence, 2010). Additionally, more 
advanced methods are developed to identify bull and bear markets such as the Markov-
switching model (Maheu and McCurdy, 2000; Chen, 2009) or locating turning points in 
composite index returns (Capocci et al., 2005; Gonzalez et al., 2005). After identifying the 
bull and bear periods, researchers also investigate what factors are related to these markets 
such as stock market trading (Chordia et al., 2001), investor sentiment (Baker and Wurgler, 
2007), and macroeconomic factors (Chen, 2009).  
 
Overall, the measures and methods applied in the literature are diverse but they all evolve 
around this common point: during a bear market there are negative returns and above average 
volatility whereas during a bull market there are positive returns and below average volatility. 
This is what characterises a bear and a bull market as it is assumed in Maheu and McCurdy 
(2000) and confirmed in different ways in Chen (2009) and it is what is applied here. Since 
the PPB is identified as the ‘market’, its return and volatility are used to express a bear and a 
bull market. As such, the PPB bear market dummy equals 1 if the average monthly return of 
the PPB of fund i is negative in year t and the PPB sigma for that year is above the average of 
all this PPB’s sigmas in the period 1980-2009 (       ). The PPB bull market dummy equals 
1 where the PPB return is positive and the PPB sigma is below the 1980-2009 average 
(        ). These two dummies are included in the regression both as part of the constant and 
as an interaction with the age function. It should be noted that there is a third ‘normal’ state 
that is neither bull nor bear and it is represented by the constant itself. 
 
Provider Characteristics 
A relatively recent development in fund performance literature is a shift in the focus from the 
fund to the ‘fund family’ and its characteristics (e.g. for US mutual funds see Massa, 2003; 
Chen et al., 2004; Nanda et al., 2004; Khorana and Servaes, 2011). The existence of a ‘star’ 
fund within a family and its positive spillover effects on other funds within the same family is 
one of the main themes in this work (Nanda et al., 2004). This effect implies that families 
allocate resources in a way that promotes the creation of a star fund which is perceived to be 
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easier for larger families (Guedj and Papastaikoudi, 2003; Nanda et al., 2004). Another theme 
relates to how investors perceive funds and the main argument is that they consider both fund 
and fund family properties when making their investment choice. As such, families that are 
not good performers can use other means to appeal to investors such as product variety and 
market presence (Massa et al., 2003; Nanda et al., 2004). In line with this argument, the 
model controls for provider characteristics, such as size, market share, product variation, and 
provider age. 
 
Provider’s Size  
Fund family size is argued to be positively related to fund performance due to economies of 
scale and the resources that are available to larger families (Chen et al., 2004).  On the other 
hand, if size becomes more important than past performance in attracting investors, then 
families may stop prioritizing performance (Massa, 2003). Therefore, family size can also 
have an adverse effect on performance. The related literature uses assets under management 
as a proxy of family size but since this information is not available for this sample, the 
provider’s size is approximated by the number of funds under operation at year-end. This 
includes all types of funds offered by the provider independently of investment style. The 
first lag of the variable is used in the regression and it is measured in 100’s of funds 
(         ). 
 
Market Share in ABI Sector 
Market share is somewhat related to provider’s size in the sense that it can have a positive 
effect on fund performance due to economies of scale. There relate to the accumulated 
knowledge and understanding for the particular ABI sector which are expected to have a 
positive effect on fund performance. Nevertheless, a too large market share implies a 
potential lack of competition within an investment style. In the absence of this competition 
there may be fewer incentives to outperform. Moreover, a provider dominating the market 
may eventually trace the corresponding market index. Assuming that this market index is 
more diversified than the fund’s portfolio, the fund will underperform this index on risk-
adjusted terms. Thus, a negative effect on fund performance can also be expected. Market 
share is proxied here by the number of funds within the same ABI sector operated by the 
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same provider expressed as a percentage of the total number of funds within the same ABI 
sector in the market at year-end. The first lag of the variable is used in the regression 
(          ). 
 
ABI Share in Provider 
A wide range of products within a family is found to have negative effects on fund 
performance (Massa, 2003) which suggests that if a provider focuses on a particular style of 
investment better performance is expected. This can be related to the positive impact of 
specialization in a particular asset class. The degree of concentration on one style is measured 
by the share each ABI sector has within a provider’s portfolio of funds. This is proxied by the 
ratio of number of funds with the same ABI sector as fund i operated by the same provider 
over all funds that the provider operates at the end of year t, expressed as a percentage. The 
first lag of the variable is used in the regression (             ). 
 
Provider’s Age 
Provider’s age is used in order to approximate the provider’s experience and status in the 
market (Khorana and Servaes, 2011). There are two possible effects on performance. In line 
with the main hypothesis, given that there is no past information to judge new providers on, 
young providers will need to present strong performance in order to build up their reputation. 
As more information becomes available the effort levels decrease and performance settles 
down at a lower level. Consequently, young providers may outperform older providers. On 
the other hand, older providers may have more experience with different investment styles as 
well as know more about managerial abilities, and so operate funds that perform better than 
funds of younger providers. Therefore, it is possible that older providers score higher 
performance than younger providers. These two effects may cancel each other out or one of 
the two may dominate depending on which one is stronger. Provider’s age is measured as the 
number of years elapsed at year-end since the inception date of the provider’s first fund in the 
market. Due to collinearity issues with the fund’s age and provider’s size this variable is 
broken down into four dummies, each taking the value 1 if the provider is from 0  to  5, 5 to 
10, 10 to 15, and 15 to 20 years old at year-end. It should be noted that these dummies are not 
overlapping. The lower limit is in each case excluded, e.g. if a provider is exactly 5 years old 
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the observation is included in the 0-5 group and not the 5-10 group. The oldest provider 
group (20+) is left out to avoid collinearity with the constant. The notation 
is                                                       .  
 
Interactions 
The model can be extended to include interactive terms between fund’s age and other 
variables. First, fund’s age is interacted with the bear and bull market dummies. Kempf et al. 
(2009) argue that managerial incentives differ during bear and bull markets. The difference 
between these two conditions is based on the expectations for managerial performance. 
Expectations are high during bull markets whereas during bear markets everyone is thought 
to be negatively affected and expectations are lower. This can be interpreted in the following 
way. If managers of young funds are putting in an extra effort under ‘normal’ economic 
conditions then this effort could be lessened in a bear market since poor performance may not 
be judged as harshly. If performance is a convex function of fund’s age under normal 
conditions then it will be less steep under bear market conditions. So the interaction of fund 
age and the bear market dummy is expected to be positive. At the same time, the bar is set 
higher during bull markets and thus, managers of young funds will need to try even harder in 
order to be seen as able as everyone else to exploit the available opportunities. Therefore, the 
relationship between fund performance and fund’s age will be steeper under bull market 
conditions, i.e. the interaction of fund age and the bull market dummy is expected to be 
negative.  
 
The expected signs for these interactions can potentially be reversed. As discussed earlier, 
related literature shows that investors are more sensitive to poor performance the younger the 
fund is. Assuming that more assets are accumulated the older a fund becomes, even a small 
loss of assets can be detrimental for a young fund. Since poor performance and subsequent 
asset withdrawal are more likely to occur under bear market conditions, managers of young 
funds will put even more effort. This implies a steeper connection to fund’s age and a 
negative coefficient for the interaction with the bear market dummy. Similarly, it may be 
easier for a young fund to look good during bull markets so effort can be lower than under 
normal economic conditions. This means a less steep connection to fund’s age and a positive 
coefficient for the interaction with the bull market dummy. 
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Second, fund’s age is interacted with provider’s size to control whether fund performance of 
larger providers has a different relationship to fund’s age than of smaller providers. A 
possible reason for this is the difference in resources available to larger providers. If there is 
increased effort for young funds then larger providers may be more successful in this since 
they can allocate more resources into the management of the fund e.g. more managers, faster 
and wider information collection etc. However, at the same time smaller providers have 
fewer funds to focus their attention on. Therefore, even if they have limited resources they 
can take proportionately more care of a newly opened fund and thus be more successful than 
large providers in making a new fund look good. This means that the interaction of fund’s 
age and provider’s size can have any of the two signs, depending on which effect dominates. 
 
Finally, fund’s age is interacted with each of the provider’s age dummies in order to control 
whether funds of older providers perform differently with age than of younger providers. In 
line with the arguments for provider’s age as a single variable in the regressions its 
interaction with fund’s age can have a twofold effect. First, younger providers may try harder 
than older providers in order to build up their reputation so the performance of newly opened 
funds is expected to be higher for younger providers. On the other hand, providers 
accumulate experience and information the longer they have operated in the market. 
Consequently, older providers may be in a better position to judge how to manage the fund’s 
portfolio, how to achieve high returns or ever how to exploit changing market conditions. So 
they can be more successful than younger providers in making a new fund shine. Both these 
effects imply that the interaction of fund’s age and provider’s age is negative. However, the 
first effect predicts the fund’s age interaction with young providers to be more negative than 
that with old providers. The second effect predicts that the interaction with old providers is 
more negative than that with young providers. Again, depending on which effect is stronger, 
one of the two should be observed unless they cancel each other out. 
 
Regulatory Shocks 
Two additional variables are included in the model that control for regulatory shocks in this 
pension sector. As described in Chapter 2, the introduction of personal pension plans in 1988 
and of stakeholder pension schemes in 2001 were two important changes in the industry. Two 
dummies are created, each taking the value 1 for years after 1988 and 2001 accordingly (     
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and     ). The introduction of personal plans may be related to fund performance via market 
demand. Employees opting for personal plans may have preferred contributing to a fund that 
diversifies across asset classes instead of mixing funds specialising in one asset type 
(especially in view of the fees that the latter option would involve). This would imply an 
accumulation of assets for allocation funds which may make the difference in terms of 
performance. A similar result may be expected for fixed income or UK equity funds 
assuming that policyholders would feel ‘safer’ with this type of investment instead of e.g. 
emerging equity. The introduction of stakeholder schemes may have affected the 
performance of some fund types due to characteristics of such schemes. In particular, 
stakeholder schemes are characterised by restricted fees. If the investment style of a fund 
calls for costly information gathering or high transaction costs then an upper limit for fees 
means that managers are paid less for their effort. Thus, they may have fewer incentives to 
continue performing as well for such funds. If such an effect exists, it is expected to appear 
for emerging or international equity funds rather than UK equity or fixed income funds where 
information is (probably) less costly to gather. 
 
To summarize, the regressions start with the constant only in order to assess whether there 
was statistically significant outperformance or underperformance. This serves as a 
confirmation of the results in the descriptive analysis. Then, the functions of fund’s age and 
the provider’s characteristics are added to form specification (2). This is followed by 
specification (3) with market conditions and the two regulatory change dummies. The last 
specification (4) adds all the interaction effects and is as follows
28
: 
 
               
             (      )                                               
                                                                  (      )        
    (      )                                                                           
    (      )            (      )                                  (4) 
                                                          
28
  Note that specification (4) is carried out with all fund’s age functions but not with the operation year 
dummies. The reason for this is the increase in multicollinearity when each operation year dummy is interacted 
with the provider’s age and size as well as the market condition dummies. 
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Summary statistics for the individual explanatory variables (excluding the interactive terms) 
for all samples are provided in Appendix D in the columns under ‘Unrestricted’. 
 
3.3.2. Technical issues 
 
One potential estimation problem is collinearity among the independent variables. Although 
OLS estimates remain unbiased – if other factors allow it – their variance can increase and 
affect their significance (Belsley, Kuh, and Welsch, 2004). For the chosen specifications, 
there is potential for high correlation particularly between the two market condition dummies 
as well as between the provider characteristic variables. Tables 3.3.A-G in Appendix E show 
the pairwise correlation coefficients for all variables in specification (3). 
 
Fortunately, none of pairwise correlations has an absolute value of above 0.55. Obviously, 
the fund’s age functions are highly correlated but this is not an issue given they are used 
alternatively. For all samples except fixed income funds the bear and the bull market 
dummies have a negative correlation that ranges circa between -0.45 and -0.55. This is 
expected as they represent ‘opposite’ market states. Provider size is positively correlated with 
the stakeholder dummy with a coefficient of about 0.45. This is not surprising as the longer a 
provider exists the more funds are opened and accumulated, especially by the end of the 
sample period where the stakeholder dummy equals one (after 2001). Understandably, 
provider size is also correlated with market share (particularly when at the same time other 
providers are opening funds with the same investment style).  
 
Although correlations of about 0.5 are not remarkably high more advanced collinearity 
diagnostics are calculated. There are several parameters that can be calculated for this 
purpose, the main ones being the variance inflation factor (VIF), the condition number and 
the determinant of the correlation matrix of the explanatory variables. The VIF essentially 
shows to what degree the variance of the estimated coefficients is affected by collinearity. 
The condition number and the determinant of the correlation matrix indicate whether the 
coefficients can be estimated – which is not possible in case of perfect collinearity. There are 
no set thresholds of acceptable values, however, collinearity can be a problem when the mean 
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VIF is above 10, the condition number above 30, and the determinant close to zero (Belsley, 
Kuh, and Welsch, 2004). The values of these parameters for each of the samples are 
summarized in Table 3.4 with and without the interaction terms for specifications (3) and (4). 
Despite the correlation between provider size and the other variables as well as the market 
condition dummies, there is no collinearity when the interaction terms are not taken into 
account. This changes naturally when the interaction terms are included. The determinants 
are very close to zero (they appear as 0 due to rounding) and the condition numbers do not 
exceed 40 except for the allocation funds sample. Nevertheless, the coefficients can still be 
estimated. Moreover, none of the condition numbers is above 100, a range where collinearity 
is considered to significantly impair hypothesis testing. 
 
Table 3.4. Collinearity diagnostics for specifications (3) and (4), i.e. with and without interaction terms for all 
samples. 
Collinearity Diagnostics* 
 
Sample Specification Mean VIF Condition No Determinant 
All Funds 
(3) 1.28 31.690 0.2468 
(4) 3.33 34.879 0.0000 
Allocation  
(3) 1.46 75.509 0.1294 
(4) 4.03 83.362 0.0000 
Fixed Income  
(3) 1.37 24.593 0.1409 
(4) 3.38 27.331 0.0000 
Equity  
(3) 1.32 34.295 0.2188 
(4) 3.45 37.754 0.0000 
Emerging Equity  
(3) 1.55 17.836 0.1208 
(4) 4.71 20.997 0.0000 
International Equity  
(3) 1.38 36.220 0.1817 
(4) 3.60 40.339 0.0000 
UK Equity  
(3) 1.36 32.251 0.1850 
(4) 3.40 35.326 0.0000 
*With   (      )         . Other age functions and provider age dummies produce very similar results. 
 
 
The next technical issues relate to the panel structure of the sample. The first one to be 
addressed is testing for unit effects (Wooldridge, 2002). When unobserved unit effects are 
present in a panel the OLS estimator is biased and inconsistent. However, there are panel 
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estimation methods that deal with this and their main difference relates to the correlation 
between the unit effects and the explanatory variables. Random effects estimation assumes 
that there is no correlation, whereas fixed effects estimation allows for it. If there is such 
correlation the random effects estimator is inconsistent. There is a method developed by 
Hausman (1978) which tests whether there is a systematic difference between the estimated 
coefficients of the random and fixed effects estimation. The Hausman test results are similar 
across different specifications and samples so for brevity reasons only those for the all-fund 
sample are presented here. Table 3.5 has the results of specification (4) with the linear age 
function. The Hausman null hypothesis that there is no systematic difference between the 
random and the fixed effect coefficients is strongly rejected. This difference is obvious by 
simple comparison as well therefore subsequent panel regressions are done with fund fixed 
effects. 
 
The next problem concerns the estimated standard errors. Tests need to be carried out to 
ascertain the properties of the residuals and, in particular, test for homoscedasticity and 
correlation. Table 3.6 summarizes the regression results along with the diagnostic tests for 
specification (4). First, a simple fixed effects regression is shown (column ‘FE’), then a fixed 
effects regression with clustering by fund to control for heteroscedasticity (column ‘FE 
cluster’) is presented, and last are the results for a fixed effects regression with standard 
errors which are robust to heteroscedasticity, autocorrelation, and spatial correlation (column 
‘FE Hoechle’). 
 
Group-wise heteroscedasticity is tested using the Lagrange multiplier method (Baum, 2001) 
with null hypothesis that of homoscedasticity. The chi-squared statistics of this test are 
strongly significant therefore heteroscedasticity is present. Autocorrelation is tested using the 
Wooldridge method (Drukker, 2003) with null hypothesis that there is no first-order 
autocorrelation. The Wooldridge F-statistic is also highly significant so there is also 
autocorrelation. This is also the case when standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity as 
well (see ‘FE cluster’ column).  
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Apart from autocorrelation, another form of correlation might also be present, namely spatial 
correlation. This appears when there is correlation between the cross-sections of the panel 
(Wooldridge, 2002). There are methods to test for it (Hoyos and Sarafidis, 2006) but these 
cannot be carried out due to capacity constraints as the panel is unbalanced and there are too 
many cross-sections. Nevertheless, spatial correlation is considered common for panels with 
much more cross-sections than time periods – as is the case here – therefore the regressions 
are estimated again, this time using the Hoechle (2007) method which calculates Driscoll-
Kraay standard errors (Driscoll and Kraay, 1998) for balanced and unbalanced panels. This 
method produces standard errors that are robust to heteroscedasticity, autocorrelation, and 
spatial correlation. These standard errors in column ‘FE Hoechle’ are considerably higher 
than those of simple and clustered robust fixed effects implying the presence of all three 
properties in the residuals. The Hoechle method with fund fixed effects is applied for all 
subsequent regression analysis in this chapter. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
68 
 
Table 3.5. Panel regression results and Hausman test for specification (4). All-funds sample. The PPB is the 
benchmark. The panel observations have a yearly frequency. The specification includes the linear age function. 
P-values are in parentheses (* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01). 
 
 
Sharpe RFund-RPPB M2 
 
Random Fixed Random Fixed Random Fixed 
Constant 0.0303 0.0881*** 0.1504*** -0.0231 0.1575*** 0.1285** 
 
(0.136) (0.001) (0.003) (0.740) (0.002) (0.042) 
        -0.0019** 0.0005 -0.0020 -0.0061 -0.0040* 0.0035 
 
(0.018) (0.731) (0.331) (0.107) (0.060) (0.314) 
         -0.5567*** -0.5549*** -0.0421** 0.0220 -0.1361*** -0.0760*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.028) (0.293) (0.000) (0.000) 
         0.0689*** 0.0938*** 0.0213 0.0918*** -0.2113*** -0.1365*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.212) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
           0.0222*** 0.0408*** 0.0178*** 0.0688*** 0.0473*** 0.0693*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
            -0.0019*** -0.0004 0.0005 0.0036** -0.0043*** -0.0008 
 
(0.000) (0.538) (0.560) (0.037) (0.000) (0.588) 
               0.0040*** 0.0004 0.0010 0.0123*** 0.0047*** 0.0148*** 
 
(0.000) (0.745) (0.336) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
         0.0680** -0.1449*** -0.1032 -0.3797*** 0.1723** -0.1201 
 (0.031) (0.004) (0.191) (0.005) (0.026) (0.325) 
         0.1221*** -0.0235 -0.0345 -0.4613*** 0.2129*** -0.2081*** 
 (0.000) (0.420) (0.490) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) 
          -0.0213 -0.0510** -0.0849** -0.2680*** -0.0443 -0.1376*** 
 (0.204) (0.020) (0.042) (0.000) (0.287) (0.009) 
          0.0265* 0.0081 0.0535 -0.0439 0.0583* 0.0226 
 (0.051) (0.605) (0.113) (0.292) (0.076) (0.551) 
                0.0053 0.0444*** 0.0757** 0.1016*** 0.0040 0.0563* 
 (0.664) (0.001) (0.014) (0.006) (0.890) (0.093) 
                -0.0097** 0.0054 0.0035 0.0381*** -0.0302*** 0.0199* 
 (0.019) (0.255) (0.736) (0.003) (0.002) (0.083) 
                 0.0086*** 0.0078*** 0.0157*** 0.0184*** 0.0151*** 0.0167*** 
 (0.000) (0.002) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
                 0.0020 0.0013 -0.0009 -0.0013 0.0010 -0.0008 
 (0.151) (0.394) (0.789) (0.751) (0.766) (0.834) 
                 -0.0009*** -0.0014*** -0.0008** -0.0026*** -0.0013*** -0.0021*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.021) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
              0.0062*** 0.0046*** 0.0090*** 0.0053** 0.0094*** 0.0055*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.017) (0.000) (0.006) 
              -0.0013* -0.0030*** -0.0002 -0.0038** 0.0040** -0.0006 
 (0.060) (0.000) (0.928) (0.043) (0.013) (0.720) 
     0.0070 -0.0656*** -0.0054 -0.0419 0.0285 -0.1115** 
 (0.702) (0.001) (0.905) (0.433) (0.509) (0.022) 
     0.0217*** -0.0229** -0.0377** -0.0511* 0.0084 -0.0687*** 
 
(0.003) (0.027) (0.034) (0.064) (0.646) (0.006) 
R2 overall 0.3025 0.2804 0.0035 0.0017 0.0293 0.0184 
R2 within 0.3962 0.4006 0.0048 0.0094 0.0202 0.0249 
Wald/F-stat 14402.75 811.33 102.52 11.52 791.4 31.01 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Funds 4897 4897 4897 4897 4897 4897 
Observations 28408 28408 28408 28408 28408 28408 
Hausman 302.21 200.63 270.96 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
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Table 3.6. Panel regression results for the all-funds sample  with heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation tests for specification (4). The 
PPB is the benchmark. The panel observations have a yearly frequency. The specification includes the linear age function. Standard 
errors are in parentheses (* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01). 
  Sharpe   RFund-RPPB   M2  
 
FE FE cluster FE Hoechle FE FE cluster FE Hoechle FE FE cluster FE Hoechle 
Constant 0.0881*** 0.0881*** 0.0881 -0.0231 -0.0231 -0.0231 0.1285** 0.1285 0.1285 
 
(0.0262) (0.0246) (0.0979) (0.0697) (0.0941) (0.3325) (0.0632) (0.0821) (0.2648) 
        0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 -0.0061 -0.0061* -0.0061 0.0035 0.0035 0.0035 
 
(0.0014) (0.0019) (0.0102) (0.0038) (0.0032) (0.0102) (0.0034) (0.0036) (0.0107) 
         -0.5549*** -0.5549*** -0.5549*** 0.0220 0.0220 0.0220 -0.0760*** -0.0760*** -0.0760 
 
(0.0079) (0.0089) (0.0684) (0.0209) (0.0288) (0.0460) (0.0190) (0.0241) (0.0687) 
         0.0938*** 0.0938*** 0.0938 0.0918*** 0.0918*** 0.0918 -0.1365*** -0.1365*** -0.1365* 
 
(0.0075) (0.0098) (0.0664) (0.0198) (0.0226) (0.0839) (0.0180) (0.0223) (0.0780) 
           0.0408*** 0.0408*** 0.0408** 0.0688*** 0.0688*** 0.0688* 0.0693*** 0.0693*** 0.0693* 
 
(0.0029) (0.0037) (0.0198) (0.0078) (0.0084) (0.0349) (0.0070) (0.0087) (0.0360) 
            -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0004 0.0036** 0.0036 0.0036 -0.0008 -0.0008 -0.0008 
 
(0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0022) (0.0017) (0.0022) (0.0028) (0.0016) (0.0019) (0.0033) 
               0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0.0123*** 0.0123*** 0.0123*** 0.0148*** 0.0148*** 0.0148** 
 
(0.0011) (0.0012) (0.0027) (0.0030) (0.0045) (0.0042) (0.0028) (0.0042) (0.0071) 
         -0.1449*** -0.1449*** -0.1449 -0.3797*** -0.3797** -0.3797 -0.1201 -0.1201 -0.1201 
 
(0.0506) (0.0497) (0.1222) (0.1345) (0.1755) (0.2782) (0.1220) (0.1545) (0.2656) 
         -0.0235 -0.0235 -0.0235 -0.4613*** -0.4613*** -0.4613*** -0.2081*** -0.2081** -0.2081 
 (0.0292) (0.0298) (0.0787) (0.0776) (0.0935) (0.1462) (0.0703) (0.0956) (0.1427) 
          -0.0510** -0.0510** -0.0510 -0.2680*** -0.2680*** -0.2680** -0.1376*** -0.1376** -0.1376 
 (0.0219) (0.0247) (0.0791) (0.0583) (0.0583) (0.1205) (0.0529) (0.0569) (0.1171) 
          0.0081 0.0081 0.0081 -0.0439 -0.0439 -0.0439 0.0226 0.0226 0.0226 
 (0.0157) (0.0172) (0.0479) (0.0417) (0.0336) (0.0739) (0.0379) (0.0365) (0.0565) 
                0.0444*** 0.0444*** 0.0444 0.1016*** 0.1016** 0.1016 0.0563* 0.0563 0.0563 
 (0.0139) (0.0130) (0.0274) (0.0369) (0.0471) (0.0668) (0.0335) (0.0404) (0.0485) 
                0.0054 0.0054 0.0054 0.0381*** 0.0381** 0.0381** 0.0199* 0.0199 0.0199 
 (0.0048) (0.0052) (0.0090) (0.0126) (0.0165) (0.0167) (0.0115) (0.0169) (0.0168) 
                 0.0078*** 0.0078*** 0.0078 0.0184*** 0.0184*** 0.0184** 0.0167*** 0.0167*** 0.0167* 
 (0.0025) (0.0027) (0.0046) (0.0067) (0.0063) (0.0081) (0.0061) (0.0063) (0.0091) 
                 0.0013 0.0013 0.0013 -0.0013 -0.0013 -0.0013 -0.0008 -0.0008 -0.0008 
 (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0030) (0.0041) (0.0030) (0.0042) (0.0037) (0.0032) (0.0029) 
                 -0.0014*** -0.0014*** -0.0014*** -0.0026*** -0.0026*** -0.0026** -0.0021*** -0.0021*** -0.0021** 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0012) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0010) 
              0.0046*** 0.0046*** 0.0046 0.0053** 0.0053** 0.0053 0.0055*** 0.0055** 0.0055 
 (0.0008) (0.0010) (0.0034) (0.0022) (0.0025) (0.0034) (0.0020) (0.0022) (0.0043) 
              -0.0030*** -0.0030** -0.0030 -0.0038** -0.0038** -0.0038 -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0006 
 (0.0007) (0.0012) (0.0030) (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0045) (0.0017) (0.0018) (0.0046) 
     -0.0656*** -0.0656*** -0.0656 -0.0419 -0.0419 -0.0419 -0.1115** -0.1115* -0.1115 
 (0.0201) (0.0197) (0.0868) (0.0535) (0.0736) (0.2777) (0.0485) (0.0653) (0.1950) 
     -0.0229** -0.0229** -0.0229 -0.0511* -0.0511* -0.0511 -0.0687*** -0.0687*** -0.0687 
 (0.0104) (0.0109) (0.0887) (0.0276) (0.0268) (0.1173) (0.0250) (0.0253) (0.1142) 
R2 within 0.4006 0.4006 0.4006 0.0094 0.0094 0.0094 0.0249 0.0249 0.0249 
F-statistic 811.33 1541.03 109.56 11.52 9.37 35.82 31.01 26.39 71.71 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Wooldridge F-stat. 413.847 413.847 
 
77.943 77.943 
 
11.749 11.749 
 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 
 
0.0000 0.0000 
 
0.0006 0.0006 
 
Wald Chi2 2.30E+36 
  
3.20E+38 
  
1.40E+37 
  
p-value 0.0000 
  
0.0000 
  
0.0000 
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3.3.3. Results with the PPB as benchmark 
 
In the first instance, fund performance measures are regressed on only the constant. This 
method estimates the average performance across all funds in each sample but more 
importantly it assesses the performance’s significance with corrected standard errors 
(Driscoll-Kraay) and estimates (fund fixed effects). This type of regression does not explain 
any of the variance of the dependent variable and thus, R
2
-within is 0 and the F-test for the 
significance of the regression cannot be calculated. Table 3.7 shows the estimated 
coefficients for the constant, the number of funds and observations in each sample.  
 
Table 3.7. The estimated constant coefficient for specification (1), sorted by sample and performance measure. 
The R
2
-within is in all cases 0 and the F-test for the significance of the regression is not applicable. The 
benchmark is the PPB and the panel has the yearly structure. The results are obtained using Driscoll-Kraay 
standard errors and fund fixed effects. P-values are in parentheses (* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01). 
 
 
Constant Coefficient 
   
Sample Sharpe RFund-RPPB M2 Funds Obs. 
All Funds 0.0381 0.1775*** 0.2216*** 4909 28586 
(0.597) (0.000) (0.000) 
Allocation  0.0800 0.2049*** 0.2873*** 320 1579 
(0.464) (0.007) (0.003) 
Fixed Income  0.0009 0.2536*** 0.2596*** 705 4380 
(0.989) (0.004) (0.000) 
Equity  0.0655 0.1688*** 0.2235*** 3571 21072 
(0.405) (0.000) (0.000) 
Emerging Equity  0.2049* 0.1087* 0.2919* 183 714 
(0.067) (0.068) (0.087) 
International 
Equity  
0.0490 0.1538*** 0.1946*** 1892 11611 
(0.398) (0.001) (0.007) 
UK Equity  0.0760 0.1937*** 0.2562*** 1496 8747 
(0.479) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
 
The most striking result is that although funds are found to significantly outperform their 
PPBs their average Sharpe ratio is not significantly different from 0. The only notable 
exception is the sample of emerging equity funds that manage to have a significantly positive 
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Sharpe ratio at the 10% level. They are also the only sample where the performance against 
the PPB is significantly different from 0 at the 10% significance level whereas all others are 
significant at the 1% level. This is in line with the t-test results in the descriptive analysis, 
where the mean difference-in-returns and M2 of emerging equity funds are not significantly 
different from 0. Generally, Table 3.7 confirms Table 3.2 and, in particular, that the M2 risk-
adjusted performance is higher than the difference-in-returns performance. As explained 
earlier, this is due to the fact that the difference between fund risk and PPB risk is smaller 
than the difference between fund return and PPB return so that on risk-adjusted terms funds 
perform better than their PPBs. Note that all effects discussed below will refer to annualised 
performance. For example, since the observations are based on average monthly returns an 
outperformance of 0.1775% in the all-funds sample implies an annualised outperformance of 
2.15%. The risk-adjusted outperformance of 0.2216% is approximately 2.7% in annualised 
terms.  
 
Out of the three large samples, the equity funds perform worse against their PPBs than the 
allocation and the fixed income funds. Still the differences are not more than 0.7%. Fixed 
income funds have the highest difference-in-returns outperformance at a level of 3% whereas 
allocation funds have the highest M2 measure at around 3.5%. Among the equity sub-
samples, UK equity funds have the highest difference-in-returns outperformance at almost 
2.4% whereas emerging equity funds have the highest M2 at 3.54%.  
 
Although these results look very positive, particularly in comparison to the poor performance 
that previous research finds, one fact should be noted. Funds significantly outperform their 
PPBs but they do not have a significantly positive Sharpe ratio. This implies that there may 
be some benchmark selection issues, i.e. funds’ portfolios tend to be diversified in a wider 
class of assets than those included in the chosen benchmarks to give a high probability of 
showing outperformance over the chosen benchmarks. This argument is consistent with the 
fact that when returns on portfolios were run against returns on their benchmarks (CAPM 
regressions) the estimated betas were consistently significantly lower than 1. This brings us 
back to the argument discussed earlier in Section 3.2.1 why a CAPM-like analysis is not 
suitable: given that portfolios contain assets from outside their benchmarks, benchmarks 
cannot serve as proxies for the market portfolios.  
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Tables 3.8.A-G report the regression results for specifications (2) to (4) using all available 
observations and the square root age function.
29
 Table 3.8.A shows the estimation results for 
the all-funds sample and Tables 3.8.B-G show the estimation results for the subsamples of 
individual investment styles (i.e., allocation, fixed income, equity, emerging equity, 
international equity, and UK equity funds). Given that the results obtained for the individual 
investment styles samples differ significantly from each other, Tables 3.8.B-G are of main 
concern. However, for the completeness of the analysis the results for the all-funds sample 
(Table 3.8.A) are presented as well. 
 
Before the explanatory power of the independent variables is discussed in detail it should be 
noted that there is no age function that provides the best fit across all specifications, although 
the explanatory power of the linear function regressions is in most cases the lowest one. The 
significance of the estimated coefficients is similar across all age functions, which 
strengthens the robustness of the findings. Replacing the fund’s age functions with operation 
year dummies doesn’t reveal any clear pattern except some cases of significant 
underperformance in the first year or outperformance in years 7 to 10 for equity funds. 
Moreover, controlling for market conditions and regulatory shocks improves greatly the 
regressions’ explanatory power as seen from the R-squared and F-test of specifications (2) 
and (3). This improvement is stronger for the regressions with the Sharpe ratio with R-
squared increasing from less than 1% to 40% in the all-funds sample. 
 
There are considerable differences in the factors that explain fund performance across the 
sub-samples but there are some characteristics that are more or less common for all, or at 
least the majority, of the regressions. For instance, the significance of the constant term 
disappears in most cases. The allocation and emerging equity funds are the only styles that 
have significant constants for performance relative to the PPB. However, in contrast with the 
results in Table 3.7 the corresponding constants are negative. These results suggest that the 
independent variables capture characteristics of funds and their providers as well as market 
conditions that explain differences in the performance of investment styles. 
                                                          
29
 The results with the other age functions are reported in Appendix F. Parts F1, F2, and F3 have the results for 
the linear, logarithmic, and cubic root functions. Part F.4 shows the results for the operational year dummies. As 
a reminder, specification (4) is not carried out with these dummies due to the high multicollinearity that is 
created with the inclusion of the interactive terms. 
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The effect of market conditions is another common factor and can be briefly summarised in 
two points. First, the Sharpe ratio is more susceptible to market changes than the performance 
relative to the PPB. This explains the dramatic increase in the Sharpe regressions’ R-squared 
when including the market condition dummies compared to a much more modest increase for 
the difference-in-returns and M2 regressions. Second, performance is affected by the bear 
markets more than it does by the bull markets. In more detail, the Sharpe ratio of all samples 
decreases by about 6 in years with a bear market. Emerging equity funds are worse hit with a 
decrease of 11 whereas fixed income funds are least hit with a decrease of 4.9. Additionally, 
the difference-in-returns is largely unaffected by market conditions but the M2 measure 
seems to decrease in both the bear and the bull markets, particularly for equity funds. The 
results for the Sharpe ratio suggest that the losses incurred in ‘bad’ years are not made up by 
gains in ‘good’ years. Moreover, funds lose relative to their PPBs (in risk-adjusted terms) 
when the PPB market is going through a bull period implying that managers not only lose in 
bear markets but also fail to exploit bull markets. These findings suggest the possibility that 
managers have poor timing skills, which is consistent with previous research.  
 
The provider’s size is positive and significant for all sub-samples except the UK equity funds. 
All three performance measures increase with size concurring with the argument in Chen et 
al. (2004) that larger providers have more resources available to them and can score higher 
fund performance than smaller providers. The effect differs across samples. For example, an 
additional 100 funds within a provider increases the difference-in-returns by about 4.9% for 
emerging equity funds, 3.6% for allocation and fixed income funds but only by 1.09% for 
international equity funds.  The negative sign in the UK equity sample is found for both the 
difference-in-returns and the M2, meaning that they are reduced with increasing size. With 
100 more funds, the difference-in-returns decreases by roughly 0.84% and the M2 by 1.2%. 
According to Massa (2003) this can happen when providers focus more on size than 
performance as means to attract investors.  
 
The provider’s market share in each fund’s ABI sector is insignificant for most samples. It 
has a negative effect on the Sharpe ratio of allocation funds (around -2.4) and on the 
difference-in-returns of emerging equity funds (around -0.12). In both cases the effect is 
rather small but it still indicates a potential lack of competition for these investment styles 
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which may reduce incentives to perform and, consequently, drives down fund performance. 
At the same time, market share has a positive effect on the difference-in-returns performance 
of UK equity funds. Once more, the coefficient is rather low, with the difference-in-returns 
increasing by only about 0.18% if the provider increases his market share in UK equity funds 
by 1%. Still the result is robust and suggests that economies of scale for this investment style 
are created when a provider has many funds of this type in the market relative to other 
providers.  
 
The ABI’s share in the provider’s fund portfolio is also insignificant for several subsamples. 
It positively covaries with the performance of international equity funds with both the 
difference-in-returns and the M2 increasing by about 0.24% with an extra 1% in that style’s 
share. There is also a significantly negative effect on the Sharpe ratio of UK equity funds, 
i.e., if the share of UK equity funds within the provider’s group of funds increases by 1% the 
Sharpe ratio will decrease by 0.17. This indicates that it pays off to specialise in international 
equity but not so for domestic equity. A possible explanation for this is that specialisation 
makes a difference for performance in ‘special’ cases where a lot of information is required 
(such as international markets) but there may be a point where too much specialisation in 
something that is not as ‘special’ (domestic investments) has an adverse effect on 
performance. 
 
Finally, regulatory change has an effect on the performance but for specific investment styles. 
For allocation funds the introduction of personal pension plans has positively affected fund 
performance relative to PPB. Particularly the difference-in-returns is higher by 7.4% in the 
years after the change in regulation. This may be related to the demand for allocation funds, 
i.e. funds that diversify across asset classes may be more desirable that mixing funds that 
invest mainly in one asset type. Thus, the fast accumulation of assets for allocation funds 
post-1988 may have brought about higher performance. At the same time, managers 
anticipating that there would be higher demand for allocation funds may have increased their 
efforts to make such funds look better and exploit further this situation. The introduction of 
stakeholder schemes appears to have increased the Sharpe ratio of UK equity funds by 2.4 
and decreased the performance relative to the PPB for international equity funds by 
approximately the same amount. Both results are consistent with the hypothesis that an 
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introduction of fees’ upper limit may have resulted in managers focusing on investment styles 
that require relatively less information gathering and, therefore, are less costly to run. This 
may well apply here assuming that the international equity markets require more effort than 
the domestic stock market. 
 
Contrary to expectations there is only weak evidence that the fund’s age explains 
performance. Significant coefficients are obtained in very few samples. First, the 
performance relative to the PPB of the fixed income funds has a negative relationship with 
fund’s age, which is consistent with the main hypothesis. A fund that is 5 years old would be 
underperforming a 1-year-old fund by circe 2% whereas a 10-year-old fund would 
underperform the 5-year-old by 1.45%. The other case is the emerging equity sample where 
the Sharpe ratio increases with fund’s age. A 10-year-old fund has a Sharpe ratio that is 
higher by 10 compared to a 5-year-old fund whose Sharpe ratio is in turn higher by 14 than 
that of a 1-year old emerging equity fund. Lastly, there is significance at the 10% for the M2 
measure for emerging and international equity funds. The coefficient is positive at 3.6% and 
circa 1.2% respectively, but its significance is not robust across specifications.  
 
Although these positive coefficients for fund’s age do not correspond to the expected pattern 
they do not necessarily refute the main hypothesis. Bauer et al. (2005) find a similar result 
though in a different context. They study the performance of ethical mutual funds (a style that 
was then considered new) in comparison to that of more “conventional” mutual funds in 
Germany, the US, and the UK. Ethical funds are found to have a significantly lower 
performance than conventional funds after their opening and that this difference gradually 
diminishes. Bauer et al. conclude that ethical funds have a “catching-up phase, possibly due 
to learning”. This argument of funds going through a catching-up phase may also apply here 
and doesn’t exclude the possibility that managers put in more effort at the beginning of the 
fund’s operation than later on. This estimated concave relationship means that performance 
increases fast for a short period and then settles at a higher level. Therefore, it may be that 
more effort is put at the beginning in order to catch up as fast as possible and as the fund 
becomes older there is less effort and performance settles. 
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Apart for the above cases there is no other evidence that fund’s age alone covaries with 
performance, however, the significance of numerous interactive terms suggests that funds’ 
age matters in combination with other factors. For instance, as the coefficients estimated for 
provider’s size are consistently positive (with an exception of the UK equity funds), the 
interaction of fund’s age and size has a consistently negative coefficient (again with the 
exception of the UK equity funds). This seems to suggest that the positive impact of size 
becomes less important as a fund gets older. For example, if one considers the allocation 
funds’ sample and the linear age function it seems that an additional 100 funds would 
increase the difference-in-returns of a 1-year-old allocation fund by 3.6% but that of a 5 and 
10-year old fund would be increased by roughly 2.18% and 1.45% respectively. There is also 
some evidence that older funds underperform less during bear markets (where the interactive 
term of the bear dummy and age is positive and significant), although in the case of the 
allocation funds the effect is opposite. Moreover, the older fixed income funds are the worse 
their performance is during the bull market times. 
 
The age of the providers needs a word of explanation. As with the above discussed factors, it 
seems that the explanatory power of providers’ age also varies among investment styles. 
Without the interactive terms provider’s age seems to matter little for performance. In the 
case of allocation funds, 5 to 10-year-old providers seem to underperform their benchmarks 
relative to the other age groups in the range of 3.6-4.9% (for the difference-in-returns). Fixed 
income funds of providers that are up to 10 years old have a significantly lower M2 of about 
3.6%. Last, 0 to 10-year-old providers of emerging equity funds have a significantly higher 
Sharpe ratio (the 0-5 group outperforms by 9,64 and the 10-15 group by 4.66). However, the 
inclusion of the interactions shows a much different picture. In the most general terms, if 
there is a period of relative underperformance it occurs between 5-15 years of provider’s age 
when funds are compared against their benchmarks. The degree of underperformance 
depends on the investment style, for example for the difference-in-returns 5 to 10-year-old 
providers of international equity funds underperform the others by approximately 11.3% and 
10 to 15 year old providers of UK equity funds underperform by 7.4%. In contrast, the 
youngest providers (0-5) of emerging equity funds show some ability to outperform their 
oldest colleagues by almost 12.7%.  
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The interactive terms of funds’ age and provider’s age show a quite complex picture. For 
each investment style, with an exception of the fixed income funds, there are some significant 
coefficients obtained for the interactive terms indicating that within each provider’s age 
group young funds perform differently than old funds. In the case of the allocation funds the 
performance declines with age so that 0-5 and 15-20 year-old providers overall outperform 
the others by around 14.7% but this outperformance decreases the older their funds become 
(significantly negative interactions). In a similar way, equity funds of 5 to 15 year-old 
providers have a significantly lower difference-in-returns (8.7% for the 5-10 group and 4.9% 
for the 10-15 group) but this underperformance decreases with fund’s age (positive 
interactions). This pattern is also clearly observable for the international and UK equity 
funds. Thus, these middle-aged providers may underperform the others but they slowly catch 
up with them.  
 
These results suggest that the impact of provider’s age has a pattern somewhat consistent 
with the argument behind the main hypothesis, although it is a bit more complicated than a 
simple prediction of the initial superior performance which lapses over time. Indeed, it seems 
that the impact of provider’s age is U-shaped. That is, there is some evidence that the 
youngest providers’ performance is statistically indifferent or even better than the 
performance of the oldest providers while the middle-age providers tend to statistically 
underperform the oldest funds. This pattern appears in different forms for all three investment 
styles, i.e. allocation, fixed income, and equity. One could also argue that this pattern is also 
consistent with the mean-reverting properties of performance. Under the Efficient Market 
Hypothesis it is impossible for a particular agent (or a group of agents) to outperform the 
market in a consistent way. So even if some period is characterised by outperformance, it will 
be followed by a period of underperformance. What is important here, however, is that this 
pattern becomes more obvious once the interactive terms are added, particularly for 
allocation and equity funds.  
 
Overall, the results of specification (4) uncover many details by including the interactive 
terms. For example, the positive effect of provider’s size is confirmed, but it’s interaction 
with fund’s age shows that this positive effect decreases with time. In another case, one can 
observe that for particularly for equity funds middle-aged providers underperform younger 
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and older providers but they catch-up with time (positive interaction with fund’s age). This 
result is not obvious from specifications (2) and (3) where provider’s age seems to makes no 
real difference. Moreover, the interactions with the market dummies imply that funds handle 
bear and bull markets in different ways depending on how old they are (older funds lose less 
in a bear market and gain less in a bull market than young funds). In conclusion, these results 
are more informative than those of the simpler specifications, thus demonstrating the 
importance of including the interactive terms in the regression.   
 
There are, however, some issues that may affect the reliability of these results. First, the 
results concerning provider’s age may be spurious and reflect the fact that older providers 
have more observations of fund performance than younger providers rather than that any 
pattern exists. In order to deal with this issue, the regressions with the interactive terms are 
repeated under the restriction that the fund’s age does not exceed 5 years for all age 
functions. The results for these restricted regressions are shown in Table 3.9.A for the all-
funds, allocation, fixed income, and equity samples and Table 3.9.B shows the corresponding 
results for the three equity sub-samples, i.e. emerging, international, and UK equity. Both 
tables are to be found right below the unrestricted regressions discussed above in Tables 
3.8.A-G. The results with the other age functions are reported in Appendix H. Summary 
statistics for the individual explanatory variables (excluding the interactive terms) for all 
samples under the restriction are provided in Appendix D in the columns under ‘Restricted’. 
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Table 3.8.A. Results for the all-funds sample with           √      . The PPB is the benchmark. The panel 
observations have a yearly frequency. The results are obtained using Driscoll-Kraay standard errors and fund 
fixed effects. P-values are in parentheses (* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01).  
 
Dependent  Sharpe   RFund-RPPB   M2  
Specification (2) (3) (4) (2) (3) (4) (2) (3) (4) 
Constant -0.0584 0.0931 0.0451 -0.0402 0.0355 -0.0337 -0.1713 0.1220 0.0896 
 
(0.786) (0.289) (0.615) (0.730) (0.911) (0.921) (0.335) (0.629) (0.749) 
          -0.0067 0.0285 0.0257 -0.0041 0.0251 0.0022 0.0368 0.0585 0.0408 
 
(0.928) (0.507) (0.629) (0.895) (0.499) (0.965) (0.265) (0.198) (0.508) 
          -0.5296*** -0.5751***   0.0477 -0.0410   -0.0446 -0.1362 
 
  (0.000) (0.000)   (0.256) (0.506)   (0.430) (0.157) 
          0.0677 0.1194*   0.0556 0.1152   -0.1457** -0.1298 
 
  (0.347) (0.094)   (0.362) (0.255)   (0.021) (0.207) 
          0.0148 0.0159 0.0517** 0.0179 0.0219 0.1095** 0.0432* 0.0325 0.0846** 
 
(0.603) (0.249) (0.016) (0.290) (0.239) (0.017) (0.068) (0.142) (0.043) 
           0.0062** 0.0007 -0.0005 0.0070** 0.0061** 0.0031 0.0004 0.0009 -0.0009 
 
(0.026) (0.750) (0.809) (0.024) (0.036) (0.293) (0.919) (0.784) (0.788) 
              0.0014 0.0006 0.0002 0.0142*** 0.0132*** 0.0116*** 0.0155** 0.0148* 0.0138* 
 
(0.675) (0.813) (0.947) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.042) (0.054) (0.067) 
        0.0621 0.0468 -0.1799 0.0997 0.0530 -0.4114 0.2766 0.1402 -0.0588 
 (0.803) (0.659) (0.240) (0.600) (0.752) (0.262) (0.157) (0.458) (0.856) 
         -0.0223 0.0593 0.0090 -0.1684 -0.2052 -0.6459*** 0.0756 -0.0715 -0.2636 
 (0.914) (0.473) (0.947) (0.319) (0.137) (0.008) (0.551) (0.575) (0.278) 
          0.0226 0.0566 -0.0380 -0.0058 -0.0356 -0.3715** 0.1234 0.0389 -0.1629 
 (0.890) (0.414) (0.764) (0.945) (0.671) (0.039) (0.185) (0.677) (0.415) 
          0.0130 0.0561 0.0131 0.0286 0.0039 -0.0561 0.1298* 0.0514 0.0422 
 (0.907) (0.259) (0.871) (0.657) (0.955) (0.622) (0.099) (0.372) (0.602) 
                     0.1379**    0.2924    0.1229 
    (0.048)    (0.104)    (0.290) 
                      0.0208    0.2088***    0.0883 
    (0.700)    (0.010)    (0.313) 
                       0.0311    0.1136**    0.0685 
    (0.345)    (0.018)    (0.246) 
                       0.0117    0.0095    -0.0046 
    (0.581)    (0.740)    (0.829) 
                       -0.0091**    -0.0223**    -0.0134** 
    (0.029)    (0.015)    (0.038) 
                     0.0223    0.0432**    0.0421 
    (0.258)    (0.046)    (0.144) 
                     -0.0192    -0.0215    -0.0049 
    (0.312)    (0.364)    (0.863) 
       -0.0713 -0.0738   -0.0681 -0.0834   -0.1244 -0.1278 
   (0.376) (0.360)   (0.809) (0.764)   (0.531) (0.516) 
       -0.0499 -0.0329   -0.1302 -0.0782   -0.1080 -0.0796 
 
  (0.528) (0.691)   (0.190) (0.464)   (0.308) (0.473) 
R2 within 0.0063 0.3970 0.4008 0.0046 0.0064 0.0106 0.0145 0.0236 0.0256 
F-statistic 1.9464 28.4626 137.3760 2.0905 1.5968 156.8246 1.0329 4.8186 45.6055 
p-value 0.0921 0.0000 0.0000 0.0713 0.1496 0.0000 0.4355 0.0003 0.0000 
Funds 4897 4897 4897 4897 4897 4897 4897 4897 4897 
Observations 28408 28408 28408 28408 28408 28408 28408 28408 28408 
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Table 3.8.B. Results for the allocation funds sample with           √      . The PPB is the benchmark. The 
panel observations have a yearly frequency. The results are obtained using Driscoll-Kraay standard errors and 
fund fixed effects. P-values are in parentheses (* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01).  
 
Dependent  Sharpe   RFund-RPPB   M2  
Specification (2) (3) (4) (2) (3) (4) (2) (3) (4) 
Constant -0.0774 0.0045 -0.1424 0.1262 -0.7888** -1.4234*** -0.1850 -0.5391** -0.7227** 
 
(0.766) (0.975) (0.302) (0.609) (0.010) (0.000) (0.511) (0.018) (0.049) 
          -0.0573 -0.0465 -0.0351 -0.0720 -0.0966 0.0379 0.0542 0.0331 0.1095 
 
(0.576) (0.372) (0.613) (0.313) (0.188) (0.765) (0.431) (0.730) (0.538) 
          -0.6507*** -0.6067***   0.3542*** 0.5966***   -0.0528 -0.0213 
 
  (0.000) (0.000)   (0.002) (0.000)   (0.664) (0.938) 
          -0.0340 -0.0123   0.3045 0.4127*   -0.1011 -0.2102 
 
  (0.770) (0.924)   (0.130) (0.092)   (0.506) (0.457) 
          0.0530 0.0406 0.1346*** 0.0664* 0.1127* 0.3174*** 0.0850** 0.0707 0.0841 
 
(0.301) (0.111) (0.005) (0.090) (0.089) (0.001) (0.035) (0.111) (0.145) 
           -0.0003 -0.0133 -0.0182* -0.0359** -0.0446 -0.0485* -0.0289 -0.0195 -0.0143 
 
(0.982) (0.188) (0.090) (0.019) (0.107) (0.100) (0.118) (0.290) (0.447) 
              0.0109 0.0201 0.0180 0.0293 0.0410 0.0367 0.0229 0.0153 0.0120 
 
(0.628) (0.166) (0.190) (0.413) (0.363) (0.404) (0.475) (0.648) (0.716) 
        0.0116 0.1112 0.4167 -0.2139 -0.1133 1.0310 0.3754 0.4380* 1.1400* 
 (0.971) (0.251) (0.408) (0.311) (0.560) (0.109) (0.101) (0.058) (0.058) 
         -0.0947 0.0971 -0.0892 -0.5308* -0.4171* -0.2715 0.0368 0.1266 0.3298 
 (0.724) (0.429) (0.590) (0.059) (0.091) (0.473) (0.823) (0.450) (0.486) 
          -0.0016 0.0947 -0.1230 0.0084 0.0767 0.6664 0.3253* 0.3417** 1.1597* 
 (0.991) (0.207) (0.555) (0.971) (0.691) (0.245) (0.057) (0.032) (0.074) 
          0.0403 0.0667 0.1875 -0.0438 0.1092 0.7535** 0.2378 0.2398* 1.0435*** 
 (0.823) (0.422) (0.269) (0.720) (0.489) (0.021) (0.106) (0.067) (0.005) 
                     -0.2026    -0.8935**    -0.6822** 
    (0.443)    (0.019)    (0.011) 
                      0.0708    -0.2255    -0.2869 
    (0.412)    (0.343)    (0.269) 
                       0.0553    -0.3592    -0.4432 
    (0.537)    (0.113)    (0.113) 
                       -0.0657    -0.3127***    -0.3642** 
    (0.293)    (0.010)    (0.025) 
                       -0.0261***    -0.0622***    -0.0111 
    (0.001)    (0.000)    (0.550) 
                     -0.0187    -0.1088**    -0.0191 
    (0.235)    (0.036)    (0.834) 
                     -0.0097    -0.0462    0.0464 
    (0.662)    (0.425)    (0.615) 
       0.0009 -0.0082   0.5577 0.6397*   0.3946 0.4994* 
   (0.996) (0.956)   (0.127) (0.054)   (0.168) (0.076) 
       0.1236 0.1593   -0.0602 0.0060   0.1341 0.1225 
 
  (0.315) (0.177)   (0.800) (0.979)   (0.584) (0.604) 
R2 within 0.0251 0.5051 0.5133 0.0189 0.0501 0.0655 0.0432 0.0465 0.0577 
F-statistic 1.1666 47.8421 135.5341 2.7425 24.3894 94.2351 2.1091 5.7026 81.7410 
p-value 0.3600 0.0000 0.0000 0.0277 0.0000 0.0000 0.0773 0.0002 0.0000 
Funds 320 320 320 320 320 320 320 320 320 
Observations 1572 1572 1572 1572 1572 1572 1572 1572 1572 
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Table 3.8.C. Results for the fixed income funds sample with           √      . The PPB is the benchmark. The 
panel observations have a yearly frequency. The results are obtained using Driscoll-Kraay standard errors and 
fund fixed effects. P-values are in parentheses (* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01).  
 
Dependent  Sharpe   RFund-RPPB   M2  
Specification (2) (3) (4) (2) (3) (4) (2) (3) (4) 
Constant -0.0151 -0.0128 -0.1121 0.2215 0.2684 -0.0052 0.3267 0.3189 0.1262 
 
(0.947) (0.940) (0.534) (0.456) (0.513) (0.991) (0.157) (0.160) (0.647) 
          -0.0605 0.0104 0.0115 -0.1534*** -0.1636** -0.1358* -0.1413*** -0.1721*** -0.1526** 
 
(0.248) (0.914) (0.913) (0.009) (0.019) (0.054) (0.005) (0.005) (0.015) 
          -0.2565** -0.4164**   0.1051 -0.0730   0.1980*** 0.1825 
 
  (0.032) (0.012)   (0.371) (0.730)   (0.002) (0.204) 
          0.1294 0.1662   -0.0392 0.1603   -0.0864* 0.0810 
 
  (0.255) (0.181)   (0.512) (0.231)   (0.058) (0.383) 
          0.0401* 0.0556*** 0.1444*** 0.0859** 0.0804** 0.3045** 0.0689** 0.0594* 0.2452** 
 
(0.065) (0.006) (0.003) (0.039) (0.039) (0.047) (0.036) (0.059) (0.017) 
           0.0042* 0.0031 0.0007 0.0017 0.0017 -0.0037 -0.0008 -0.0006 -0.0049 
 
(0.067) (0.214) (0.803) (0.793) (0.789) (0.481) (0.873) (0.908) (0.251) 
              0.0030 -0.0068 -0.0117 0.0301 0.0289 0.0130 0.0174 0.0176 0.0015 
 
(0.867) (0.509) (0.247) (0.257) (0.221) (0.527) (0.320) (0.300) (0.907) 
        -0.2885* -0.1055 -0.4085 -0.1505 -0.2120 -0.4492 -0.1900 -0.2753* -0.8555 
 (0.079) (0.525) (0.166) (0.331) (0.276) (0.493) (0.134) (0.094) (0.167) 
         -0.1669 -0.0229 0.1047 -0.2649 -0.3196 -0.3797 -0.2289** -0.3040** -0.5869** 
 (0.217) (0.860) (0.645) (0.428) (0.192) (0.244) (0.042) (0.013) (0.030) 
          -0.1065 -0.0324 -0.0406 -0.0205 -0.0580 -0.2708 -0.0143 -0.0735 -0.3070 
 (0.211) (0.719) (0.801) (0.836) (0.638) (0.460) (0.873) (0.506) (0.223) 
          -0.0426 0.0211 -0.0049 0.0377 -0.0010 0.0106 0.0505 -0.0200 -0.0050 
 (0.643) (0.805) (0.978) (0.657) (0.983) (0.926) (0.463) (0.673) (0.965) 
                     0.1923    0.1793    0.3762 
    (0.112)    (0.570)    (0.214) 
                      -0.0584    0.0278    0.1249 
    (0.447)    (0.818)    (0.229) 
                       -0.0051    0.0568    0.0658 
    (0.907)    (0.544)    (0.317) 
                       0.0024    -0.0225    -0.0213 
    (0.958)    (0.554)    (0.542) 
                       -0.0238***    -0.0597*    -0.0490** 
    (0.007)    (0.056)    (0.015) 
                     0.0668*    0.0767    0.0098 
    (0.056)    (0.178)    (0.801) 
                     -0.0107    -0.0687**    -0.0589** 
    (0.633)    (0.042)    (0.023) 
       -0.0841 -0.0815   0.0264 0.0022   0.1453 0.1049 
   (0.567) (0.585)   (0.936) (0.995)   (0.325) (0.458) 
       -0.1695 -0.1326   -0.0190 0.0688   -0.0103 0.0668 
 
  (0.363) (0.467)   (0.867) (0.417)   (0.920) (0.443) 
R2 within 0.0149 0.1126 0.1258 0.0171 0.0199 0.0332 0.0163 0.0328 0.0458 
F-statistic 5.6517 10.8576 27.1098 8.1720 9.8363 20.9964 16.6750 8.8053 18.2294 
p-value 0.0003 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Funds 705 705 705 705 705 705 705 705 705 
Observations 4358 4358 4358 4358 4358 4358 4358 4358 4358 
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Table 3.8.D. Results for the equity funds sample with           √      . The PPB is the benchmark. The panel 
observations have a yearly frequency. The results are obtained using Driscoll-Kraay standard errors and fund 
fixed effects. P-values are in parentheses (* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01).  
 
Dependent  Sharpe   RFund-RPPB   M2  
Specification (2) (3) (4) (2) (3) (4) (2) (3) (4) 
Constant -0.0201 0.1443 0.1521 -0.1455 -0.1106 -0.0396 -0.3030* 0.0346 0.0855 
 
(0.931) (0.133) (0.126) (0.234) (0.748) (0.911) (0.076) (0.914) (0.804) 
          -0.0043 0.0130 -0.0076 0.0282 0.0589 0.0133 0.0763* 0.1004** 0.0781 
 
(0.959) (0.704) (0.855) (0.391) (0.109) (0.786) (0.053) (0.038) (0.230) 
          -0.5789*** -0.6423***   -0.0140 -0.1453   -0.0906 -0.1987* 
 
  (0.000) (0.000)   (0.837) (0.166)   (0.177) (0.086) 
          0.0515 0.0423   0.0363 0.0356   -0.1984*** -0.1896 
 
  (0.498) (0.577)   (0.546) (0.710)   (0.005) (0.116) 
          0.0116 0.0092 0.0331* 0.0042 0.0076 0.0449 0.0419** 0.0262 0.0337 
 
(0.668) (0.301) (0.074) (0.749) (0.543) (0.138) (0.040) (0.132) (0.337) 
           0.0108** 0.0024 0.0011 0.0103** 0.0086* 0.0061 -0.0039 -0.0020 -0.0028 
 
(0.029) (0.428) (0.700) (0.031) (0.050) (0.167) (0.482) (0.679) (0.551) 
              -0.0024 -0.0025 -0.0025 0.0187** 0.0189** 0.0183** 0.0214*** 0.0229*** 0.0226*** 
 
(0.643) (0.543) (0.540) (0.015) (0.019) (0.016) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) 
        0.0991 0.0403 -0.1402 0.1500 0.1137 -0.4087 0.4104* 0.2619 0.1600 
 (0.719) (0.666) (0.294) (0.501) (0.578) (0.243) (0.065) (0.179) (0.616) 
         -0.0460 0.0211 -0.0595 -0.1635 -0.1946 -0.7011** 0.1536 -0.0114 -0.1449 
 (0.840) (0.766) (0.600) (0.300) (0.179) (0.018) (0.280) (0.929) (0.607) 
          -0.0011 0.0228 -0.0961 -0.0432 -0.0825 -0.4448** 0.1342 0.0422 -0.1693 
 (0.995) (0.755) (0.446) (0.689) (0.456) (0.042) (0.218) (0.688) (0.476) 
          -0.0153 0.0257 -0.0306 0.0213 -0.0115 -0.0803 0.1699** 0.0716 0.0450 
 (0.895) (0.538) (0.599) (0.780) (0.892) (0.496) (0.035) (0.206) (0.620) 
                     0.1111*    0.3338*    0.0651 
    (0.058)    (0.064)    (0.629) 
                      0.0366    0.2514**    0.0682 
    (0.437)    (0.024)    (0.532) 
                       0.0432    0.1329**    0.0829 
    (0.182)    (0.022)    (0.256) 
                       0.0179    0.0175    0.0072 
    (0.240)    (0.593)    (0.812) 
                       -0.0057    -0.0087    -0.0016 
    (0.123)    (0.226)    (0.826) 
                     0.0286*    0.0596*    0.0478 
    (0.058)    (0.059)    (0.180) 
                     0.0046    0.0017    -0.0030 
    (0.748)    (0.952)    (0.936) 
       -0.0304 -0.0311   0.0102 -0.0181   -0.1375 -0.1474 
   (0.705) (0.696)   (0.972) (0.950)   (0.609) (0.581) 
       0.0036 0.0176   -0.1511 -0.1191   -0.1142 -0.1065 
 
  (0.958) (0.808)   (0.151) (0.292)   (0.305) (0.362) 
R2 within 0.0097 0.5414 0.5439 0.0067 0.0094 0.0132 0.0240 0.0408 0.0424 
F-statistic 1.4904 33.8074 197.2943 1.9858 1.6299 14.9130 2.2555 16.3828 24.8715 
p-value 0.2053 0.0000 0.0000 0.0859 0.1397 0.0000 0.0533 0.0000 0.0000 
Funds 3571 3571 3571 3571 3571 3571 3571 3571 3571 
Observations 20985 20985 20985 20985 20985 20985 20985 20985 20985 
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Table 3.8.E. Results for the emerging equity funds sample with           √      . The PPB is the benchmark. 
The panel observations have a yearly frequency. The results are obtained using Driscoll-Kraay standard errors 
and fund fixed effects. P-values are in parentheses (* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01).  
 
Dependent  Sharpe   RFund-RPPB   M2  
Specification (2) (3) (4) (2) (3) (4) (2) (3) (4) 
Constant -0.5431 -0.2945 -0.2366 -0.5661* -0.3235 -0.9272*** -1.1225** -0.2678 -0.7126*** 
 
(0.107) (0.144) (0.210) (0.076) (0.190) (0.008) (0.013) (0.339) (0.008) 
          0.0669 0.2043*** 0.2041** 0.1078 0.2619 0.2308 0.1563 0.3246* 0.2418 
 
(0.649) (0.005) (0.023) (0.231) (0.140) (0.294) (0.260) (0.082) (0.286) 
          -0.8005*** -0.9028***   -0.0623 -0.1949   -0.4490*** -0.5863*** 
 
  (0.000) (0.000)   (0.365) (0.338)   (0.000) (0.007) 
          0.0623 0.1364**   0.2948 0.5989*   -0.1692 0.0140 
 
  (0.311) (0.028)   (0.123) (0.087)   (0.420) (0.964) 
          0.0869* 0.0223* -0.0154 0.0627** 0.0564** 0.3951*** 0.1730*** 0.1326*** 0.4266*** 
 
(0.066) (0.057) (0.668) (0.016) (0.019) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
           0.0159*** 0.0014 0.0027 0.0063 0.0005 -0.0163* 0.0109 0.0048 -0.0108 
 
(0.004) (0.535) (0.397) (0.263) (0.931) (0.059) (0.154) (0.486) (0.247) 
              -0.0059 0.0252** 0.0269** 0.0325 0.0369 0.0350 0.0431 0.0344 0.0375 
 
(0.595) (0.030) (0.034) (0.333) (0.301) (0.156) (0.230) (0.209) (0.116) 
        0.1928 0.7741*** 0.5966** 0.2638 0.3282 0.9872* 0.3687 0.4643 0.9285 
 (0.600) (0.000) (0.015) (0.681) (0.593) (0.070) (0.667) (0.470) (0.111) 
         -0.2924 0.6208*** -0.5616 -0.4496 -0.1571 -1.9687 0.0057 0.1097 -2.2171 
 (0.525) (0.001) (0.251) (0.435) (0.788) (0.227) (0.994) (0.866) (0.325) 
          -0.3696 0.3810* 0.3442 -0.4955 -0.4250 -0.4109 -0.4990 -0.5385 -1.1060** 
 (0.359) (0.065) (0.148) (0.264) (0.349) (0.533) (0.354) (0.159) (0.022) 
          -0.1586 0.1641 0.1566 -0.3768 -0.4439** -0.4833 -0.2309 -0.5207** -0.6670 
 (0.450) (0.452) (0.641) (0.102) (0.034) (0.238) (0.572) (0.016) (0.178) 
                     0.1990    -0.3489*    -0.0305 
    (0.280)    (0.055)    (0.838) 
                      0.8196**    1.5104    1.8856 
    (0.020)    (0.109)    (0.170) 
                       0.0047    0.1392    0.4102*** 
    (0.929)    (0.596)    (0.007) 
                       -0.0003    0.0281    0.0671 
    (0.997)    (0.885)    (0.769) 
                       0.0108    -0.0962***    -0.0830*** 
    (0.303)    (0.001)    (0.002) 
                     0.0529    0.1238    0.1124 
    (0.321)    (0.187)    (0.316) 
                     -0.0382    -0.1200    -0.0701 
    (0.310)    (0.212)    (0.437) 
                 
             
       0.0281 0.0327   -0.5977 -0.4814   -0.6995 -0.5660 
 
  (0.873) (0.862)   (0.177) (0.164)   (0.172) (0.209) 
R2 within 0.1265 0.7971 0.8066 0.0524 0.0879 0.1400 0.2158 0.2885 0.3311 
F-statistic 18.1536 395.3173 1958863.2088 25.8431 290.2517 358.1669 5.2320 39.8612 12185.6419 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0011 0.0000 0.0000 
Funds 183 183 183 183 183 183 183 183 183 
Observations 713 713 713 713 713 713 713 713 713 
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Table 3.8.F. Results for the international equity funds sample with           √      . The PPB is the 
benchmark. The panel observations have a yearly frequency. The results are obtained using Driscoll-Kraay 
standard errors and fund fixed effects. P-values are in parentheses (* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01).  
 
Dependent  Sharpe   RFund-RPPB   M2  
Specification (2) (3) (4) (2) (3) (4) (2) (3) (4) 
Constant -0.1918 0.0899 0.1002 -0.4424** -0.4974 -0.3790 -0.4864** 0.0097 0.0650 
 
(0.405) (0.401) (0.428) (0.015) (0.144) (0.258) (0.013) (0.975) (0.825) 
          0.0073 0.0383 0.0280 0.0332 0.0726 0.0380 0.0580 0.0997* 0.0959 
 
(0.908) (0.295) (0.569) (0.523) (0.156) (0.550) (0.216) (0.065) (0.161) 
          -0.4435*** -0.4910***   -0.1130 -0.2865   -0.2529** -0.3785*** 
 
  (0.000) (0.000)   (0.430) (0.118)   (0.024) (0.005) 
          0.1173* 0.1226   0.0288 0.0431   -0.2277*** -0.1698* 
 
  (0.081) (0.103)   (0.729) (0.499)   (0.008) (0.052) 
          0.0129 0.0184* 0.0459 0.0270 0.0343** 0.0933** 0.0699** 0.0503*** 0.0815** 
 
(0.564) (0.058) (0.107) (0.216) (0.028) (0.041) (0.011) (0.003) (0.011) 
           0.0082 -0.0017 -0.0044 0.0289* 0.0233* 0.0164 -0.0013 0.0016 -0.0022 
 
(0.367) (0.737) (0.412) (0.062) (0.078) (0.257) (0.931) (0.899) (0.858) 
              0.0171* 0.0061 0.0054 0.0339*** 0.0265** 0.0227** 0.0379*** 0.0272** 0.0246** 
 
(0.059) (0.157) (0.216) (0.004) (0.026) (0.031) (0.004) (0.022) (0.019) 
        0.0857 0.0218 -0.1916 -0.0570 -0.0568 -0.4909 0.2565 0.1355 0.0229 
 (0.702) (0.797) (0.370) (0.840) (0.844) (0.372) (0.304) (0.571) (0.969) 
         -0.0069 0.0289 -0.1059 -0.2129 -0.2360 -0.9094** 0.0732 -0.0743 -0.5513* 
 (0.968) (0.661) (0.436) (0.307) (0.270) (0.018) (0.623) (0.621) (0.087) 
          0.0374 0.0265 -0.0198 0.0053 -0.0518 -0.1685 0.1886 0.0927 0.1548 
 (0.818) (0.711) (0.904) (0.974) (0.750) (0.578) (0.136) (0.416) (0.625) 
          0.0117 0.0128 0.0136 0.0535 -0.0085 -0.0025 0.2065* 0.0849 0.1349 
 (0.907) (0.757) (0.859) (0.681) (0.949) (0.989) (0.077) (0.315) (0.384) 
                     0.1301    0.2768    0.0719 
    (0.185)    (0.287)    (0.794) 
                      0.0622    0.3352**    0.2422* 
    (0.273)    (0.032)    (0.059) 
                       0.0104    0.0237    -0.0408 
    (0.833)    (0.799)    (0.687) 
                       -0.0044    -0.0126    -0.0241 
    (0.844)    (0.820)    (0.580) 
                       -0.0068    -0.0146    -0.0082 
    (0.248)    (0.146)    (0.252) 
                     0.0216    0.0763*    0.0555 
    (0.193)    (0.074)    (0.188) 
                     -0.0009    -0.0036    -0.0215 
    (0.957)    (0.907)    (0.597) 
       -0.0958 -0.1101   0.2563 0.1825   -0.1314 -0.1879 
   (0.322) (0.243)   (0.358) (0.492)   (0.613) (0.448) 
       -0.1098 -0.0982   -0.2576* -0.2268*   -0.1931** -0.1801* 
 
  (0.175) (0.250)   (0.051) (0.098)   (0.038) (0.055) 
R2 within 0.0139 0.4811 0.4838 0.0193 0.0331 0.0387 0.0408 0.0710 0.0755 
F-statistic 5.6639 31.1968 114.8126 3.0648 4.2388 63.5067 3.0532 3.4881 23.8236 
p-value 0.0003 0.0000 0.0000 0.0131 0.0008 0.0000 0.0134 0.0031 0.0000 
Funds 1892 1892 1892 1892 1892 1892 1892 1892 1892 
Observations 11574 11574 11574 11574 11574 11574 11574 11574 11574 
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Table 3.8.G. Results for the UK equity funds sample with           √      . The PPB is the benchmark. The 
panel observations have a yearly frequency. The results are obtained using Driscoll-Kraay standard errors and 
fund fixed effects. P-values are in parentheses (* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01).  
 
Dependent  Sharpe   RFund-RPPB   M2  
Specification (2) (3) (4) (2) (3) (4) (2) (3) (4) 
Constant 0.2031 0.1682 0.1412 0.0637 0.3556 0.4825 -0.0964 0.2157 0.4217 
 
(0.446) (0.180) (0.262) (0.754) (0.445) (0.324) (0.667) (0.607) (0.340) 
          -0.0021 -0.0222 -0.0406 0.0600 0.0656 0.0240 0.1261** 0.1280 0.0950 
 
(0.985) (0.560) (0.287) (0.199) (0.329) (0.768) (0.035) (0.112) (0.313) 
          -0.7358*** -0.7443***   0.1306* 0.0440   0.1496 0.0387 
 
  (0.000) (0.000)   (0.079) (0.614)   (0.278) (0.814) 
          -0.0257 -0.0195   0.0278 -0.0214   -0.1674 -0.2545 
 
  (0.773) (0.807)   (0.785) (0.897)   (0.136) (0.109) 
          0.0028 -0.0051 0.0181 -0.0478*** -0.0480*** -0.0818* -0.0124 -0.0269 -0.1075** 
 
(0.938) (0.685) (0.495) (0.000) (0.005) (0.063) (0.475) (0.227) (0.044) 
           0.0202*** 0.0081* 0.0067 0.0130** 0.0150** 0.0159** -0.0027 0.0048 0.0086 
 
(0.003) (0.072) (0.142) (0.045) (0.032) (0.040) (0.699) (0.490) (0.254) 
              -0.0219 -0.0147** -0.0137** 0.0069 0.0021 0.0037 0.0086 0.0060 0.0058 
 
(0.107) (0.018) (0.025) (0.505) (0.823) (0.696) (0.327) (0.357) (0.405) 
        0.0475 0.0653 -0.0054 0.3823 0.2407 -0.2295 0.5622** 0.4078* 0.4341 
 (0.896) (0.664) (0.968) (0.171) (0.333) (0.515) (0.041) (0.095) (0.188) 
         -0.1462 0.0068 0.0273 -0.0582 -0.1467 -0.0680 0.2352 0.0556 0.5465 
 (0.630) (0.952) (0.875) (0.770) (0.362) (0.817) (0.241) (0.767) (0.124) 
          -0.1037 0.0070 -0.2220** -0.0970 -0.1152 -0.5897*** 0.0247 -0.0496 -0.4546** 
 (0.652) (0.939) (0.044) (0.341) (0.416) (0.001) (0.862) (0.763) (0.048) 
          -0.0732 0.0571 -0.0726 -0.0160 -0.0212 -0.0670 0.1180* 0.0357 0.0103 
 (0.588) (0.323) (0.293) (0.798) (0.716) (0.566) (0.077) (0.579) (0.929) 
                     0.0487    0.2914    -0.0167 
    (0.483)    (0.223)    (0.933) 
                      -0.0081    -0.0388    -0.2321 
    (0.895)    (0.793)    (0.175) 
                       0.0941***    0.1986***    0.1869*** 
    (0.000)    (0.002)    (0.007) 
                       0.0486**    0.0152    0.0138 
    (0.029)    (0.768)    (0.798) 
                       -0.0051    0.0100    0.0217** 
    (0.253)    (0.250)    (0.026) 
                     0.0036    0.0367    0.0445 
    (0.854)    (0.169)    (0.136) 
                     -0.0028    0.0203    0.0344 
    (0.905)    (0.596)    (0.247) 
       0.0922 0.1020   -0.3200 -0.3215   -0.2313 -0.2334 
   (0.348) (0.314)   (0.410) (0.402)   (0.524) (0.516) 
       0.2228** 0.2387**   0.0211 0.0111   0.0020 -0.0335 
 
  (0.023) (0.014)   (0.913) (0.958)   (0.992) (0.865) 
R2 within 0.0216 0.6380 0.6404 0.0113 0.0183 0.0215 0.0104 0.0468 0.0531 
F-statistic 3.2499 57.6860 215.2913 12.3043 24.9774 32.5343 3.2070 15.0936 37.9816 
p-value 0.0096 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0103 0.0000 0.0000 
Funds 1496 1496 1496 1496 1496 1496 1496 1496 1496 
Observations 8698 8698 8698 8698 8698 8698 8698 8698 8698 
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Table 3.9.A. Results for the all-funds, allocation, fixed income, and equity samples with           √      , under the restriction that fund’s age is up to 5 years. The PPB is 
the benchmark. The panel observations have a yearly frequency. The results are obtained using Driscoll-Kraay standard errors and fund fixed effects. P-values are in 
parentheses (* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01). 
Sample All-Funds Allocation Fixed Income Equity 
Dependent Sharpe RFund-RPPB M2 Sharpe RFund-RPPB M2 Sharpe RFund-RPPB M2 Sharpe RFund-RPPB M2 
Constant -0.3844** -0.4065 0.0027 -1.0344*** -2.1569*** -1.3880** -0.5373*** -0.2734 -0.5995 -0.2198 -0.2456 0.1925 
 
(0.015) (0.108) (0.991) (0.004) (0.002) (0.011) (0.009) (0.616) (0.247) (0.114) (0.369) (0.548) 
          0.2908** 0.1540** 0.1835* 0.4806*** 0.8927*** 0.5869* 0.1743 -0.2567* -0.1298 0.2628*** 0.1364 0.1861 
 
(0.012) (0.025) (0.062) (0.007) (0.002) (0.074) (0.296) (0.058) (0.356) (0.008) (0.196) (0.182) 
        -0.3361** -0.2587* -0.3106 -0.2546 0.7648* -0.2650 -0.5636*** -0.9544** -0.3509 -0.3800*** -0.2696 -0.2835 
 
(0.010) (0.051) (0.177) (0.187) (0.088) (0.544) (0.005) (0.024) (0.246) (0.005) (0.102) (0.325) 
        0.7277*** 0.6718** 0.3177 1.0358*** 1.9727*** 0.9224* 0.8268*** 0.6430 0.3917 0.5576*** 0.5082** 0.1004 
 
(0.000) (0.019) (0.233) (0.003) (0.001) (0.052) (0.000) (0.186) (0.285) (0.001) (0.040) (0.716) 
          0.0421** 0.1200** 0.0633 0.1604*** 0.3886*** -0.0628 0.0624 0.2031** 0.2356*** 0.0109 0.0383 0.0216 
 
(0.025) (0.015) (0.221) (0.001) (0.000) (0.644) (0.353) (0.029) (0.002) (0.566) (0.608) (0.731) 
           0.0049 0.0098* 0.0033 -0.0331 -0.0520 0.0238 0.0060 -0.0011 -0.0050 0.0103* 0.0264** 0.0085 
 
(0.143) (0.060) (0.526) (0.244) (0.114) (0.318) (0.112) (0.914) (0.564) (0.099) (0.012) (0.372) 
              -0.0081** 0.0249* 0.0253* 0.0340 0.0248 0.0025 -0.0218 0.0083 0.0331 -0.0119* 0.0261* 0.0262* 
 
(0.043) (0.094) (0.073) (0.160) (0.274) (0.902) (0.254) (0.849) (0.295) (0.061) (0.091) (0.095) 
        -0.1362 -0.4133 -0.0400 0.5231 1.0062 1.2051 -0.2386 -1.9279 -1.2028 -0.0933 -0.4071 0.1603 
 (0.513) (0.348) (0.928) (0.315) (0.361) (0.190) (0.503) (0.140) (0.217) (0.670) (0.288) (0.700) 
         -0.0023 -0.9922*** -0.6131* -0.0968 -1.4120* 0.0803 0.5009* -0.0464 -0.9716 -0.0363 -1.1272*** -0.5901 
 (0.988) (0.005) (0.064) (0.757) (0.055) (0.905) (0.067) (0.966) (0.149) (0.831) (0.001) (0.101) 
          -0.1198 -0.4294** -0.3371 -0.1971 0.5702 0.8669 0.2135 -0.1643 0.1054 -0.1502 -0.6351*** -0.5491* 
 (0.243) (0.016) (0.147) (0.326) (0.360) (0.133) (0.123) (0.610) (0.664) (0.127) (0.008) (0.056) 
          0.1526** -0.3514** -0.0161 0.5659*** 0.9373*** 1.4802*** 0.0915 -0.1884 -0.0109 0.0824 -0.5454*** -0.1511 
 (0.050) (0.020) (0.924) (0.005) (0.007) (0.000) (0.613) (0.296) (0.948) (0.199) (0.006) (0.406) 
                  0.0758 0.2788 0.0519 -0.2827 -1.1260*** -0.8744*** 0.1245 0.2965 0.0989 0.0443 0.4019 0.0663 
 (0.339) (0.309) (0.805) (0.294) (0.000) (0.003) (0.337) (0.429) (0.693) (0.579) (0.180) (0.790) 
                   0.0311 0.5381*** 0.4256** 0.1344 0.1601 -0.0425 -0.1397 -0.5243 0.1535 0.0268 0.6666*** 0.4635** 
 (0.655) (0.007) (0.015) (0.304) (0.650) (0.917) (0.397) (0.477) (0.663) (0.693) (0.001) (0.020) 
                    0.0376 0.1451 0.1101 -0.0115 -0.7502** -0.5462 -0.0228 -0.0460 -0.2467 0.0505 0.2560* 0.2316 
 (0.700) (0.179) (0.508) (0.918) (0.044) (0.203) (0.839) (0.832) (0.304) (0.620) (0.067) (0.239) 
                    -0.1101** 0.2197** 0.0037 -0.2716** -0.3205 -0.6046* -0.0175 0.0601 -0.0761 -0.0774* 0.3221*** 0.0856 
 (0.017) (0.021) (0.973) (0.040) (0.229) (0.068) (0.876) (0.649) (0.482) (0.065) (0.007) (0.424) 
                    -0.0017 -0.0156 -0.0063 -0.0339*** -0.0862** 0.0418 0.0126 0.0061 -0.0425 -0.0008 -0.0018 -0.0038 
 (0.878) (0.593) (0.841) (0.009) (0.037) (0.527) (0.696) (0.868) (0.178) (0.920) (0.957) (0.891) 
                  -0.1193 0.2157*** 0.1744 -0.2093** -0.1296 0.1753 0.1809 0.6830** 0.4174** -0.1368* 0.1564* 0.0971 
 (0.134) (0.003) (0.132) (0.020) (0.551) (0.417) (0.190) (0.023) (0.043) (0.058) (0.060) (0.502) 
                  -0.4062*** -0.3679*** -0.2879** -0.6663*** -0.9835*** -0.6856** -0.4264** -0.3366 -0.2211 -0.3263*** -0.3087** -0.2048 
 (0.001) (0.006) (0.033) (0.007) (0.001) (0.014) (0.018) (0.181) (0.271) (0.004) (0.012) (0.168) 
     -0.0736 -0.0350 -0.2021** 0.0709 0.5087 0.8582*** -0.0614 0.0811 0.3959 -0.0654 -0.0853 -0.3308*** 
 (0.207) (0.808) (0.032) (0.700) (0.192) (0.003) (0.419) (0.755) (0.156) (0.322) (0.550) (0.004) 
     0.0280 -0.3212*** -0.2060** -0.0257 -0.7572*** -0.1724 0.0050 0.0296 -0.0382 0.0861 -0.2757*** -0.1401 
 
(0.728) (0.000) (0.027) (0.858) (0.001) (0.368) (0.965) (0.810) (0.679) (0.323) (0.000) (0.123) 
R2 within 0.4898 0.0335 0.0355 0.5327 0.1557 0.1160 0.1951 0.0485 0.0520 0.5958 0.0405 0.0453 
F-statistic 58.5422 43.5167 22.3748 589.7869 201.0065 317.8551 20.4455 32.8374 22.3242 413.6079 46.8557 22.1454 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Funds 4708 4708 4708 294 294 294 665 665 665 3468 3468 3468 
Observations 15372 15372 15372 950 950 950 2143 2143 2143 11512 11512 11512 
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Table 3.9.B. Results for the equity sub-samples with           √      , under the restriction that fund’s age is up to 5 years. The PPB is the benchmark. The panel 
observations have a yearly frequency. The results are obtained using Driscoll-Kraay standard errors and fund fixed effects. P-values are in parentheses (* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, 
*** p<0.01). 
Sub-sample Emerging International UK 
Dependent Sharpe RFund-RPPB M2 Sharpe RFund-RPPB M2 Sharpe RFund-RPPB M2 
Constant -0.0703 -1.4040*** -1.4655*** -0.2872* -0.1914 0.6098** -0.2193 0.2393 0.2055 
 
(0.781) (0.000) (0.000) (0.084) (0.556) (0.015) (0.197) (0.644) (0.631) 
          0.0693 0.9062*** 1.0419** 0.2636*** 0.1638 0.2369 0.2529* 0.1478 0.1636 
 
(0.782) (0.004) (0.011) (0.002) (0.285) (0.129) (0.097) (0.495) (0.422) 
        -0.9585*** -0.5270* -0.6224 -0.2366** -0.2353 -0.3200* -0.5262*** -0.0662 0.0026 
 
(0.000) (0.097) (0.129) (0.043) (0.138) (0.068) (0.006) (0.715) (0.995) 
        0.2176 2.2399*** 1.5450*** 0.5176*** 0.8510*** 0.4086* 0.6037** 0.0197 -0.3704 
 
(0.475) (0.000) (0.008) (0.000) (0.002) (0.062) (0.037) (0.959) (0.344) 
          -0.1168** 0.0302 0.2668*** 0.0524 0.0270 0.0204 -0.0261 -0.0027 -0.0809 
 
(0.048) (0.734) (0.002) (0.116) (0.821) (0.805) (0.395) (0.963) (0.288) 
           0.0040 0.0166* -0.0028 -0.0026 0.0340 0.0100 0.0190* 0.0380*** 0.0249** 
 
(0.485) (0.050) (0.783) (0.783) (0.273) (0.695) (0.079) (0.005) (0.028) 
              0.0764*** -0.0028 0.0065 -0.0066 0.0054 -0.0047 -0.0140 0.0221 0.0225 
 
(0.002) (0.935) (0.880) (0.273) (0.838) (0.846) (0.111) (0.335) (0.194) 
        0.0538 0.7378 0.8126 0.0252 -1.0483** -0.4877 -0.3065 0.1168 0.8524* 
 (0.889) (0.377) (0.247) (0.931) (0.048) (0.343) (0.148) (0.847) (0.091) 
         -1.1890 -1.0641 -1.3788 -0.0979 -2.0276*** -1.6305*** 0.0380 -0.1839 0.5904 
 (0.173) (0.276) (0.304) (0.611) (0.001) (0.001) (0.832) (0.663) (0.134) 
          0.7909** -1.3221 -0.4600 -0.1270 -0.7352** -0.6511** -0.2071** -0.5623** -0.5313 
 (0.023) (0.195) (0.565) (0.328) (0.034) (0.041) (0.026) (0.039) (0.122) 
          -0.9948* 0.1711 -1.5875** 0.1692* -0.7295** -0.3653 0.0438 -0.4790 -0.0643 
 (0.072) (0.849) (0.030) (0.065) (0.018) (0.115) (0.602) (0.107) (0.828) 
                  0.4300** -0.5983* -0.3026 0.0775 0.4054 0.1272 -0.0096 0.3699 -0.0020 
 (0.020) (0.085) (0.266) (0.428) (0.204) (0.697) (0.939) (0.391) (0.995) 
                   1.0126** 0.9190 1.3168 0.1402 1.1358*** 0.9755*** -0.1708 0.0639 -0.1307 
 (0.035) (0.102) (0.114) (0.162) (0.001) (0.001) (0.146) (0.842) (0.652) 
                    -0.3625* 0.5432 0.0320 0.0785 0.2477 0.2306 0.0174 0.2631 0.3164 
 (0.056) (0.307) (0.951) (0.503) (0.193) (0.271) (0.851) (0.188) (0.185) 
                    0.6118* -0.4887 0.7834* -0.1183** 0.4444** 0.2153 -0.0720 0.2395 -0.0009 
 (0.075) (0.428) (0.075) (0.023) (0.023) (0.122) (0.217) (0.123) (0.996) 
                    0.0522** 0.0355 -0.0386 -0.0127 0.0236 0.0121 0.0084 -0.0260 -0.0050 
 (0.020) (0.418) (0.398) (0.239) (0.634) (0.730) (0.306) (0.394) (0.874) 
                  0.1016 0.5978*** 0.3567 -0.1418** 0.0304 -0.0130 -0.1252 0.1272 0.0541 
 (0.531) (0.006) (0.160) (0.037) (0.690) (0.901) (0.269) (0.186) (0.790) 
                  -0.0552 -0.9317*** -0.8273** -0.2472*** -0.5127*** -0.3970*** -0.4142** -0.0628 0.0423 
 (0.769) (0.003) (0.044) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.038) (0.749) (0.837) 
         -0.0591 -0.0754 -0.5510*** -0.0197 -0.3401* -0.0848 
     (0.450) (0.679) (0.001) (0.787) (0.060) (0.643) 
     0.1986 -0.9353*** -0.8918** -0.0306 -0.2848 -0.1958 0.2634** -0.3181 -0.1422 
 
(0.320) (0.000) (0.018) (0.764) (0.228) (0.129) (0.023) (0.140) (0.426) 
R2 within 0.8780 0.2434 0.3898 0.5486 0.0854 0.0969 0.6590 0.0364 0.0628 
F-statistic 2243.4547 85461.2614 17012.6442 181.7728 24.9647 44.2745 1031.3192 110.4798 74.6793 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Funds 179 179 179 1827 1827 1827 1462 1462 1462 
Observations 490 490 490 6041 6041 6041 4981 4981 4981 
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Indeed, giving individual funds a similar representation in the sample, i.e., taking into 
account only the first five years of funds’ life gives a better insight into the story. To continue 
on the point made in the previous paragraph, the observed decline in the slope of the 
interactive term of fund’s age and provider’s age is still present, so it cannot be fully 
attributed to an uneven number of observations used in regressions. Moreover, the 
underperformance of the ‘middle-age’ providers is also preserved, although the superior 
performance of the youngest providers disappears. This may be the effect of the exclusion of 
older years of funds that have been in operation for more than five years. Obviously, these 
funds will be operated by older providers. If these old funds of old providers do not perform 
well in comparison with young funds, excluding them improves the performance figures of 
old providers and reduces a performance gap between them and young providers.    
 
There is also evidence that bear market underperformance (outperformance for the allocation 
funds) is preserved, and as previously fund’s age reduced it. A slightly different result is 
obtained for bull markets. This time outperformance is observed for all investment styles, and 
older funds outperform less (the interactive term has a negative coefficient). The interaction 
of the bear dummy with fund’s age is very similar to that of the unrestricted samples. 
However, the interaction with the bull market dummy becomes significant and negative for 
all investment types. The restriction reveals that very young funds gain much more in bullish 
climate, suggesting that managers of these young funds try harder to make use of the positive 
conditions. 
 
It is also interesting that the impact of provider’s size and its interaction with fund’s age on 
performance slightly changes when only young funds are used in the regressions. The strong 
impact of size as presented in Tables 3.8 is not so uniform now. For example, the 
international equity funds and the UK equity funds have hardly any significant coefficients, 
and the emerging equity funds have negative coefficients estimated for the Sharpe ratios. The 
coefficients estimated for the interaction term of size and fund’s age are mostly insignificant 
with an exception of the allocation funds (negative) and the emerging equity funds (positive). 
This seems to suggest that the positive impact of size becomes less important as a fund gets 
older for the allocation funds, but more important for the emerging equity funds. In the case 
of the other investment styles, it does not matter. 
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The results for the provider’s market share and the ABI’s share within the provider are 
similar to those of the unrestricted samples. This is also the case for the regulatory change 
dummies although their effect is more pronounced under the restriction. The performance of 
young allocation funds increased after the introduction of personal plans and decreased with 
that of the stakeholder schemes. The introduction of personal plans also decreased the 
performance of both international and UK equity funds. This may well be an indication that 
the focus shifted from funds investing in ‘single’ asset types to those that had a more 
diversified portfolio. The introduction of stakeholder schemes has again a positive effect on 
the Sharpe ratio of UK equity funds but this time it is the performance of emerging equity 
funds that is strongly negatively affected. This is also consistent with the hypothesis that 
there would be less attention on expensive investment styles once management fees got an 
upper limit. 
 
The biggest difference in the results, however, is in the significance of the constant and of 
fund’s age. This time the majority of the estimates of the constant terms are negative and 
statistically significant. The exceptions are the international equity funds for which several 
positive coefficients are obtained, as well as the equity funds and the UK equity funds where 
there is practically no significance at all. Contrary to the previous results, the coefficients 
estimated for the age functions are statistically significant for every investment style. They 
are positive for the allocation and the equity funds (and all three equity subsamples, i.e. 
emerging, international, UK) but they remain negative for the fixed income funds. This 
shows that although a learning period may well apply to young allocation and equity funds, 
fixed income funds start with high performance.  
 
On a final note, the average performance of the funds as indicated by the constant coefficient 
in specification (1) does not change much under the restriction. The results for this set of 
regressions are shown in Appendix G. The constant for the Sharpe ratio is once more 
insignificant for all samples (except emerging equity funds) whereas it is significantly 
positive for performance relative to the PPB. The only notable change is that the difference-
in-returns for emerging equity funds becomes insignificant under the restriction. 
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The other issue that may affect the reliability of these results relates to the discussion of 
Figure 2.6 in Chapter 2. This Figure shows that approximately two-thirds of all funds 
available at the end of 2009 opened after 2000. This is reflected in the observed sample with 
61% of all return observations belonging to funds with inception date from 2000 and later. In 
comparison, only 14.6% of observations are from funds that opened in the 1990s, 22% in the 
1980s, and just 2% in the 1970s. This disproportionality may create a bias in the assessment 
of performance, and more importantly, in its relationship with fund’s age since the 
performance of young funds may have been affected by events taking place in the early 
2000s and not by fund’s age per se.  
 
Ideally, this potential bias could be controlled for by including in the specification dummy 
variables that represent the inception year of each fund. These dummies would then capture 
any ‘foundation year’ effects. However, Section 3.3.2 has demonstrated that there are strong 
fund effects in the panel calling for unit fixed effects estimation in order to get unbiased 
coefficients. Consequently, it is technically impossible to add time-invariant factors such as 
foundation year dummies. In order to sidestep this problem, the all-funds sample is divided 
into sub-samples according to the inception decade of each fund and the regression analysis is 
repeated for each decade. Tables 3.10.A-C show the results of specifications (3) and (4) for 
the all-funds sample with the square root age function sorted by inception decade. The 
corresponding results with the linear, logarithmic, and cubic root functions are shown in 
Appendix I. Note that the regulatory dummies are excluded from these regressions since for 
funds that opened in the 1990s and 2000s there are no observations for the PPP introduction. 
This should not be an important omission since both dummies were insignificant in all 
previous regressions for the all-funds sample. 
 
The first obvious difference between the decades is the number of funds and available 
observations for each decade. Funds that opened in the 2000s dominate in the all-funds 
sample. This can be seen, for example, in the effect of provider’s size on performance which 
appears to have a significantly positive effect for all performance measures in the all-funds 
sample but is significant only for the 2000s sample for the Sharpe ratio and the 2000s and 
1980s samples for the difference-in-returns and the M2. Furthermore, the difference-in-
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returns underperformance of middle-aged providers (who then catch-up as their funds get 
older) is ‘caused’ by funds that opened in the 2000s and the 1990s. 
 
In terms of the relationship between performance and fund’s age, one sees that the catching-
up pattern appears in the Sharpe ratio for funds that opened in the 1990s and 2000s. However, 
the Sharpe ratio of funds that opened in the 1970s actually declines with fund’s age so that 
the ‘average’ effect in the all-funds sample is insignificant. The coefficients of fund’s age are 
insignificant for the difference-in-returns for all foundation decades but the catching-up 
pattern shows again for the 1990s and 1980s in the M2 regressions. 
 
Nevertheless, there is some consistency across decades with the results of the previous 
analysis. For example, market conditions seem to affect the Sharpe ratio more than they do 
the performance relative to the benchmark. Moreover, the losses during bear years are not 
fully made up for in years with bull markets. The provider’s market share still has no effect 
whereas the ABI’s share covaries positively with the difference-in-returns.  
 
Generally, there are some differences depending on which decade funds have been incepted 
in. Some form of catching-up appears in all decades except the 1970 and the results 
particularly for market conditions are consistent with those previously presented. It is clear 
that funds that opened in the 2000s ‘cause’ the overall results since they account for more 
than half of the observations. As such, there is the possibility of some foundation year effects 
but any potential bias caused by this is probably small since the results do not vary greatly 
between decades. 
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Table 3.10.A. Results for the all-funds sample with           √       sorted by the fund’s foundation decade. 
The PPB is the benchmark. The panel observations have a yearly frequency. The results are obtained using 
Driscoll-Kraay standard errors and fund fixed effects. P-values are in parentheses (* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** 
p<0.01).  
 
Dependent     Sharpe      
Foundation Decade All 2000s 1990s 1980s 1970s All 2000s 1990s 1980s 1970s 
Constant 0.0048 0.1379 -0.0751 -0.1201 0.5253** -0.0419 -0.1332 -0.2349 -0.0447 0.7177** 
 
(0.956) (0.150) (0.454) (0.281) (0.041) (0.696) (0.326) (0.104) (0.800) (0.028) 
          0.0156 -0.0264 0.0433 0.0154 -0.1049** 0.0151 0.0946* 0.1151** 0.0071 -0.1453* 
 
(0.653) (0.638) (0.200) (0.582) (0.035) (0.707) (0.062) (0.023) (0.888) (0.075) 
        -0.5344*** -0.5897*** -0.4468*** -0.4327*** -0.3513*** -0.5778*** -0.4720*** -0.1753 -0.4361** -0.6050** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.300) (0.011) (0.016) 
        0.0628 0.0106 0.1371 0.1430** 0.2106** 0.1143 0.3030** 0.5443*** 0.4250** 0.6099* 
 
(0.391) (0.888) (0.102) (0.038) (0.034) (0.104) (0.049) (0.000) (0.032) (0.088) 
          0.0161 0.0334** -0.0037 0.0009 0.0523 0.0563** 0.0779** -0.0763 -0.1246 -0.2710 
 
(0.235) (0.022) (0.824) (0.955) (0.129) (0.024) (0.023) (0.134) (0.201) (0.262) 
           0.0010 0.0007 0.0008 0.0012 0.0007 -0.0004 -0.0033 0.0024 0.0024 -0.0005 
 
(0.630) (0.890) (0.732) (0.475) (0.844) (0.842) (0.610) (0.114) (0.126) (0.925) 
              0.0011 -0.0044 -0.0006 0.0058 -0.0167 0.0005 -0.0013 -0.0005 0.0059 -0.0089 
 
(0.703) (0.441) (0.774) (0.245) (0.183) (0.865) (0.820) (0.797) (0.220) (0.477) 
        0.0888 -0.2796 0.2324* 0.0771 -0.1297 -0.1378 -0.5253** 0.7003 -0.0901 -0.8006** 
 (0.434) (0.155) (0.063) (0.419) (0.542) (0.386) (0.038) (0.300) (0.701) (0.032) 
         0.0928 -0.1662 0.1079* 0.0630 -0.0898 0.0337 -0.3951** 0.0427 -0.1462 -0.4251 
 (0.306) (0.299) (0.063) (0.474) (0.545) (0.821) (0.030) (0.752) (0.530) (0.464) 
          0.0762 -0.1934** 0.1076 0.0775 -0.1214 -0.0350 -0.1011 0.0036 -0.1482 -0.2809 
 (0.282) (0.013) (0.164) (0.209) (0.250) (0.778) (0.167) (0.982) (0.442) (0.570) 
          0.0709 -0.0212 0.0371 0.0417 0.0796 0.0133 0.1600 -0.0323 -0.0569 -0.5989* 
 (0.199) (0.670) (0.432) (0.258) (0.335) (0.869) (0.259) (0.666) (0.712) (0.055) 
                       0.1354* 0.2164*** -0.2522 0.0525 0.2755** 
      (0.062) (0.004) (0.498) (0.578) (0.014) 
                        0.0223 0.1239 0.0528 0.0638 0.0878 
      (0.634) (0.208) (0.302) (0.455) (0.580) 
                         0.0352 -0.0677 0.0640 0.0694 0.0402 
      (0.197) (0.323) (0.213) (0.220) (0.747) 
                         0.0148 -0.1107 0.0335 0.0230 0.1681** 
      (0.389) (0.238) (0.228) (0.574) (0.013) 
                         -0.0101** -0.0179** 0.0178 0.0261 0.0574 
      (0.026) (0.017) (0.160) (0.226) (0.183) 
                       0.0222 -0.0592 -0.1036** 0.0006 0.0519 
      (0.270) (0.191) (0.038) (0.991) (0.388) 
                       -0.0185 -0.1627** -0.1520*** -0.0779 -0.0839 
           (0.328) (0.015) (0.002) (0.149) (0.311) 
R2 within 0.3960 0.4696 0.3753 0.2910 0.3534 0.4002 0.4794 0.4077 0.3067 0.3863 
F-statistic 28.4575 26580.9908 21.9536 30.1507 9.9844 59.1972 1327.6346 348.5479 23.6920 17.7095 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Funds 4897 4207 326 326 38 4897 4207 326 326 38 
Observations 27978 17007 4159 6250 562 27978 17007 4159 6250 562 
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Table 3.10.B. Results for the all-funds sample with           √       sorted by the fund’s foundation decade. 
The PPB is the benchmark. The panel observations have a yearly frequency. The results are obtained using 
Driscoll-Kraay standard errors and fund fixed effects. P-values are in parentheses (* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** 
p<0.01).  
 
Dependent     RFund-RPPB      
Foundation Decade All 2000s 1990s 1980s 1970s All 2000s 1990s 1980s 1970s 
Constant -0.0816 -0.0959 0.0503 -0.1407 0.2320 -0.1523 -0.2143 0.0904 -0.4194 0.0820 
 
(0.580) (0.664) (0.798) (0.638) (0.740) (0.422) (0.246) (0.737) (0.283) (0.921) 
          -0.0035 -0.0383 0.0314 -0.0121 -0.1157 -0.0189 -0.0484 0.0217 0.0606 -0.1194 
 
(0.913) (0.418) (0.434) (0.819) (0.398) (0.645) (0.604) (0.756) (0.407) (0.386) 
        0.0354 0.0045 0.1441 0.1286 -0.0814 -0.0453 -0.3014*** 0.1535 0.6000*** -2.3753** 
 
(0.425) (0.936) (0.175) (0.192) (0.717) (0.461) (0.005) (0.603) (0.007) (0.042) 
        0.0445 0.0668 0.0631 0.0838 0.1269 0.1065 0.0071 0.3298 0.4674 1.4429 
 
(0.475) (0.563) (0.476) (0.266) (0.253) (0.284) (0.923) (0.176) (0.154) (0.220) 
          0.0210 0.0542* -0.0244 0.0098 0.0470 0.1196** 0.1778*** -0.1645* 0.1525* 0.0687 
 
(0.272) (0.100) (0.269) (0.619) (0.131) (0.010) (0.001) (0.059) (0.060) (0.905) 
           0.0068** 0.0066* 0.0062 0.0049 0.0070 0.0032 -0.0062 0.0086** 0.0044 -0.0034 
 
(0.025) (0.051) (0.138) (0.322) (0.614) (0.275) (0.141) (0.042) (0.374) (0.871) 
              0.0141*** 0.0065 0.0046 0.0273** 0.0333** 0.0120*** 0.0108* 0.0041 0.0278*** 0.0603** 
 
(0.002) (0.204) (0.233) (0.014) (0.033) (0.004) (0.073) (0.301) (0.009) (0.043) 
        0.1159 -0.3574 -0.1374 0.2512 0.1642 -0.3668 -0.7430 2.0137 0.0102 0.3436 
 (0.550) (0.168) (0.600) (0.262) (0.690) (0.414) (0.172) (0.118) (0.990) (0.725) 
         -0.1479 -0.2305 -0.3220** -0.2370 -0.2299 -0.6299** -1.0503** -0.1679 -0.8511 1.6845 
 (0.386) (0.167) (0.043) (0.199) (0.637) (0.043) (0.047) (0.714) (0.206) (0.344) 
          0.0057 -0.1536 -0.1951 -0.0074 0.1626 -0.3764** -0.1671 -0.8158** -0.1615 0.4652 
 (0.947) (0.155) (0.222) (0.945) (0.509) (0.041) (0.468) (0.012) (0.582) (0.630) 
          0.0406 -0.0118 -0.0663 0.0026 0.0617 -0.0568 0.2044 -0.5076** -0.0094 -0.8349 
 (0.570) (0.869) (0.477) (0.970) (0.533) (0.621) (0.466) (0.026) (0.969) (0.562) 
                       0.2989 0.3762* -0.9928 0.1959 -0.0124 
      (0.139) (0.078) (0.152) (0.603) (0.974) 
                        0.2217** 0.4350* 0.1241 0.3117 -0.7220 
      (0.015) (0.078) (0.518) (0.203) (0.199) 
                         0.1247*** -0.0954 0.3790*** 0.0489 -0.0807 
      (0.009) (0.399) (0.006) (0.544) (0.752) 
                         0.0165 -0.1448 0.2254** -0.0081 0.2297 
      (0.535) (0.424) (0.013) (0.891) (0.501) 
                         -0.0248*** -0.0426*** 0.0367* -0.0300* -0.0061 
      (0.006) (0.009) (0.057) (0.080) (0.951) 
                       0.0423* 0.1780*** -0.0067 -0.1335*** 0.4863** 
      (0.069) (0.002) (0.933) (0.009) (0.026) 
                       -0.0207 0.0239 -0.0984 -0.1106 -0.2743 
           (0.382) (0.752) (0.168) (0.172) (0.238) 
R2 within 0.0052 0.0072 0.0127 0.0158 0.0512 0.0102 0.0146 0.0275 0.0263 0.1903 
F-statistic 1.8930 168.1659 2.8184 1.5682 5.9053 68.9558 1964.9857 460.8846 4.2824 58.3724 
p-value 0.0894 0.0000 0.0250 0.1680 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0003 0.0000 
Funds 4897 4207 326 326 38 4897 4207 326 326 38 
Observations 27978 17007 4159 6250 562 27978 17007 4159 6250 562 
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Table 3.10.C. Results for the all-funds sample with           √       sorted by the fund’s foundation decade. 
The PPB is the benchmark. The panel observations have a yearly frequency. The results are obtained using 
Driscoll-Kraay standard errors and fund fixed effects. P-values are in parentheses (* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** 
p<0.01).  
 
Dependent     M2      
Foundation Decade All 2000s 1990s 1980s 1970s All 2000s 1990s 1980s 1970s 
Constant -0.0405 0.0352 -0.1603 -0.1312 0.0877 -0.0721 0.0927 -0.1893 -0.5818* 0.2534 
 
(0.835) (0.899) (0.402) (0.577) (0.892) (0.773) (0.735) (0.460) (0.067) (0.712) 
          0.0319 -0.0229 0.1133** 0.0049 -0.0367 0.0175 -0.0562 0.1265* 0.1204** -0.1092 
 
(0.378) (0.778) (0.027) (0.891) (0.750) (0.699) (0.636) (0.080) (0.043) (0.344) 
        -0.0551 -0.1001 -0.0021 0.0528 0.1710 -0.1416 -0.4108** 0.0709 0.5992** -0.4894 
 
(0.330) (0.243) (0.984) (0.529) (0.142) (0.131) (0.039) (0.784) (0.012) (0.172) 
        -0.1558** -0.1678 -0.1335 -0.0831 0.0342 -0.1403 -0.1539 0.1113 0.2934 0.7859 
 
(0.015) (0.117) (0.161) (0.243) (0.670) (0.150) (0.326) (0.626) (0.169) (0.164) 
          0.0325 0.0631* -0.0111 0.0212 0.0513* 0.0953** 0.0894* -0.0899 0.1956** 0.2377 
 
(0.143) (0.097) (0.685) (0.209) (0.052) (0.038) (0.053) (0.176) (0.018) (0.648) 
           0.0016 -0.0089 0.0066 0.0023 0.0070 -0.0007 -0.0131* 0.0082* 0.0020 -0.0025 
 
(0.643) (0.246) (0.155) (0.592) (0.536) (0.829) (0.070) (0.072) (0.630) (0.870) 
              0.0157* 0.0227 0.0061 0.0247** 0.0080 0.0143* 0.0246 0.0055 0.0255** 0.0300 
 
(0.051) (0.146) (0.410) (0.021) (0.672) (0.062) (0.118) (0.503) (0.015) (0.182) 
        0.2193 -0.3771 0.2215 0.2871 0.2182 0.0124 -0.8269* 2.4672** 0.2685 0.2073 
 (0.287) (0.176) (0.448) (0.101) (0.487) (0.974) (0.066) (0.047) (0.626) (0.796) 
         -0.0066 -0.1392 -0.0749 -0.1382 -0.2061 -0.2274 -0.5112 0.1873 -0.4625 -2.5662** 
 (0.962) (0.473) (0.521) (0.270) (0.412) (0.383) (0.251) (0.631) (0.285) (0.015) 
          0.0788 -0.1920 -0.0302 0.0711 0.1600 -0.1623 -0.2779 -0.4406 0.1536 -0.5085 
 (0.421) (0.108) (0.835) (0.411) (0.338) (0.415) (0.142) (0.129) (0.487) (0.420) 
          0.0830 0.0056 0.0202 0.0200 0.1456 0.0421 0.2249* -0.2871** 0.1806 -0.7094 
 (0.223) (0.912) (0.769) (0.701) (0.164) (0.610) (0.086) (0.026) (0.317) (0.470) 
                       0.1238 0.1874* -1.1346* 0.1007 -0.1229 
      (0.342) (0.100) (0.073) (0.690) (0.715) 
                        0.0970 0.0875 0.0182 0.1992 0.8048** 
      (0.264) (0.692) (0.911) (0.235) (0.028) 
                         0.0791 -0.0710 0.2544** -0.0269 0.1631 
      (0.140) (0.516) (0.034) (0.695) (0.326) 
                         0.0027 -0.1612* 0.1568** -0.0565 0.1962 
      (0.877) (0.081) (0.014) (0.208) (0.395) 
                         -0.0160** -0.0096 0.0205 -0.0374** -0.0293 
      (0.030) (0.483) (0.193) (0.028) (0.746) 
                       0.0415 0.1779** -0.0297 -0.1553*** 0.1370* 
      (0.167) (0.032) (0.715) (0.008) (0.093) 
                       -0.0036 -0.0125 -0.0912 -0.1095* -0.1580 
           (0.896) (0.885) (0.152) (0.052) (0.154) 
R2 within 0.0224 0.0357 0.0216 0.0166 0.0636 0.0249 0.0408 0.0321 0.0280 0.1177 
F-statistic 4.6180 3108.0841 10.3860 2.9751 13.9000 42.4173 100.3199 123.4623 4.7911 7.2867 
p-value 0.0006 0.0000 0.0000 0.0111 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 
Funds 4897 4207 326 326 38 4897 4207 326 326 38 
Observations 27978 17007 4159 6250 562 27978 17007 4159 6250 562 
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3.3.4. Results using the quarterly frequency 
 
Section 3.2.2 discussed, among other things, the issue of the frequency of observations. The 
yearly frequency was adopted to overcome some econometric issues. Although using yearly 
data shows the long-term properties of fund performance, it is possible that it eliminates time 
patterns that may appear only on a short-term basis. In order to control for this a panel with 
quarterly frequency is also created. The procedure is identical to the one for the yearly panel 
where average return and risk are calculated for each calendar quarter from 1980 to 2009. All 
three monthly observations are required for each quarter, i.e. n=3. For funds that opened 
during a quarter (e.g. in February 1991) the first observation is considered to be the first 
calendar quarter with all three monthly observations (e.g. second quarter of 1991). Since this 
is less restricting than the minimum 6 months that the yearly panel required, approximately 
an extra 100 funds are included in the quarterly panel ending with a total of 5,016 funds and 
111,696 observations. Like in the yearly panel, allocation, fixed income, and equity funds 
make out the vast majority of this sample, i.e. circa 95% of the funds and observations. In 
particular, there are 381 allocation funds, 743 fixed income funds, and 3,617 equity funds. 
The Sharpe ratio and the M2 are again subject to outliers which are winsorized. The 
adjustment is made on 0.5% of the distribution of each measure and applied on both tails.  
 
There is some difference, however, in the summary statistics between the two panels. Table 
3.11 shows the average return and sigma of funds and their PPBs for the yearly and quarterly 
panels.
30
 The means and standard deviations of the three performance measures are also 
included. The averages are fairly similar between the two panels. The main exception is the 
Sharpe ratio that is considerably higher in the quarterly panel for all samples. The size of 
each variable’s standard deviation is another notable difference between the yearly and the 
quarterly data. Return and risk vary much more around their mean in the quarterly panel than 
in the yearly one, e.g. the quarterly standard deviation of M2 is about three times as much as 
the yearly one. This is expected as part of the frequency smoothing. Observations based on 
12-month averages are smoother than observations based on 3-month averages. 
Consequently, the quarterly panel has more ‘noise’ than the yearly panel. 
 
                                                          
30
 The statistics for the yearly panel are taken from Table 3.1. 
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Table 3.11. Summary statistics for fund and PPB return and sigma, and fund performance measures. 
Comparison of yearly and quarterly panel. 
 
Fund Type Category Variable 
Yearly Quarterly 
Mean St. Dev. Obs. Mean St. Dev. Obs. 
All funds 
Fund 
Return 0.404 1.841 
28586 
0.468 3.005 
111696 
Sigma 4.362 2.390 3.945 3.129 
PPB 
Return 0.226 1.710 0.285 2.943 
Sigma 4.252 2.400 3.896 3.060 
Performance 
Sharpe 0.038 0.416 0.296 1.695 
RFund-RPPB 0.178 0.824 0.183 1.397 
M2 0.222 0.796 0.322 2.408 
Allocation 
Funds 
Fund 
Return 0.372 1.418 
1579 
0.426 2.463 
7999 
Sigma 3.428 1.626 3.268 2.410 
PPB 
Return 0.167 1.330 0.202 2.514 
Sigma 3.504 1.951 3.380 2.618 
Performance 
Sharpe 0.080 0.385 0.459 1.742 
RFund-RPPB 0.205 0.765 0.224 1.169 
M2 0.287 0.756 0.461 2.174 
Fixed 
Income 
Funds 
Fund 
Return 0.442 0.952 
4380 
0.458 1.634 
17432 
Sigma 2.038 1.247 1.718 1.493 
PPB 
Return 0.188 0.788 0.217 1.477 
Sigma 1.944 1.073 1.661 1.356 
Performance 
Sharpe 0.001 0.397 0.073 1.659 
RFund-RPPB 0.254 0.861 0.241 1.343 
M2 0.260 0.733 0.242 2.029 
Equity 
Funds 
Fund 
Return 0.407 2.020 
21072 
0.482 3.292 
82160 
Sigma 5.041 2.165 4.598 3.154 
PPB 
Return 0.238 1.881 0.306 3.214 
Sigma 4.881 2.192 4.511 3.054 
Performance 
Sharpe 0.066 0.367 0.386 1.625 
RFund-RPPB 0.169 0.775 0.176 1.346 
M2 0.223 0.746 0.365 2.397 
 
 
Each of the three performance measures is regressed on only the constant in order to assess 
their statistical significance for the quarterly panel. Table 3.12 is a reproduction of Table 3.7 
and shows the estimated coefficients of specification (1). The constant coefficient for the 
Sharpe ratio is as expected much higher than in the yearly panel. Nevertheless, it is not 
statistically significant for all the samples. It becomes significant at the 10% level for the 
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allocation, the equity, and the UK equity funds and at the 5% for the emerging equity funds. 
Performance relative to the PPB requires a word of explanation. The constant coefficient for 
the difference-in-returns measure differs very little for the two panels. However, the constant 
for the M2 is much higher for the quarterly panel, particularly for the emerging equity funds. 
The only exception is the fixed income funds where M2 is very similar as indicated by the 
summary statistics in Table 3.11. 
 
Table 3.12. The estimated constant coefficient for specification (1), sorted by sample and performance measure. 
The R
2
-within is in all cases 0 and the F-test for the significance of the regression is not applicable. PPB is the 
benchmark and the panel has the quarterly structure. The results are obtained using Driscoll-Kraay standard 
errors and fund fixed effects. P-values are in parentheses (* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01). 
 
 
Constant Coefficient 
   
Sample Sharpe RFund-RPPB M2 Funds Obs. 
All funds 0.2962 0.1830*** 0.3217*** 5016 111696 
(0.145) (0.000) (0.006) 
Allocation Funds 0.4586* 0.2240*** 0.4614*** 381 7999 
(0.097) (0.000) (0.003) 
Fixed Income Funds 0.0729 0.2410** 0.2422** 743 17432 
(0.663) (0.023) (0.048) 
Equity Funds 0.3855* 0.1764*** 0.3649*** 3617 82160 
(0.077) (0.000) (0.002) 
Emerging Equity Funds 0.5923** 0.1501** 0.7611* 186 2767 
(0.027) (0.011) (0.083) 
International Equity 
Funds 
0.3402 0.1553*** 0.2982*** 1918 45250 
(0.103) (0.007) (0.004) 
UK Equity Funds 0.4288* 0.2066*** 0.4212*** 1513 34143 
(0.066) (0.000) (0.006) 
 
 
The regression results for specification (4) for all unrestricted samples are in in Appendix J. 
The results under the restriction that fund’s age is up to 5 years are not presented or discussed 
for the quarterly panel as they are very much alike with those without the restriction. Similar 
to the yearly panel, funds’, providers’ and market characteristics explain most of the fund 
performance. In most cases the constant becomes insignificant once all explanatory variables 
are included. Allocation funds still underperform their PPBs by about 14% for the difference-
in-returns and 33% for the M2. The significant underperformance found in the yearly panel 
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for the emerging equity funds becomes insignificant in the quarterly panel. The only other 
difference between the two panels is that the constant of the UK equity funds remains 
significant for the Sharpe ratio and M2.  
 
The relationship between performance and fund’s age is less strong for the quarterly panel 
but still appears almost entirely through the interactions between fund’s age and provider’s 
age. One important exception is the M2 for the emerging equity funds. The coefficient of the 
fund’s age function is significant for all specifications except the linear. The sign is positive 
indicating a concave relationship between M2 and the fund’s age. The lower observation 
frequency brings out the clear catching-up pattern that emerging equity funds follow. The 
other exception is the difference-in-returns for the UK equity funds where results give a slight 
indication of a concave relationship as well (for the logarithmic and the cubic root functions).  
 
The effects of the other variables on performance are fairly similar to those found for the 
yearly panel. However, there are two results that should be pointed out. First, the regulatory 
change dummies are more significant in the quarterly panel but the results still agree with 
those from the yearly panel and with the stated hypotheses. For example, the international 
and the UK equity funds appear to have a significantly lower Sharpe ratio following the 
introduction of personal pension plans whereas the performance of the allocation funds 
increased. This is consistent with the hypothesis that there was a shift from single to multiple 
asset portfolios.  
 
The second result relates to market conditions. In the yearly panel, it is most often the case 
that only the bear market dummy is significant and affects the Sharpe ratio rather than the 
performance relative to the PPB (in the unrestricted regressions). In the quarterly panel, both 
the bear and bull market dummy have a significant effect on the Sharpe ratio. In almost all 
samples, the decrease in the Sharpe ratio under bear market conditions is lower than the 
increase under bull market conditions. The fixed income funds are the only exception, where 
only the bull market dummy has a significantly positive effect on the Sharpe ratio. Moreover, 
market conditions affect the performance relative to the PPB as well. The difference-in-
returns measure increases in years with a bearish climate for most samples but is unchanged 
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in years with bull markets.
31
 This may seem good news since in raw terms funds score higher 
returns than their PPBs when the markets are going down. However, there is indication that 
the M2 actually decreases in bear years for all samples except the fixed income and the UK 
equity funds. Therefore, in risk-adjusted terms funds underperform their PPBs under bear 
conditions. 
 
Finally, it should be noted that as market conditions become more significant with the higher 
observation frequency, provider characteristics become less significant. The positive effect of 
the ABI’s share on performance relative to the PPB remains. This ‘shift’ in significance is 
indicative of what is important over different time horizons. In the short-run performance is 
more affected by temporary market changes. However, in the long-run factors that proxy 
resources, specialization, and experience are more important for fund performance. 
 
 
                                                          
31
 The difference-in-returns for the emerging and the UK equity funds is unaffected by both the bear and the bull 
market dummies. 
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3.3.5. Results with the FTSE All Shares index as benchmark 
 
So far, fund performance has been discussed relative only to the PPB. In this part, the 
performance of equity funds is analysed relative to the FTSE All Shares index as well. This 
serves primarily comparison purposes, i.e. it brings the findings for performance relative to 
the PPB into some perspective. Moreover, it is not unreasonable to assume that performance 
of these equity funds relative to the domestic stock market has some informational quality 
particularly for policyholders.  
 
The methodology from the previous part is applied here as well. The equity sample is 
separated into its three subsamples. The return and risk information for the FTSE index is 
available for the entire period of observation unlike the corresponding information for the 
PPBs. Therefore, there are more observations for performance relative to the FTSE than to 
the PPB. In order to avoid this mismatch, the sample with the FTSE is restricted to the size of 
the sample with the PPB so that the results are 1:1 comparable. Note that the M2 against the 
FTSE is also winsorized (0.5% from both tails). 
 
Table 3.13 shows the characteristics of equity funds in comparison to those of the FTSE All 
Shares index. It contains the results of t-tests examining whether there is a statistically 
significant difference between the average returns and risk of the equity funds from those of 
the FTSE All Shares index. The results for the yearly panel are in the upper half of Table 3.13 
and below there are the results for the quarterly panel. All types of equity funds have 
significantly higher average returns than that of the FTSE index. The largest difference is for 
the emerging equity funds at around 12.7%. The international and the UK equity funds have a 
similar difference from the FTSE; 3.04 and 2.43 accordingly. The more interesting feature is 
the difference in risk. The funds’ average risk is much higher than the FTSE risk. Moreover, 
this difference in average risk is markedly higher than the difference in average returns. 
Consequently, the risk-adjusted outperformance is very similar to the non-risk-adjusted one, 
unlike performance relative to the PPB. This is yet another point indicating that there may be 
some PPB selection issues in the industry. 
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Table 3.13. Results of t-tests on the difference of mean return and sigma between fund and the FTSE All Shares 
index (unequal variances) and of t-tests on mean difference-in-returns and M2-FTSE equalling 0. The tests are 
carried out for the yearly and the quarterly panels. 
 
Sample Null Hypothesis Variable Mean St. Error t-statistic p-value Obs. 
Yearly Panel 
Equity Funds 
Difference in 
Means=0 
Return 0.255 0.019 13.740 0.0000 
21072 
Sigma 0.918 0.019 48.765 0.0000 
Mean=0 
RFund-RFTSE 0.255 0.008 32.735 0.0000 
M2-FTSE 0.279 0.007 41.636 0.0000 
Emerging 
Equity Funds 
Difference in 
Means=0 
Return 0.995 0.150 6.646 0.0000 
714 
Sigma 2.920 0.119 24.486 0.0000 
Mean=0 
RFund-RFTSE 0.995 0.073 13.656 0.0000 
M2-FTSE 0.904 0.038 24.043 0.0000 
International 
Equity Funds 
Difference in 
Means=0 
Return 0.251 0.024 10.415 0.0000 
11611 
Sigma 1.212 0.026 47.489 0.0000 
Mean=0 
RFund-RFTSE 0.251 0.012 21.220 0.0000 
M2-FTSE 0.260 0.011 24.611 0.0000 
UK Equity 
Funds 
Difference in 
Means=0 
Return 0.200 0.029 6.971 0.0000 
8747 
Sigma 0.364 0.027 13.573 0.0000 
Mean=0 
RFund-RFTSE 0.200 0.008 24.836 0.0000 
M2-FTSE 0.254 0.007 35.383 0.0000 
Quarterly Panel 
Equity Funds 
Difference in 
Means=0 
Return 0.272 0.015 17.845 0.0000 
82160 
Sigma 0.766 0.014 56.407 0.0000 
Mean=0 
RFund-RFTSE 0.272 0.007 40.526 0.0000 
M2-FTSE 0.340 0.012 29.115 0.0000 
Emerging 
Equity Funds 
Difference in 
Means=0 
Return 1.079 0.107 10.042 0.0000 
2767 
Sigma 2.776 0.093 29.735 0.0000 
Mean=0 
RFund-RFTSE 1.079 0.058 18.598 0.0000 
M2-FTSE 1.114 0.057 19.388 0.0000 
International 
Equity Funds 
Difference in 
Means=0 
Return 0.268 0.021 13.025 0.0000 
45250 
Sigma 1.081 0.019 57.968 0.0000 
Mean=0 
RFund-RFTSE 0.268 0.010 26.187 0.0000 
M2-FTSE 0.298 0.017 17.227 0.0000 
UK Equity 
Funds 
Difference in 
Means=0 
Return 0.213 0.023 9.258 0.0000 
34143 
Sigma 0.185 0.019 9.564 0.0000 
Mean=0 
RFund-RFTSE 0.213 0.007 29.005 0.0000 
M2-FTSE 0.334 0.016 21.413 0.0000 
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Table 3.13 also shows that all types of the equity funds significantly outperform the FTSE All 
Shares index. The average difference-in-returns and the average M2 are significantly 
different from 0 for all samples. However, the regression results of specification (1) shown in 
Table 3.14 show that the international equity funds do not outperform the FTSE All Shares 
index. The only exception is the risk-adjusted outperformance in the quarterly panel which is 
statistically significant at the 10%. Still, it is lower than the outperformance of both the 
emerging and the UK equity funds. The emerging equity funds are by far the highest 
performing equity funds. 
 
 
Table 3.14. The estimated constant coefficient for specification (1), sorted by panel, sample, and performance 
measure. The R
2
-within is in all cases 0 and the F-test for the significance of the regression is not applicable. 
The FTSE All Shares index is the benchmark. The estimated coefficients for the yearly and quarterly panel are 
presented. The results are obtained using Driscoll-Kraay standard errors and fund fixed effects. P-values are in 
parentheses (* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01). 
 
 
Constant Coefficient 
  
Sample RFund-RFTSE M2-FTSE Funds Obs. 
Yearly Panel 
Equity Funds 0.2549*** 0.2794** 3571 21072 
(0.001) (0.042) 
Emerging Equity 
Funds 
0.9951*** 0.9036*** 183 714 
(0.005) (0.000) 
International Equity 
Funds 
0.2509 0.2599 1892 11611 
(0.120) (0.235) 
UK Equity Funds 0.1997*** 0.2543*** 1496 8747 
(0.001) (0.000) 
Quarterly Panel 
Equity Funds 0.2723*** 0.3404*** 3617 82160 
(0.006) (0.005) 
Emerging Equity 
Funds 
1.0795** 1.1139*** 186 2767 
(0.023) (0.003) 
International Equity 
Funds 
0.2680 0.2977* 1918 45250 
(0.124) (0.076) 
UK Equity Funds 0.2127** 0.3342** 1513 34143 
(0.018) (0.040) 
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Tables 3.15.A-B show the regression results of specification (4) for the all equity, the 
emerging, the international, and the UK equity samples using the square root function.
32
 The 
first table presents the results from the yearly panel whereas the second those from the 
quarterly panel. Appendix K reports the same results for the other three age functions.  
 
The impressive outperformance of the emerging equity funds turns insignificant and in two 
occasions M2 becomes negative. The insignificant outperformance of the international equity 
funds turns to significant underperformance. For both the yearly and the quarterly panels the 
constant coefficient for M2 ranges between -26% and -34% so that international funds 
definitely underperform the domestic stock market. However, the UK equity funds do better. 
The constant for M2 in the quarterly panel is positive and significant at the 5% level 
(although in the yearly panel it is insignificant). Still, it should be reminded that the results of 
the quarterly panel have to be treated with care since they contain more noise than those of 
the yearly panel. 
 
The results for the all equity sample show very little explanatory power. Particularly for the 
yearly panel there are only two coefficients out of all regressions that are statistically 
significant but these do not persist across different specifications. There is more to be said 
about the quarterly panel results. The regressions for the difference-in-returns measure of 
performance have little or no statistical significance but, the M2 regressions are highly 
significant. The PPB bull market dummy has a very strong effect on M2. When the fund’s 
PPB market goes through a bullish period, these funds outperform the FTSE by about 0.9%. 
At the same time performance doesn’t change during a PPB bear period. Thus, even if there 
is poor timing relative to the PPB (indicated by results in the previous part) managers seem to 
do better relative to the FTSE under changing conditions. 
 
There is no direct relationship between M2 and fund’s age or an indirect one with the 
provider’s age interactions. The only exception is the interaction with the 15-20 year old 
provider dummy which is significant using the logarithmic function and only marginally 
insignificant for the other age functions. This interaction has a negative sign implying a 
                                                          
32
 These results refer to the unrestricted samples. The results under the restriction that fund’s age is up to 5 years 
are very similar for both yearly and quarterly panels and are not shown for brevity. 
104 
 
slightly convex relationship between M2 and fund’s age for providers that are 15-20 years old 
relative to the 20+ group. Of course, as this is marginally significant at the 10% level it is not 
considered to be hard evidence. Nevertheless, there is one point to be made. There is 
practically no change in performance relative to the FTSE over time whereas equity funds are 
found to catch-up with their PPBs. No matter if there are PPB selection issues, managers 
seem to really take care how funds perform relative to the PPB whereas performance relative 
to the domestic stock market appears to be far less important. 
 
The interaction between the fund’s age and the PPB bear dummy has a positive sign for the 
M2. Given that there is no relationship between M2 and fund’s age, this coefficient means 
that older funds do better relative to the FTSE than younger funds when the PPB market is 
bearish. This is an indication that experience matters when it comes to handling changing 
market conditions. 
 
Contrary to the all equity sample, the results for the subsamples are very rich. The yearly 
panel results for the emerging equity funds show that performance relative to the FTSE has a 
direct concave relationship to fund’s age. This relationship is much stronger for the risk-
adjusted outperformance and suggests that emerging equity funds need time to catch-up with 
the FTSE. This may well be expected particularly in view that emerging equity is one of the 
youngest investment styles. Consequently, there is a period of adjustment as in Bauer et al. 
(2005) during which knowledge and experience need to be accumulated in order to catch up 
with the more established domestic equity market. 
 
Nevertheless, there is one group of providers whose funds’ performance has a convex 
relationship with fund’s age. The 0-5 year old dummy is positive and statistically 
significantly different from the 20+ group for all specifications. Providers that are up to 5 
years old significantly outperform the FTSE relative to the oldest providers both in raw and 
risk-adjusted terms. Moreover, the interaction between this dummy and fund’s age is 
significant for all specifications and has a negative sign as the main hypothesis would predict. 
Note that the difference-in-returns and the M2 for all providers (direct relationship) have 
almost equal slopes (1.0164 and 1.001).  
105 
 
These results reveal how differently young funds perform when they are operated by a young 
provider. Particularly the shape of the difference-in-returns is what the main hypothesis 
predicts: initial outperformance which gradually settles down at a lower level. Although the 
direct relationship with fund’s age does not appear in the quarterly sample the interaction 
with the young providers’ group does. It seems that providers who have recently entered this 
industry put in an effort to make their newly opened emerging equity fund shine relative to 
the FTSE – at least more so than providers that are more than 20 years old. Note that a similar 
result was found for performance relative to the PPB although the relationship was found 
only for the difference-in-returns and was less strong. Perhaps, performance relative to the 
domestic stock market is perceived to be more effective in attracting policyholders than 
performance relative to the PPB for emerging equity funds.  
 
Concerning market conditions, bear markets have a negative effect on outperformance 
whereas bull markets don’t. This negative effect is stronger for the quarterly panel. The 
interaction between the bear market dummy and fund’s age is positive, consistent with the 
hypothesis that managers try harder and catch up faster under bearish conditions (given the 
overall concave relationship with fund’s age).  
 
Finally, there is indication that the provider’s size has a positive effect and the provider’s 
market share a negative effect on fund performance. These results are consistent with what is 
found for performance relative to the PPB implying that availability of resources (size) and 
competition (market share) have an impact on fund performance no matter what the 
benchmark is. 
 
The results for international equity funds show that their performance relative to the FTSE is 
not directly related to fund’s age. Particularly the yearly panel results indicate that mostly 
market conditions can make a difference. Bear market conditions appear to have a positive 
effect on M2. Given that international equity funds generally underperform the FTSE 
(constant of about -24%) this means that underperformance is reduced under bearish 
conditions. At the same time, the quarterly panel results show that funds reduce their 
underperformance during bull years. A possible explanation for this is the high correlation 
between international stock markets (Bartran and Bodnar, 2009) so that a bear/bull PPB 
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market probably means that there is bear/bull FTSE market as well. Thus, the performance of 
international equity funds comes closer to the performance of the FTSE (on risk-adjusted 
terms) under such market conditions.   
 
Another point that exists in both panels is that the ABI’s share within the provider has a 
positive effect on performance, which also appeared for performance relative to the PPB. 
This is again a case where a provider characteristic can have a general effect on fund 
performance irrespective of what the benchmark is. 
 
The provider’s age dummies show that younger providers perform better (or underperform 
less) relative to the FTSE than older providers. Providers that are up to 5 years old have no 
statistically different performance from the 20+ group. However, providers that are between 5 
and 10 years old have the lowest risk-adjusted underperformance at approximately -12.7%. 
Providers between 10 and 15 years old underperform by about -15% and providers that are 
between 15 and 20 years old underperform by about -21% (all relative to the 20+ group). 
 
From the interactions between the provider’s age dummies and the fund’s age only that of the 
15-20 year group is significantly different from the 20+ group. The coefficient is negative 
indicating a convex relationship between M2 and fund’s age for these providers. Considering 
that they are already underperforming the FTSE by 21% this means that the 
underperformance widens with fund’s age in comparison to that of 20+ year old providers. 
Interestingly, this convex relationship for the specific age group appears relative to the PPB 
as well. This indicates that there is some effort at the beginning of the fund’s life which 
eventually diminishes but this change does not happen for younger providers. Maybe old 
providers can afford to reduce their effort once they consider the fund’s reputation to be 
sufficiently established more than younger providers do.  
 
The results for the UK equity funds are very similar to the corresponding ones with the PPB 
as benchmark. It is reasonable to expect that many of the funds investing in UK equity use 
the FTSE All Shares index as a PPB. Moreover, any other FTSE index used as a PPB e.g. 
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FTSE 100, has a high correlation with the FTSE All Shares index and thus, it will make little 
difference which of the two is used as benchmark.  
 
Performance is again related to fund’s age through its interaction with the 10-15 year old 
provider dummy. Additionally, the results for the yearly panel show that providers up to 5 
years old have a significant interaction with fund’s age. The relationship between fund 
performance and fund’s age is concave indicating that inexperienced providers go through a 
catching up period relative to the 20+ group. However, they seem to catch up faster than the 
10-15 year old providers; the coefficient of their interaction with fund’s age is in all cases 
higher than that of the older group. Hence, there is again consistency with the hypothesis that 
younger providers put in more effort to perform well than older providers, based on the 
assumption that news about their performance is more valuable to the market. 
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Table 3.15.A. Results for the equity fund samples with           √      . The FTSE All Shares index is the 
benchmark. The panel observations have a yearly frequency. The results are obtained using Driscoll-Kraay standard 
errors and fund fixed effects. P-values are in parentheses (* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01).  
 
Sample Equity Emerging International UK 
Dependent RFund-RFTSE M2-FTSE RFund-RFTSE M2-FTSE RFund-RFTSE M2-FTSE RFund-RFTSE M2-FTSE 
Constant -0.3696 -0.4618 -0.6905 -1.1414* -1.4738 -1.8229* 0.4878 0.5642 
 
(0.541) (0.443) (0.432) (0.056) (0.132) (0.072) (0.311) (0.199) 
          0.0949 0.0601 0.8841 0.8191** 0.2913 0.1463 -0.0719 0.0093 
 
(0.528) (0.729) (0.107) (0.029) (0.261) (0.577) (0.396) (0.919) 
        -0.0706 0.4517 -3.9421*** -0.6764 0.6250 1.1893* -0.3017* -0.0559 
 
(0.757) (0.242) (0.000) (0.112) (0.210) (0.055) (0.060) (0.813) 
        0.2887 0.0756 0.3591 0.2052 0.6639* 0.5126 -0.0463 -0.2909 
 
(0.175) (0.771) (0.509) (0.736) (0.056) (0.123) (0.767) (0.174) 
          -0.0086 -0.0537 0.0432 0.1227 -0.0561 -0.0440 -0.0065 -0.0770 
 
(0.931) (0.598) (0.831) (0.180) (0.801) (0.819) (0.911) (0.231) 
           0.0083 -0.0069 0.0227 -0.0002 0.0048 -0.0255 0.0147* 0.0089 
 
(0.451) (0.446) (0.259) (0.986) (0.890) (0.366) (0.075) (0.229) 
              0.0047 0.0054 -0.0620 -0.0750 0.0269 0.0342** 0.0003 0.0005 
 
(0.696) (0.652) (0.352) (0.153) (0.155) (0.047) (0.979) (0.947) 
        0.1944 0.6428 5.1746*** 4.0275*** 1.0859 1.2821 -0.7544** 0.0577 
 (0.720) (0.204) (0.000) (0.000) (0.289) (0.197) (0.040) (0.854) 
         -0.2137 0.3336 -2.5628 0.4064 0.2406 0.6750 -0.3159 0.1998 
 (0.630) (0.383) (0.469) (0.796) (0.734) (0.293) (0.295) (0.483) 
          -0.2144 -0.1498 -0.2993 0.7148 0.3329 0.3284 -0.8051*** -0.7209*** 
 (0.624) (0.728) (0.643) (0.294) (0.638) (0.616) (0.000) (0.000) 
          -0.0975 0.0529 -0.0989 0.9715 -0.0909 0.1361 -0.1459 -0.0403 
 (0.673) (0.814) (0.909) (0.147) (0.798) (0.702) (0.357) (0.748) 
                  0.1561 -0.0468 -2.9970*** -1.3084*** -0.3206 -0.4172 0.4894* 0.0804 
 (0.517) (0.855) (0.000) (0.008) (0.515) (0.418) (0.051) (0.709) 
                   0.1382 -0.0407 2.8193 1.2893 -0.0022 -0.1444 0.0215 -0.1567 
 (0.267) (0.764) (0.175) (0.144) (0.993) (0.509) (0.888) (0.357) 
                    0.0901 0.0974 0.2901 0.0935 -0.0751 -0.0476 0.2419*** 0.2403*** 
 (0.471) (0.433) (0.467) (0.793) (0.722) (0.802) (0.001) (0.001) 
                    0.0043 -0.0121 -0.2884 -0.4046 0.0135 -0.0176 0.0273 0.0116 
 (0.947) (0.846) (0.465) (0.112) (0.892) (0.857) (0.653) (0.834) 
                    0.0037 0.0175 -0.0037 -0.0194 0.0179 0.0205 -0.0024 0.0164 
 (0.847) (0.379) (0.941) (0.436) (0.673) (0.569) (0.826) (0.171) 
                  0.0565 0.0543 0.5691*** 0.1502 -0.0852 -0.0405 0.0779** 0.0491 
 (0.479) (0.363) (0.002) (0.269) (0.416) (0.660) (0.025) (0.262) 
                  -0.0234 -0.0072 -0.1677 -0.2139 -0.0751 -0.0786 -0.0022 0.0263 
 (0.653) (0.898) (0.336) (0.171) (0.357) (0.302) (0.954) (0.608) 
     0.2890 0.5177    0.8242 1.3098 -0.2035 -0.1926 
 (0.609) (0.369)    (0.352) (0.170) (0.599) (0.591) 
     -0.1166 -0.0533 0.4537 0.4758 -0.3597 -0.1164 0.1198 0.0512 
 
(0.696) (0.835) (0.643) (0.495) (0.412) (0.728) (0.531) (0.770) 
R2 within 0.0148 0.0770 0.5654 0.3389 0.0374 0.1515 0.0216 0.0579 
F-statistic 6.6348 17.3198 4851374.58
27 
6492.9893 14.3008 4.3257 20.6857 26.7723 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002 0.0000 0.0000 
Funds 3571 3571 183 183 1892 1892 1496 1496 
Observations 20985 20985 713 713 11574 11574 8698 8698 
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Table 3.15.B. Results for the equity fund samples with           √      . The FTSE All Shares index is the 
benchmark. The panel observations have a quarterly frequency. The results are obtained using Driscoll-Kraay standard 
errors and fund fixed effects. P-values are in parentheses (* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01). 
 
Sample Equity Emerging International UK 
Dependent RFund-RFTSE M2-FTSE RFund-RFTSE M2-FTSE RFund-RFTSE M2-FTSE RFund-RFTSE M2-FTSE 
Constant 0.0070 -0.3582 0.2562 -0.2049 -0.8073 -2.4981** 0.7994 2.0559** 
 
(0.992) (0.636) (0.838) (0.869) (0.444) (0.042) (0.110) (0.026) 
          -0.0567 0.0301 0.5481 -0.1039 0.0200 0.1925 -0.1577 -0.0650 
 
(0.758) (0.876) (0.399) (0.841) (0.935) (0.482) (0.209) (0.688) 
        -0.3701 -0.0528 -4.2509*** -1.4949* -0.0481 0.3505 -0.3373 -0.4517 
 
(0.114) (0.884) (0.000) (0.062) (0.856) (0.458) (0.412) (0.490) 
        -0.0704 0.8600*** -0.6446 -0.0514 0.0548 1.1914*** -0.2094 0.4567 
 
(0.759) (0.000) (0.377) (0.941) (0.803) (0.008) (0.566) (0.263) 
          0.0417 -0.0097 0.1504 0.2620 0.0463 0.2103 0.0083 -0.2886 
 
(0.584) (0.923) (0.576) (0.418) (0.754) (0.104) (0.904) (0.127) 
           -0.0061 -0.0075 -0.0044 -0.0723*** -0.0157 -0.0319 -0.0007 0.0101 
 
(0.635) (0.579) (0.864) (0.003) (0.739) (0.464) (0.941) (0.480) 
              0.0009 0.0126 -0.0141 0.1306 0.0130 0.0779** 0.0013 -0.0167 
 
(0.942) (0.381) (0.904) (0.280) (0.708) (0.034) (0.908) (0.355) 
        0.5390 0.1006 4.5603*** 7.4398*** 0.8421 0.1693 -0.2009 -0.8403 
 (0.235) (0.890) (0.004) (0.000) (0.191) (0.871) (0.551) (0.315) 
         -0.3341 0.6119 -2.5102 0.3548 -0.0755 1.3956* -0.2643 -0.1896 
 (0.531) (0.288) (0.406) (0.889) (0.905) (0.067) (0.473) (0.713) 
          0.0227 0.1837 0.3772 0.9979 0.5831 1.1679 -0.6897** -0.9570** 
 (0.964) (0.733) (0.837) (0.514) (0.404) (0.107) (0.016) (0.019) 
          -0.0309 0.4005 -0.5034 -0.1356 0.0715 0.7954* -0.2036 0.0067 
 (0.913) (0.187) (0.725) (0.893) (0.858) (0.066) (0.257) (0.979) 
                  -0.1993 0.1574 -2.2935** -2.6000** -0.4198 0.2798 0.0369 0.0847 
 (0.342) (0.653) (0.013) (0.028) (0.209) (0.594) (0.848) (0.821) 
                   0.1134 -0.1790 2.3245 2.1608 -0.0065 -0.4314 -0.0223 -0.1474 
 (0.486) (0.363) (0.215) (0.186) (0.979) (0.172) (0.854) (0.461) 
                    -0.0120 -0.0188 0.1327 0.8262 -0.2208 -0.3101 0.2042*** 0.2129* 
 (0.931) (0.902) (0.849) (0.162) (0.315) (0.200) (0.005) (0.051) 
                    -0.0194 -0.1291 -0.0556 0.2603 -0.0624 -0.2158* 0.0499 -0.0554 
 (0.804) (0.107) (0.925) (0.590) (0.601) (0.099) (0.225) (0.545) 
                    -0.0078 0.0153 -0.0519 -0.0929 -0.0036 -0.0212 -0.0063 0.0614* 
 (0.630) (0.472) (0.413) (0.207) (0.882) (0.379) (0.626) (0.076) 
                  0.0557 0.1094** 0.3310* 0.2238 -0.0422 0.1269 0.0759 0.0072 
 (0.392) (0.045) (0.071) (0.178) (0.554) (0.124) (0.175) (0.895) 
                  0.0521 0.0089 0.2232 0.1915 0.0790 0.0415 -0.0027 -0.1053 
 (0.229) (0.885) (0.249) (0.217) (0.115) (0.575) (0.955) (0.222) 
     0.3101 -0.1730    0.9088 0.5893 -0.2553 -1.1123* 
 (0.587) (0.771)    (0.280) (0.518) (0.556) (0.086) 
     0.0850 0.2376 0.6608 1.6200 -0.0855 0.0850 0.2404 0.4439 
 
(0.849) (0.624) (0.613) (0.144) (0.895) (0.904) (0.289) (0.282) 
R2 within 0.0048 0.0179 0.2654 0.0622 0.0083 0.0334 0.0100 0.0166 
F-statistic 1.5290 3.1725 7.1484 5.9471 0.9310 2.4813 3.5268 2.2622 
p-value 0.0877 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.5466 0.0016 0.0000 0.0042 
Funds 3617 3617 186 186 1918 1918 1513 1513 
Observations 82149 82149 2767 2767 45246 45246 34136 34136 
 
 
 
 
 
110 
 
3.4. Discussion 
 
The primary objective of this chapter was to explore whether fund performance changes with 
the fund’s age. The main hypothesis states that fund performance is at its highest when funds 
are young. The premise for this conjecture is in the career concern theory which stresses the 
importance of good news when there is no or limited information about the past performance. 
Following from this it can be expected that superior performance of funds is particularly 
important when they are young, and therefore they may deliver better results at the beginning 
of their operational life, than when they are ‘mature’.  
 
There are several points that emerged from the analysis presented. First, descriptive statistics 
show that funds in the UK personal pension fund industry outperform their benchmarks. 
Regression analysis shows that the chosen variables explain most of this outperformance. 
 
Second, controlling for market conditions is more important for a performance measure such 
as the Sharpe ratio than performance relative to a benchmark. Moreover, bear market 
conditions seem to affect performance more strongly than bull market conditions and, overall, 
there is a slight indication that managers have poor timing skills. This, however, seems not to 
be the case for younger funds. Using the restriction that funds are up to 5 years old shows that 
funds can outperform (although only in nominal terms) their benchmarks in bear markets, but 
most importantly outperform their benchmarks in bull markets. As such, poor timing may be 
more relevant the older a fund becomes. 
 
Third, fund provider’s characteristics covary with fund performance. The most prominent 
result obtained both in the analysis with and without the restriction on fund’s age, is that fund 
performance increases with provider’s size and with the degree of the provider’s 
specialization in the fund’s investment style. These provider’s characteristics are among the 
most important explanatory variables. 
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Fourth, the regulatory changes have had an effect on fund performance. The introduction of 
personal pension funds appears to have positively affected performance of the allocation 
funds. The introduction of stakeholder schemes has had a negative effect on performance of 
the international equity funds and the young emerging equity funds. However, it positively 
impacted on the performance of the UK equity funds.  
 
The last and most important point is that performance is related to fund’s age but this 
relationship exists almost exclusively through the interaction between fund’s age and 
provider’s age. Fund’s age is individually significant for the fixed income and the emerging 
equity funds when all the available observations are used in the analysis, but becomes 
significant for all the investment types if only the first five years of a fund’s life are used in 
the analysis. Taken as a whole, the relationship between performance and fund’s age is 
convex for the fixed income funds, as the main hypothesis predicts, but it is concave for the 
equity funds. Nevertheless, the concave shape is not inconsistent with the hypothesis. A 
possible explanation of the concave shape is offered by Bauer et al. (2005). They argue that 
funds need some time to ‘catch-up’ with their benchmarks possibly due to learning. The fact 
that funds eventually catch-up and settle at higher levels indicates that there was increased 
effort at the beginning of the fund’s operations which subsided once fund performance 
reached a certain level.  
 
Fund performance varies over time and the way it changes is related to the value of 
information which decreases with time. Provider’s age is found to be a very important factor 
in this. Overall, there seems to be a balance between effort and experience where younger 
providers put in more effort but lack experience and older providers put in potentially less 
effort but are more experienced. The relationship between fund performance and fund’s age 
changes according to the age of the provider. The shift in this balance between effort and 
experience depends on whether the restriction on fund’s age is imposed or not. 
 
This chapter makes several contributions. On a practical level, it provides empirical evidence 
that defined contribution pension schemes on average outperform their benchmarks – 
although some benchmark selections issues may be possible. This has implications for 
employees wanting to choose between different options for their pension provision. It has 
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also implications for policymakers particularly in view of the increasing trend to close 
defined benefit plans and replace them with defined contribution schemes. 
 
Moreover, it contributes to related research on fund performance in various ways. First, it 
provides evidence that fund’s age is important and should not be overlooked. Particularly the 
first years of fund performance should be included in the analysis as they differ from the 
latter periods in the fund’s life. Additionally, the analysis proposes three ways to assess fund 
performance that are outside the CAPM-APT framework. These are especially useful in 
absence of detailed information on the fund’s portfolio allocation.  
 
There are also some limitations of the provided analysis all arising from a lack of 
information. First, the experience of the fund manager is not controlled for. This could be 
proxied by the age of the manager, the length of tenure in the fund, the career length, 
education etc. These are factors that are found to have an effect on fund performance (Golec, 
1996; Chevalier and Ellison, 1999a) and would make for a more complete model. Second, the 
size of the fund measured by assets under management could also be a valuable addition. A 
review by Musalem and Pasquini (2009) documents that size measured in this way plays a 
role. Moreover, Ippolito and Turner (1987), Ambachtsheer et al. (1998), and Blake et al. 
(1998) show that fund size has a positive effect on risk-adjusted fund returns. Third, the 
performance is not measured net of fees. However, there is work that shows how 
outperformance can disappear or turn into underperformance when fees are accounted for 
(Daniel et al., 1997; Wermers, 2000; Tonks, 2005). Nevertheless, this relates to the 
assessment of general performance and may not be an important omission here. If fees do not 
change with time, the same relationship with fund’s age should be observed gross or net of 
fees. 
 
Finally, the findings of this chapter open the way for further research. First, future work can 
investigate in detail how learning is related to main hypothesis. This would involve a method 
that approximates effort, for example, by measuring the rate of catching-up. It would also be 
of interest (particularly within an agency theory framework) to examine which factors affect 
this rate e.g. managerial compensation. Moreover, peer analysis may reveal new dimensions 
in the time pattern that performance follows. This can be done on two levels. First, 
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performance could be measured against an industry average e.g. sector averages provided by 
the ABI. Second, performance of new funds could be measured against performance of old 
funds with similar characteristics. Lastly, the findings in this chapter indicated that there may 
be some issues with benchmark selection. Future work may investigate how benchmarks are 
chosen, e.g. how often an index is included in a benchmark, what are the differences between 
the fund’s portfolio and the selected benchmark etc.  
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CHAPTER 4: PERFORMANCE AND OUTSOURCING 
 
This chapter studies the role of outsourcing in the UK personal pension fund industry. The 
first section discusses outsourcing within economic theory and goes over to literature looking 
at its application in fund management. It concludes with the hypothesis that internally and 
externally managed funds are expected to have the same risk-adjusted performance. 
Moreover, the performance of each group is expected to have the same relationship with 
fund’s age. The second section documents the development of outsourcing in this sector and 
shows that although it is a comparatively recent phenomenon it has become the dominant 
management practice. Additionally, it describes the methodology used to test the main two 
hypotheses and provides some descriptive statistics to compare the performance of internally 
and externally managed funds. The last section reports the results of regression analysis and 
concludes with a discussion of current limitations and future research directions.  
 
4.1. Literature review and hypothesis statement 
 
Outsourcing is generally understood to be the purchase of services from an external agent as 
opposed to delivering these services within the ‘buyer’ organisation. The external agent can 
be domestic or foreign. In the latter case outsourcing is also known as ‘offshoring’ (Olsen, 
2006) and is the subject of intense debate and certainly more controversial than outsourcing 
domestically (Samuelson, 2004; Mankiw and Swagel, 2006). In any case, outsourcing can 
add value to a company in various ways, such as reducing costs and accessing skills that are 
not available internally (Bryce and Useem, 1998). The external agent benefits as well mainly 
through economies of scale achieved by bringing together services offered to different 
companies (Loh and Venkatraman, 1992; Bryce and Useem, 1998).  
 
Outsourcing in the fund management framework falls under the theory of management 
delegation. The larger part of related literature explores issues arising from delegating 
decisions to an internal manager (e.g. Palomino and Prat, 2003; Stracca, 2006; Basak et al., 
2007). Nevertheless, delegating fund management to external professionals is considered to 
be even more complicated. Lakonishok et al. (1992) study US pension funds whose trustees 
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commission money managers instead of hiring in-house professionals. They argue that this 
creates a ‘double agency’ problem where the employee delegates pension fund management 
to the trustees, who in turn delegate the investment decisions to an external manager.  
 
Despite this double agency problem, this type of management has been on the rise 
particularly in the US, the Netherlands, and the UK (Shackleton, 2011). For example, Tkac 
(2007) points out that one of the recent innovations in the US mutual fund industry is the use 
of ‘subadvisory contracts’. Hiring independent wealth management companies has been on 
the rise: Tkac reports that 17% of mutual funds had such arrangement in 2006 compared to 
12% in 2002 and only 7% in 1996. Shackleton (2011) comments that in the Netherlands 89% 
of pension fund assets have changed from internal to external management since 2002. A 
similar trend is observed in the occupational pension fund industry in the UK. Avrahampour 
(2007) reports that only 5 of the 50 largest occupational pension funds were internally 
managed in 2006, whereas there were 22 in 1981. This decline in internal management is 
matched by an increase of the number of companies hired as external managers. In 1981 a 
pension fund would hire at most 7 external managers whereas in 2006 there were funds hiring 
as many as 32 management firms.  
 
Although the rise of external fund management is documented, it has not been studied in 
detail by fund performance literature. To the author’s knowledge the first work done on this 
is by Chen et al. (2006) who explicitly investigate the performance of outsourced US mutual 
funds. They find that externally managed funds significantly underperform those that are 
internally managed. This result is robust to different specifications including an adjustment 
for management fees. They also find that fund closure after a period of poor performance is 
more likely for outsourced funds.  
 
Nonetheless, Cashman and Deli (2009) who also examine US mutual funds argue that 
outsourced or ‘sub-advised’ funds will outperform their internal counterparts if the 
investment style calls for ‘specific knowledge’. They draw this argument from Jensen and 
Meckling (1992) who define it as “knowledge that is costly to transfer among agents” and 
therefore “requires decentralising many decision rights in both the economy and in firms”. 
Cashman and Deli identify two categories of funds that may require ‘specific knowledge’. 
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The first category is funds that invest in international markets and, thus, require regional 
knowledge. The second category refers to domestic funds that invest in assets that are “harder 
to value”, e.g. they consider corporate bonds to be harder to value than government bonds. 
Similar to Chen et al. (2006) they find that outsourced funds underperform the internal ones. 
However, they show that when accounting for the need of specific knowledge, this 
underperformance is reduced.  
 
Further work on US mutual funds by Duong (2010) contradicts the findings of Chen et al. as 
well as Cashman and Deli.
33
 Duong finds no difference in the performance of external and 
internal funds. Moreover, no evidence is found that external funds are more likely to be 
closed following a period of poor performance. Still, external funds underperform internal 
funds in a subsample of companies that manage funds in-house and provide management 
services to other mutual funds. Duong argues that this underperformance is due to companies 
focusing more on the internal funds.  
 
The above findings are inconsistent with what theory would suggest. In fact, Cashman and 
Deli (2009) point out that this could not exist in a truly competitive environment. It may be 
that fund performance can be affected by the managers’ personal characteristics (Golec, 
1996; Chevalier and Ellison, 1997) or by the fund family characteristics (Massa, 2003; Chen 
et al., 2004). However, there is nothing to indicate that these types of characteristics differ on 
average between pension fund providers and external money management companies. 
Therefore, it is expected that there is no difference between the performance of internally 
managed funds and that of externally managed funds in the UK personal pension industry. 
Moreover, as a step further from the past research, it is also expected that the same factors 
explain fund performance independently of management type. This also applies to fund’s age, 
i.e. fund performance is expected to have a convex relationship with fund’s age for both 
internal and external funds. The rationale for the first case is that pension providers wish to 
attract potential policyholders and thus, their internal managers put in extra effort to make 
young funds perform as high as possible. As time goes by, the market has a better picture of 
these funds’ quality and the effort level gradually declines. The exact same argument applies 
for money management companies who instead of policyholders wish to attract other pension 
                                                          
33
 The samples of Chen et al. (2006) and Duong (2010) cover the period 1994-2004. The sample in Cashman 
and Deli (2009) covers the years 1998-2005.  
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providers. In this case, managers put in more effort for young funds to signal their managerial 
quality and skill to pension providers. 
 
4.2. Methodology and descriptive analysis  
 
This section has two parts. The first part, describes briefly the applied methodology. The 
second part starts with a documentation of how management outsourcing has developed in 
this industry. It continues with a descriptive analysis which compares the performance of 
internally managed funds to the performance of externally managed funds. 
 
4.2.1. Methodology 
 
The methodology applied in this chapter is the same as the one applied in Chapter 3. Fund 
performance is measured with the Sharpe ratio, the difference-in-returns and the M2 
measures. The benchmark for all investment styles is each fund’s PPB. Additionally, the 
performance of equity groups is measured against the FTSE All Shares index for comparison 
purposes. The distributions of the Sharpe ratio and the M2 measure have been winsorized by 
0.5% in order to adjust for outliers. Finally, the frequency of observations is reduced from a 
monthly to a yearly panel using the average cumulative monthly returns formula.  
 
However, there is a very important difference from the methodology in the previous chapter. 
Here, each sample is separated into two subsamples according to the funds’ management 
type. For example the equity sample is split into the internally managed equity funds 
subsample and the externally managed equity funds subsample. This way the properties of 
each can be studied in more detail. In particular, this allows the comparison of the factors that 
affect the performance of each subsample. 
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4.2.2. Descriptive analysis  
 
In the Morningstar
TM
 database, the name of pension funds that are externally managed starts 
with the form “name of company A” / “name of company B”. The name of company A 
indicates who the provider is. The name of company B indicates the fund management firm. 
For example, a fund with name “Alico/BlackRock US Dynamic Pen” implies that the fund 
provider is the insurance company Alico and the fund portfolio is managed by the wealth 
management company BlackRock. This means that investors contribute to a pension fund 
bought from Alico and in turn Alico channels the contributions into a fund run by BlackRock. 
Investors will deal with the pension provider alone (i.e., Alico) and not with the underlying 
fund manager (i.e., BlackRock). 
 
All externally managed funds in the sample have been identified by checking the name of 
each fund separately. From the total 12,307 funds available at the end of 2009, 5,040 are 
internally managed and 7,267 are externally managed. So the management of about 60% of 
all funds is outsourced. Figure 4.1 is a reproduction of Figure 2.6 where funds are sorted by 
management type. This figure shows that although a small number of funds had been 
outsourced through the 1960s-1990s, the proportion of outsourced funds has increased 
dramatically in the recent years. In more detail, in 1980 only 22 funds were managed 
externally. This number had increased to 235 by 1990 and then to 739 by 2000.  By the end 
of 2009 it exploded to 7,267 funds. This is an increase of almost 900% within only nine 
years. Indeed, in 2000 almost 80% of the newly incepted funds were still internally managed. 
In 2001 approximately the same number of internally and externally managed new funds was 
opened. In 2005 more than 80% of newly opened funds were run externally. This trend 
continued in the following years up to the end of 2009 whereas internally managed funds 
continued opening at a rate similar to that before 2000. This clearly shows that providers have 
developed a strong preference for external management.  
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Figure 4.1. Number of internally and externally managed pension funds opened each year in the period 1968-
2009. Source: Own calculations using Morningstar Direct
TM
 data. 
 
 
 
A more careful look at the data reveals that providers have also a clear preference for 
outsourcing particular investment styles. Table 4.1 shows the ratio of externally to internally 
managed funds for broad and narrow investment categories. In terms of broad investment 
style, equity and specialist funds are significantly more outsourced than the other types. 
Money market and protected funds are predominantly internally managed, while 20-30% of 
allocation and fixed income funds are externally managed. Real estate funds are equally 
distributed between internal and external management. The breakdown into narrow 
investment sectors shows a more distinct pattern. International investment types are 
significantly more outsourced than UK-focused funds for any asset class. This especially the 
case for emerging equity funds where over 90% of funds is externally managed.  
 
 
 
 
 
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1600
1800
1
9
6
8
1
9
6
9
1
9
7
0
1
9
7
1
1
9
7
2
1
9
7
3
1
9
7
4
1
9
7
5
1
9
7
6
1
9
7
7
1
9
7
8
1
9
7
9
1
9
8
0
1
9
8
1
1
9
8
2
1
9
8
3
1
9
8
4
1
9
8
5
1
9
8
6
1
9
8
7
1
9
8
8
1
9
8
9
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
1
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
3
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
7
1
9
9
8
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
8
2
0
0
9
N
u
m
b
e
r 
o
f 
fu
n
d
s
Internal External
120 
 
Table 4.1. The number of internally and externally managed personal pension funds per investment sector. The 
last column is the ratio of the number of externally managed funds over the number of internally managed 
funds. Numbers refer to the entire sample. Source: Own calculations using Morningstar Direct
TM
 data. 
 
 
 
Number of internally 
managed funds (IN) 
Number of externally 
managed funds (EX) 
Ratio EX / IN 
Broad investment sector 4715 7248 1.5 
Allocation 1215 1407 1.2 
Equity 1963 4242 2.2 
Fixed income 723 944 1.3 
Money market 369 68 0.2 
Protected 104 6 0.1 
Real estate 211 210 1.0 
Specialist 130 371 2.9 
Narrow investment sector 4112 6803 1.7 
Allocation 100 169 387 2.3 
Allocation 85 389 449 1.2 
Allocation 60 200 464 2.3 
Allocation 35 62 9 0.1 
Equity emerging 21 283 13.5 
Equity international 1079 2183 2.0 
Equity UK 658 1621 2.5 
Fixed income international 49 116 2.4 
Fixed income UK 582 803 1.4 
Real estate international 22 101 4.6 
Real estate UK 161 102 0.6 
 
 
The above information makes clear that outsourcing has become the dominant type of 
management in the industry. This raises the question whether there is any empirical evidence 
to indicate that this is a beneficial development for policyholders in terms of performance. 
This is important since these pension funds are DC and the fund’s performance may 
determine a high proportion of the policyholder’s retirement income. The sample that is used 
for this purpose is the same as in Chapter 3, i.e., it includes a total of 4,909 funds and 28.586 
observations. In this sample there are 3,571 equity, 320 allocation, and 705 fixed income 
funds. Table 4.2 shows the results of t-tests examining whether there are significant 
differences between internal and external funds for each sample. The variables tested are 
return, risk, and the Sharpe ratio of the fund and the PPB as well as the two performance 
measures relative to the PPB.  
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Table 4.2. Results of t-tests. Null hypothesis is that the difference in means is 0. The difference is calculated as 
internal minus external. 
Fund Type Null Hypothesis Variable Mean St. Error t-statistic p-value 
Internal External 
Funds Obs. Funds Obs. 
 All Funds Difference in 
Means=0 
Fund Return 0.045 0.021 2.095 0.0362 934 9810 3975 18776 
Fund Sigma -0.849 0.029 -29.007 0.0000 
Fund Sharpe -0.045 0.005 -8.589 0.0000 
PPB Return 0.081 0.020 4.080 0.0000 
PPB Sigma -0.779 0.029 -26.716 0.0000 
PPB Sharpe -0.021 0.005 -4.505 0.0000 
RFund-RPPB -0.036 0.010 -3.648 0.0003 
M2 -0.107 0.010 -10.836 0.0000 
Allocation 
Funds 
Difference in 
Means=0 
Fund Return -0.049 0.096 -0.506 0.6131 37 249 283 1330 
Fund Sigma -0.185 0.120 -1.540 0.1244 
Fund Sharpe -0.007 0.025 -0.290 0.7724 
PPB Return 0.109 0.084 1.304 0.1930 
PPB Sigma -0.202 0.177 -1.142 0.2542 
PPB Sharpe -0.013 0.022 -0.589 0.5562 
RFund-RPPB -0.158 0.074 -2.137 0.0335 
M2 -0.249 0.075 -3.337 0.0010 
Fixed Income 
Funds 
Difference in 
Means=0 
Fund Return 0.131 0.029 4.468 0.0000 216 2314 489 2066 
Fund Sigma -0.234 0.038 -6.212 0.0000 
Fund Sharpe 0.038 0.012 3.146 0.0017 
PPB Return -0.027 0.024 -1.093 0.2746 
PPB Sigma -0.289 0.033 -8.840 0.0000 
PPB Sharpe -0.079 0.012 -6.818 0.0000 
RFund-RPPB 0.158 0.027 5.884 0.0000 
M2 0.153 0.023 6.691 0.0000 
Equity Funds Difference in 
Means=0 
Fund Return 0.022 0.028 0.761 0.4468 596 6443 2975 14629 
Fund Sigma -0.344 0.031 -11.052 0.0000 
Fund Sharpe -0.020 0.005 -3.751 0.0002 
PPB Return 0.090 0.027 3.371 0.0008 
PPB Sigma -0.336 0.032 -10.635 0.0000 
PPB Sharpe 0.001 0.005 0.200 0.8417 
RFund-RPPB -0.068 0.012 -5.886 0.0000 
M2 -0.143 0.011 -13.100 0.0000 
Emerging 
Equity Funds 
Difference in 
Means=0 
Fund Return -0.040 0.430 -0.093 0.9261 5 48 178 666 
Fund Sigma 0.147 0.375 0.392 0.6963 
Fund Sharpe -0.060 0.059 -1.022 0.3111 
PPB Return -0.069 0.413 -0.168 0.8670 
PPB Sigma -0.306 0.376 -0.814 0.4195 
PPB Sharpe -0.040 0.059 -0.678 0.5008 
RFund-RPPB 0.029 0.062 0.471 0.6388 
M2 -0.207 0.069 -2.996 0.0036 
International 
Equity Funds 
Difference in 
Means=0 
Fund Return -0.010 0.037 -0.262 0.7935 327 3634 1565 7977 
Fund Sigma -0.304 0.043 -7.155 0.0000 
Fund Sharpe -0.019 0.007 -2.827 0.0047 
PPB Return 0.081 0.034 2.360 0.0183 
PPB Sigma -0.206 0.043 -4.828 0.0000 
PPB Sharpe 0.006 0.006 1.036 0.3003 
RFund-RPPB -0.091 0.015 -5.887 0.0000 
M2 -0.140 0.015 -9.623 0.0000 
UK Equity 
Funds 
Difference in 
Means=0 
Fund Return 0.126 0.043 2.966 0.0030 264 2761 1232 5986 
Fund Sigma -0.208 0.042 -4.908 0.0000 
Fund Sharpe -0.008 0.009 -0.886 0.3754 
PPB Return 0.174 0.041 4.259 0.0000 
PPB Sigma -0.280 0.043 -6.511 0.0000 
PPB Sharpe 0.008 0.008 1.047 0.2949 
RFund-RPPB -0.047 0.018 -2.668 0.0077 
M2 -0.141 0.017 -8.492 0.0000 
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The results show that externally managed funds outperform their PPBs significantly more 
than internally managed funds. Moreover, the difference in the M2 measure is larger than that 
in the difference-in-returns measure. The fixed income funds are only exception where 
internal funds outperform external funds relative to the PPB. Indeed, the internal fixed 
income funds also have a significantly higher return whereas for almost all the other samples, 
the fund’s return is not significantly different between internal and external funds.  
 
Allocation and emerging equity funds stand out from the rest as there is practically no 
difference between internal and external funds and their PPBs. Still, the performance relative 
to the PPB is significantly different for these two samples. A reason for the allocation sample 
is that internal funds have smaller fund returns but higher PPB returns than external funds so 
that performance relative to the PPB is overall smaller for internal funds. For the emerging 
equity sample, one sees that internal funds have higher risk and their PPBs have lower risk 
than the corresponding variables of external funds. Although the differences are insignificant, 
they suffice to produce a significantly different risk-adjusted outperformance. 
 
Generally, external funds have significantly higher risk but their PPBs are also riskier than 
those of the internal funds. At the same time, their PPBs have either lower or insignificantly 
different returns from the PPBs of internal funds. Thus, it appears that external managers 
have PPBs that are inefficient, i.e. their PPBs have low returns and high risk (relative to the 
PPBs of internal funds). This may suggest that the unequal performance is not due to 
differences in the fund but to differences in the PPB. This is corroborated by the funds’ 
Sharpe ratios that differ very little when they are significant at all. This implies that external 
managers may choose more ‘flattering’ benchmarks. 
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4.3. Regression analysis 
 
4.3.1. Explanatory variables and pairwise correlations 
 
The frequency of the panel observations is yearly for all samples. The regression analysis 
adopted in this chapter is based on specifications (1) and (4) subject to several adjustments. 
Namely, it can be argued that the provider’s size and experience may affect the choice of the 
external manager. For example, a large provider has the resources to find out who the best 
external manager is, same as an older provider has the experience to filter out the best 
managers. This choice may affect future fund performance. Therefore, it is deemed more 
appropriate to match the provider’s characteristics to the corresponding ‘provider’. Thus, for 
the internal samples the provider’s characteristics are defined as follows: 
 Provider’s size (         ) is the first lag of the number of all internally managed funds 
within the same provider, measured in 100’s of funds. 
 Provider’s market share (          ) in the fund’s ABI sector is the first lag of the ratio of 
all internally managed funds with the same ABI sector within the same provider over the 
number of all internally managed funds with the same ABI operated by any provider, 
measured in per cent. 
 ABI’s share in the provider (             ) is the first lag of the ratio of number of 
internal funds with the same ABI sector and the same provider over all internal funds that 
the provider operates, also measured in per cent. 
 Provider’s age is defined in the same way as in Chapter 3. 
For the external samples, these definitions refer to the external management company, i.e.: 
 Provider’s size (         ) is the first lag of the number of all managed funds within the 
same wealth management company, measured in 100’s of funds. 
 Provider’s market share (          ) in the fund’s ABI sector is the first lag of the ratio of 
all managed funds with the same ABI sector within the same wealth management 
company over the number of all managed funds with the same ABI operated by any 
wealth management company, measured in per cent. 
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 ABI’s share in the provider (             ) is the first lag of the ratio of number of funds 
with the same ABI sector and the same wealth management company over all funds that 
this company operates, also measured in per cent. 
 Provider’s age is measured as the number of years elapsed at year-end since the inception 
date of the wealth management company’s first fund in the market. Once more this 
variable is broken down into four dummies, each taking the value 1 if the management 
company is from 0 to 5, 5 to 10, 10 to 15, and 15 to 20 years old at year-end, i.e. 
                                                       . 
 
The pairwise correlations between the explanatory variables are shown in Tables 4.3.A-G for 
the internally managed funds and in Tables 4.4.A-G for the externally managed funds in 
Appendix L. In most cases the absolute values of the correlation coefficients do not exceed 
0.56. Unsurprisingly, the correlation between the bear and bull market dummies is negative 
and around -0.5. The provider’s characteristics are also correlated, particularly, for the 
internal sample. 
 
Generally, collinearity between the explanatory variables doesn’t seem to be an issue except 
for the internally managed emerging equity funds. This sample consists of only 5 funds with 
48 observations as this style is mostly externally managed. As such, the regression of 
specification (4) produces very erratic results and is dropped from the analysis. The 
collinearity diagnostics that include the interaction terms are very similar to those reported in 
Table 3.4 and are not be shown here for brevity. Obviously, the only exception is the 
internally managed emerging equity sample where the condition number exceeds 300 and the 
determinant is very close to zero.  
 
Summary statistics for the individual explanatory variables (excluding the interactive terms) 
for all samples are provided in Appendix M. The statistics for the internally managed funds 
are in the columns under ‘Internal’ and those for externally managed funds under ‘External’.  
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4.3.2. Results with the PPB as benchmark 
 
The regression analysis is done with fund fixed effects and the standard errors are calculated 
with the Hoechle (2007) method, i.e. they are corrected for heteroscedasticity, 
autocorrelation, and spatial correlation. Table 4.5 shows the results of specification (1) sorted 
by management type and then by sample.
34
 Separating each sample according to the funds’ 
management type doesn’t make any difference for the significance of the Sharpe ratios. 
Neither the internal nor the external samples have statistically significant Sharpe ratios with 
the exception of the externally managed emerging equity funds (same as in Table 3.7).  
 
However, there is a difference in the performance relative to the PPB. For internally managed 
funds the difference-in-return measure is very close to the M2 measure, which means that 
adjusting for risk doesn’t change the result. The reason for this is that the difference between 
the fund’s and the PPB’s returns is proportionate to the difference between the fund’s and the 
PPB’s risk. On the other hand, the M2 measure is noticeably larger than the difference-in-
returns for externally managed funds. For example, both the difference-in-returns and the M2 
of the internally managed UK equity funds are circa 1.9%.
35
 However, there is a considerable 
difference for external UK equity funds with their difference-in-returns at 2.55% and their 
M2 at 3.66%. This indicates that the difference between the fund’s and the PPB’s returns is 
larger than the difference between their risks. This corroborates the evidence in Table 4.2 
which shows that external funds may have inefficient PPBs (low returns and high risk).  
 
In terms of overall performance, internal management suits best fixed income funds. They 
have the highest outperformance among internal funds at around 3.6%. At the same time, 
fixed income funds that are externally managed are the only external group that has 
insignificant performance. Allocation funds are exactly the opposite, i.e. external 
management produces the best results for allocation funds whereas they are the only group 
among internal funds to have insignificant performance. 
 
                                                          
34
 The results of specification (1) for the internally managed emerging equity funds are shown as well but note 
that there is no corresponding analysis for specification (4). 
35
 As a reminder, all effects on performance refer to annualised returns even though the analysis is carried out on 
average monthly cumulative returns. 
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Table 4.5. The estimated constant coefficient for specification (1), sorted by management type, sample and 
performance measure. The R
2
-within is in all cases 0 and the F-test for the significance of the regression is not 
applicable. The benchmark is the PPB and the panel has the yearly structure. The results are obtained using 
Driscoll-Kraay standard errors and fund fixed effects. P-values are in parentheses (* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** 
p<0.01). 
 
Constant Coefficient 
   
Sample Sharpe RFund-RPPB M2 Funds Obs. 
Internally Managed 
All Funds 0.0082 0.1536*** 0.1512*** 934 9810 
(0.879) (0.000) (0.000) 
Allocation Funds 0.0738 0.0715 0.0777 37 249 
(0.445) (0.636) (0.560) 
Fixed Income Funds 0.0190 0.3279*** 0.3316*** 216 2314 
(0.689) (0.000) (0.000) 
Equity Funds 0.0517 0.1216*** 0.1245*** 596 6443 
(0.452) (0.001) (0.008) 
Emerging Equity 
Funds 
0.1488 0.1361** 0.0985 5 48 
(0.115) (0.023) (0.231) 
International Equity 
Funds 
0.0359 0.0913** 0.0982* 327 3634 
(0.527) (0.026) (0.072) 
UK Equity Funds 0.0709 0.1612*** 0.1595*** 264 2761 
(0.417) (0.001) (0.001) 
Externally Managed 
All Funds 0.0537 0.1900*** 0.2583*** 3975 18776 
(0.528) (0.000) (0.001) 
Allocation Funds 0.0811 0.2298*** 0.3266*** 283 1330 
(0.472) (0.003) (0.002) 
Fixed Income Funds -0.0193 0.1703 0.1789 489 2066 
(0.844) (0.271) (0.104) 
Equity Funds 0.0716 0.1896*** 0.2671*** 2975 14629 
(0.410) (0.000) (0.000) 
Emerging Equity 
Funds 
0.2089* 0.1067* 0.3059* 178 666 
(0.072) (0.089) (0.089) 
International Equity 
Funds 
0.0550 0.1823*** 0.2386*** 1565 7977 
(0.373) (0.001) (0.005) 
UK Equity Funds 0.0784 0.2086*** 0.3008*** 1232 5986 
(0.517) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
 
Generally, although the Sharpe ratios of both management types are not significantly 
different from 0, externally managed funds perform better relative to their PPBs than internal 
funds. For example, in the all-funds sample the difference-in-returns is higher by 0.43% and 
the M2 by 12.7%. These are considerable differences in PPB outperformance, particularly 
when there is a risk-adjustment, which at least refutes the hypothesis that internal and 
external funds have the same performance relative to the PPB. However, there is an important 
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point to be made on the PPB outperformance. The average Sharpe ratio is on average 
statistically not different from 0 but in most cases funds still manage to outperform their 
PPBs. This raises again the question on a PPB selection, i.e. how appropriate the chosen 
PPBs are for funds to measure their performance against. This may be more important for 
externally managed funds in view of the previous evidence that their PPBs have relatively 
low returns and high risk.  
 
Tables 4.6.A-B show the results for the internal samples and Tables 4.7.A-B show the results 
of the external samples.
36
 These regressions are carried out with the square root function of 
fund’s age. The results with the other age functions are very consistent with these and are 
presented in Appendix N. Given that the explanatory power of the independent variables is 
different for the internal and the external funds the discussion distinguishes clearly between 
the results obtained for the two groups. 
 
The significance of the constant term disappears from all the internal funds regressions 
except for those estimated for the fixed income funds. A quite different result is obtained for 
the external funds. Here some outperformance in comparison with PPBs is found for the 
equity, the UK equity and, to some weaker extent, for the international equity funds.  In 
addition, some underperformance is obtained for the emerging equity, the fixed income and 
the allocation funds.  
 
Consistently across the two groups the vast majority of the estimated coefficients for the 
Sharpe ratios are negative and significant during the bear markets. However, the Sharpe ratio 
of internal funds decreases by about 4.9 whereas that of external funds decreases by 7.4; that 
is a considerable difference of 2.5 on annualised terms. The internal funds do not perform 
worse than their benchmarks during the bear times, whereas, the externally managed 
international, emerging equity and equity funds significantly underperform their PPBs. This 
underperformance ranges from -3.66% for the M2 of all equity funds to -12.7% of emerging 
equity funds. In contrast, the externally managed allocation funds outperform their PPBs in 
bear years by 4.9% but this is only in nominal terms.  
                                                          
36
 Note that regressions with specification (4) have not been carried out for internally managed emerging equity 
funds due to the low number of observations and high correlation between the explanatory variables. 
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The performance during the bull markets is also very different for the internal and the 
external funds. The Sharpe ratio of all internal samples increases on average by around 4.9 
whereas for external funds there is a significant increase of 3.6 only for the fixed income 
sample. Moreover, internal allocation and equity funds outperform their PPBs: the difference-
in-returns increases by about 6.2% for equity funds and 12.7% for allocation funds whose M2 
also increases by around 26.8%. At the same time, the allocation as well as international and 
UK equity funds show some underperformance with their M2 decreasing by around 3.6%. 
Only the external fixed income funds show outperformance during the bull years of 8.7% for 
the difference-in-returns and 6.17% for the M2. These results indicate that internal managers 
can cope better with changing market conditions whereas external managers have rather poor 
timing skills, i.e. fund performance is negatively affected in bear markets and there are no 
gains in bull markets. 
 
The interactions between the market condition dummies and fund’s age have also a different 
effect on the performance of the internal and the external funds. The interaction with the bear 
dummy is in most cases insignificant for the internally managed funds. It is positive only for 
the fixed income funds suggesting that older funds are less affected by a bear market. For 
example, using the specification with the logarithmic function, the average monthly M2 of a 
5-year-old is 1.33% higher than that of a 1-year-old fund during a bear year. In contrast, the 
external equity, emerging and international equity funds have several positive coefficients for 
the interactive term suggesting that their bear market underperformance which was discussed 
earlier declines with fund’s age.  
 
There is also a visible difference between the coefficients estimated for the interactive term of 
the bull market dummy and fund’s age. For the external funds only the fixed income funds 
have statistically significant coefficients. Their sign is negative suggesting that older funds 
underperform younger funds during bull years, e.g. the difference-in-returns of a 5-year-old 
fund is 7.4% lower than that of a 1-year-old fund (using the logarithmic function). Contrary, 
in the case of internal funds the fixed income ones are the only group without statistically 
significant coefficients. However, the relationship is the same, i.e. younger funds perform 
better under bull market conditions. Using again the logarithmic function and the difference-
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in-returns example, a 1-year-old internal equity fund outperforms the corresponding 5-year-
old fund by about 2.4%. 
 
The results for provider characteristics are not strong for either management type. In general, 
the provider’s size seems to have a more positive effect on the performance of external funds 
whereas it is sometimes negative for the internal ones. For internal allocation funds all 
coefficients are insignificant. There is some significance for the M2 of internal fixed income 
and UK equity funds in the range of 3.6% and 2.4% for an extra 100 funds respectively but 
the difference-in-returns of international equity funds decreases by about 3.6%. However 
there is a significantly positive effect for all types of external funds except for UK equity. 
This effect is at its lowest for international equity with the difference-in-returns increasing by 
1.2% and at its highest for emerging equity with an increase of about 4.9% with every 
additional 100 funds in size. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that external 
management companies can pool together the services they provide to their clients and realise 
economies of scale. This is corroborated by the results for the market share variable that has a 
positive effect on the external funds’ Sharpe ratio (a small increase of 0.04 for an additional 
1% in market share) whereas there is hardly any effect estimated for the internal funds. 
 
Specialisation in an investment style seems beneficial for the performance of both 
management types with just one sample in each being positively affected. In particular, 
internal UK equity funds see their difference-in-returns and M2 increase by 0.36% and 0.24% 
respectively with every additional 1% in ABI’s share whereas from the external samples 
there is a significant effect for the fixed income sample with corresponding increases of just 
0.08% and 0.06%. Overall, the results for the provider’s characteristics suggest that 
economies of scale are more important in the case of the external management companies. A 
possible explanation for this is that wealth management tends to be the only service these 
companies provide whereas the majority of pension fund providers have many different 
services such as pension, insurance, money management etc. and so the economies of scale 
are in a way already realised.  
 
The age of provider does not seem to matter much for the internally managed funds. The U-
shaped relationship observed in Chapter 3 appears only for the allocation funds with the 5-10 
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and 10-15 year-old providers significantly underperforming the others by an astounding 
101% and 42% for the difference-in-returns and 79% and 60% for the M2 respectively. In 
contrast, there are some positive and statistically significant coefficients for the M2 of the 
international equity funds with the 10-15 year-old providers outperforming the others by 
about 8.7%, and in the case of UK equity funds an outperformance of about 4.9% is 
estimated for 15-20 year-old providers (significant at 10% only). However, given the patchy 
nature of these results it is hard to draw any firm conclusions.  
 
Considerably stronger results have been obtained for the external funds. First, a U-shaped 
relationship between provider’s age and performance is again observed for the allocation 
funds where 5 to 10 year-old providers have a significantly lower Sharpe ratio by around 4.9 
and a lower difference-in-returns by about 11%. In the case of the international equity sample 
(and to a weaker extent the equity sample) the 0-15 year-old providers have significantly 
higher difference-in-returns from the 20+ group with the outperformance ranging between 
11% and 4.9%. A very similar picture appears for fixed income funds with the 0-15 group 
outperforming by about 4.9%. So it would seem that the provider’s age is more important for 
externally managed funds with younger providers delivering better performance than older 
providers. The only exception to this are external emerging equity funds where 0 to 10 year-
old providers have a significantly lower M2 from the 20+ group by about 19%.  
 
The interactions between fund’s age and provider’s age also show differences between the 
internal and external funds. In the case of the internal funds the vast majority of the 
significant coefficients are positive, whereas they are negative for the externally managed 
funds except for those estimated for the emerging equity funds (which are positive) and the 
UK equity funds (no significance). There is a tendency, both for the internal and the external 
funds, for the statistical significance to appear for the middle-age providers, although the 
significance of the coefficients estimated for the internally managed is much weaker (often 
only 10%) in comparison with the significance obtained for the externally managed funds. In 
short, it seems that in the case of the internally managed funds and the externally managed 
equity funds performance increases with fund’s age for middle-age providers, and declines 
with fund’s age for all other externally managed funds (but for the UK equity funds where no 
significance is found). Overall, the results for both management types indicate that at least 
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one type of equity funds is subject to a catching up phase independent of management style 
(international equity).  
 
The last interesting difference between the two management types concerns regulatory 
change. Although the performance of internally managed funds is practically unaffected by 
the introduction of either personal or stakeholder pensions, the performance of external funds 
has changed significantly. The difference-in-returns of the allocation funds and the Sharpe 
ratio of the UK equity funds have increased significantly after the introduction of personal 
pensions, the former by about 11% and the latter by 2.43. This is consistent with the 
hypothesis that the industry anticipates higher demand for these investment types and puts in 
more effort to increase performance in order to capitalise this demand. Still, performance 
relative to the PPB decreased for the external UK equity funds by approximately 5.2%.  
 
The introduction of stakeholder schemes has had a positive effect on the performance of the 
allocation and the UK equity funds but a strong negative effect on international equity funds. 
In detail, the M2 of allocation funds increased by around 4.9% and the Sharpe ratio of UK 
equity funds by 3.6. This is consistent with the theory that there are fewer incentives to gather 
costly information on foreign markets when management fees are restricted. Overall, it seems 
that external management companies are more sensitive to regulatory change. Again, this 
may be due to money management being their sole business purpose and thus, they pay a lot 
more attention of developments that can change the industry. Most pension providers, on the 
other hand, have a diversified corporate strategy and react less strongly to new regulation that 
applies to only one part of their business. 
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Table 4.6.A. Results for the internally managed all-funds, allocation, fixed income, and equity samples with           √      . The PPB is the benchmark. The panel 
observations have a yearly frequency. The results are obtained using Driscoll-Kraay standard errors and fund fixed effects. P-values are in parentheses (* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, 
*** p<0.01). 
Sample All-Funds Allocation Fixed Income Equity 
Dependent Sharpe RFund-RPPB M2 Sharpe RFund-RPPB M2 Sharpe RFund-RPPB M2 Sharpe RFund-RPPB M2 
Constant 0.0808 0.2399 0.1283 0.0162 -1.2212 -0.3144 0.2367 0.4331 0.5536*** 0.0359 -0.1267 -0.2557 
 
(0.485) (0.520) (0.677) (0.979) (0.456) (0.862) (0.260) (0.271) (0.006) (0.708) (0.761) (0.488) 
          0.0377 -0.0343 0.0365 0.0626 0.9186 0.9159 -0.0161 -0.1088 -0.1281*** 0.0528 0.0502 0.1726* 
 
(0.568) (0.673) (0.690) (0.682) (0.147) (0.156) (0.877) (0.105) (0.002) (0.345) (0.566) (0.092) 
        -0.3968*** -0.0010 -0.0108 -0.1795 0.8332 1.5795 -0.3884*** -0.6236 -0.1570 -0.3806*** 0.2105 0.1084 
 
(0.000) (0.993) (0.904) (0.569) (0.252) (0.140) (0.001) (0.102) (0.151) (0.000) (0.238) (0.400) 
        0.3346*** 0.2538* 0.1233 0.5421** 1.4934* 2.1681* 0.3244*** -0.0115 -0.0448 0.3275*** 0.4612** 0.1858 
 
(0.000) (0.093) (0.336) (0.034) (0.080) (0.083) (0.004) (0.928) (0.634) (0.000) (0.019) (0.234) 
          -0.1661*** -0.0609 -0.0005 0.3752 1.5954* 1.7816 -0.1126 0.1491 0.1927 -0.0420 -0.1143 -0.0298 
 
(0.005) (0.380) (0.994) (0.564) (0.078) (0.334) (0.182) (0.341) (0.137) (0.225) (0.255) (0.665) 
           0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0010 -0.0128 -0.0631 -0.1064 0.0005 -0.0084** -0.0055 0.0003 0.0054 -0.0005 
 
(0.890) (0.959) (0.779) (0.744) (0.143) (0.148) (0.890) (0.049) (0.418) (0.842) (0.211) (0.885) 
              0.0040 0.0132** 0.0095* -0.0239 -0.0662 -0.1394 -0.0049 0.0292 0.0009 -0.0006 0.0228*** 0.0187*** 
 
(0.369) (0.036) (0.066) (0.525) (0.573) (0.122) (0.554) (0.230) (0.941) (0.904) (0.002) (0.004) 
        -0.0232 -0.1748 0.2291 -0.5201 1.1741 0.6476 -0.2980 0.1305 -0.4603 0.1166 -0.2469 0.6730 
 (0.918) (0.754) (0.627) (0.439) (0.508) (0.747) (0.481) (0.841) (0.608) (0.498) (0.692) (0.207) 
         -0.0446 -0.1752 -0.1675 -3.2852** -6.0690* -4.7621* -0.0585 0.2108 -0.2215 -0.0308 -0.1728 0.2188 
 (0.809) (0.652) (0.604) (0.024) (0.089) (0.086) (0.846) (0.565) (0.202) (0.830) (0.711) (0.578) 
          -0.0720 -0.2104 0.0964 -1.8538*** -2.9436** -3.7024*** -0.2131 0.0100 -0.1764 -0.0625 -0.1913 0.3729 
 (0.607) (0.323) (0.660) (0.002) (0.012) (0.005) (0.230) (0.971) (0.299) (0.592) (0.413) (0.125) 
          -0.0512 -0.1751 -0.0508 -0.4040 0.5570 -0.3788 -0.1655 0.0404 0.0131 -0.0320 -0.1869 0.1424 
 (0.559) (0.253) (0.720) (0.393) (0.572) (0.717) (0.320) (0.649) (0.881) (0.588) (0.244) (0.303) 
                  0.0241 0.1516 -0.0351 0.2732 -0.1063 -0.0819 0.0929 -0.0546 0.2783 -0.0342 0.2255 -0.1868 
 (0.814) (0.600) (0.881) (0.407) (0.864) (0.927) (0.593) (0.860) (0.555) (0.687) (0.522) (0.529) 
                   0.0220 0.0213 0.0361 1.3564** 2.4137* 1.8494* -0.0222 -0.1260 0.0526 0.0129 0.0127 -0.1004 
 (0.722) (0.868) (0.733) (0.019) (0.050) (0.093) (0.821) (0.320) (0.378) (0.797) (0.935) (0.475) 
                    0.0387 0.0756 -0.0178 0.4403*** 0.5704* 0.7758** 0.0562 0.0336 0.0761 0.0253 0.0549 -0.0981 
 (0.345) (0.199) (0.749) (0.004) (0.082) (0.022) (0.252) (0.656) (0.152) (0.494) (0.341) (0.123) 
                    0.0233 0.0593 0.0180 0.1265 -0.2095 0.0367 0.0378 -0.0104 -0.0115 0.0106 0.0674* -0.0210 
 (0.351) (0.125) (0.610) (0.332) (0.454) (0.884) (0.389) (0.626) (0.675) (0.535) (0.080) (0.549) 
                    0.0314** 0.0192 0.0037 -0.0505 -0.6003* -0.4459 0.0238 -0.0311 -0.0435 0.0077 0.0348* 0.0135 
 (0.033) (0.188) (0.774) (0.749) (0.057) (0.317) (0.205) (0.377) (0.101) (0.246) (0.084) (0.321) 
                  -0.0096 0.0392 0.0255 -0.1214 -0.0269 -0.2800 0.0671** 0.1672** 0.0759*** -0.0289 -0.0226 -0.0122 
 (0.613) (0.236) (0.428) (0.210) (0.927) (0.420) (0.011) (0.022) (0.005) (0.107) (0.640) (0.796) 
                  -0.0642*** -0.0507 -0.0467 -0.1863** -0.2858 -0.5392 -0.0313 -0.0044 -0.0058 -0.0626*** -0.1061** -0.0807** 
 (0.001) (0.173) (0.128) (0.018) (0.372) (0.159) (0.187) (0.853) (0.780) (0.000) (0.021) (0.033) 
     -0.0996 -0.1583 -0.1760     -0.1120 0.0724 0.1545 -0.0674 -0.1761 -0.2707 
 (0.232) (0.587) (0.370)     (0.410) (0.821) (0.186) (0.431) (0.574) (0.351) 
     -0.0166 -0.0051 -0.0189 0.0070 -0.4710 -1.1778 -0.0631 0.0381 0.0669 -0.0063 -0.0730 -0.1030 
 
(0.855) (0.949) (0.826) (0.976) (0.425) (0.132) (0.709) (0.598) (0.345) (0.931) (0.435) (0.412) 
R2 within 0.3173 0.0131 0.0093 0.4520 0.1217 0.1597 0.1856 0.0689 0.0666 0.5109 0.0238 0.0299 
F-statistic 59.2430 7.6276 17.0910 3019.5332 276.1224 1485.7434 68.0058 25.8212 32.0601 131.8935 6.7207 12.1799 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Funds 933 933 933 37 37 37 216 216 216 596 596 596 
Observations 9756 9756 9756 248 248 248 2296 2296 2296 6417 6417 6417 
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Table 4.6.B. Results for the internally managed equity sub-samples with           √      . The PPB is the benchmark. The panel observations have a yearly frequency. The 
results are obtained using Driscoll-Kraay standard errors and fund fixed effects. P-values are in parentheses (* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01). 
Sub-sample International UK 
Dependent Sharpe RFund-RPPB M2 Sharpe RFund-RPPB M2 
Constant -0.0008 -0.2475 -0.1304 0.0904 -0.2378 -0.4470 
 
(0.995) (0.588) (0.668) (0.455) (0.693) (0.416) 
          0.0839 0.0258 0.1455 0.0036 0.0720 0.2084 
 
(0.110) (0.786) (0.143) (0.955) (0.547) (0.127) 
        -0.3187*** 0.2123 0.0617 -0.5079*** 0.2446 0.1509 
 
(0.002) (0.334) (0.708) (0.000) (0.188) (0.382) 
        0.3638*** 0.3594* 0.0837 0.2768*** 0.5900* 0.2946 
 
(0.000) (0.077) (0.499) (0.002) (0.070) (0.286) 
          -0.0311 -0.2666* -0.1433 -0.0548 0.0819 0.1463 
 
(0.393) (0.080) (0.119) (0.237) (0.363) (0.110) 
           -0.0013 0.0425** 0.0159 0.0016 0.0016 -0.0004 
 
(0.754) (0.022) (0.184) (0.272) (0.799) (0.936) 
              0.0011 0.0025 0.0131 -0.0062 0.0319*** 0.0207*** 
 
(0.810) (0.884) (0.348) (0.390) (0.003) (0.009) 
        0.2294 0.0757 1.2247 -0.0383 -0.5592 -0.0929 
 (0.301) (0.924) (0.102) (0.864) (0.534) (0.909) 
         0.0806 0.2016 0.6141 -0.1009 -0.4223 -0.1471 
 (0.634) (0.735) (0.191) (0.517) (0.338) (0.706) 
          0.0373 0.0141 0.7227** -0.1566 -0.3380 -0.0078 
 (0.818) (0.970) (0.038) (0.212) (0.176) (0.977) 
          0.0299 -0.3689 -0.0305 -0.1071 0.0266 0.3171* 
 (0.748) (0.177) (0.880) (0.195) (0.870) (0.094) 
                  -0.1083 -0.0473 -0.6054 0.0873 0.4726 0.3233 
 (0.401) (0.914) (0.157) (0.470) (0.351) (0.463) 
                   -0.0241 -0.0866 -0.2242 0.0444 0.0269 -0.0153 
 (0.676) (0.677) (0.190) (0.382) (0.838) (0.904) 
                    -0.0190 -0.0213 -0.2355** 0.0796** 0.1123* 0.0414 
 (0.722) (0.835) (0.018) (0.016) (0.050) (0.493) 
                    -0.0153 0.1176* 0.0180 0.0488* 0.0031 -0.0688 
 (0.518) (0.057) (0.711) (0.053) (0.926) (0.108) 
                    0.0068 0.0681** 0.0385** 0.0069 -0.0067 -0.0247 
 (0.365) (0.029) (0.043) (0.365) (0.704) (0.152) 
                  -0.0170 -0.0361 -0.0362 -0.0388** -0.0133 0.0256 
 (0.399) (0.526) (0.447) (0.039) (0.805) (0.665) 
                  -0.0649*** -0.0973* -0.0772* -0.0596** -0.1135 -0.0778 
 (0.003) (0.070) (0.051) (0.015) (0.109) (0.190) 
     -0.1282 0.0943 -0.2318 0.0487 -0.4042 -0.3768 
 (0.155) (0.742) (0.379) (0.643) (0.329) (0.303) 
     -0.1004 -0.0734 -0.0866 0.1813 -0.1201 -0.1611 
 
(0.170) (0.476) (0.456) (0.104) (0.494) (0.356) 
R2 within 0.4464 0.0239 0.0403 0.6337 0.0538 0.0547 
F-statistic 186.8956 6.3520 17.3021 128.0717 25.5550 130.0020 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Funds 327 327 327 264 264 264 
Observations 3623 3623 3623 2746 2746 2746 
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Table 4.7.A. Results for the externally managed all-funds, allocation, fixed income, and equity samples with           √      . The PPB is the benchmark. The panel 
observations have a yearly frequency. The results are obtained using Driscoll-Kraay standard errors and fund fixed effects. P-values are in parentheses (* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, 
*** p<0.01). 
Sample All-Funds Allocation Fixed Income Equity 
Dependent Sharpe RFund-RPPB M2 Sharpe RFund-RPPB M2 Sharpe RFund-RPPB M2 Sharpe RFund-RPPB M2 
Constant -0.0202 -0.3242 0.3569 0.3355 -1.5625** -0.8271 -0.9683** -1.6473 -1.1413 0.1576 -0.0051 0.6508** 
 
(0.910) (0.374) (0.278) (0.484) (0.023) (0.202) (0.013) (0.231) (0.301) (0.241) (0.981) (0.016) 
          0.0682 0.2504 0.2388 -0.0208 0.0750 0.1553 0.2659 0.5294 0.3735 -0.0008 0.1845* 0.2045 
 
(0.496) (0.121) (0.160) (0.872) (0.776) (0.459) (0.274) (0.159) (0.239) (0.988) (0.073) (0.108) 
        -0.6174*** -0.0927 -0.1744 -0.7677*** 0.4374** -0.2130 -0.4279*** -0.2751 0.1380 -0.7230*** -0.2719*** -0.2798* 
 
(0.000) (0.172) (0.176) (0.000) (0.022) (0.149) (0.001) (0.491) (0.587) (0.000) (0.001) (0.057) 
        0.0496 0.0874 -0.1523 -0.0598 0.4984 -0.3413* 0.2663*** 0.7173** 0.5108** -0.0675 -0.1420 -0.3132* 
 
(0.491) (0.556) (0.354) (0.626) (0.164) (0.068) (0.005) (0.030) (0.045) (0.287) (0.102) (0.062) 
          0.0337 0.1145 0.0378 -0.0554 0.4019 0.0480 0.1640 0.4055* 0.3065 0.0010 -0.0134 -0.0523 
 
(0.570) (0.101) (0.689) (0.809) (0.241) (0.882) (0.443) (0.066) (0.220) (0.985) (0.869) (0.601) 
           0.0023** 0.0022 0.0012 0.0034 0.0038 0.0017 0.0068** 0.0029 0.0005 0.0013 0.0028 0.0029 
 
(0.031) (0.513) (0.728) (0.592) (0.740) (0.855) (0.041) (0.610) (0.912) (0.466) (0.634) (0.598) 
              0.0005 0.0035 0.0015 0.0025 0.0095 0.0066 0.0027 0.0071*** 0.0054** -0.0002 0.0027 0.0010 
 
(0.524) (0.233) (0.404) (0.190) (0.115) (0.126) (0.126) (0.005) (0.033) (0.784) (0.411) (0.675) 
        0.1167 0.2918 -0.0288 -0.3135 -0.4348 0.1828 0.6375 1.2146 0.0811 0.0758 0.3326 0.0068 
 (0.564) (0.398) (0.918) (0.503) (0.492) (0.818) (0.325) (0.433) (0.953) (0.509) (0.149) (0.976) 
         0.1569 0.3822 0.2354 -0.3614* -0.8722* -0.1593 0.8224*** 0.6941 0.9970 0.0857 0.4845** 0.2157 
 (0.139) (0.214) (0.284) (0.095) (0.058) (0.743) (0.003) (0.451) (0.245) (0.161) (0.017) (0.128) 
          0.2367** 0.4514 0.2624 0.1531 -0.0571 0.4265 0.4193* 0.2996 0.6788 0.1246* 0.3754** 0.1370 
 (0.047) (0.126) (0.251) (0.453) (0.874) (0.264) (0.078) (0.557) (0.255) (0.057) (0.048) (0.253) 
          0.1691 0.2535 0.1953 0.2156 0.4481 0.4539 0.3692** 0.3889 0.5038 0.0999* 0.1300 0.0732 
 (0.103) (0.189) (0.231) (0.385) (0.267) (0.109) (0.028) (0.486) (0.269) (0.090) (0.271) (0.273) 
                  0.0318 -0.0581 0.0471 0.1128 0.3135 0.1148 -0.0765 -0.1787 0.2780 0.0108 -0.1187 -0.0146 
 (0.504) (0.557) (0.644) (0.403) (0.222) (0.785) (0.749) (0.681) (0.581) (0.821) (0.191) (0.861) 
                   -0.0163 -0.1438* -0.1052 0.0548 0.2495 0.0206 -0.2423*** -0.1259 -0.3512* 0.0027 -0.1817** -0.0966 
 (0.447) (0.096) (0.220) (0.239) (0.187) (0.885) (0.005) (0.233) (0.068) (0.896) (0.018) (0.136) 
                    -0.0375 -0.1501* -0.1136 -0.0696* -0.0573 -0.1914* -0.0353 -0.0318 -0.2017 -0.0096 -0.1132 -0.0697 
 (0.230) (0.094) (0.158) (0.081) (0.594) (0.060) (0.616) (0.663) (0.120) (0.663) (0.167) (0.240) 
                    -0.0249 -0.0585 -0.0653 -0.0591 -0.1167 -0.1483* -0.1083** -0.1372 -0.1928** -0.0109 -0.0146 -0.0259 
 (0.429) (0.264) (0.222) (0.277) (0.240) (0.053) (0.047) (0.173) (0.046) (0.644) (0.731) (0.497) 
                    -0.0003 -0.0456*** -0.0179 0.0181 -0.0778 -0.0146 -0.0215 -0.1579*** -0.1058 0.0041 -0.0153 0.0020 
 (0.987) (0.007) (0.464) (0.733) (0.328) (0.832) (0.679) (0.010) (0.119) (0.757) (0.343) (0.933) 
                  0.0151 0.0486 0.0290 0.0173 -0.1390 -0.0483 0.0497 0.2830 0.0813 0.0403* 0.0824** 0.0457 
 (0.590) (0.146) (0.513) (0.496) (0.109) (0.389) (0.227) (0.126) (0.445) (0.093) (0.027) (0.387) 
                  -0.0118 -0.0221 -0.0400 -0.0028 -0.1426 0.0068 -0.1278** -0.3875*** -0.3176*** 0.0295 0.0512 0.0014 
 (0.698) (0.641) (0.486) (0.934) (0.168) (0.920) (0.013) (0.005) (0.003) (0.186) (0.141) (0.982) 
     -0.0974 0.0278 -0.3167* -0.1368 0.9264*** 0.5481 -0.0760 0.1136 0.0886 -0.0433 0.0251 -0.3834** 
 (0.316) (0.885) (0.083) (0.496) (0.009) (0.217) (0.698) (0.811) (0.808) (0.595) (0.891) (0.040) 
     0.0032 -0.2527* -0.2181 0.1619 0.2170 0.3936** 0.0182 0.1730 0.1067 0.0471 -0.2768** -0.2380 
 
(0.972) (0.074) (0.209) (0.109) (0.208) (0.014) (0.929) (0.286) (0.574) (0.576) (0.016) (0.138) 
R2 within 0.4638 0.0091 0.0404 0.5568 0.1034 0.1588 0.1425 0.0523 0.0601 0.5710 0.0146 0.0584 
F-statistic 2425.0234 57.0138 177.9827 12511.3493 118.5539 90.9409 337.8373 78.6786 148.4566 1058.3670 192.6224 97.2463 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Funds 3964 3964 3964 283 283 283 489 489 489 2975 2975 2975 
Observations 18624 18624 18624 1316 1316 1316 2055 2055 2055 14557 14557 14557 
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Table 4.7.B. Results for the externally managed equity sub-samples with           √      . The PPB is the benchmark. The panel observations have a yearly frequency. The 
results are obtained using Driscoll-Kraay standard errors and fund fixed effects. P-values are in parentheses (* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01). 
Sub-sample Emerging International UK 
Dependent Sharpe RFund-RPPB M2 Sharpe RFund-RPPB M2 Sharpe RFund-RPPB M2 
Constant -0.1123 -1.2653** 0.4369 0.1327 -0.3368 0.6677 -0.1320 0.7785* 0.8464** 
 
(0.696) (0.038) (0.472) (0.431) (0.440) (0.104) (0.468) (0.067) (0.024) 
          0.1467 0.5013** 0.1278 0.0400 0.2773** 0.2101* -0.0373 0.0233 0.1726 
 
(0.180) (0.047) (0.623) (0.483) (0.029) (0.089) (0.566) (0.864) (0.265) 
        -0.9538*** -0.4213** -1.0256*** -0.5691*** -0.4808*** -0.5541*** -0.7801*** -0.0279 0.0661 
 
(0.000) (0.016) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.678) (0.790) 
        0.1180 0.6587 -0.0946 0.0155 -0.1293** -0.3029*** -0.1058 -0.2352* -0.3695* 
 
(0.163) (0.150) (0.831) (0.799) (0.044) (0.004) (0.140) (0.071) (0.093) 
          0.0415 0.4493** 0.3175 0.0521 0.0384 0.0077 -0.0459 -0.0725 -0.1577 
 
(0.772) (0.042) (0.196) (0.401) (0.679) (0.930) (0.691) (0.722) (0.375) 
           0.0033 -0.0137 -0.0033 -0.0013 0.0018 -0.0027 0.0070** 0.0102 0.0180** 
 
(0.603) (0.343) (0.817) (0.606) (0.821) (0.753) (0.015) (0.344) (0.044) 
              -0.0008 0.0092 0.0011 -0.0001 0.0015 -0.0009 -0.0007 0.0017 -0.0008 
 
(0.844) (0.360) (0.916) (0.918) (0.728) (0.789) (0.582) (0.394) (0.753) 
        0.1536 -0.4620 -1.9666** 0.1327 0.8861*** 0.2700 -0.0077 -0.4141 -0.2552 
 (0.508) (0.525) (0.026) (0.225) (0.007) (0.451) (0.967) (0.248) (0.352) 
         0.2152 0.7213 -1.3260 0.1444* 0.6175*** 0.3286 -0.0148 0.1560 0.0530 
 (0.335) (0.198) (0.101) (0.100) (0.010) (0.108) (0.871) (0.512) (0.717) 
          0.2257 1.0307** -0.0961 0.1637*** 0.3937** 0.1244 0.0375 0.2460 0.1001 
 (0.220) (0.018) (0.885) (0.006) (0.036) (0.465) (0.757) (0.428) (0.695) 
          -0.0010 0.3762 -0.7951* 0.1793*** 0.3290** 0.1961** -0.0055 -0.1015 0.0582 
 (0.993) (0.139) (0.079) (0.002) (0.033) (0.038) (0.962) (0.517) (0.635) 
                  0.0169 0.1690 0.7487*** -0.0112 -0.3429** -0.1133 0.0376 0.1175 0.0101 
 (0.791) (0.550) (0.000) (0.791) (0.015) (0.399) (0.618) (0.568) (0.956) 
                   0.0534 -0.2651 0.5147** -0.0129 -0.1599** -0.0789 0.0294 -0.1865 -0.1549 
 (0.400) (0.427) (0.026) (0.620) (0.036) (0.251) (0.384) (0.169) (0.181) 
                    -0.0066 -0.2185* 0.0203 -0.0233 -0.0809 -0.0189 0.0237 -0.1452 -0.1333 
 (0.909) (0.089) (0.914) (0.201) (0.103) (0.703) (0.560) (0.390) (0.356) 
                    0.0579 0.0331 0.3618*** -0.0252 -0.0388 -0.0284 0.0023 -0.0042 -0.0715 
 (0.137) (0.527) (0.004) (0.125) (0.404) (0.490) (0.950) (0.948) (0.268) 
                    0.0275 -0.1423*** -0.0392 -0.0025 -0.0100 0.0098 0.0055 -0.0252 -0.0021 
 (0.448) (0.010) (0.642) (0.837) (0.600) (0.658) (0.849) (0.598) (0.963) 
                  0.0768 0.2097*** 0.2547** 0.0358 0.1080* 0.0783 -0.0102 0.0540* 0.0174 
 (0.137) (0.005) (0.031) (0.135) (0.052) (0.191) (0.742) (0.097) (0.779) 
                  -0.0153 -0.1290 -0.0203 0.0317 0.0651 0.0072 -0.0048 0.0542* 0.0144 
 (0.729) (0.324) (0.869) (0.106) (0.153) (0.893) (0.897) (0.096) (0.817) 
         -0.1240 0.2203 -0.3648 0.2286* -0.5146** -0.5657** 
     (0.256) (0.422) (0.156) (0.052) (0.032) (0.043) 
     -0.0411 -0.1783 -0.2491 -0.0998 -0.5274*** -0.4261*** 0.3184*** 0.0918 0.0366 
 
(0.790) (0.597) (0.627) (0.359) (0.010) (0.004) (0.001) (0.778) (0.897) 
R2 within 0.8191 0.1402 0.3123 0.5170 0.0552 0.1052 0.6545 0.0327 0.0933 
F-statistic 22628.7865 1139.1968 472.0970 2058.6334 116.2377 227.2697 7064.8634 219.9436 117.6680 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Funds 178 178 178 1565 1565 1565 1232 1232 1232 
Observations 664 664 664 7938 7938 7938 5955 5955 5955 
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4.3.3. Performance with the FTSE All Shares index as benchmark 
 
This section examines the performance of equity funds relative to the FTSE All Shares index. 
As in Chapter 3, this is carried out as a comparison to the results with the PPB as benchmark. 
For a start, externally managed funds outperform the FTSE All Shares index more than 
internal funds. Table 4.8 shows the estimation results for specification (1) and in all the cases 
the coefficients for the externally managed samples are larger than their internal equivalents. 
The internal and the external emerging equity funds outperform the FTSE All Shares index 
far more than the international and the UK equity funds do. The international equity funds do 
not outperform the index irrespective of their management type. The only indication 
otherwise is the difference-in-returns of the externally managed funds that is statistically 
significant at the 10% level.  
 
Table 4.8. The estimated constant coefficient for specification (1), sorted by management type, sample and 
performance measure. The R
2
-within is in all cases 0 and the F-test for the significance of the regression is not 
applicable. The benchmark is the FTSE All Shares index and the panel has the yearly structure. The results are 
obtained using Driscoll-Kraay standard errors and fund fixed effects. P-values are in parentheses (* p<0.1, ** 
p<0.05, *** p<0.01). 
 
Constant Coefficient 
  
Sample RFund-RFTSE M2-FTSE Funds Obs. 
Internally Managed 
Equity Funds 0.1607** 0.1693 596 6443 
(0.041) (0.121) 
Emerging Equity 
Funds 
0.8936** 0.6198** 5 48 
(0.012) (0.041) 
International Equity 
Funds 
0.1390 0.1453 327 3634 
(0.297) (0.371) 
UK Equity Funds 0.1765*** 0.1930*** 264 2761 
(0.000) (0.001) 
Externally Managed 
Equity Funds 0.2963*** 0.3279** 2975 14629 
(0.000) (0.031) 
Emerging Equity 
Funds 
1.0024*** 0.9241*** 178 666 
(0.007) (0.000) 
International Equity 
Funds 
0.3019* 0.3121 1565 7977 
(0.091) (0.209) 
UK Equity Funds 0.2104*** 0.2826*** 1232 5986 
(0.007) (0.000) 
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The regression results of specification (4) show that most of this outperformance is explained 
by the chosen variables. Table 4.9.A reports the results for the internal samples and Table 
4.9.B has the results for the external samples, both with the square root function of fund’s 
age. The results with the other age functions are very consistent with these and are not 
presented for brevity.  
 
As previously, there are differences between the samples. In the all-equity sample there is no 
direct relationship between performance and fund’s age for either management type. The 
interaction between fund’s age and provider’s age is insignificant for the internal funds but it 
is highly significant for the external funds. In detail, the performance for providers that are 5-
10 and 10-15 years old declines with fund’s age relative to the 20+ group. Table 4.9.B shows 
that this result is driven by the international equity sample. Although equity funds generally 
need to catch-up with their PPBs, this result suggests that at least some externally managed 
funds score their highest performance against the FTSE All Shares index right at the 
beginning of their operation. Interestingly, a similar result appears also for international funds 
that are internally managed. In that case, funds by providers that are up to 5 years old have 
significant outperformance relative to the oldest providers and this outperformance declines 
with fund’s age.  
 
The results for the other equity subsamples follow the familiar catching-up pattern. The M2 
measure of internally managed UK equity funds increases with fund’s age. However, the 
performance of external UK equity funds has no relationship with fund’s age. This indicates 
that external managers have a better start relative to the FTSE All Shares index as they don’t 
need to catch-up with it. Still, external managers of emerging equity funds need some time to 
catch up with the FTSE. This is possibly due to emerging equity being a relatively young 
investment style. Overall, external funds perform better relative to the FTSE All Shares 
index. Moreover, the results indicate that external funds manage to outperform the FTSE 
index when they are young whereas internal funds are rather subject to a learning period.  
 
Concerning the other variables there are few differences. Externally managed funds are more 
affected by changing market conditions; the performance of emerging and UK equity funds 
significantly decreases whereas international equity funds perform significantly higher during 
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PPB bear periods. There is only a slight indication that the difference-in-returns increases 
during PPB bull markets for internally managed funds. This is consistent with the findings 
where the PPB is the benchmark. 
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Table 4.9.A. Results for the internally managed equity fund samples with           √      . The FTSE All 
Shares index is the benchmark. The panel observations have a yearly frequency. The results are obtained using 
Driscoll-Kraay standard errors and fund fixed effects. P-values are in parentheses (* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** 
p<0.01).  
 
Sample Equity International UK 
Dependent RFund-RFTSE M2-FTSE RFund-RFTSE M2-FTSE RFund-RFTSE M2-FTSE 
Constant -0.3985 -0.5930 -1.0619 -1.4775 -0.0363 0.0118 
 
(0.485) (0.230) (0.274) (0.114) (0.950) (0.980) 
          0.0264 0.0179 0.0214 -0.0599 0.0461 0.1118* 
 
(0.857) (0.912) (0.932) (0.812) (0.479) (0.067) 
        -0.5379 -0.2639 -0.8069 -0.2946 -0.0020 -0.0738 
 
(0.193) (0.534) (0.205) (0.635) (0.992) (0.679) 
        0.4485* 0.1304 0.5426 0.2901 0.3060 -0.0777 
 
(0.054) (0.514) (0.111) (0.251) (0.262) (0.643) 
          -0.0117 0.0924 -0.1582 0.0164 0.0552 0.0535 
 
(0.933) (0.343) (0.461) (0.913) (0.410) (0.503) 
           0.0073 0.0032 0.0675*** 0.0468** 0.0014 -0.0011 
 
(0.308) (0.534) (0.003) (0.010) (0.817) (0.828) 
              0.0098 0.0006 -0.0317 -0.0293 0.0290*** 0.0148* 
 
(0.494) (0.960) (0.244) (0.236) (0.008) (0.096) 
        0.8669 1.1210 2.2798** 2.5672* -0.5338 -0.2770 
 (0.248) (0.179) (0.048) (0.059) (0.514) (0.685) 
         -0.2789 0.3360 0.7162 1.3469 -0.3906 -0.2190 
 (0.721) (0.593) (0.531) (0.182) (0.294) (0.479) 
          -0.1158 0.1860 0.2114 0.5908 -0.3872* -0.1838 
 (0.802) (0.689) (0.805) (0.412) (0.056) (0.369) 
          -0.1635 0.0531 -0.2100 0.0140 -0.1104 0.2058 
 (0.551) (0.846) (0.689) (0.976) (0.539) (0.168) 
                  -0.2941 -0.3681 -1.1808** -1.2690* 0.4633 0.3718 
 (0.473) (0.413) (0.026) (0.070) (0.353) (0.368) 
                   0.0831 -0.1093 -0.2842 -0.4787 0.0200 -0.0203 
 (0.758) (0.622) (0.460) (0.160) (0.884) (0.887) 
                    0.0320 -0.0417 -0.0973 -0.1913 0.1300** 0.0857 
 (0.829) (0.771) (0.707) (0.364) (0.030) (0.133) 
                    0.0652 0.0068 0.0742 0.0185 0.0444 -0.0393 
 (0.388) (0.925) (0.579) (0.874) (0.369) (0.345) 
                    0.0123 -0.0121 0.0467 0.0095 -0.0025 -0.0074 
 (0.646) (0.555) (0.271) (0.759) (0.829) (0.609) 
                  0.1820* 0.2210** 0.2814** 0.3212** 0.0203 0.0582 
 (0.057) (0.021) (0.037) (0.023) (0.650) (0.167) 
                  -0.0903 -0.0342 -0.0909 -0.0452 -0.0767 -0.0156 
 (0.151) (0.523) (0.330) (0.548) (0.232) (0.686) 
     0.2607 0.4674 0.9637 1.4042* -0.3602 -0.3140 
 (0.598) (0.344) (0.146) (0.062) (0.370) (0.359) 
     -0.0395 0.0271 -0.1588 0.0168 -0.0870 -0.0665 
 
(0.877) (0.907) (0.659) (0.957) (0.453) (0.537) 
R2 within 0.0359 0.0699 0.0613 0.1247 0.0567 0.0931 
F-statistic 8.4065 6.2092 38.5985 15.8081 16.5130 12.3651 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Funds 596 596 327 327 264 264 
Observations 6417 6417 3623 3623 2746 2746 
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Table 4.9.B. Results for the externally managed equity fund samples with           √      . The FTSE All 
Shares index is the benchmark. The panel observations have a yearly frequency. The results are obtained using 
Driscoll-Kraay standard errors and fund fixed effects. P-values are in parentheses (* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** 
p<0.01). 
 
Sample Equity Emerging International UK 
Dependent RFund-RFTSE M2-FTSE RFund-RFTSE M2-FTSE RFund-RFTSE M2-FTSE RFund-RFTSE M2-FTSE 
Constant -0.5168 -0.2700 -3.0439** -1.0591 -1.0635 -1.3143 0.3312 0.7944* 
 
(0.433) (0.711) (0.027) (0.145) (0.376) (0.271) (0.593) (0.076) 
          0.2194 0.0690 1.0871* 0.4960 0.3226 0.0832 0.0930 0.1144 
 
(0.189) (0.727) (0.095) (0.240) (0.202) (0.760) (0.620) (0.561) 
        0.1005 0.6599* -3.5403*** -0.6276*** 1.1032*** 1.6513*** -0.3472** -0.0029 
 
(0.633) (0.088) (0.000) (0.001) (0.007) (0.003) (0.049) (0.992) 
        0.2475 0.0755 0.7430 0.1046 0.7804* 0.6641 -0.1476 -0.3200 
 
(0.393) (0.830) (0.184) (0.835) (0.067) (0.105) (0.374) (0.282) 
          0.3192 0.2021 0.5242 -0.0873 0.5415 0.5286 -0.0444 -0.1446 
 
(0.150) (0.356) (0.520) (0.877) (0.344) (0.284) (0.913) (0.545) 
           0.0074 0.0058 0.0282 0.0138 0.0062 0.0024 0.0114 0.0172** 
 
(0.430) (0.379) (0.391) (0.494) (0.559) (0.753) (0.286) (0.049) 
              -0.0023 -0.0049** -0.0196 -0.0407*** -0.0031 -0.0046 -0.0003 -0.0025 
 
(0.364) (0.020) (0.371) (0.000) (0.449) (0.211) (0.875) (0.483) 
        0.0231 -0.5337 2.0128 0.3619 -0.5526 -0.9567 0.1709 -0.2451 
 (0.951) (0.273) (0.283) (0.732) (0.428) (0.227) (0.688) (0.480) 
         0.4492 0.0730 3.7991*** 1.7636** 0.1835 0.0321 0.2991 -0.0536 
 (0.285) (0.854) (0.007) (0.033) (0.800) (0.961) (0.364) (0.767) 
          0.4769* 0.0094 2.1734* 1.5924** 0.2844 -0.2151 0.4416 0.0162 
 (0.078) (0.972) (0.060) (0.012) (0.546) (0.640) (0.342) (0.953) 
          0.3557 0.1178 1.6939* 0.1435 0.1726 -0.0209 0.2737 0.2024 
 (0.224) (0.562) (0.070) (0.732) (0.756) (0.965) (0.379) (0.264) 
                  -0.1190 0.0717 -0.3404 0.1475 -0.0434 0.1585 -0.0323 0.0375 
 (0.564) (0.713) (0.281) (0.586) (0.878) (0.572) (0.908) (0.843) 
                   -0.2613** -0.1434* -0.6761 -0.1517 -0.2296 -0.1613 -0.1659 -0.0861 
 (0.018) (0.065) (0.191) (0.544) (0.243) (0.248) (0.366) (0.429) 
                    -0.2462** -0.1313 -0.2902 -0.2118 -0.2591* -0.0943 -0.1497 -0.0775 
 (0.029) (0.182) (0.402) (0.394) (0.068) (0.510) (0.514) (0.590) 
                    -0.0949 -0.0518 -0.1688 0.2452 -0.0499 -0.0165 -0.0845 -0.0949 
 (0.191) (0.325) (0.558) (0.105) (0.630) (0.863) (0.502) (0.254) 
                    -0.0878** -0.0504 -0.0422 0.1612 -0.1269 -0.1122 -0.0238 0.0046 
 (0.043) (0.190) (0.823) (0.249) (0.248) (0.228) (0.834) (0.946) 
                  -0.0082 0.0012 0.4308*** 0.1336** -0.2289 -0.1640 0.0701* 0.0239 
 (0.938) (0.988) (0.000) (0.024) (0.109) (0.141) (0.099) (0.768) 
                  0.0187 -0.0068 -0.2081 -0.1002 -0.0654 -0.1159 0.0160 0.0117 
 (0.802) (0.938) (0.308) (0.476) (0.538) (0.241) (0.752) (0.893) 
     0.2284 0.4188    0.5076 0.9960 -0.3638 -0.5014* 
 (0.725) (0.543)    (0.609) (0.334) (0.168) (0.097) 
     -0.2495 -0.1470 0.9258 0.7702 -0.6102 -0.2537 0.1880 0.0983 
 
(0.433) (0.601) (0.273) (0.281) (0.241) (0.460) (0.568) (0.741) 
R2 within 0.0160 0.0950 0.5887 0.4049 0.0580 0.1993 0.0231 0.0639 
F-statistic 19.2468 63.3169 68335.6307 4480.1137 47.5473 84.1043 57.6176 114.2223 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Funds 2975 2975 178 178 1565 1565 1232 1232 
Observations 14557 14557 664 664 7938 7938 5955 5955 
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4.4. Discussion 
 
The main purpose of this chapter was to examine whether the externally managed funds 
perform differently than the internally managed funds. According to the central hypothesis 
there should be no difference in the performance of the internally and the externally managed 
funds and in what factors explain this performance. 
 
The analysis has revealed that externally and internally managed funds have on average 
insignificant risk-adjusted returns (Sharpe ratio). Performance relative to the PPB is 
significant for all the styles and for both investment types, except the internally managed 
allocation funds and the externally managed fixed income funds for which it is insignificant. 
The performance relative to the PPB is higher for externally managed funds for all styles 
except fixed income funds. However, the descriptive statistics have highlighted possible 
differences in PPB selection where the external funds seem to have more favourable 
benchmarks.  
 
There are also differences in the relationship between performance and fund’s age. The M2 
performance of the internally managed fixed income funds declines with fund’s age whereas 
there is no change for any of the performance measures of the external fixed income funds.  
In the case of the internal equity funds, only the Sharpe ratio of the international equity funds 
increases with fund’s age. However, the difference-in-returns of the emerging equity and the 
international equity funds as well as the M2 of the international equity funds increases with 
fund’s age for the external samples. The only thing these results have in common is that 
funds investing in equity are more prone to going through a catching-up period.  
 
Differences also appear in the way performance is explained by the other variables. 
Provider’s age seems to have some explanatory power for the internal funds but the results do 
not show any distinct pattern. On the other hand, the performance of the external allocation 
funds follows a U-shape with middle-aged providers underperforming younger and older 
providers. At the same time younger providers of the external fixed income and the 
international equity funds perform better than older providers whereas for the emerging funds 
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they do worse. The controls for market conditions show that the external managers have poor 
timing skills relative to the internal managers as they do not increase their performance in 
bull years whereas internal managers do. Moreover, variables that relate to economies of 
scale such as size and market share are more important for external funds. Finally, external 
managers seem to react more strongly to regulatory change. 
 
The main contribution of this chapter is to highlight the importance of outsourcing which has 
been overlooked by most of the past performance literature. The chapter documents how 
outperformance has become the dominant management practice in the industry within only a 
few years. This immense development may appear to be advantageous to policyholders as 
most externally managed funds outperform their benchmarks more than internal ones do but 
this difference seems to be largely due to benchmark selection. 
 
Much of the methodology here follows that from the previous chapter. As such, it is also 
subject to the same limitations. However, the omission of management fees is of much more 
consequence here. Although accounting for fees does not change the results in Chen et al. 
(2006) it is an important factor particularly if externally managed funds pose different fees 
than internal ones.  
 
Outsourcing seems to have gathered a lot of momentum in the past decade within the pension 
fund industry. The results here show that it doesn’t make a difference for policyholders in 
terms of risk-adjusted returns although external funds outperform their PPBs more than 
internal funds do, which raises questions on the benchmark selection. Future work can 
compare directly the performance of externally and internally managed funds instead of 
comparing the performance of each to their corresponding PPBs. This will involve a careful 
matching of fund and provider characteristics. Moreover, it will be useful to compare in detail 
the chosen benchmarks and examine if there are any differences, and specifically if external 
funds indeed choose more ‘flattering’ PPBs. A survey of pension providers and wealth 
management companies on benchmark selection may shed some light into this. Finally, 
further work is needed on the incentive structure of internal and external managers. This may 
extend to a study of the contracting practices for the managers as well as the agreements with 
the policyholders.   
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CHAPTER 5: DETERMINANTS OF OUTSOURCING 
 
This chapter investigates whether there are any economic factors that affect a pension 
provider’s decision to outsource fund management. The first section reviews related literature 
and argues that in addition to the traditionally accounted for superior performance argument 
the growing trend to outsource is driven, at least partly, by a ‘fashion to outsource’. In other 
words, the more outsourcing has taken place, the more likely it is that it will be implemented 
in the future. The second section explains the applied methodology and, in particular, 
describes how the ‘fashion to outsource’ is accounted for. The third section presents and 
discusses the results of the regression analysis. The chapter concludes with a discussion of 
the findings, limitations and proposes courses for future research. 
 
5.1. Literature review and hypothesis statement 
 
Previous research done on outsourcing of business functions has dealt with possible reasons 
to outsource (e.g. Loh and Venkatraman, 1992; Ang and Straub, 1998; Bryce and Useem, 
1998). These can be summarised into three main groups. The first one is saving costs, i.e. it is 
more expensive to run a business function (particularly IT) internally than delegating it to an 
external company. The second one is poor performance in the sense that a business function 
performs poorly compared to peers and outsourcing it to an external company can produce 
better results. The third one relates to company size and potential exploitation of economies 
of scale, i.e. companies may be more inclined to outsource if they are small and cannot 
realise economies of scale. An external company, on the other hand, can bring together the 
services it provides to different clients and create economies of scale.  
 
Despite the rapid development of management outsourcing for mutual and pension funds, as 
discussed in the previous chapter, there is very little empirical evidence on the reasons behind 
this particular type of outsourcing. The only work known to the author is by Cashman and 
Deli (2009). They argue that management outsourcing for US mutual funds is more likely 
when the fund’s portfolio contains assets that are difficult to price, e.g. equities relative to 
bonds, or corporate relative to government bonds. Additionally, they show that two 
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characteristics of providers also affect the decision to outsource. First, they find that large 
providers are less likely to outsource because they already benefit from economies of scale 
(the same argument as in the literature for business function outsourcing). Second, they find 
that a wider range of funds increases the probability of outsourcing, i.e., if a fund provider 
specialises in an investment style but still wishes to offer other styles, these will be 
outsourced. This is consistent with an argument provided by Chen et al. (2006) that providers 
face “capacity limits”.  
 
The literature also mentions one more reason to outsource, but this one is more anecdotal 
than empirically tested. Weidenbaum (1998) discusses advantages and disadvantages of 
international outsourcing and cautions against the practice of outsourcing “because 
everybody is doing it” which may underestimate transaction costs etc. that arise from this 
decision. The previous chapter shows that external management grew enormously within a 
relatively short period of time. It also shows that there is no hard-core evidence that the 
externally managed funds perform better than the internally managed funds. For instance, 
Table 4.5 shows that indeed the externally managed funds seem better in beating their 
benchmarks than the internally managed funds, but there is no statistical evidence that they 
deliver better risk adjusted returns (the Sharpe ratios of both management types are 
insignificant). Outperforming PPBs (especially if they are deliberately chosen to be easy to 
beat because the actual portfolios contain assets more diversified than the benchmarks) can 
look nice in prospectuses sent to current and potential future contributors, but should not fool 
pension providers outsourcing the management of their funds. Therefore, this chapter tests 
whether there is any evidence in support of Weidenbaum’s (1998) assessment of the 
‘everybody is doing it’ argument, i.e., whether a trend to outsource has any explanatory 
power in justifying decisions to outsource.  
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5.2. Methodology 
 
The objective is to identify which factors affect the decision to outsource a fund. A cross 
section sample is constructed for this purpose using all 12,307 funds in the database. All 
observations are put together in a way that describes the personal pension fund industry at the 
exact time each fund opened.  
 
The dependent variable            is binary and equals one if the new fund is externally 
managed and zero if it is run in-house. The regression analysis is done with a Probit model 
and the observations are clustered by provider. The independent variables can be summarized 
in three groups: past performance, provider characteristics, and proxies for trend. The first 
two are based on the empirical results of previous research whereas the third group of proxies 
tests whether outsourcing can be explained by the amount of outsourcing that has been taking 
place. It should be noted at the start that given that there is no information about the costs 
involved for internal and external management, e.g. manager compensation, fees, transaction 
costs etc., a potential cost saving argument is not tested for. This is a potential limitation of 
this analysis. 
 
Past performance 
The above-mentioned research on outsourcing indicates that external management may be a 
solution for poor internal performance. Accordingly, good past performance of internally 
managed funds is expected to decrease the probability of outsourcing. At the same time, it is 
reasonable to assume that a provider will be more inclined to outsource if the externally 
managed funds performed well in the past, i.e. the probability of outsourcing will increase 
with the past performance of external funds. Four performance measures are considered: 
simple returns, Sharpe ratios, difference-in-returns, and the M2. The benchmark for the last 
two measures is the PPB. Each measure is calculated based on the monthly fund returns in 
the period prior to each fund’s opening. The periods considered for past performance are the 
following: 
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- 12 months, i.e. the last year preceding fund inception; 
- 12-24 months, i.e. the year before last which is the ‘lag’ of the first period; 
- 24 months, i.e. the last two years preceding fund inception. 
 
These periods do not correspond to calendar years but they refer to the date of each fund’s 
opening. The last two periods are taken into account because it is probable that the decision 
to outsource is met some time before the fund’s inception and therefore, providers are likely 
to assess relatively older performance data. Each new fund is matched to its corresponding 
group, which consists of funds that are run by the same provider and belong to the same ABI 
sector. In order to avoid heterogeneity, the matching group includes funds that have monthly 
return information for all months in the period under consideration. Once the matching group 
is identified, the average return is calculated across funds for each month in the above three 
periods to form the matching group’s monthly returns. Then the arithmetic average and 
standard deviation of the group’s monthly returns are calculated as proxies of past return and 
risk. The same procedure is applied for the PPB returns and risk as well as the risk-free 
return.
37
 Table 5.1 shows the summary statistics for the past performance of the internal and 
external matching groups.  
 
The minima and maxima of the constructed Sharpe ratios and M2 measures show that there 
are no outliers, and therefore, no winsorizing is needed. Table 5.1 also shows that the number 
of observations decreases as older periods are considered. Indeed, the limited availability of 
return observations shrinks the sample to less than half its original size.  
 
Moreover, it is interesting to note that the past returns of the internal funds are larger than 
those of the external funds whereas the external funds outperform their PPBs more than the 
internal funds do. This is consistent with the findings of the previous chapter and points out 
again to the benchmark selection issue for the internal and the external funds. 
 
 
                                                          
37
 The risk-free return is approximated by the 1-month UK Treasury bill. 
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Table 5.1. Summary statistics for the past performance measures of internally and externally managed funds 
with the same ABI sector and operated by the same provider as the new fund.  
 
Management Variable Period Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Internal 
Return 12 6049 0.394 1.440 -5.27 6.67 
Sharpe 12 6049 0.037 0.492 -8.50 3.21 
RFund-RPPB 12 2631 0.145 0.639 -5.01 3.00 
M2 12 2631 0.202 0.668 -4.98 10.68 
External 
Return 12 5122 0.248 1.622 -5.54 8.74 
Sharpe 12 5122 0.030 0.412 -1.75 1.93 
RFund-RPPB 12 4623 0.205 0.525 -5.01 7.21 
M2 12 4623 0.226 0.488 -4.00 7.33 
Internal 
Return 12-24 5857 0.685 1.297 -4.72 5.86 
Sharpe 12-24 5857 0.104 0.507 -11.50 3.25 
RFund-RPPB 12-24 2516 0.170 0.510 -4.47 3.42 
M2 12-24 2516 0.155 0.541 -6.61 7.00 
External 
Return 12-24 4738 0.615 1.421 -5.25 11.06 
Sharpe 12-24 4738 0.122 0.389 -3.00 1.97 
RFund-RPPB 12-24 4306 0.220 0.473 -4.44 8.27 
M2 12-24 4306 0.203 0.435 -4.00 4.01 
Internal 
Return 24 5849 0.544 0.948 -3.06 4.26 
Sharpe 24 5849 0.054 0.377 -12.00 2.94 
RFund-RPPB 24 2509 0.145 0.410 -2.41 2.39 
M2 24 2509 0.151 0.505 -3.74 8.77 
External 
Return 24 4726 0.436 1.034 -3.22 5.05 
Sharpe 24 4726 0.048 0.287 -1.67 1.27 
RFund-RPPB 24 4298 0.216 0.326 -1.94 5.78 
M2 24 4298 0.202 0.307 -1.54 4.00 
 
 
Ideally, the regression specification should include the past performance measure of both 
internal and external funds so that it can be clearly distinguished which of the two has the 
strongest effect (if at all). However, this is not possible for simple fund returns and the Sharpe 
ratio as the correlation coefficient between internal and external funds is above 0.9 for all 
periods. Consequently, the difference of internal minus external performance is calculated 
and used in the regressions instead. This is not a problem for the difference-in-returns and M2 
measures since the corresponding correlation coefficients range between 0.1 and 0.33.  
 
The four performance measures are used alternatively in the regressions, i.e.  
               {                                   
                    
          
         
   } , 
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where each measure refers to the group that matches fund ‘i’ and ‘t’ is the period prior to this 
fund’s inception (12, 12-24, and 24 months). The superscripts ‘in’ and ‘ex’ signify ‘internal’ 
and ‘external’ respectively. The first two measures are calculated as             
         
    and  
                     
             
   . 
 
Provider’s characteristics 
The work by Cashman and Deli (2009) indicates that smaller mutual fund providers are more 
likely to outsource fund management and so do fund families with a wide range of funds. 
They measure size with the value of assets under management and investment style range 
with the number of funds in operation. These two measures cannot be applied here for two 
reasons. First, the number of funds in operation does not represent the range of investment 
styles since it is possible that a provider operates many funds of the same style. Second, there 
is no information for assets under management and, therefore, size must be approximated by 
another variable. 
 
The range of funds is approximated here by the share of the new fund’s ABI sector within the 
provider’s portfolio of funds. The definition is identical to that of ABI’s share in Chapter 3, 
i.e. it is the ratio of the number of funds with the same ABI sector and provider as the new 
fund i over all funds that the provider operates at the time the new fund opened, expressed as 
a percentage (      ). This variable measures the degree of the provider’s specialisation in 
the corresponding ABI sector and the higher it is the lower the probability to outsource the 
new fund is expected to be. 
 
The provider’s size cannot be approximated by the number of funds in operation as in 
Chapter 3. The reason for this is that both the number of operated funds and that of 
outsourced funds increase over time and are highly correlated. Thus, size measured in this 
way will be significant but the result will be spurious due this correlation. An alternative way 
to measure the provider’s size is relative to the whole market, i.e. using the provider’s market 
share. To this effect, market share is proxied by the total number of funds operated by the 
same provider expressed as a percentage of the total number of funds in the market at the 
time the new fund opens (      ). Providers with smaller market share are expected to be 
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more likely to outsource, assuming that they cannot realise economies of scale internally due 
to lack of size. A similar variable is the relative size in the fund’s ABI sector which relates to 
economies of scale for the fund’s particular investment style. This is proxied by the total 
number of funds with the same ABI that the provider operates as a percentage of the total 
number of funds with the same ABI in the market when the new fund opens (          ). 
Providers with a large market share in the new fund’s ABI are expected to be less likely to 
outsource the new fund since they may realise economies of scale internally (same as with 
      ). 
 
The last characteristic refers to the provider’s origin. Providers that are founded outside the 
UK may be more inclined to hire external managers, particularly before establishing 
themselves in the local market. At the same time, domestic providers may be better informed 
about local wealth management companies and thus, outsourcing will involve fewer costs, in 
terms of contracting, information gathering etc. Therefore, being an international provider 
may both increase and decrease the probability of outsourcing. The provider’s origin is 
proxied by a dummy variable, which equals 1 if the provider is founded outside the UK and 0 
otherwise (            .
38
 
 
Trend 
The purpose of the trend proxies is to detect whether there is general tendency to outsource 
more, which is not due to performance or any other of the above factors, but simply because 
the market has acquired a habit of hiring external managers. There are three pairs of trend 
proxies and each pair includes two proxies, one for the market’s trend and one for the 
provider’s trend to outsource. First, it is considered how much the overall market uses 
external management. This is measured by the number of externally managed funds as a 
percentage of all funds existing in the market at the time each new fund opens (      . This 
accounts for all funds that have been opened prior to the new fund’s inception and as such, is 
considered to be a long-term measure of the outsourcing trend. The same measure is 
calculated for the provider of each new fund, i.e. the number of funds the provider outsources 
as a percentage of all funds that the provider operates (         .  
                                                          
38
 Founding information has been collected manually from the history statement of each provider’s website. 
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The second pair measures the degree of outsourcing the new fund’s ABI style. For the total 
market it is calculated as the ratio of the number of all funds with the same ABI sector that 
are externally managed over the number of all funds with the same ABI sector at the time of 
the new fund’s inception (        ). For the fund’s provider it is the number of externally 
managed funds with the same ABI sector and provider as a percentage of all the provider’s 
funds (           ).  
 
The third pair measures how much the market and the provider have outsourced shortly 
before the opening of each fund. This is a rather short-term measure of the outsourcing trend 
and it is named ‘propensity’ in order to distinguish it from the long-term ‘trend’. Propensity 
is measured in the same way as trend but only the funds that are opened within a particular 
period are considered. The periods are defined in the same way as past performance, namely 
12, 12-24, and 24 months prior to the fund’s inception. So for example, the market’s 
propensity to outsource in the last 12 months is calculated as the number of all outsourced 
funds that opened in this period expressed as a percentage of all funds that opened in the 
same period. The market’s propensity to outsource in period ‘t’ is named ‘           ’ and 
the provider’s propensity to outsource is named ‘              ’.  
 
Additional controls 
As discussed in Chapter 3, performance is affected by changing market conditions. 
Nevertheless, creating market condition dummies cannot be done in the same way for this 
analysis. The reason is that the observations are cross-sectional and the periods over which 
performance is measured differs for each fund and does not correspond to calendar years. The 
definition in Chapter 3 is based on negative/positive return and above/below average 
volatility. It is relatively straightforward to calculate the average PPB return for each fund’s 
matching group (as is indeed done in order to calculate the difference-in-returns and M2). On 
the other hand, it is hard to assess whether the overall PPB volatility of the matching group is 
above or below average, simply because the calculation of this average presupposes the 
calculation of intermediate volatilities (e.g. quarterly). However, the performance measures 
do not correspond to any calendar periods and so there would be a mismatch between 
performance and these intermediate volatilities. 
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In order to sidestep this problem, the broader definition in Fabozzi and Francis (1977) is 
applied whereby an average negative return signifies a bear market and a positive return a 
bull market. Average PPB returns are calculated in the same way as for the past performance 
measures, i.e. the returns’ arithmetic average in the 12, 12-24, and 24 months before 
inception. The matching group includes all funds with the same ABI sector in the market. 
Moreover, Chapter 4 indicates that there may be differences between the benchmarks of 
internal and external funds. For this reason, the matching group of PPB returns is further 
separated into internally and externally managed funds. Bear markets are proxied by a 
dummy, which equals 1 if the average PPB return of both internal and external funds in the 
considered period is negative and 0 otherwise,                            . A dummy for 
bull markets can be defined in the same way (i.e. it equals 1 if both averages are positive) but 
its correlation to the bear dummy is -0.9 so only the bear dummy is used in the regressions. 
 
To summarize, Probit regressions are run on the following specification: 
                                                                   
                                                                                      (1)          
 
The regression is repeated for each past performance measure and pair of trend proxies. It is 
also repeated for the three periods (12, 12-24, and 24 months) where the past performance 
measure, the bear market dummy, and the propensity to outsource (when applicable) change 
together according to the period under consideration. Tables 5.2 and 5.3 show the summary 
statistics of all the explanatory variables. Table 5.2 shows the statistics for the past 
performance measures. It is different from Table 5.1 in that it contains the difference in fund 
returns and the Sharpe ratio as well as only those observations that are included in the 
regression. The number of available observations is reduced down to how many funds have 
past performance information for both internal and external funds.  
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Table 5.2. Summary statistics of all variables measuring past performance, sorted by the number months prior to 
fund inception over which past performance is calculated.  
 
Variable Mean St.dev. Min Max Obs. 
12 months 
         -0.05 0.38 -2.39 2.19 3725 
            -0.01 0.11 -0.92 1.02 3725 
                
   0.13 0.64 -3.71 2.92 1702 
                
   0.24 0.36 -2.43 1.88 1702 
      
   0.19 0.45 -2.70 2.42 1702 
      
   0.24 0.33 -1.12 1.46 1702 
12-24 months 
            -0.07 0.39 -2.39 2.20 3476 
               -0.01 0.13 -0.80 1.67 3476 
                   
   0.13 0.46 -4.47 2.76 1577 
                   
   0.21 0.36 -1.97 2.91 1577 
         
   0.13 0.38 -2.72 2.29 1577 
         
   0.15 0.36 -2.37 2.48 1577 
24 months 
         -0.06 0.26 -1.58 1.80 3464 
            -0.01 0.08 -0.64 0.82 3464 
                
   0.12 0.41 -2.41 1.78 1571 
                
   0.22 0.21 -1.36 1.04 1571 
      
   0.11 0.35 -1.94 1.48 1571 
      
   0.18 0.20 -0.61 1.11 1571 
 
 
 
Table 5.3 shows the summary statistics for all the remaining explanatory variables. Because 
there are more observations available for the past fund return and Sharpe ratio than for the 
performance relative to the PPB the summary statistics in Table 5.3 are calculated twice to 
match the corresponding past performance observations. 
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Table 5.3. Summary statistics of all independent variables (excl. past performance), sorted by matching 
performance sample, and number of months prior to fund inception over which the past performance, the bear 
dummy, and the propensity variables are calculated. 
 
 
Return & Sharpe 
 
RFund-RPPB & M2 
 
Variable Mean St.dev. Min Max Mean St.dev. Min Max 
  12 months 
       5.36 2.45 0.36 18.49 4.81 1.99 0.48 18.49 
           7.34 5.59 0.69 46.15 6.62 4.54 0.69 31.61 
       9.44 6.48 0.58 59.52 10.97 6.69 0.98 59.52 
            0.52 0.50 0.00 1.00 0.43 0.50 0.00 1.00 
       0.37 0.48 0.00 1.00 0.38 0.48 0.00 1.00 
      42.30 12.95 8.80 58.92 44.13 11.00 13.06 58.92 
         57.08 23.60 5.26 90.95 49.67 20.19 6.36 90.35 
         50.50 18.46 2.78 93.62 53.28 15.03 2.78 93.62 
            60.82 24.13 4.62 97.56 54.11 23.48 4.62 94.05 
             74.44 19.04 4.60 89.60 78.02 13.58 4.60 89.60 
                 72.47 32.98 0.00 100.00 70.74 33.33 0.00 100.00 
  12-24 months 
       5.43 2.42 0.48 16.20 4.89 1.93 0.48 16.20 
           7.31 5.45 0.69 42.27 6.70 4.56 0.69 31.61 
       9.60 6.50 0.94 59.52 11.24 6.76 0.98 59.52 
            0.52 0.50 0.00 1.00 0.43 0.50 0.00 1.00 
          0.25 0.43 0.00 1.00 0.23 0.42 0.00 1.00 
      42.24 12.89 8.80 58.92 44.03 11.03 13.06 58.92 
         57.22 23.60 5.26 90.95 49.35 20.12 6.36 90.35 
         50.25 18.16 3.00 93.62 53.08 14.95 3.02 93.62 
            60.78 24.29 4.62 97.06 53.87 23.48 4.62 94.05 
                70.01 20.09 5.95 88.23 72.77 15.87 11.65 88.23 
                    69.70 33.18 0.00 100.00 65.04 33.10 0.00 100.00 
  24 months 
       5.42 2.42 0.48 16.20 4.88 1.92 0.48 16.20 
           7.31 5.46 0.69 42.27 6.71 4.57 0.69 31.61 
       9.61 6.50 0.94 59.52 11.25 6.77 0.98 59.52 
            0.52 0.50 0.00 1.00 0.43 0.50 0.00 1.00 
       0.34 0.47 0.00 1.00 0.36 0.48 0.00 1.00 
      42.33 12.82 8.80 58.92 44.14 10.92 13.06 58.92 
         57.31 23.59 5.26 90.95 49.42 20.12 6.36 90.35 
         50.37 18.07 3.00 93.62 53.23 14.77 3.02 93.62 
            60.87 24.27 4.62 97.06 53.95 23.48 4.62 94.05 
             72.77 18.96 10.78 87.80 75.88 14.05 11.73 87.80 
                 75.56 24.80 0.00 100.00 74.07 21.86 0.00 100.00 
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The correlation coefficients of the chosen explanatory variables are very similar for all the 
variants of specification (1). Table 5.4 shows the pairwise correlations for the specification 
with the difference in fund return as past performance measure and the long-term trend 
proxies. The period considered are the 12 months prior to each fund’s opening. There is some 
correlation between the provider’s total market share and market share in each ABI sector as 
well as between the market and the provider’s trend to outsource. However, collinearity 
diagnostics for all possible specification (not shown here) indicate that this degree of 
correlation does not impair the estimation. The mean VIF does not exceed the value of 1.5 
and all condition numbers are around 10. 
 
 
Table 5.4. Correlation coefficients between independent variables. In bold are correlations with absolute value 
larger than 0.4. The past performance and the bear market dummy refer to the 12 months preceding the fund’s 
inception. The pair of the long-term trend to outsource is chosen. 
 
 
                                                                  
       1        
       0.0675 1       
           0.0894 0.4156 1      
       0.0510 -0.0788 0.3252 1     
            0.0249 0.0780 0.1157 0.0252 1    
       0.1467 0.0476 0.0052 -0.0165 0.0136 1   
      0.0060 0.0507 -0.0711 -0.1752 0.1224 0.1860 1 
 
         0.0188 0.1870 0.1268 -0.1716 0.3278 0.1606 0.6551 1 
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5.3. Regression analysis 
 
The results for the Probit regressions are shown in Tables 5.5 to 5.7. Each table has the same 
set of regression specifications where the only variable that alternates is the proxy for the 
trend to outsource. Table 5.5 contains the long-term trend of the market and the provider to 
outsource any fund type. Table 5.6 includes the trend of the market and the provider to 
outsource funds of the same ABI sector as the new fund. Table 5.7 has the market’s and the 
provider’s propensity (i.e. ‘short-term’ trend) to outsource any fund type. The results in each 
table are sorted according to the period over which the past performance, the bear market 
dummy, and the propensity to outsource (where applicable) are calculated. Then, for each 
period, results are sorted according to which past performance measure is used. As a 
reminder, only the difference between the internal and the external fund returns and Sharpe 
ratio is taken due to the high correlation of these two measures between management types. 
For the performance measures relative to the PPB it is possible to separate into past internal 
and external performance. Given that Probit is used to estimate the regressions the estimated 
coefficients cannot be interpreted directly. The sign of the estimated coefficients (in bold) 
indicates whether the variable in question increases or decreases the probability to outsource 
the new fund. How much the probability will change depends on the actual value of the 
explanatory variable. However, it is possible to estimate how much the probability to 
outsource changes at the variable means (shown in Tables 5.2 and 5.3) which is known as 
‘marginal effect’ and this is reported in italic below each coefficient.39 
 
The results show that the decision to outsource is affected by past performance. Indeed, this 
appears for all periods prior to the new fund’s opening suggesting that providers consider at 
least the past two years of performance. The coefficient in front of the Sharpe ratio difference 
is the most robust result among past performance measures. The coefficient’s sign is negative 
which is consistent with the hypothesis that the past performance of the internal funds 
decreases and that of the external funds increases the probability to outsource. When the 
performance relative to the PPB is considered, it is mostly the positive effect of the external 
funds’ outperformance that makes a difference whereas that of the internal funds is rather 
insignificant. The difference in simple fund returns is insignificant. In terms of marginal 
                                                          
39
 For continuous variables the marginal effect calculation is made for an infinitesimal change in the variable 
whereas for discrete variables (dummies) it is made for a discrete change from 0 to 1. 
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effects, the difference in the Sharpe ratio has a very strong effect, i.e. if the difference 
increases by 1% at the mean, then the probability to outsource increases by about 20%. Note, 
that the bear market dummy is insignificant and does not affect the decision to outsource. 
 
From the provider’s characteristics only the market share in the new fund’s ABI sector 
remains significant for all specifications. Its coefficient has a negative sign indicating that 
providers who have a large market share of the new fund’s investment style are less likely to 
outsource (consistent with the economies of scale argument). The marginal effect of a 1% 
increase in market share at the mean ranges between 1% and 2%. At the same time the 
provider’s market share (proxy for relative size) has on several occasions a significantly 
positive coefficient with a marginal effect of around 3%. Both were expected to have 
negative coefficients so this result indicates that the economies-of-scale argument applies to 
individual investment styles but not to the overall size of the provider. At the same time, the 
degree of specialization in the new fund’s ABI (Rangei) remains insignificant for most 
regressions except when the specification includes the past performance relative to the PPB 
and the trend to outsource the fund’s ABI sector. In these cases, the coefficient is positive and 
the marginal effect at the mean is approximately 0.6%. This is also contrary to the hypothesis 
that the more a provider specializes in an investment style the less likely outsourcing is. 
Maybe, the ‘capacity limits’ argument by Chen et al. (2006) applies here in a different way. 
Instead of outsourcing more the more types of funds a provider offers, there are capacity 
limits to how many funds of the same type can be run internally.  
 
The results for all three trend proxies are very consistent across all regressions and suggest 
that the trend to outsource has a significantly positive effect on the probability of further 
outsourcing. Moreover, the market’s trend to outsource is more significant than the provider’s 
trend to outsource. Where both are significant, the marginal effect of the market’s trend is 
larger in most cases. This implies that the general momentum to outsource in the personal 
pension fund industry may be more important for the decision to outsource than the 
provider’s management choices. This may happen because providers are influenced by the 
practices of their peers and are more likely to outsource if many others have done so. 
Although the marginal effects at the means are relatively low (ranging from 0.3% to 0.8%) 
the positive effect on the probability of outsourcing is very robust. 
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Overall, the past performance has the strongest effect on the probability to outsource. 
Relative size is also important but the economies-of-scale argument seems to apply more to 
the relative size of individual investment styles. The provider’s origin and bear market 
conditions have no effect on the decision to outsource. Finally, the general trend to outsource 
is important and there is indication the management practices of peers carry more weight than 
the provider’s own outsourcing habits. 
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Table 5.5. Regression results with the proxies of the long-term trend of outsourcing. The dependent variable is binary and equals one if the new fund is outsourced. The 
estimation is done with Probit and the cross-sections are clustered by provider. The results are sorted by the period over which past performance and the bear market dummy 
are calculated, and by the measure of past performance. The estimated coefficients are in bold, the marginal effects are in italic, and the p-values are in parentheses (* p<0.1, 
** p<0.05, *** p<0.01). 
Trend 
 
        and           
 Period 12 months 12-24 months 24 months 
Performance Return Sharpe RFund-RPPB M2 Return Sharpe RFund-RPPB M2 Return Sharpe RFund-RPPB M2 
Constant -0.5323* -0.5289* -0.9192** -0.8639* -0.6305 -0.5929 -0.9576* -0.9282* -0.6353* -0.5885 -0.8823* -0.8617* 
 (0.091) (0.083) (0.045) (0.077) (0.103) (0.114) (0.090) (0.088) (0.095) (0.108) (0.067) (0.096) 
                 -0.0919 -0.8813*** 
  
-0.2097 -0.8500** 
  
-0.3746* -1.4569** 
  
margin -0.0229 -0.2189*** 
  
-0.0505 -0.2046** 
  
-0.0895* -0.3484** 
  
 (0.466) (0.009) 
  
(0.105) (0.016) 
  
(0.087) (0.012) 
  
              
     
 
0.0934*** 0.0478   
 
-0.1451 0.0477   
 
0.0052 0.1003 
margin   
 
0.0237*** 0.0122   
 
-0.0358 0.0118   
 
0.0013 0.0246 
   
 
(0.008) (0.487)   
 
(0.227) (0.707)   
 
(0.937) (0.367) 
              
     
 
0.3195** 0.2215   
 
0.0682 0.2233**   
 
0.4510 0.4903** 
margin   
 
0.0813** 0.0566   
 
0.0168 0.0551**   
 
0.1107 0.1200** 
   
 
(0.014) (0.253)   
 
(0.634) (0.017)   
 
(0.127) (0.045) 
       0.0544 0.0462 0.1310* 0.1290* 0.0369 0.0272 0.1252* 0.1163 0.0469 0.0345 0.1246* 0.1260* 
margin 0.0135 0.0115 0.0333* 0.0330* 0.0089 0.0066 0.0309* 0.0287 0.0112 0.0082 0.0306* 0.0308* 
 (0.323) (0.378) (0.073) (0.074) (0.512) (0.604) (0.077) (0.108) (0.401) (0.492) (0.080) (0.083) 
           -0.0487** -0.0457** -0.0947*** -0.0934*** -0.0482** -0.0439** -0.0988*** -0.0975*** -0.0483** -0.0442** -0.0975*** -0.0969*** 
margin -0.0121** -0.0114** -0.0241*** -0.0239*** -0.0116** -0.0106** -0.0244*** -0.0241*** -0.0115** -0.0106** -0.0239*** -0.0237*** 
 (0.038) (0.030) (0.000) (0.000) (0.036) (0.029) (0.000) (0.000) (0.042) (0.022) (0.000) (0.000) 
       0.0030 0.0012 0.0108 0.0104 0.0033 0.0025 0.0101 0.0098 0.0034 0.0016 0.0086 0.0089 
margin 0.0008 0.0003 0.0027 0.0027 0.0008 0.0006 0.0025 0.0024 0.0008 0.0004 0.0021 0.0022 
 (0.706) (0.873) (0.341) (0.368) (0.715) (0.762) (0.377) (0.409) (0.716) (0.843) (0.444) (0.444) 
            0.0839 0.0843 0.2192 0.2308 0.0874 0.0662 0.1857 0.1793 0.0631 0.0423 0.1531 0.1707 
margin 0.0209 0.0210 0.0550 0.0582 0.0211 0.0160 0.0453 0.0437 0.0151 0.0101 0.0372 0.0413 
 (0.655) (0.651) (0.254) (0.230) (0.661) (0.734) (0.361) (0.391) (0.759) (0.835) (0.451) (0.442) 
      0.0121 0.0197 0.0229 -0.0249 -0.0445 -0.0505 0.0976 0.1217 0.0698 0.0634 0.0170 -0.0102 
margin 0.0030 0.0049 0.0058 -0.0064 -0.0108 -0.0123 0.0235 0.0291 0.0165 0.0150 0.0042 -0.0025 
 (0.938) (0.898) (0.919) (0.911) (0.731) (0.689) (0.615) (0.520) (0.641) (0.668) (0.936) (0.959) 
      0.0162*** 0.0170*** 0.0307** 0.0313** 0.0202*** 0.0200*** 0.0347** 0.0339** 0.0190*** 0.0193*** 0.0307** 0.0311** 
margin 0.0040*** 0.0042*** 0.0078** 0.0080** 0.0049*** 0.0048*** 0.0086** 0.0084** 0.0045*** 0.0046*** 0.0075** 0.0076** 
 (0.003) (0.001) (0.018) (0.019) (0.002) (0.002) (0.014) (0.014) (0.001) (0.001) (0.014) (0.019) 
         0.0140*** 0.0140*** 0.0040 0.0032 0.0149*** 0.0152*** 0.0051 0.0050 0.0145*** 0.0147*** 0.0059 0.0050 
margin 0.0035*** 0.0035*** 0.0010 0.0008 0.0036*** 0.0037*** 0.0013 0.0012 0.0035*** 0.0035*** 0.0014 0.0012 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.615) (0.700) (0.005) (0.004) (0.547) (0.557) (0.008) (0.007) (0.490) (0.576) 
Pseudo R2 0.1407 0.1441 0.1762 0.1702 0.1604 0.1620 0.1933 0.1954 0.1581 0.1601 0.1920 0.1930 
Chi2 103.4432 106.6721 160.7762 113.2020 98.5432 122.4767 347.2339 193.6712 74.5903 84.9135 213.1324 212.1613 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Observations 3725 3725 1702 1702 3476 3476 1577 1577 3464 3464 1571 1571 
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Table 5.6. Regression results with the proxies of the long-term trend of the ABI sector’s outsourcing. The dependent variable is binary and equals one if the new fund is 
outsourced. The estimation is done with Probit and the cross-sections are clustered by provider. The results are sorted by the period over which past performance and the bear 
market dummy are calculated, and by the measure of past performance. The estimated coefficients are in bold, the marginal effects are in italic, and the p-values are in 
parentheses (* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01). 
Trend 
 
           and                 
 Period 12 months 12-24 months 24 months 
Performance Return Sharpe RFund-RPPB M2 Return Sharpe RFund-RPPB M2 Return Sharpe RFund-RPPB M2 
Constant -0.7141** -0.6997** -1.0649** -1.0223** -0.7569** -0.7343** -1.0779* -1.0350* -0.7487** -0.7229** -0.9922** -0.9933* 
 (0.019) (0.018) (0.015) (0.027) (0.033) (0.035) (0.067) (0.061) (0.034) (0.038) (0.043) (0.056) 
                 -0.0801 -0.6191* 
  
-0.0921 -0.5242* 
  
-0.2369 -0.9923* 
  
margin -0.0197 -0.1521* 
  
-0.0220 -0.1249* 
  
-0.0561 -0.2350* 
  
 (0.500) (0.083) 
  
(0.432) (0.088) 
  
(0.229) (0.058) 
  
              
     
 
0.0727*** -0.0165   
 
-0.1617 0.0269   
 
-0.0188 0.0821 
margin   
 
0.0184*** -0.0042   
 
-0.0402 0.0067   
 
-0.0046 0.0202 
   
 
(0.006) (0.830)   
 
(0.120) (0.815)   
 
(0.790) (0.543) 
              
     
 
0.3559*** 0.2841   
 
0.0391 0.2392**   
 
0.4291 0.5519** 
margin   
 
0.0902*** 0.0725   
 
0.0097 0.0595**   
 
0.1060 0.1358** 
   
 
(0.005) (0.126)   
 
(0.803) (0.029)   
 
(0.157) (0.023) 
       0.0559 0.0513 0.1458** 0.1447** 0.0442 0.0377 0.1519** 0.1393** 0.0509 0.0437 0.1469** 0.1457** 
margin 0.0137 0.0126 0.0370** 0.0369** 0.0105 0.0090 0.0378** 0.0346** 0.0121 0.0103 0.0363** 0.0359** 
 (0.273) (0.298) (0.036) (0.034) (0.407) (0.463) (0.022) (0.043) (0.326) (0.371) (0.029) (0.036) 
           -0.0463** -0.0446*** -0.0967*** -0.0966*** -0.0471** -0.0437** -0.1031*** -0.1004*** -0.0466** -0.0437*** -0.0984*** -0.0976*** 
margin -0.0114** -0.0110*** -0.0245*** -0.0246*** -0.0112** -0.0104** -0.0256*** -0.0250*** -0.0110** -0.0103*** -0.0243*** -0.0240*** 
 (0.015) (0.009) (0.000) (0.000) (0.015) (0.012) (0.000) (0.000) (0.015) (0.007) (0.000) (0.000) 
       0.0086 0.0071 0.0237** 0.0237** 0.0101 0.0091 0.0247** 0.0235** 0.0092 0.0079 0.0211* 0.0216** 
margin 0.0021 0.0018 0.0060** 0.0061** 0.0024 0.0022 0.0061** 0.0059** 0.0022 0.0019 0.0052* 0.0053** 
 (0.273) (0.317) (0.023) (0.023) (0.251) (0.260) (0.036) (0.047) (0.292) (0.296) (0.050) (0.046) 
            0.1189 0.1240 0.2428 0.2688 0.1514 0.1442 0.2729 0.2575 0.1224 0.1164 0.2267 0.2320 
margin 0.0293 0.0306 0.0606 0.0675 0.0362 0.0345 0.0666 0.0629 0.0291 0.0277 0.0552 0.0562 
 (0.468) (0.447) (0.167) (0.113) (0.326) (0.344) (0.113) (0.142) (0.442) (0.466) (0.186) (0.229) 
      0.0054 0.0103 0.0465 -0.0100 -0.0852 -0.0862 0.0750 0.0957 0.0461 0.0432 0.0424 0.0124 
margin 0.0013 0.0025 0.0117 -0.0026 -0.0207 -0.0210 0.0183 0.0232 0.0108 0.0102 0.0104 0.0030 
 (0.975) (0.952) (0.836) (0.964) (0.500) (0.489) (0.699) (0.605) (0.761) (0.776) (0.841) (0.949) 
         0.0133*** 0.0136*** 0.0214** 0.0226*** 0.0159*** 0.0160*** 0.0252** 0.0243** 0.0151*** 0.0155*** 0.0221** 0.0221** 
margin 0.0033*** 0.0034*** 0.0054** 0.0058*** 0.0038*** 0.0038*** 0.0063** 0.0060** 0.0036*** 0.0037*** 0.0055** 0.0055** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.010) (0.009) (0.000) (0.000) (0.011) (0.010) (0.000) (0.000) (0.011) (0.015) 
            
 
0.0150*** 0.0148*** 0.0062 0.0050 0.0150*** 0.0150*** 0.0049 0.0050 0.0146*** 0.0145*** 0.0055 0.0053 
margin 0.0037*** 0.0036*** 0.0016 0.0013 0.0036*** 0.0036*** 0.0012 0.0012 0.0035*** 0.0034*** 0.0014 0.0013 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.204) (0.311) (0.000) (0.000) (0.391) (0.374) (0.000) (0.000) (0.334) (0.373) 
Pseudo R2 0.1586 0.1602 0.1777 0.1721 0.1736 0.1748 0.1877 0.1896 0.1703 0.1716 0.1854 0.1879 
Chi2 230.2885 231.0557 251.7181 158.8550 252.7661 312.9252 343.4701 254.6276 189.2147 220.8811 241.1041 199.1381 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Observations 3725 3725 1702 1702 3476 3476 1577 1577 3464 3464 1571 1571 
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Table 5.7. Regression results with the proxies of the short-term trend of outsourcing. The dependent variable is binary and equals one if the new fund is outsourced. The 
estimation is done with Probit and the cross-sections are clustered by provider. The results are sorted by the period over which past performance and the bear market dummy 
are calculated, and by the measure of past performance. The estimated coefficients are in bold, the marginal effects are in italic, and the p-values are in parentheses (* p<0.1, 
** p<0.05, *** p<0.01). 
Trend 
 
 
              and                  
 
 
Period 12 months 12-24 months 24 months 
Performance Return Sharpe RFund-RPPB M2 Return Sharpe RFund-RPPB M2 Return Sharpe RFund-RPPB M2 
Constant -0.7369*** -0.7323*** -1.3131* -1.2384* -0.5338 -0.4982 -1.2370** -1.1564** -1.0675*** -1.0286*** -1.5260*** -1.5464*** 
 (0.009) (0.007) (0.063) (0.082) (0.124) (0.147) (0.038) (0.041) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) 
                 -0.0698 -0.8649* 
  
-0.2114 -0.6819* 
  
-0.3414 -1.2910** 
  
margin -0.0169 -0.2094* 
  
-0.0518 -0.1671* 
  
-0.0819 -0.3106** 
  
 (0.602) (0.060) 
  
(0.177) (0.085) 
  
(0.141) (0.033) 
  
              
   
  
0.1250*** 0.0233 
  
-0.1841* -0.0227 
  
0.0232 0.1004 
margin 
  
0.0309*** 0.0058 
  
-0.0454* -0.0056 
  
0.0057 0.0244 
 
  
(0.003) (0.770) 
  
(0.086) (0.873) 
  
(0.732) (0.406) 
              
   
  
0.2925** 0.1331 
  
0.0024 0.1971 
  
0.4983** 0.6425*** 
margin 
  
0.0724** 0.0333 
  
0.0006 0.0487 
  
0.1217** 0.1562*** 
 
  
(0.032) (0.437) 
  
(0.988) (0.106) 
  
(0.029) (0.003) 
       0.0909* 0.0832* 0.1700** 0.1656** 0.0685 0.0624 0.1523** 0.1400** 0.0793* 0.0690* 0.1305** 0.1290** 
margin 0.0221* 0.0201* 0.0421** 0.0415** 0.0168 0.0153 0.0375** 0.0346** 0.0190* 0.0166* 0.0319** 0.0314** 
 (0.091) (0.100) (0.021) (0.020) (0.208) (0.231) (0.025) (0.040) (0.081) (0.087) (0.027) (0.034) 
           -0.0405 -0.0373* -0.0932*** -0.0936*** -0.0445** -0.0415** -0.0946*** -0.0926*** -0.0392* -0.0355** -0.0849*** -0.0841*** 
margin -0.0098 -0.0090* -0.0231*** -0.0234*** -0.0109** -0.0102** -0.0233*** -0.0229*** -0.0094* -0.0085** -0.0207*** -0.0204*** 
 (0.107) (0.095) (0.000) (0.000) (0.048) (0.041) (0.000) (0.000) (0.077) (0.045) (0.000) (0.000) 
       -0.0031 -0.0050 0.0075 0.0074 -0.0000 -0.0005 0.0111 0.0106 0.0071 0.0053 0.0134 0.0137 
margin -0.0007 -0.0012 0.0019 0.0018 -0.0000 -0.0001 0.0027 0.0026 0.0017 0.0013 0.0033 0.0033 
 (0.739) (0.537) (0.476) (0.472) (0.999) (0.959) (0.349) (0.391) (0.420) (0.475) (0.162) (0.170) 
            0.0156 0.0181 0.0362 0.0357 0.2649 0.2550 0.1837 0.1701 0.0399 0.0268 0.0279 0.0387 
margin 0.0038 0.0044 0.0089 0.0089 0.0655 0.0631 0.0447 0.0416 0.0096 0.0064 0.0068 0.0094 
 (0.919) (0.904) (0.827) (0.814) (0.231) (0.249) (0.270) (0.322) (0.788) (0.857) (0.813) (0.771) 
      0.0513 0.0683 0.0654 0.0148 -0.0440 -0.0517 -0.0065 0.0138 0.1359 0.1299 0.0330 -0.0091 
margin 0.0124 0.0164 0.0161 0.0037 -0.0109 -0.0128 -0.0016 0.0034 0.0320 0.0307 0.0080 -0.0022 
 (0.650) (0.552) (0.702) (0.932) (0.738) (0.692) (0.970) (0.932) (0.320) (0.340) (0.869) (0.960) 
            0.0110*** 0.0113*** 0.0189** 0.0190** 0.0138*** 0.0137*** 0.0232*** 0.0221** 0.0085** 0.0087** 0.0153** 0.0161** 
margin 0.0027*** 0.0027*** 0.0047** 0.0048** 0.0034*** 0.0034*** 0.0057*** 0.0055** 0.0020** 0.0021** 0.0037** 0.0039** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.034) (0.031) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.010) (0.018) (0.016) (0.048) (0.038) 
               0.0098*** 0.0098*** 0.0057** 0.0056** 0.0051 0.0051 0.0037 0.0036 0.0152*** 0.0153*** 0.0135*** 0.0129*** 
margin 0.0024*** 0.0024*** 0.0014** 0.0014** 0.0013 0.0013 0.0009 0.0009 0.0036*** 0.0037*** 0.0033*** 0.0031*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.018) (0.016) (0.181) (0.173) (0.380) (0.393) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Pseudo R2 0.1526 0.1561 0.1793 0.1707 0.1427 0.1427 0.2041 0.2034 0.1721 0.1735 0.2058 0.2092 
Chi2 253.1249 256.2933 235.6933 150.1387 74.4713 80.1649 306.6645 238.8103 253.3957 341.4762 365.8982 347.8486 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Observations 3521 3521 1655 1655 3303 3303 1547 1547 3332 3332 1562 1562 
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5.4. Discussion 
 
The objective of this chapter was to examine potential factors determining a decision to 
outsource, and, in particular, whether the past scale of outsourcing impacts on the current 
decision to outsource. Previous research has identified a series of factors associated with 
decisions to outsource but has neglected the importance of ‘fashion to outsource’. This 
chapter makes a first step in filling this gap in the literature. 
 
Different proxies were created in order to measure ‘fashion to outsource’ and regression 
analysis showed that these are significant. Furthermore, the degree of overall outsourcing in 
the market was found to be more important than the degree of outsourcing within each 
provider supporting the hypothesis that there is an “everybody is doing it” factor behind the 
rapid development of outsourcing in the personal pension industry in the UK.  
 
Past performance was found to have the strongest effect on the probability to outsource. 
Particularly, the evidence indicates that if internally managed funds with the same investment 
style as the new fund have performed well in the past it is less likely that the new fund will be 
run externally. At the same time, the higher the past performance of externally managed 
funds is the higher the probability that a new fund of the same investment type will be 
outsourced. The latter effect seems to be the strongest of the two. 
 
Out of the remaining explanatory variables, only the provider’s relative size in the new fund’s 
ABI sector had an effect on outsourcing which is robust across all specifications. The result 
implied that providers that are able to create economies of scale for a particular investment 
style are less likely to outsource new funds of the same style. However, further evidence 
indicated that this argument does not apply to the overall size of the provider suggesting that 
there are capacity limits within every organization. 
 
This biggest contribution of this chapter is to confirm the importance of a factor, not related 
to performance, which has been used only anecdotally as a reason for any type of outsourcing 
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in the past literature. It also adds to the literature of fund management outsourcing by 
showing that when providers decide whether to outsource there is at least some consideration 
on what competitors do. The most important limitation in this analysis is the absence of 
management costs due to lack of information. Previous literature showed that saving costs 
was one of the main determinants of outsourcing, particularly for IT services. As such, future 
research could include information on manager compensation, the contract arrangements for 
outsourced funds, etc. Moreover, it may be worthwhile to approach industry professionals 
and conduct a survey on what they consider to be important when making the decision to 
outsource. This can provide valuable insights for the related academic literature. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
163 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This thesis had three main objectives. The first objective was to investigate the relationship 
between fund performance and fund’s age. The second objective was to examine whether 
there were any differences in the performance of internally and externally managed funds. 
The third objective was to test whether the boom in fund management outsourcing can be in 
any way explained by ‘fashion’. 
 
The first objective was addressed in Chapter 3. The analysis showed that fund performance 
changes with fund’s age but in most cases, this relationship depends on the age of the fund 
provider. Moreover, it emerged that although the performance of fixed income funds changes 
with fund’s age in the way that is predicted by the chapter’s main hypothesis, the 
performance of equity funds follows a different pattern. It is argued, however, that this 
pattern is not inconsistent with the premise of the hypothesis.  
 
The second objective was addressed in Chapter 4. Both descriptive and regression analysis 
showed that externally managed funds outperform their benchmarks more than internally 
managed funds do. Nevertheless, there was indication that this difference is due to external 
funds having more ‘flattering’ benchmarks. This was also supported by the fact the risk-
adjusted returns of either type are on average insignificantly different from zero. The 
relationship between performance and fund’s age was found to be somewhat similar for both 
types but there was a difference in the effects of the other variables. The performance of 
external funds was found to be more affected by changing market conditions, and indeed 
there was some indication that external managers have poor timing skills relative to internal 
managers. Additionally, size and market share have a stronger positive effect on the 
performance of external funds. A possible explanation for this is that most providers are large 
insurance companies and have a diversified business portfolio whereas most wealth 
management companies focus on one business purpose and thus, economies of scale are more 
important for them. This may also explain why the performance of external funds is more 
strongly affected by changes in regulation, i.e. external managers are more attentive of any 
factor that may influence their business. 
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The third and last objective was addressed in Chapter 5. The analysis results showed that 
‘fashion’ affects the providers’ decision to outsource fund management. Although its 
marginal effect was relatively low, it was highly significant across all specifications. Past 
performance of internally and externally managed funds was found to be the strongest 
determinant of outsourcing.  
 
Several results emerged from the investigation of the performance of UK personal pension 
funds. First, the risk-adjusted returns (Sharpe ratio) were not significantly different from zero 
for any investment style. However, performance relative to the PPB was on average positive 
and significant for all styles, which raises questions on how benchmarks are selected. Out of 
the three major investment types (allocation, fixed income, and equity) equity funds had the 
lowest PPB outperformance. Moreover, the average performance relative to the PPB of 
externally managed funds is generally found to be higher than that of internally managed 
funds, except for fixed income funds.  
 
There were many differences between investment styles but some results appeared several 
times. One of the most consistent results was that fund outperformance is explained by 
provider size, i.e. funds operated by larger providers perform better than funds by smaller 
providers. However, the negative interaction between size and fund’s age indicated that this 
difference diminishes the older a fund is. Furthermore, fund performance is explained by 
provider’s age and the relationship tends to follow a U-shape, i.e. funds that are operated by 
‘middle-aged’ providers underperform those operated by either very young or very old 
providers. Finally, the interactions between fund’s age and the bear and bull market dummies 
implied that older funds can cope better in bearish times whereas young funds can gain more 
in bullish markets.  
 
This thesis makes several contributions, mostly to fund performance literature. It gives 
empirical evidence of the performance of UK personal pension funds, a sector that is not met 
in past literature. It proposes measures of fund performance that are outside the CAPM-APT 
framework. More importantly, it shows that fund’s age and outsourcing need to be addressed 
in more detail when fund performance is discussed.  
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There are also contributions outside the academic sphere. The results show that these funds 
don’t have significant risk-adjusted returns although they appear to outperform their 
benchmarks. This raises the questions for regulators and contributors of how benchmarks are 
used in the marketing of the funds. The same question applies to management outsourcing. 
Neither internal nor external funds have significant risk-adjusted returns but external funds 
outperform their PPBs more. Descriptive analysis indicates that may be due to more 
favourable benchmark selection so that performance statistics presented for marketing 
purposes may be misleading. 
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APPENDIX 
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A. Entry year, name, and total number of funds of personal pension providers (Chapter 2) 
 
Shows the names of the institutions offering personal pensions in the UK. It includes the total number of personal pension funds 
offered by each institution as well as their entry year. The latter relates to the year when each institution incepted for the first time a 
personal pension fund in the UK. All information as of end 2009. Source: Own calculations using Morningstar Direct
TM
 data. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Entry Year Entry Year
1971 Abbey Life Assurance 103 1983 MGM Assurance 40
1983 AEGON 470 1996 Nationwide Life 2
1994 Alico 443 1992 NatWest Life Assurance 27
1972 Aviva 990 1988 NFU Mutual Unit Managers 34
1979 AXA 769 1982 NPI National Provident Institution 210
1977 Barclays Life 24 1980 Pearl Assurance 8
1989 BlackRock 139 1969 Phoenix Life Assurance 274
1975 Canada Life 282 1968 Prudential 470
1971 Century Life 68 2006 Reassure UK Life Assurance Company 7
1979 City of Westminster Assurance 7 1984 Reliance Mutual 47
1982 Clerical Medical 178 1987 Royal Liver Assurance 15
2005 Co-operative Insurance Society 50 1986 Royal London Asset Management 15
1984 Countrywide Assured 10 1990 Royal Scottish Assurance 12
1984 Equitable Life Assurance Society 35 1972 Save & Prosper Group 9
1989 Family Investments 2 1998 Scottish Friendly Assurance 6
1995 Forester Life 1 1984 Scottish Life 107
1971 Friends Provident Life and Pensions 465 1985 Scottish Mutual Assurance 82
1985 Generali 7 1981 Scottish Widows Group 531
1986 GT Plan 2 1979 Skandia Life Assurance 1168
1980 Guardian Insurance and Annuity 26 1991 St James Place Group 62
1984 Halifax Life 92 1980 Standard Life 600
1990 HSBC Life 18 1973 Sun Life of Canada 53
1997 Invesco 36 1989 Swiss Life Holding 8
1981 Irish Life 13 1987 Teachers Assurance 2
1977 Legal & General 690 1987 The Chidren's Mutual 2
1977 Lincoln Financial Group 164 2007 The Hartford 113
2003 Liverpool Victoria Friendly Society 203 1985 United Friendly Insurance 20
1981 London Life Insurance Company 14 1988 Wesleyan Assurance 9
1995 Marks & Spencer Life Assurance 4 1977 Windsor Life 770
1993 Medical Sickness Annuity and Life 7 1984 Winterthur 968
1972 Merchant Investors 456 1974 Zurich 757
2007 MetLife 111 TOTAL 12307
Pension Provider and Number of Total Funds Pension Provider and Number of Total Funds
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B. Investment Style Classification (Chapter 2) 
 
 
The Association of British Insurers (ABI) uses a sector classification system for life and pension funds based on 
their observed investment strategy. This is meant to assist investors and advisers to compare similar funds. The 
Morningstar database includes this information for the UK pension funds under the variable “ABI pension 
sector”. Additionally, they report a separate variable “specialist sector” which also conveys the investment 
profile of a fund. The combination of the two variables enables the identification of the dominant investment 
strategies. Using the ABI and Morningstar classifications funds can be summarized into the following - 
mutually exclusive - broad investment sectors: 
 
 
i. Allocation 
It includes all funds that belong to these ABI sectors: Balanced, Cautious, Defensive, and Flexible. Where ABI 
sector is “Unclassified” or not available, funds with the words “asset allocation” in the Morningstar “Specialist 
Sector” variable are also classified within this group.     
 
ii. Equity 
It includes all funds that belong to the se ABI sectors: Asia Pacific excl. Japan, Asia Pacific incl. Japan, Europe 
excl. UK, Europe incl. UK, Global Equities, Global Emerging Markets Equities, North America, UK All 
Companies, UK Smaller Companies, UK Equity Income. Where ABI sector is “Unclassified” or not available, 
funds with the word “equity” in the Morningstar “Specialist Sector” variable are also classified within this 
group.     
 
iii. Fixed Income 
It includes all funds that belong to the following ABI sectors: Global Fixed Interest, Global High Yield, Sterling 
Fixed Interest, Sterling Long Bond, Sterling Corporate Bond, UK Index-Linked Gilts, UK gilt. Where ABI 
sector is “Unclassified” or not available, funds with the words “fixed interest” in the Morningstar “Specialist 
Sector” variable are also classified within this group.     
 
iv. Money Market 
It includes all funds that belong to the ABI sector: Money Market. Where ABI sector is “Unclassified” or not 
available, funds with the words “money market” in the Morningstar “Specialist Sector” variable are also 
classified within this group.     
 
v. Protected 
It includes all funds that belong to the ABI sector: Protected/Guaranteed.  
 
vi. Real Estate 
It includes all funds that belong to these ABI sectors: Global Property, UK Direct Property, and UK Property 
Securities.  Where ABI sector is “Unclassified” or not available, funds with the words “real estate” in the 
Morningstar “Specialist Sector” variable are also classified within this group.     
 
vii. Specialist 
It includes all funds that belong to the ABI sector: Specialist.  
 
viii. Unclassified 
It includes all funds that belong to the ABI sector: Unclassified, for which no additional information is given by 
Morningstar.  
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The ABI and Morningstar definitions for investment style allow a more detailed classification. Using asset 
allocation limits for allocation funds and geographical focus for the other types, the broad investment sectors are 
divided into the following - mutually exclusive - narrow investment sectors: 
 
 
i. Allocation 100 
It includes all funds that belong to the ABI “Allocation Flexible” sector. This sector allows for up to 100% 
allocation in equity.  
 
ii. Allocation 85 
It includes all funds that belong to the ABI “Allocation Balanced” sector. This sector allows for up to 85% 
allocation in equity.  
 
iii. Allocation 60 
It includes all funds that belong to the ABI “Allocation Cautious” sector. This sector allows for up to 60% 
allocation in equity.  
 
iv. Allocation 35 
It includes all funds that belong to the ABI “Allocation Defensive” sector. This sector allows for up to 35% 
allocation in equity.  
 
v. Equity emerging 
It includes all funds that belong to the ABI sector “Emerging Markets Equities”. 
 
vi. Equity international 
It includes all funds that belong to these ABI sectors: Asia Pacific excl. Japan, Asia Pacific incl. Japan, Europe 
excl. UK, Europe incl. UK, Global Equities, Global Emerging Markets Equities, North America.  
 
vii. Equity UK 
It includes all funds that belong to these ABI sectors: UK All Companies, UK Smaller Companies, UK Equity 
Income. 
 
viii. Fixed income international  
It includes all funds that belong to these ABI sectors: Global Fixed Interest, Global High Yield. 
 
ix. Fixed income UK 
It includes all funds that belong to these ABI sectors: Sterling Fixed Interest, Sterling Long Bond, Sterling 
Corporate Bond, UK Index-Linked Gilts, UK gilt.  
 
x. Real estate international  
It includes all funds that belong to the ABI sector “Global Property”. 
 
xi. Real estate UK 
It includes all funds that belong to these ABI sectors: UK Direct Property, UK Property Securities. 
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ABI Sector Definition40 
 
ABI Sectors Category ABI Definition 
Asia Pacific excl. Japan Equities Equity 
Funds which invest at least 80% of their assets in Asia Pacific equities, but which normally hold no equities 
quoted on the Japanese stock market; Asia Pacific includes all countries in the FTSE World Asia Pacific 
Index. 
Asia Pacific incl. Japan Equities Equity 
Funds which invest at least 80% of their assets in Asia Pacific equities and which include Japanese equities; 
Asia Pacific includes all countries in the FTSE World Asia Pacific index; not to include funds which would 
otherwise qualify for the Japan Equity sector. 
Balanced (up to 85% Equity) Managed Allocation 
Maximum of 85% total equity (including Preference Shares, Permanent Interest Bearing Shares and 
Convertibles); minimum of 40% total equity; minimum of 50% Sterling based assets (including fixed 
interest hedged back to Sterling); fixed interest defined as Government Sovereign Bonds and Corporate 
Bonds. 
Cautious (up to 60% Equity) Managed Allocation 
Maximum of 60% total equity (including Preference Shares, Permanent Interest Bearing Shares and 
Convertibles); minimum of 20% total equity; minimum of 60% Sterling based assets (including fixed 
interest hedged back to Sterling; fixed interest defined as Government Sovereign Bonds and Corporate 
Bonds. 
Commodity/Energy Equity 
Funds that invest at least 80% of their assets in commodity and/or energy related securities (Precious Metals; 
Other Metals; Energy; and Materials) 
Defensive (up to 35% Equity) Managed Allocation 
Maximum of 35% total equity (including Preference Shares, Permanent Interest Bearing Shares and 
Convertibles); No minimum equity requirement but managers' stated intention retains the right to invest in 
equities; minimum of 85% Sterling based assets (including fixed interest hedged back to Sterling; fixed 
interest defined as Government Sovereign Bonds and Corporate Bonds. 
Europe excl. UK Equities Equity 
Funds which invest at least 80% of their assets in equities quoted on European stock markets, but which 
normally hold no equities quoted on the UK stock market; Europe includes all countries in the FTSE World 
Europe/MSCI Europe indices. 
Europe incl. UK Equities Equity 
Funds which invest at least 80% of their assets in equities quoted on UK and European stock markets; not to 
include funds which would otherwise qualify for a UK equity sector; Europe includes all countries in the 
FTSE World Europe/MSCI Europe indices. 
Flexible (up to 100% Equity) Managed Allocation 
Maximum of 100% total equity (including Preference Shares, Permanent Interest Bearing Shares and 
Convertibles); no minimum equity requirement but manager's stated intention retains the right to invest up to 
100% in equities; minimum of 20% Sterling based assets (including fixed interest hedged back to Sterling). 
                                                          
40    Source: Association of British Insurers (www.abi.org.uk).  
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Global Emerging Markets Equities Equity 
Funds which invest at least 80% of their assets in equities from emerging markets, as defined by the FTSE 
World Index Indices, without geographical restriction; funds with more than 50% of assets in any one 
geographical region or theme, e.g. China, India, Latin America or BRIC will also be flagged on fund data 
provider platforms. 
Global Equities Equity 
Funds which invest at least 80% of their assets in equities; funds must be invested in more than one equity 
region; not to include funds which would otherwise qualify for the Global Emerging Markets Equity sector. 
Global Fixed Interest Fixed Interest 
Funds which invest at least 80% of their assets in non-UK broad investment grade fixed interest securities. 
Fixed interest defined as Government Sovereign Bonds and Corporate Bonds. 
Global High Yield Fixed Interest 
Funds which invest at least 80% of their assets in non-UK fixed interest securities. Funds which invest at 
least 50% of their assets in subinvestment grade fixed interest securities. Fixed interest defined as 
Government Sovereign Bonds and Corporate Bonds. 
Global Property Real Estate 
Funds that invest at least 80% of their assets in direct property and property securities. Minimum 50% non-
UK assets. 
Japan Equities Equity Funds which invest at least 80% of their assets in equities quoted on the Japanese stock market. 
Money Market 
Money 
Market 
Funds which invest at least 95% of their assets in sterling (or hedged back to sterling) money market 
instruments. Money market instruments are defined as cash and near cash, such as bank deposits, certificates 
of deposit, and fixed interest securities within three months of maturity or floating rate notes. 
North America Equity 
Funds which invest at least 80% of their assets in equities quoted on United States and Canadian stock 
markets. 
Protected/Guaranteed Funds Protected 
Funds, other than money market funds, which principally aim to provide a return of a set amount of capital 
back to the investor (either explicitly guaranteed or via an investment strategy highly likely to achieve this 
objective) plus some market upside. 
Specialist Specialist 
Funds that have an investment universe that is not accommodated by the mainstream sectors. Performance 
ranking of funds within the sector as a whole is inappropriate, given the diverse nature of its constituents. As 
there are no parameters for funds in the Specialist Sector, funds should not be compared on a like-for-like 
basis. 
Sterling Corporate Bond Fixed Interest 
Funds which invest at least 80% of their assets in sterling denominated (or hedged back to sterling) broad 
investment grade corporate bond securities. This excludes Preference Shares, Permanent Interest Bearing 
Shares and Convertible Securities. Broad Investment Grade is defined as (or equivalent to) BBB minus or 
above as measured by Standard & Poor’s and by Fitch and Baa or above as measured by Moody’s. 
Sterling Fixed Interest Fixed Interest 
Funds which invest at least 80% of their assets in sterling-denominated (or hedged back to sterling) broad 
investment grade fixed interest securities; fixed interest defined as Government Sovereign Bonds and 
Corporate Bonds; Preference Shares, Permanent Interest Bearing Shares and  Convertibles are not treated as 
fixed interest payments. 
Sterling High Yield Fixed Interest 
Funds which invest at least 80% of their assets in sterling denominated (or hedged back to sterling) fixed 
interest securities. Funds which invest at least 50% of their assets in sub investment grade fixed interest 
securities. 
Sterling Long Bond Fixed Interest 
Funds (used in conjunction with pension plans) with a specific objective for the movement in the value of 
units in the fund to approximate to movements in annuity purchase prices. Funds which invest at least 80% 
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of their assets in sterling denominated (or hedged back to sterling) long duration (10 years or more) broad 
investment grade fixed interest securities. N.B. Duration requirements for the Sterling Long Bond Sector 
reflect the likely interest rate risk affecting funds, with the specific additional requirement for pension fund 
objectives to consider movements in annuity purchase prices. 
Sterling Other Fix Interest Fixed Interest 
Funds with investment policy permitting significant changes in asset allocation between broad investment 
grade and subinvestment grade securities; funds which invest at least 80% of their assets in sterling 
denominated (or hedged back to sterling) fixed interest securities; fixed interest defined as Government 
Sovereign Bonds and Corporate Bonds; Preference Shares, Permanent Interest Bearing Shares and 
Convertibles are not treated as fixed interest investments. 
Sterling Preference Shares & Convertibles Fixed Interest 
Funds which invest at least 80% of their assets in sterling denominated (or hedged back to sterling) 
Preference Shares, Permanent Interest Bearing Shares and Convertibles. 
UK All Companies Equity 
Funds which invest at least 80% of their assets in equities quoted on the UK stock market; funds have the 
primary objective of achieving capital growth or total return. 
UK Direct Property Real Estate 
Funds that normally invest at least 80% of their assets in UK property. Managers may occasionally use 
Property Index Certificates or other property instruments for up to 20% property investment.UK property 
defined as real estate located within the UK. 
UK Equity Income Equity 
Funds which invest at least 80% of their assets in equities quoted on the UK stock market; net of tax yield on 
the underlying portfolio at least 110% of the FTSE All Share yield. 
UK Gilt Fixed Interest Funds which invest at least 80% of their assets in UK Government securities (Gilts). 
UK Index-Linked Gilts Fixed Interest 
Funds which invest at least 80% of their assets in UK Index Linked Government securities (Index-Linked 
Gilts). 
UK Property Securities Real Estate 
Funds that invest at least 80% of their assets in property securities quoted on the UK stock market and direct 
property located in the UK. Property securities include real estate investment trusts, 
shares issued by companies that own, develop or manage direct property and Property Index Certificates. 
UK Smaller Companies Equity 
Funds which invest at least 80% of their assets in equities quoted on the UK stock market which form the 
bottom 10% by market capitalisation. 
Unclassified Unclassified Funds that do not provide sufficient data for the ICC to monitor their classification effectively. 
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C. Calculation of the M2 Measure (Chapter 3) 
 
The M2 is calculated with the following formula: 
Bi RRM 
*2                                                              (1), 
where 
*
iR  is the return of the new adjusted portfolio, adjusted to the risk of the benchmark portfolio. 
 
The M2 can be derived using the following formula: 
B
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i
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                                                           (2), 
 
where sigma denotes standard deviation of returns and rf the return of the risk-free asset. This is based on the 
fact that the fund portfolio and the adjusted portfolio have the same Sharpe ratio and the adjusted fund has the 
same risk (sigma) as the fund’s benchmark. Manipulating (2) produces the following: 
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Combining this with (1) gives the following: 
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which is the way M2 has been calculated for this analysis. 
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D. Summary statistics for the independent variables (Chapter 3) 
 
This Appendix shows the summary statistics for all individual explanatory variables used in specifications (3) 
and (4). The statistics are sorted by fund type and sample size. The columns under ‘Unrestricted’ show the 
statistics for all observations in each sample. The columns under ‘Restricted’ show the statistics under the 
restriction that fund’s age is up to 5 years. 
 
  
Unrestricted 
 
Restricted 
 Sample Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
All Funds 
       6.77 6.54 0.50 34.92 2.41 1.25 0.50 5.00 
             1.74 0.78 0.41 3.58 1.15 0.39 0.41 1.79 
√      
  2.34 1.15 0.71 5.91 1.49 0.42 0.71 2.24 
√      
  1.71 0.56 0.80 3.27 1.29 0.25 0.80 1.71 
        0.22 0.41 0.00 1.00 0.23 0.42 0.00 1.00 
        0.44 0.50 0.00 1.00 0.44 0.50 0.00 1.00 
          3.64 2.77 0.01 10.85 3.85 2.70 0.01 10.85 
           7.50 7.25 0.09 100.00 7.47 7.14 0.09 100.00 
              7.86 5.57 0.13 100.00 7.79 5.79 0.13 100.00 
        0.03 0.16 0.00 1.00 0.05 0.21 0.00 1.00 
         0.04 0.18 0.00 1.00 0.04 0.20 0.00 1.00 
          0.06 0.24 0.00 1.00 0.05 0.22 0.00 1.00 
          0.09 0.28 0.00 1.00 0.07 0.25 0.00 1.00 
     0.98 0.12 0.00 1.00 0.98 0.15 0.00 1.00 
     0.82 0.39 0.00 1.00 0.88 0.32 0.00 1.00 
Allocation 
Funds 
       5.49 4.98 0.51 30.54 2.39 1.24 0.51 5.00 
             1.62 0.70 0.41 3.45 1.15 0.38 0.41 1.79 
√      
  2.13 0.97 0.71 5.53 1.49 0.42 0.71 2.24 
√      
  1.62 0.49 0.80 3.13 1.29 0.25 0.80 1.71 
        0.24 0.43 0.00 1.00 0.25 0.43 0.00 1.00 
        0.48 0.50 0.00 1.00 0.47 0.50 0.00 1.00 
          3.74 2.84 0.01 10.85 4.08 2.78 0.01 10.85 
           5.99 3.69 0.20 25.00 6.22 3.79 0.20 25.00 
              7.74 6.34 0.47 50.00 6.64 4.97 0.47 50.00 
        0.02 0.14 0.00 1.00 0.03 0.18 0.00 1.00 
         0.03 0.18 0.00 1.00 0.04 0.19 0.00 1.00 
          0.06 0.24 0.00 1.00 0.05 0.21 0.00 1.00 
          0.07 0.25 0.00 1.00 0.05 0.21 0.00 1.00 
     1.00 0.06 0.00 1.00 0.99 0.07 0.00 1.00 
     0.88 0.33 0.00 1.00 0.89 0.31 0.00 1.00 
Fixed Income 
Funds 
       8.07 7.88 0.51 34.92 2.40 1.24 0.51 5.00 
             1.85 0.84 0.41 3.58 1.15 0.38 0.41 1.79 
√      
  2.53 1.30 0.71 5.91 1.49 0.42 0.71 2.24 
√      
  1.80 0.62 0.80 3.27 1.29 0.25 0.80 1.71 
        0.15 0.36 0.00 1.00 0.18 0.38 0.00 1.00 
        0.40 0.49 0.00 1.00 0.37 0.48 0.00 1.00 
          3.36 2.63 0.01 10.85 3.78 2.59 0.01 10.85 
           9.72 10.02 0.33 100.00 9.65 10.13 0.33 100.00 
              4.09 3.09 0.22 20.00 3.33 2.70 0.22 20.00 
        0.03 0.16 0.00 1.00 0.05 0.21 0.00 1.00 
         0.04 0.20 0.00 1.00 0.04 0.19 0.00 1.00 
          0.07 0.25 0.00 1.00 0.05 0.21 0.00 1.00 
          0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00 0.07 0.26 0.00 1.00 
     0.97 0.17 0.00 1.00 0.96 0.20 0.00 1.00 
     0.77 0.42 0.00 1.00 0.87 0.34 0.00 1.00 
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Unrestricted 
 
 
Restricted 
 
 
Sample Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Equity Funds 
       6.49 6.17 0.50 34.92 2.43 1.25 0.50 5.00 
             1.72 0.76 0.41 3.58 1.16 0.39 0.41 1.79 
√      
  2.30 1.10 0.71 5.91 1.50 0.42 0.71 2.24 
√      
  1.70 0.55 0.80 3.27 1.30 0.25 0.80 1.71 
        0.24 0.42 0.00 1.00 0.24 0.43 0.00 1.00 
        0.45 0.50 0.00 1.00 0.45 0.50 0.00 1.00 
          3.65 2.79 0.01 10.85 3.80 2.70 0.01 10.85 
           6.91 6.20 0.09 100.00 6.98 6.26 0.09 100.00 
              8.85 5.39 0.13 33.33 8.91 5.54 0.13 33.33 
        0.03 0.16 0.00 1.00 0.05 0.22 0.00 1.00 
         0.04 0.19 0.00 1.00 0.04 0.20 0.00 1.00 
          0.06 0.24 0.00 1.00 0.05 0.22 0.00 1.00 
          0.09 0.28 0.00 1.00 0.07 0.25 0.00 1.00 
     0.99 0.11 0.00 1.00 0.98 0.14 0.00 1.00 
     0.82 0.38 0.00 1.00 0.88 0.33 0.00 1.00 
Emerging 
Equity Funds 
       4.40 4.35 0.50 25.96 2.17 1.19 0.50 4.98 
             1.44 0.67 0.41 3.29 1.08 0.39 0.41 1.79 
√      
  1.90 0.90 0.71 5.09 1.41 0.42 0.71 2.23 
√      
  1.50 0.47 0.80 2.96 1.25 0.25 0.80 1.71 
        0.25 0.44 0.00 1.00 0.26 0.44 0.00 1.00 
        0.47 0.50 0.00 1.00 0.48 0.50 0.00 1.00 
          4.72 3.02 0.01 10.85 4.92 2.91 0.01 10.85 
           15.76 16.83 0.36 100.00 14.87 15.91 0.36 100.00 
              3.58 2.05 0.32 19.05 3.49 2.20 0.32 19.05 
        0.01 0.09 0.00 1.00 0.01 0.11 0.00 1.00 
         0.03 0.16 0.00 1.00 0.04 0.19 0.00 1.00 
          0.06 0.24 0.00 1.00 0.05 0.22 0.00 1.00 
          0.05 0.22 0.00 1.00 0.02 0.13 0.00 1.00 
     1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
     0.93 0.26 0.00 1.00 0.94 0.23 0.00 1.00 
International 
Equity Funds 
       6.84 6.20 0.51 30.54 2.42 1.26 0.51 5.00 
             1.77 0.77 0.41 3.45 1.16 0.39 0.41 1.79 
√      
  2.36 1.12 0.71 5.53 1.50 0.42 0.71 2.24 
√      
  1.73 0.55 0.80 3.13 1.30 0.25 0.80 1.71 
        0.23 0.42 0.00 1.00 0.24 0.43 0.00 1.00 
        0.45 0.50 0.00 1.00 0.46 0.50 0.00 1.00 
          3.57 2.76 0.01 10.85 3.74 2.67 0.01 10.85 
           6.43 4.35 0.09 40.00 6.39 4.21 0.09 40.00 
              6.97 3.64 0.13 21.82 7.08 3.73 0.13 21.82 
        0.02 0.15 0.00 1.00 0.04 0.20 0.00 1.00 
         0.04 0.19 0.00 1.00 0.05 0.21 0.00 1.00 
          0.07 0.25 0.00 1.00 0.06 0.23 0.00 1.00 
          0.09 0.29 0.00 1.00 0.06 0.24 0.00 1.00 
     0.99 0.11 0.00 1.00 0.98 0.14 0.00 1.00 
     0.80 0.40 0.00 1.00 0.87 0.34 0.00 1.00 
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  Unrestricted 
 
Restricted 
 Sample Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
UK Equity 
Funds 
       6.20 6.21 0.51 34.92 2.46 1.25 0.51 5.00 
             1.68 0.74 0.41 3.58 1.17 0.38 0.41 1.79 
√      
  2.24 1.09 0.71 5.91 1.51 0.42 0.71 2.24 
√      
  1.67 0.54 0.80 3.27 1.30 0.25 0.80 1.71 
        0.24 0.43 0.00 1.00 0.25 0.43 0.00 1.00 
        0.44 0.50 0.00 1.00 0.44 0.50 0.00 1.00 
          3.66 2.80 0.01 10.85 3.76 2.69 0.01 10.85 
           6.84 6.15 0.21 80.00 6.93 6.15 0.21 80.00 
              11.77 6.05 0.38 33.33 11.65 6.25 0.38 33.33 
        0.03 0.18 0.00 1.00 0.06 0.24 0.00 1.00 
         0.04 0.19 0.00 1.00 0.04 0.19 0.00 1.00 
          0.06 0.23 0.00 1.00 0.04 0.20 0.00 1.00 
          0.09 0.28 0.00 1.00 0.07 0.26 0.00 1.00 
     0.98 0.13 0.00 1.00 0.98 0.15 0.00 1.00 
     0.84 0.37 0.00 1.00 0.89 0.31 0.00 1.00 
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E. Tables 3.3.A – 3.3.G (Chapter 3) 
 
 
Table 3.3.A. Correlation coefficient between independent variables. In bold are correlations with absolute value larger than 0.4 for variables that are used in the same 
specification. All-funds sample. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
All Funds 
 
 
                    √      
  √      
                                                                                                    
       
1 
              
             
0.9284 1 
             
√      
  0.9753 0.9874 1 
            
√      
  0.9533 0.9971 0.9963 1 
           
        
-0.0451 -0.0609 -0.0553 -0.0596 1 
          
        
0.0323 0.0309 0.0324 0.0322 -0.4699 1 
         
          
-0.0683 -0.0629 -0.0678 -0.0643 0.0329 -0.1497 1 
        
           
-0.0018 0.0247 0.0139 0.0203 -0.0555 0.0345 0.2995 1 
       
              
-0.0051 0.0191 0.0085 0.0146 0.0297 0.0512 -0.1392 -0.0148 1 
      
        
-0.1170 -0.1456 -0.1360 -0.1411 -0.0023 -0.0260 -0.1889 -0.1187 0.1212 1 
     
         
-0.0868 -0.0833 -0.0863 -0.0851 0.0069 -0.0544 -0.2081 -0.0591 0.0616 -0.0312 1 
    
          
-0.0264 0.0190 0.0003 0.0096 -0.0105 0.0247 -0.2223 -0.0191 0.0081 -0.0420 -0.0493 1 
   
          
0.0379 0.0763 0.0624 0.0694 0.0029 -0.0184 -0.2703 0.0227 0.0398 -0.0508 -0.0596 -0.0801 1 
  
     
0.0652 0.0662 0.0672 0.0667 0.0149 0.0579 0.1403 -0.0467 -0.0478 -0.1819 -0.2304 -0.0834 -0.0243 1 
 
     
-0.0655 -0.1304 -0.1071 -0.1183 0.1001 -0.0151 0.4459 -0.1075 -0.0664 -0.0668 -0.2083 -0.2356 -0.3421 0.2638 1 
178 
 
 
Table 3.3.B. Correlation coefficient between independent variables. In bold are correlations with absolute value larger than 0.4 for variables that are used in the same 
specification. Allocation funds sample. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Allocation Funds 
 
 
                    √      
  √      
                                                                                                    
       
1 
              
             
0.9317 1 
             
√      
  0.9743 0.9895 1 
            
√      
  0.9526 0.9979 0.9965 1 
           
        
-0.0181 -0.0306 -0.0265 -0.0298 1 
          
        
0.0189 0.0047 0.0113 0.0076 -0.5472 1 
         
          
-0.1483 -0.1346 -0.1431 -0.1375 0.0120 -0.1791 1 
        
           
-0.0782 -0.0485 -0.0618 -0.0531 -0.0808 0.0498 0.4555 1 
       
              
0.2748 0.2807 0.2827 0.2828 -0.0039 -0.0233 -0.3867 0.0085 1 
      
        
-0.0935 -0.1051 -0.1024 -0.1036 -0.0268 -0.0181 -0.1688 -0.1847 0.1726 1 
     
         
-0.0609 -0.0496 -0.0550 -0.0523 0.0295 -0.0593 -0.2169 -0.1790 0.2109 -0.0269 1 
    
          
0.0266 0.0588 0.0475 0.0535 0.0477 0.0298 -0.2490 -0.2649 0.1002 -0.0360 -0.0483 1 
   
          
0.1129 0.1184 0.1189 0.1182 -0.0040 -0.0456 -0.2660 -0.1299 0.1289 -0.0387 -0.0520 -0.0696 1 
  
     
0.0504 0.0747 0.0660 0.0716 0.0056 0.0094 0.0684 -0.1312 -0.0344 -0.0733 -0.1122 0.0143 -0.0731 1 
 
     
-0.0235 -0.0486 -0.0399 -0.0443 0.1083 0.0531 0.3962 -0.0048 -0.2470 -0.1834 -0.3287 -0.0259 -0.2310 0.1506 1 
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Table 3.3.C. Correlation coefficient between independent variables. In bold are correlations with absolute value larger than 0.4 for variables that are used in the same 
specification. Fixed income funds sample. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fixed Income Funds 
 
 
                    √      
  √      
                                                                                                    
       
1 
              
             
0.9324 1 
             
√      
  0.9779 0.9872 1 
            
√      
  0.9577 0.9969 0.9966 1 
           
        
-0.0675 -0.0698 -0.0714 -0.0709 1 
          
        
0.0768 0.0866 0.0851 0.0863 -0.3515 1 
         
          
-0.1295 -0.1343 -0.1362 -0.1344 0.1810 -0.1942 1 
        
           
-0.0193 0.0209 0.0034 0.0130 -0.0431 0.0173 0.1628 1 
       
              
0.2047 0.2606 0.2409 0.2515 -0.0751 0.0831 -0.4513 0.0678 1 
      
        
-0.1178 -0.1438 -0.1349 -0.1396 0.0254 -0.0410 -0.1875 -0.1265 0.2092 1 
     
         
-0.0845 -0.0596 -0.0720 -0.0662 -0.0074 -0.0247 -0.2229 -0.0026 0.2973 -0.0335 1 
    
          
-0.0359 0.0178 -0.0051 0.0059 -0.0496 0.0296 -0.2338 -0.0104 0.1998 -0.0434 -0.0544 1 
   
          
0.0252 0.0730 0.0546 0.0635 -0.0073 0.0506 -0.2708 0.0839 0.1862 -0.0544 -0.0683 -0.0883 1 
  
     
0.0868 0.0710 0.0797 0.0752 0.0011 0.1058 0.1875 -0.0775 -0.2557 -0.2168 -0.3214 -0.1420 -0.0185 1 
 
     
-0.0479 -0.1507 -0.1100 -0.1297 0.0899 -0.1231 0.4719 -0.2080 -0.4926 -0.1396 -0.2607 -0.2303 -0.3244 0.3310 1 
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Table 3.3.D. Correlation coefficient between independent variables. In bold are correlations with absolute value larger than 0.4 for variables that are used in the same 
specification. Equity funds sample. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Equity Funds 
 
 
                    √      
  √      
                                                                                                    
       
1 
              
             
0.9288 1 
             
√      
  0.9751 0.9877 1 
            
√      
  0.9531 0.9973 0.9963 1 
           
        
-0.0286 -0.0517 -0.0428 -0.0491 1 
          
        
0.0132 0.0091 0.0110 0.0108 -0.4984 1 
         
          
-0.0580 -0.0455 -0.0530 -0.0481 0.0131 -0.1474 1 
        
           
-0.0179 0.0080 -0.0028 0.0038 -0.0442 0.0489 0.4059 1 
       
              
-0.0054 -0.0007 -0.0038 -0.0015 0.0152 0.0482 -0.0940 -0.0430 1 
      
        
-0.1209 -0.1510 -0.1409 -0.1464 -0.0074 -0.0220 -0.1915 -0.1467 0.1062 1 
     
         
-0.0912 -0.0930 -0.0939 -0.0938 0.0078 -0.0611 -0.2062 -0.0963 0.0175 -0.0321 1 
    
          
-0.0232 0.0203 0.0025 0.0114 -0.0078 0.0298 -0.2184 -0.0358 -0.0332 -0.0429 -0.0494 1 
   
          
0.0399 0.0747 0.0624 0.0687 0.0062 -0.0340 -0.2729 -0.0057 0.0211 -0.0519 -0.0598 -0.0798 1 
  
     
0.0673 0.0752 0.0733 0.0743 0.0147 0.0424 0.1311 -0.0015 -0.0387 -0.1831 -0.2119 -0.0529 -0.0284 1 
 
     
-0.0689 -0.1243 -0.1052 -0.1143 0.0989 0.0054 0.4443 -0.0539 -0.0036 -0.0452 -0.1940 -0.2442 -0.3446 0.2453 1 
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Table 3.3.E. Correlation coefficient between independent variables. In bold are correlations with absolute value larger than 0.4 for variables that are used in the same 
specification. Emerging equity funds sample. Note: no observations for PPPt=0 , i.e. there are no obs. before 1988. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Emerging Equity Funds 
 
 
                    √      
  √      
                                                                                                    
       
1 
              
             
0.9262 1 
             
√      
  0.9705 0.9897 1 
            
√      
  0.9452 0.9982 0.9959 1 
           
        
-0.0581 -0.1039 -0.0894 -0.1040 1 
          
        
0.0162 0.0242 0.0220 0.0262 -0.5494 1 
         
          
-0.0443 -0.0523 -0.0518 -0.0495 -0.0001 -0.1033 1 
        
           
0.1915 0.1967 0.1979 0.1996 -0.0935 0.1004 0.1887 1 
       
              
0.1263 0.1516 0.1445 0.1523 0.0003 -0.0835 0.1584 0.5414 1 
      
        
-0.0625 -0.0820 -0.0758 -0.0795 0.0169 -0.0253 -0.1288 -0.0839 -0.0685 1 
     
         
-0.1017 -0.1198 -0.1145 -0.1160 0.0501 -0.0979 -0.2015 -0.0256 0.1931 -0.0148 1 
    
          
0.0014 0.0621 0.0395 0.0523 -0.0288 0.0151 -0.2534 0.1389 0.1189 -0.0236 -0.0412 1 
   
          
0.2079 0.2402 0.2340 0.2362 -0.0234 -0.0110 -0.2395 0.1380 0.0951 -0.0218 -0.0381 -0.0608 1 
  
                    
     
-0.1037 -0.1184 -0.1157 -0.1173 0.0116 0.2070 0.3237 -0.4736 -0.3136 0.0255 -0.0942 -0.2229 -0.3219 
 
1 
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Table 3.3.F. Correlation coefficient between independent variables. In bold are correlations with absolute value larger than 0.4 for variables that are used in the same 
specification. International equity funds sample. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
International Equity Funds 
 
 
                    √      
  √      
                                                                                                    
       
1 
              
             
0.9366 1 
             
√      
  0.9781 0.9889 1 
            
√      
  0.9582 0.9976 0.9967 1 
           
        
-0.0272 -0.0534 -0.0430 -0.0500 1 
          
        
0.0050 0.0063 0.0057 0.0069 -0.4918 1 
         
          
-0.0490 -0.0507 -0.0523 -0.0506 0.0072 -0.1631 1 
        
           
0.0021 0.0310 0.0194 0.0264 -0.0484 0.0183 0.4867 1 
       
              
-0.0491 -0.0289 -0.0381 -0.0328 0.0139 0.0880 -0.1170 0.1448 1 
      
        
-0.1192 -0.1463 -0.1371 -0.1421 -0.0043 -0.0180 -0.1726 -0.1730 0.0317 1 
     
         
-0.1037 -0.1046 -0.1059 -0.1055 0.0180 -0.0511 -0.2035 -0.1444 0.0136 -0.0293 1 
    
          
-0.0386 0.0087 -0.0110 -0.0010 -0.0095 0.0417 -0.2241 -0.0814 -0.0061 -0.0406 -0.0516 1 
   
          
0.0351 0.0735 0.0594 0.0666 -0.0135 -0.0307 -0.2678 -0.0124 -0.0140 -0.0477 -0.0606 -0.0839 1 
  
     
0.0786 0.0934 0.0886 0.0912 -0.0367 0.0487 0.1201 0.0017 -0.0406 -0.1430 -0.1722 -0.0695 -0.0464 1 
 
     
-0.0460 -0.1177 -0.0912 -0.1042 0.0700 0.0044 0.4638 -0.0418 -0.0888 -0.0419 -0.1715 -0.2420 -0.3704 0.2142 1 
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Table 3.3.G. Correlation coefficient between independent variables. In bold are correlations with absolute value larger than 0.4 for variables that are used in the same 
specification. UK equity funds sample. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
UK Equity Funds 
 
 
                    √      
  √      
                                                                                                    
       
1 
              
             
0.9187 1 
             
√      
  0.9716 0.9859 1 
            
√      
  0.9468 0.9968 0.9959 1 
           
        
-0.0260 -0.0425 -0.0364 -0.0409 1 
          
        
0.0244 0.0124 0.0180 0.0155 -0.5031 1 
         
          
-0.0589 -0.0241 -0.0409 -0.0311 0.0200 -0.1332 1 
        
           
-0.0300 0.0005 -0.0125 -0.0047 -0.0468 0.0739 0.4405 1 
       
              
0.0463 0.0404 0.0428 0.0422 0.0106 0.0449 -0.1012 -0.1411 1 
      
        
-0.1260 -0.1624 -0.1502 -0.1569 -0.0125 -0.0257 -0.2175 -0.1654 0.1499 1 
     
         
-0.0765 -0.0780 -0.0789 -0.0791 -0.0082 -0.0717 -0.2102 -0.0859 0.0168 -0.0368 1 
    
          
-0.0056 0.0314 0.0170 0.0238 -0.0028 0.0136 -0.2086 -0.0388 -0.0515 -0.0460 -0.0470 1 
   
          
0.0354 0.0634 0.0539 0.0588 0.0344 -0.0397 -0.2809 -0.0115 0.0460 -0.0593 -0.0606 -0.0757 1 
  
     
0.0577 0.0585 0.0596 0.0591 0.0721 0.0365 0.1481 -0.0158 -0.0250 -0.2195 -0.2629 -0.0368 -0.0082 1 
 
     
-0.0869 -0.1200 -0.1109 -0.1148 0.1439 -0.0052 0.4231 -0.0593 0.0468 -0.0543 -0.2322 -0.2489 -0.3084 0.2937 1 
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F.  Regression results for specifications with other age functions (Chapter 3) 
 
   
Table F1.A. Results for the all-funds sample with                 . The PPB is the benchmark. The panel 
observations have a yearly frequency. The results are obtained using Driscoll-Kraay standard errors and fund 
fixed effects. P-values are in parentheses (* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01).  
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent  Sharpe   RFund-RPPB   M2  
Specification (2) (3) (4) (2) (3) (4) (2) (3) (4) 
Constant -0.0246 0.1161 0.0764 0.0260 0.0409 -0.0192 -0.0761 0.1749 0.1265 
 
(0.864) (0.262) (0.438) (0.776) (0.898) (0.954) (0.569) (0.483) (0.637) 
          -0.0083 -0.0003 0.0016 -0.0133* -0.0086 -0.0048 -0.0052 0.0028 0.0048 
 
(0.496) (0.977) (0.879) (0.081) (0.357) (0.645) (0.401) (0.759) (0.663) 
          -0.5305*** -0.5547***   0.0459 0.0209   -0.0463 -0.0763 
 
  (0.000) (0.000)   (0.260) (0.652)   (0.418) (0.276) 
          0.0659 0.0943   0.0528 0.0906   -0.1488** -0.1373* 
 
  (0.368) (0.164)   (0.369) (0.288)   (0.016) (0.088) 
          0.0225 0.0220 0.0400* 0.0319* 0.0348 0.0678* 0.0576** 0.0419* 0.0686* 
 
(0.504) (0.138) (0.053) (0.096) (0.102) (0.062) (0.033) (0.088) (0.067) 
           0.0054* 0.0004 -0.0004 0.0056* 0.0053* 0.0038 -0.0008 0.0005 -0.0006 
 
(0.064) (0.844) (0.851) (0.061) (0.072) (0.193) (0.825) (0.875) (0.852) 
              0.0011 0.0010 0.0003 0.0138*** 0.0135*** 0.0119*** 0.0158** 0.0156** 0.0143* 
 
(0.792) (0.726) (0.908) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.038) (0.045) (0.052) 
        -0.0649 -0.0236 -0.1196 -0.1246 -0.1096 -0.2477 0.0703 0.0357 -0.0169 
 (0.743) (0.816) (0.352) (0.545) (0.541) (0.394) (0.728) (0.853) (0.951) 
         -0.1204 0.0094 -0.0000 -0.3406* -0.3252** -0.4656*** -0.0768 -0.1436 -0.2021 
 (0.481) (0.910) (1.000) (0.053) (0.016) (0.008) (0.557) (0.267) (0.212) 
          -0.0468 0.0243 -0.0267 -0.1266 -0.1193 -0.2506* 0.0219 -0.0056 -0.1017 
 (0.756) (0.727) (0.769) (0.182) (0.185) (0.064) (0.801) (0.952) (0.437) 
          -0.0279 0.0383 0.0163 -0.0424 -0.0412 -0.0486 0.0704 0.0265 0.0227 
 (0.756) (0.430) (0.765) (0.492) (0.525) (0.566) (0.296) (0.627) (0.716) 
                     0.0478*    0.0826    0.0441 
    (0.086)    (0.206)    (0.302) 
                      0.0061    0.0404**    0.0201 
    (0.529)    (0.045)    (0.323) 
                       0.0073    0.0185**    0.0140 
    (0.160)    (0.046)    (0.190) 
                       0.0023    0.0000    -0.0002 
    (0.441)    (0.998)    (0.961) 
                       -0.0014***    -0.0027**    -0.0022** 
    (0.009)    (0.038)    (0.036) 
                     0.0046    0.0053    0.0055 
    (0.192)    (0.129)    (0.210) 
                     -0.0030    -0.0038    -0.0006 
    (0.330)    (0.410)    (0.903) 
       -0.0529 -0.0627   -0.0205 -0.0525   -0.0990 -0.1150 
   (0.547) (0.473)   (0.941) (0.850)   (0.614) (0.558) 
       -0.0352 -0.0220   -0.0820 -0.0526   -0.0920 -0.0702 
 
  (0.696) (0.805)   (0.469) (0.661)   (0.421) (0.544) 
R2 within 0.0078 0.3964 0.4007 0.0055 0.0066 0.0094 0.0144 0.0230 0.0249 
F-statistic 2.0413 35.8669 123.7760 2.3948 2.3166 52.7421 1.1505 3.3636 132.2577 
p-value 0.0778 0.0000 0.0000 0.0417 0.0329 0.0000 0.3623 0.0040 0.0000 
Funds 4897 4897 4897 4897 4897 4897 4897 4897 4897 
Observations 28408 28408 28408 28408 28408 28408 28408 28408 28408 
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Table F1.B. Results for the allocation funds sample with                 . The PPB is the benchmark. The 
panel observations have a yearly frequency. The results are obtained using Driscoll-Kraay standard errors and 
fund fixed effects. P-values are in parentheses (* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent  Sharpe   RFund-RPPB   M2  
Specification (2) (3) (4) (2) (3) (4) (2) (3) (4) 
Constant -0.1039 -0.0308 -0.1010 0.1421 -0.8660** -1.2511*** -0.1216 -0.5167** -0.6050** 
 
(0.605) (0.845) (0.507) (0.516) (0.012) (0.001) (0.575) (0.029) (0.025) 
          -0.0141 -0.0155 -0.0111 -0.0276 -0.0481** -0.0184 0.0056 -0.0003 0.0150 
 
(0.587) (0.138) (0.389) (0.130) (0.031) (0.467) (0.709) (0.990) (0.668) 
          -0.6509*** -0.6334***   0.3525*** 0.4921***   -0.0537 -0.0155 
 
  (0.000) (0.000)   (0.002) (0.000)   (0.659) (0.924) 
          -0.0323 -0.0222   0.3080 0.3868   -0.1023 -0.1452 
 
  (0.779) (0.862)   (0.120) (0.124)   (0.500) (0.468) 
          0.0553 0.0462 0.0764 0.0824* 0.1422** 0.2192** 0.0931** 0.0794* 0.0947 
 
(0.411) (0.164) (0.135) (0.056) (0.050) (0.033) (0.041) (0.095) (0.120) 
           -0.0030 -0.0168 -0.0176 -0.0446** -0.0586* -0.0552 -0.0306 -0.0219 -0.0161 
 
(0.891) (0.182) (0.158) (0.014) (0.072) (0.100) (0.130) (0.314) (0.471) 
              0.0102 0.0194 0.0169 0.0288 0.0396 0.0335 0.0238 0.0157 0.0112 
 
(0.641) (0.181) (0.215) (0.413) (0.368) (0.442) (0.454) (0.634) (0.738) 
        -0.0547 0.0363 0.2329 -0.4635* -0.4547* -0.0625 0.3088 0.3584 0.5552 
 (0.867) (0.692) (0.509) (0.092) (0.096) (0.893) (0.208) (0.169) (0.117) 
         -0.1429 0.0531 -0.0308 -0.7141** -0.6266* -0.6091** -0.0131 0.0735 0.0290 
 (0.592) (0.683) (0.802) (0.036) (0.054) (0.042) (0.941) (0.715) (0.923) 
          -0.0401 0.0481 -0.0645 -0.1223 -0.1203 0.1863 0.2978* 0.3034* 0.6502* 
 (0.801) (0.533) (0.602) (0.617) (0.597) (0.604) (0.054) (0.053) (0.062) 
          0.0182 0.0468 0.0728 -0.1163 0.0239 0.3090* 0.2239 0.2225* 0.5496*** 
 (0.899) (0.501) (0.461) (0.310) (0.860) (0.092) (0.109) (0.072) (0.009) 
                     -0.0535    -0.2497**    -0.2041*** 
    (0.555)    (0.047)    (0.010) 
                      0.0221    -0.0612    -0.0595 
    (0.255)    (0.255)    (0.335) 
                       0.0119    -0.0815**    -0.0850* 
    (0.469)    (0.038)    (0.091) 
                       -0.0067    -0.0557***    -0.0586** 
    (0.539)    (0.009)    (0.032) 
                       -0.0028*    -0.0080***    -0.0030 
    (0.093)    (0.002)    (0.326) 
                     -0.0027    -0.0241***    -0.0079 
    (0.393)    (0.007)    (0.545) 
                     -0.0015    -0.0120    0.0065 
    (0.782)    (0.282)    (0.618) 
       0.0005 -0.0122   0.5847* 0.6591**   0.4146 0.4556* 
   (0.997) (0.930)   (0.097) (0.037)   (0.122) (0.094) 
       0.1600 0.1865*   0.0769 0.1422   0.1521 0.1503 
 
  (0.182) (0.096)   (0.751) (0.545)   (0.570) (0.540) 
R2 within 0.0259 0.5064 0.5112 0.0209 0.0549 0.0680 0.0428 0.0463 0.0556 
F-statistic 0.9016 49.3314 196.4879 2.6853 25.7008 189.7455 2.4924 6.6545 141.9122 
p-value 0.5316 0.0000 0.0000 0.0303 0.0000 0.0000 0.0413 0.0001 0.0000 
Funds 320 320 320 320 320 320 320 320 320 
Observations 1572 1572 1572 1572 1572 1572 1572 1572 1572 
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Table F1.C. Results for the fixed income funds sample with                 . The PPB is the benchmark. The 
panel observations have a yearly frequency. The results are obtained using Driscoll-Kraay standard errors and 
fund fixed effects. P-values are in parentheses (* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent  Sharpe   RFund-RPPB   M2  
Specification (2) (3) (4) (2) (3) (4) (2) (3) (4) 
Constant -0.0058 0.0016 -0.0700 0.1845 0.1095 -0.0450 0.2865* 0.1491 0.0620 
 
(0.967) (0.993) (0.704) (0.361) (0.789) (0.921) (0.066) (0.511) (0.803) 
          -0.0155** -0.0025 -0.0002 -0.0330*** -0.0399*** -0.0300** -0.0298*** -0.0389*** -0.0300*** 
 
(0.047) (0.884) (0.990) (0.002) (0.004) (0.012) (0.000) (0.001) (0.005) 
          -0.2545** -0.3430***   0.1071 0.0147   0.1988*** 0.1729* 
 
  (0.031) (0.008)   (0.394) (0.927)   (0.006) (0.073) 
          0.1291 0.1563   -0.0339 0.0762   -0.0808* 0.0084 
 
  (0.264) (0.182)   (0.572) (0.447)   (0.076) (0.903) 
          0.0426 0.0597** 0.1045** 0.0859* 0.0812* 0.1613* 0.0682* 0.0576 0.1146* 
 
(0.143) (0.019) (0.026) (0.094) (0.086) (0.091) (0.083) (0.118) (0.092) 
           0.0035 0.0029 0.0011 0.0005 0.0008 -0.0022 -0.0018 -0.0013 -0.0034 
 
(0.133) (0.248) (0.699) (0.932) (0.890) (0.682) (0.696) (0.777) (0.429) 
              -0.0041 -0.0073 -0.0134 0.0157 0.0181 0.0073 0.0045 0.0069 -0.0027 
 
(0.811) (0.531) (0.191) (0.520) (0.445) (0.729) (0.777) (0.672) (0.834) 
        -0.3519** -0.1579 -0.2952 -0.2131 -0.2698 -0.2636 -0.2377 -0.3013 -0.5158 
 (0.039) (0.220) (0.156) (0.381) (0.360) (0.587) (0.197) (0.189) (0.229) 
         -0.2308* -0.0612 0.0233 -0.3493 -0.3977 -0.2883 -0.2986** -0.3593** -0.3660** 
 (0.060) (0.545) (0.852) (0.307) (0.147) (0.285) (0.031) (0.033) (0.049) 
          -0.1621** -0.0598 -0.0783 -0.1044 -0.1366 -0.1442 -0.0857 -0.1362 -0.1531 
 (0.028) (0.408) (0.462) (0.477) (0.440) (0.615) (0.442) (0.332) (0.443) 
          -0.0761 0.0053 -0.0018 -0.0132 -0.0417 0.0546 0.0070 -0.0515 0.0470 
 (0.245) (0.941) (0.986) (0.783) (0.388) (0.400) (0.876) (0.293) (0.500) 
                     0.0693    0.0283    0.0974 
    (0.150)    (0.796)    (0.326) 
                      -0.0103    -0.0131    0.0065 
    (0.412)    (0.620)    (0.738) 
                       0.0021    -0.0007    0.0010 
    (0.790)    (0.971)    (0.935) 
                       -0.0001    -0.0124*    -0.0119** 
    (0.989)    (0.094)    (0.047) 
                       -0.0034*    -0.0060    -0.0043* 
    (0.055)    (0.113)    (0.096) 
                     0.0119**    0.0126    0.0036 
    (0.022)    (0.116)    (0.476) 
                     -0.0018    -0.0102*    -0.0086** 
    (0.580)    (0.073)    (0.040) 
       -0.0692 -0.0765   0.0753 0.0509   0.1856 0.1415 
   (0.660) (0.633)   (0.814) (0.876)   (0.213) (0.327) 
       -0.1532 -0.1158   0.0833 0.1333   0.0832 0.1152 
 
  (0.460) (0.536)   (0.389) (0.162)   (0.372) (0.216) 
R2 within 0.0181 0.1126 0.1280 0.0190 0.0219 0.0308 0.0184 0.0348 0.0417 
F-statistic 4.4304 21.9480 40.5513 9.0678 9.8590 19.3564 15.2117 5.5752 14.5175 
p-value 0.0015 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 
Funds 705 705 705 705 705 705 705 705 705 
Observations 4358 4358 4358 4358 4358 4358 4358 4358 4358 
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Table F1.D. Results for the equity funds sample with                 . The PPB is the benchmark. The panel 
observations have a yearly frequency. The results are obtained using Driscoll-Kraay standard errors and fund 
fixed effects. P-values are in parentheses (* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent  Sharpe   RFund-RPPB   M2  
Specification (2) (3) (4) (2) (3) (4) (2) (3) (4) 
Constant 0.0139 0.1451 0.1370 -0.0701 -0.0623 -0.0414 -0.1890 0.1410 0.1368 
 
(0.930) (0.155) (0.163) (0.480) (0.858) (0.906) (0.138) (0.658) (0.678) 
          -0.0087 -0.0042 -0.0049 -0.0057 0.0027 0.0016 0.0035 0.0161* 0.0155 
 
(0.544) (0.593) (0.591) (0.462) (0.769) (0.888) (0.619) (0.082) (0.184) 
          -0.5804*** -0.6112***   -0.0168 -0.0637   -0.0934 -0.1350* 
 
  (0.000) (0.000)   (0.802) (0.390)   (0.164) (0.092) 
          0.0499 0.0476   0.0325 0.0374   -0.2027*** -0.1959** 
 
  (0.518) (0.505)   (0.587) (0.605)   (0.004) (0.023) 
          0.0204 0.0157 0.0262* 0.0173 0.0172 0.0307* 0.0558** 0.0320* 0.0442 
 
(0.537) (0.104) (0.087) (0.173) (0.190) (0.094) (0.010) (0.081) (0.112) 
           0.0097** 0.0018 0.0011 0.0091* 0.0081* 0.0068 -0.0049 -0.0020 -0.0029 
 
(0.049) (0.522) (0.698) (0.054) (0.073) (0.119) (0.367) (0.678) (0.546) 
              -0.0022 -0.0022 -0.0024 0.0194** 0.0198** 0.0193** 0.0227*** 0.0243*** 0.0239*** 
 
(0.710) (0.595) (0.564) (0.013) (0.016) (0.014) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
        -0.0414 -0.0396 -0.1028 -0.0381 0.0092 -0.1768 0.2360 0.2219 0.1961 
 (0.856) (0.654) (0.356) (0.875) (0.964) (0.523) (0.287) (0.230) (0.435) 
         -0.1535 -0.0385 -0.0516 -0.3031* -0.2685* -0.4553** 0.0306 -0.0321 -0.0788 
 (0.433) (0.588) (0.546) (0.089) (0.059) (0.032) (0.836) (0.795) (0.671) 
          -0.0763 -0.0178 -0.0701 -0.1362 -0.1275 -0.2829* 0.0592 0.0402 -0.0758 
 (0.673) (0.805) (0.470) (0.277) (0.256) (0.094) (0.578) (0.680) (0.631) 
          -0.0594 0.0039 -0.0174 -0.0332 -0.0368 -0.0558 0.1261 0.0678 0.0483 
 (0.533) (0.918) (0.701) (0.690) (0.657) (0.565) (0.102) (0.210) (0.475) 
                     0.0353    0.0983    0.0282 
    (0.122)    (0.131)    (0.546) 
                      0.0068    0.0520*    0.0172 
    (0.521)    (0.075)    (0.527) 
                       0.0084    0.0236**    0.0184 
    (0.159)    (0.044)    (0.184) 
                       0.0026    0.0022    0.0024 
    (0.344)    (0.695)    (0.640) 
                       -0.0008*    -0.0011    -0.0010 
    (0.089)    (0.116)    (0.292) 
                     0.0052**    0.0082    0.0071 
    (0.040)    (0.103)    (0.177) 
                     0.0009    0.0002    -0.0003 
    (0.732)    (0.965)    (0.965) 
       -0.0065 -0.0147   0.0388 -0.0018   -0.1316 -0.1479 
   (0.938) (0.862)   (0.896) (0.995)   (0.620) (0.577) 
       0.0271 0.0339   -0.1339 -0.1179   -0.1328 -0.1229 
 
  (0.732) (0.673)   (0.251) (0.326)   (0.276) (0.313) 
R2 within 0.0115 0.5415 0.5442 0.0067 0.0088 0.0114 0.0227 0.0398 0.0414 
F-statistic 1.5920 45.0352 207.8231 2.1881 1.9413 6.7906 2.3386 8.1532 35.4994 
p-value 0.1721 0.0000 0.0000 0.0600 0.0726 0.0000 0.0460 0.0000 0.0000 
Funds 3571 3571 3571 3571 3571 3571 3571 3571 3571 
Observations 20985 20985 20985 20985 20985 20985 20985 20985 20985 
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Table F1.E. Results for the emerging equity funds sample with                 . The PPB is the benchmark. 
The panel observations have a yearly frequency. The results are obtained using Driscoll-Kraay standard errors 
and fund fixed effects. P-values are in parentheses (* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent  Sharpe   RFund-RPPB   M2  
Specification (2) (3) (4) (2) (3) (4) (2) (3) (4) 
Constant -0.4782* -0.1002 -0.1276 -0.4064* -0.1395 -0.6250*** -0.8388*** -0.0411 -0.4633* 
 
(0.072) (0.628) (0.535) (0.092) (0.455) (0.008) (0.009) (0.882) (0.071) 
          0.0068 0.0471*** 0.0433** -0.0136 0.0138 0.0294 -0.0430* 0.0162 0.0224 
 
(0.861) (0.010) (0.029) (0.508) (0.643) (0.443) (0.099) (0.610) (0.598) 
          -0.8190*** -0.8591***   -0.0720 -0.0273   -0.4608*** -0.4463*** 
 
  (0.000) (0.000)   (0.281) (0.817)   (0.000) (0.000) 
          0.0357 0.0510   0.2561* 0.4740**   -0.2172 -0.0623 
 
  (0.535) (0.252)   (0.086) (0.048)   (0.192) (0.759) 
          0.0949 0.0240** 0.0364** 0.0958*** 0.0924**
* 
0.2508*** 0.2403*** 0.1779*** 0.3322*** 
 
(0.123) (0.049) (0.031) (0.008) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
           0.0159*** 0.0032 0.0015 0.0047 0.0003 -0.0119* 0.0069 0.0046 -0.0087 
 
(0.000) (0.196) (0.578) (0.377) (0.956) (0.097) (0.363) (0.522) (0.285) 
              -0.0066 0.0223** 0.0256** 0.0308 0.0355 0.0370 0.0401 0.0327 0.0373 
 
(0.548) (0.035) (0.047) (0.370) (0.354) (0.187) (0.310) (0.294) (0.126) 
        0.1078 0.7385*** 0.7476*** -0.0937 -0.0466 0.4191 -0.3590 -0.0071 0.4196 
 (0.779) (0.001) (0.001) (0.860) (0.933) (0.376) (0.636) (0.991) (0.434) 
         -0.3490 0.6277*** 0.0479 -0.7318 -0.4417 -1.2782 -0.5847 -0.2492 -1.2231 
 (0.469) (0.002) (0.869) (0.159) (0.419) (0.158) (0.423) (0.694) (0.347) 
          -0.3954 0.4099* 0.3368 -0.6573 -0.5370 -0.5793 -0.8479* -0.6804* -1.0498** 
 (0.389) (0.061) (0.138) (0.110) (0.233) (0.258) (0.098) (0.082) (0.012) 
          -0.1727 0.1958 0.1468 -0.4936* -0.4910** -0.5674** -0.4895 -0.5809** -0.6821** 
 (0.464) (0.365) (0.599) (0.063) (0.031) (0.032) (0.209) (0.015) (0.024) 
                     0.1168    -0.1191    0.0733 
    (0.217)    (0.144)    (0.257) 
                      0.3015**    0.5561*    0.6516 
    (0.018)    (0.060)    (0.163) 
                       0.0205    0.0464    0.1184*** 
    (0.199)    (0.451)    (0.003) 
                       0.0056    0.0068    0.0089 
    (0.762)    (0.852)    (0.843) 
                       -0.0012    -0.0141***    -0.0141*** 
    (0.279)    (0.001)    (0.000) 
                     0.0112    0.0150    0.0192 
    (0.201)    (0.438)    (0.413) 
                     -0.0017    -0.0206    -0.0093 
    (0.762)    (0.216)    (0.528) 
                 
             
       0.0005 0.0213   -0.4641 -0.4154   -0.5303 -0.4709 
 
  (0.998) (0.913)   (0.237) (0.195)   (0.252) (0.264) 
R2 within 0.1250 0.7943 0.8030 0.0512 0.0799 0.1296 0.2169 0.2759 0.3290 
F-statistic 18.5767 318.1808 10639336.15
94 
16.0301 114.8481 434.6461 5.4551 20.8636 155969.07
24 p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0008 0.0000 0.0000 
Funds 183 183 183 183 183 183 183 183 183 
Observations 713 713 713 713 713 713 713 713 713 
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Table F1.F. Results for the international equity funds sample with                 . The PPB is the benchmark. 
The panel observations have a yearly frequency. The results are obtained using Driscoll-Kraay standard errors 
and fund fixed effects. P-values are in parentheses (* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent  Sharpe   RFund-RPPB   M2  
Specification (2) (3) (4) (2) (3) (4) (2) (3) (4) 
Constant -0.1404 0.1236 0.1246 -0.3207** -0.4335 -0.3847 -0.3488** 0.1020 0.1122 
 
(0.431) (0.315) (0.332) (0.022) (0.225) (0.269) (0.014) (0.754) (0.717) 
          -0.0055 0.0031 0.0033 -0.0085 0.0061 0.0064 -0.0037 0.0159 0.0187 
 
(0.622) (0.737) (0.753) (0.441) (0.653) (0.661) (0.650) (0.173) (0.156) 
          -0.4451*** -0.4701***   -0.1161 -0.1904   -0.2563** -0.3090*** 
 
  (0.000) (0.000)   (0.419) (0.199)   (0.023) (0.005) 
          0.1149* 0.1187*   0.0243 0.0261   -0.2326*** -0.2069*** 
 
  (0.093) (0.076)   (0.777) (0.648)   (0.008) (0.003) 
          0.0214 0.0234** 0.0390** 0.0455* 0.0436** 0.0735*** 0.0886*** 0.0561*** 0.0810*** 
 
(0.408) (0.022) (0.013) (0.063) (0.018) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.000) 
           0.0060 -0.0025 -0.0042 0.0244 0.0218 0.0179 -0.0056 0.0012 -0.0017 
 
(0.528) (0.625) (0.413) (0.121) (0.113) (0.193) (0.720) (0.923) (0.886) 
              0.0171* 0.0073* 0.0061 0.0345*** 0.0287** 0.0250** 0.0394*** 0.0301** 0.0278** 
 
(0.067) (0.084) (0.155) (0.002) (0.015) (0.018) (0.004) (0.012) (0.012) 
        -0.0336 -0.0338 -0.1309 -0.3101 -0.1594 -0.2875 0.0080 0.0859 0.0646 
 (0.867) (0.699) (0.408) (0.308) (0.553) (0.495) (0.975) (0.703) (0.879) 
         -0.0978 -0.0097 -0.0659 -0.4032* -0.3070 -0.5657** -0.1099 -0.1017 -0.3008 
 (0.534) (0.894) (0.488) (0.075) (0.112) (0.029) (0.483) (0.475) (0.153) 
          -0.0252 0.0044 -0.0207 -0.1230 -0.0922 -0.1013 0.0691 0.0873 0.1462 
 (0.874) (0.952) (0.860) (0.477) (0.523) (0.643) (0.574) (0.402) (0.486) 
          -0.0246 0.0012 -0.0036 -0.0203 -0.0298 -0.0092 0.1386 0.0817 0.1143 
 (0.784) (0.977) (0.948) (0.878) (0.808) (0.946) (0.217) (0.322) (0.323) 
                     0.0479    0.0755    0.0219 
    (0.146)    (0.434)    (0.826) 
                      0.0162    0.0688*    0.0519 
    (0.200)    (0.070)    (0.100) 
                       0.0031    -0.0015    -0.0121 
    (0.755)    (0.938)    (0.551) 
                       0.0002    -0.0036    -0.0049 
    (0.969)    (0.735)    (0.556) 
                       -0.0012**    -0.0024***    -0.0020** 
    (0.024)    (0.006)    (0.010) 
                     0.0043    0.0119*    0.0087 
    (0.165)    (0.086)    (0.190) 
                     0.0002    0.0010    -0.0023 
    (0.948)    (0.842)    (0.710) 
       -0.0791 -0.1009   0.2871 0.2173   -0.1153 -0.1658 
   (0.429) (0.310)   (0.310) (0.431)   (0.660) (0.517) 
       -0.1045 -0.0949   -0.2485 -0.2294   -0.2110** -0.1984** 
 
  (0.263) (0.318)   (0.103) (0.132)   (0.034) (0.037) 
R2 within 0.0148 0.4799 0.4834 0.0195 0.0323 0.0367 0.0401 0.0701 0.0739 
F-statistic 5.3172 38.1154 187.5816 3.1922 4.2399 23.1701 3.1425 3.6829 22.8562 
p-value 0.0004 0.0000 0.0000 0.0106 0.0008 0.0000 0.0115 0.0022 0.0000 
Funds 1892 1892 1892 1892 1892 1892 1892 1892 1892 
Observations 11574 11574 11574 11574 11574 11574 11574 11574 11574 
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Table F1.G. Results for the UK equity funds sample with                 . The PPB is the benchmark. The 
panel observations have a yearly frequency. The results are obtained using Driscoll-Kraay standard errors and 
fund fixed effects. P-values are in parentheses (* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent  Sharpe   RFund-RPPB   M2  
Specification (2) (3) (4) (2) (3) (4) (2) (3) (4) 
Constant 0.2164 0.1053 0.0789 0.1226 0.4386 0.4898 0.0207 0.4016 0.4716 
 
(0.173) (0.423) (0.552) (0.464) (0.348) (0.311) (0.907) (0.341) (0.280) 
          -0.0057 -0.0150 -0.0145 0.0105 0.0121 0.0077 0.0245** 0.0310* 0.0243 
 
(0.764) (0.103) (0.119) (0.206) (0.497) (0.669) (0.036) (0.080) (0.187) 
          -0.7387*** -0.7423***   0.1305* 0.1026   0.1514 0.1015 
 
  (0.000) (0.000)   (0.075) (0.169)   (0.266) (0.467) 
          -0.0260 -0.0194   0.0261 0.0168   -0.1702 -0.2072 
 
  (0.772) (0.803)   (0.797) (0.896)   (0.126) (0.101) 
          0.0087 0.0042 0.0109 -0.0452*** -0.0452** -0.0595** -0.0096 -0.0284 -0.0469 
 
(0.842) (0.772) (0.628) (0.001) (0.020) (0.025) (0.641) (0.266) (0.186) 
           0.0193*** 0.0066 0.0062 0.0133** 0.0153** 0.0156** -0.0015 0.0064 0.0073 
 
(0.003) (0.110) (0.160) (0.045) (0.038) (0.042) (0.831) (0.391) (0.335) 
              -0.0208* -0.0138** -0.0133** 0.0066 0.0022 0.0041 0.0075 0.0055 0.0069 
 
(0.092) (0.020) (0.025) (0.549) (0.823) (0.692) (0.403) (0.422) (0.346) 
        -0.0466 -0.0620 -0.0487 0.3880 0.2356 0.0054 0.6155** 0.4860** 0.4667* 
 (0.877) (0.642) (0.675) (0.117) (0.335) (0.983) (0.013) (0.028) (0.061) 
         -0.2178 -0.0926 -0.0276 -0.0462 -0.1432 -0.0808 0.2918 0.1296 0.3377 
 (0.411) (0.376) (0.828) (0.777) (0.274) (0.669) (0.119) (0.423) (0.113) 
          -0.1520 -0.0646 -0.1574* -0.0823 -0.1055 -0.3729*** 0.0766 0.0160 -0.2815* 
 (0.487) (0.438) (0.076) (0.369) (0.353) (0.007) (0.539) (0.904) (0.078) 
          -0.1004 0.0212 -0.0185 -0.0094 -0.0194 -0.0517 0.1438*** 0.0633 0.0056 
 (0.363) (0.664) (0.709) (0.853) (0.681) (0.459) (0.007) (0.212) (0.923) 
                     0.0076    0.0919    0.0144 
    (0.775)    (0.251)    (0.836) 
                      -0.0096    -0.0120    -0.0427 
    (0.535)    (0.736)    (0.276) 
                       0.0160***    0.0424***    0.0494*** 
    (0.002)    (0.002)    (0.000) 
                       0.0056    0.0040    0.0078 
    (0.169)    (0.632)    (0.362) 
                       -0.0005    0.0012*    0.0015 
    (0.457)    (0.094)    (0.143) 
                     0.0006    0.0041    0.0069** 
    (0.822)    (0.293)    (0.048) 
                     -0.0008    0.0011    0.0047 
    (0.804)    (0.833)    (0.209) 
       0.1378 0.1382   -0.3299 -0.3391   -0.2794 -0.2771 
   (0.228) (0.229)   (0.390) (0.373)   (0.434) (0.437) 
       0.2709*** 0.2761***   0.0041 -0.0077   -0.0602 -0.0776 
 
  (0.009) (0.007)   (0.986) (0.974)   (0.781) (0.717) 
R2 within 0.0222 0.6405 0.6423 0.0111 0.0180 0.0209 0.0103 0.0476 0.0528 
F-statistic 2.8310 62.3301 142.8285 10.1027 23.8794 48.4538 3.8879 10.5937 74.5793 
p-value 0.0195 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0034 0.0000 0.0000 
Funds 1496 1496 1496 1496 1496 1496 1496 1496 1496 
Observations 8698 8698 8698 8698 8698 8698 8698 8698 8698 
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Table F2.A. Results for the all-funds sample with             (        ). The PPB is the benchmark. The 
panel observations have a yearly frequency. The results are obtained using Driscoll-Kraay standard errors and 
fund fixed effects. P-values are in parentheses (* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent  Sharpe   RFund-RPPB   M2  
Specification (2) (3) (4) (2) (3) (4) (2) (3) (4) 
Constant -0.0957 0.0816 0.0328 -0.1022 0.0086 -0.0579 -0.2082 0.1078 0.0884 
 
(0.652) (0.360) (0.724) (0.406) (0.979) (0.864) (0.271) (0.676) (0.751) 
          0.0205 0.0485 0.0567 0.0442 0.0659 0.0421 0.0839* 0.0863 0.0681 
 
(0.823) (0.288) (0.382) (0.216) (0.128) (0.490) (0.071) (0.111) (0.402) 
          -0.5290*** -0.5702***   0.0488 -0.0746   -0.0440 -0.1643 
 
  (0.000) (0.000)   (0.250) (0.276)   (0.435) (0.122) 
          0.0688 0.1326*   0.0579 0.1169   -0.1442** -0.1238 
 
  (0.336) (0.075)   (0.353) (0.238)   (0.023) (0.267) 
          0.0097 0.0141 0.0450** 0.0093 0.0167 0.1170*** 0.0374* 0.0308 0.0812** 
 
(0.701) (0.335) (0.031) (0.550) (0.350) (0.003) (0.094) (0.152) (0.019) 
           0.0065** 0.0007 -0.0003 0.0075** 0.0063** 0.0029 0.0005 0.0008 -0.0009 
 
(0.026) (0.771) (0.881) (0.018) (0.031) (0.314) (0.893) (0.809) (0.773) 
              0.0010 0.0002 0.0000 0.0135*** 0.0125*** 0.0113*** 0.0147** 0.0142* 0.0135* 
 
(0.728) (0.933) (0.995) (0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.046) (0.059) (0.074) 
        0.1238 0.0593 -0.1106 0.2010 0.1020 -0.2538 0.3304* 0.1441 0.0034 
 (0.590) (0.558) (0.404) (0.290) (0.543) (0.395) (0.090) (0.431) (0.990) 
         0.0205 0.0656 0.0497 -0.0989 -0.1739 -0.5728** 0.1082 -0.0732 -0.2333 
 (0.916) (0.405) (0.692) (0.576) (0.241) (0.028) (0.400) (0.571) (0.349) 
          0.0485 0.0576 -0.0045 0.0354 -0.0197 -0.3386* 0.1383 0.0323 -0.1500 
 (0.743) (0.386) (0.971) (0.669) (0.822) (0.065) (0.145) (0.730) (0.484) 
          0.0280 0.0572 0.0310 0.0524 0.0135 -0.0320 0.1381* 0.0488 0.0598 
 (0.800) (0.228) (0.710) (0.441) (0.853) (0.807) (0.084) (0.410) (0.494) 
                     0.1338*    0.2928    0.1126 
    (0.059)    (0.100)    (0.352) 
                      0.0091    0.2487**    0.0976 
    (0.900)    (0.021)    (0.397) 
                       0.0284    0.1468**    0.0843 
    (0.544)    (0.029)    (0.329) 
                       0.0102    0.0098    -0.0129 
    (0.757)    (0.832)    (0.696) 
                       -0.0109    -0.0352***    -0.0180* 
    (0.143)    (0.005)    (0.065) 
                     0.0271    0.0774**    0.0725 
    (0.351)    (0.024)    (0.113) 
                     -0.0330    -0.0309    -0.0102 
    (0.290)    (0.353)    (0.818) 
       -0.0727 -0.0798   -0.0782 -0.1027   -0.1220 -0.1313 
   (0.334) (0.287)   (0.782) (0.711)   (0.538) (0.503) 
       -0.0453 -0.0402   -0.1305 -0.1020   -0.0962 -0.0841 
 
  (0.530) (0.598)   (0.171) (0.307)   (0.334) (0.425) 
R2 within 0.0065 0.3976 0.4007 0.0048 0.0068 0.0112 0.0152 0.0240 0.0261 
F-statistic 1.9097 28.3148 142.6025 2.2074 1.5467 216.5180 1.1791 5.7482 27.3715 
p-value 0.0983 0.0000 0.0000 0.0580 0.1659 0.0000 0.3460 0.0001 0.0000 
Funds 4897 4897 4897 4897 4897 4897 4897 4897 4897 
Observations 28408 28408 28408 28408 28408 28408 28408 28408 28408 
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Table F2.B. Results for the allocation funds sample with             (        ). The PPB is the benchmark. 
The panel observations have a yearly frequency. The results are obtained using Driscoll-Kraay standard errors 
and fund fixed effects. P-values are in parentheses (* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent  Sharpe   RFund-RPPB   M2  
Specification (2) (3) (4) (2) (3) (4) (2) (3) (4) 
Constant -0.1134 -0.0119 -0.1852 0.0406 -0.8393*** -1.4998*** -0.1834 -0.5408** -0.7335* 
 
(0.708) (0.937) (0.185) (0.886) (0.008) (0.000) (0.541) (0.020) (0.059) 
          -0.0537 -0.0361 0.0012 -0.0316 -0.0354 0.1795 0.0793 0.0577 0.1555 
 
(0.628) (0.585) (0.989) (0.653) (0.646) (0.275) (0.366) (0.586) (0.512) 
          -0.6503*** -0.6050***   0.3559*** 0.5747***   -0.0524 -0.0499 
 
  (0.000) (0.000)   (0.001) (0.001)   (0.666) (0.876) 
          -0.0339 -0.0161   0.3063 0.3962*   -0.0999 -0.2148 
 
  (0.771) (0.898)   (0.134) (0.097)   (0.512) (0.500) 
          0.0481 0.0359 0.1382*** 0.0527 0.0951 0.3016*** 0.0835** 0.0679 0.0561 
 
(0.248) (0.131) (0.001) (0.136) (0.139) (0.000) (0.032) (0.129) (0.347) 
           0.0018 -0.0117 -0.0169* -0.0311** -0.0393 -0.0442* -0.0293* -0.0193 -0.0144 
 
(0.882) (0.242) (0.093) (0.019) (0.129) (0.097) (0.090) (0.259) (0.386) 
              0.0109 0.0201 0.0193 0.0285 0.0404 0.0391 0.0222 0.0147 0.0121 
 
(0.624) (0.160) (0.163) (0.426) (0.372) (0.377) (0.485) (0.658) (0.708) 
        0.0788 0.1606 0.4851 -0.0610 0.0527 1.2482** 0.3667 0.4539* 1.0600* 
 (0.804) (0.152) (0.273) (0.758) (0.777) (0.032) (0.107) (0.052) (0.076) 
         -0.0454 0.1288 0.0041 -0.4175 -0.3074 -0.0772 0.0313 0.1394 0.3297 
 (0.864) (0.315) (0.981) (0.112) (0.162) (0.836) (0.855) (0.413) (0.472) 
          0.0320 0.1205 -0.0601 0.0804 0.1583 0.8095 0.3175* 0.3459** 1.1668* 
 (0.825) (0.108) (0.771) (0.710) (0.389) (0.171) (0.065) (0.029) (0.081) 
          0.0588 0.0782 0.2790 -0.0053 0.1460 0.8994** 0.2325 0.2419* 1.1497*** 
 (0.758) (0.353) (0.129) (0.968) (0.382) (0.015) (0.112) (0.071) (0.003) 
                     -0.2681    -1.1174***    -0.7812** 
    (0.347)    (0.008)    (0.014) 
                      0.0487    -0.3246    -0.3623 
    (0.661)    (0.287)    (0.252) 
                       0.0577    -0.4778    -0.5854 
    (0.634)    (0.134)    (0.129) 
                       -0.1240    -0.4550***    -0.5374** 
    (0.173)    (0.009)    (0.020) 
                       -0.0388***    -0.0855***    -0.0058 
    (0.000)    (0.000)    (0.858) 
                     -0.0260    -0.1302    -0.0087 
    (0.283)    (0.124)    (0.953) 
                     -0.0121    -0.0527    0.0652 
    (0.717)    (0.591)    (0.668) 
       -0.0072 -0.0177   0.5198 0.6011*   0.3832 0.5428** 
   (0.967) (0.906)   (0.162) (0.072)   (0.191) (0.047) 
       0.1088 0.1214   -0.1008 -0.0808   0.1367 0.1255 
 
  (0.352) (0.284)   (0.672) (0.728)   (0.552) (0.571) 
R2 within 0.0244 0.5045 0.5124 0.0182 0.0489 0.0627 0.0435 0.0468 0.0587 
F-statistic 1.5271 42.7644 95.0872 2.6807 26.5445 86.8749 2.0837 5.5503 93.6212 
p-value 0.2023 0.0000 0.0000 0.0306 0.0000 0.0000 0.0806 0.0002 0.0000 
Funds 320 320 320 320 320 320 320 320 320 
Observations 1572 1572 1572 1572 1572 1572 1572 1572 1572 
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Table F2.C. Results for the fixed income funds sample with             (        ). The PPB is the 
benchmark. The panel observations have a yearly frequency. The results are obtained using Driscoll-Kraay 
standard errors and fund fixed effects. P-values are in parentheses (* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent  Sharpe   RFund-RPPB   M2  
Specification (2) (3) (4) (2) (3) (4) (2) (3) (4) 
Constant -0.0880 -0.0255 -0.1471 0.0753 0.2135 -0.1610 0.1965 0.2709 -0.0247 
 
(0.720) (0.890) (0.424) (0.829) (0.609) (0.761) (0.453) (0.254) (0.938) 
          -0.0452 0.0273 0.0538 -0.1411 -0.1509 -0.0641 -0.1329 -0.1695** -0.1087 
 
(0.580) (0.812) (0.703) (0.155) (0.132) (0.596) (0.101) (0.043) (0.252) 
          -0.2574** -0.4201**   0.1011 -0.0913   0.1946*** 0.2158 
 
  (0.031) (0.024)   (0.373) (0.690)   (0.001) (0.193) 
          0.1301 0.1733   -0.0401 0.1815   -0.0877* 0.0949 
 
  (0.248) (0.165)   (0.506) (0.197)   (0.056) (0.321) 
          0.0342* 0.0534*** 0.1353*** 0.0755** 0.0718** 0.3452** 0.0599** 0.0519* 0.3035*** 
 
(0.061) (0.007) (0.002) (0.031) (0.038) (0.044) (0.037) (0.068) (0.007) 
           0.0047** 0.0031 0.0011 0.0027 0.0023 -0.0036 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0051 
 
(0.044) (0.213) (0.708) (0.684) (0.721) (0.514) (0.978) (0.990) (0.237) 
              0.0054 -0.0075 -0.0094 0.0366 0.0318 0.0204 0.0234 0.0210 0.0078 
 
(0.742) (0.454) (0.346) (0.139) (0.150) (0.309) (0.140) (0.184) (0.551) 
        -0.2019 -0.0829 -0.2895 0.0163 -0.0849 -0.2067 -0.0424 -0.1605 -0.6017 
 (0.257) (0.642) (0.316) (0.917) (0.571) (0.671) (0.732) (0.248) (0.250) 
         -0.1007 -0.0094 0.1870 -0.1323 -0.2206 -0.2128 -0.1107 -0.2119** -0.4768* 
 (0.499) (0.945) (0.466) (0.706) (0.363) (0.501) (0.333) (0.046) (0.061) 
          -0.0593 -0.0248 0.0553 0.0772 0.0159 -0.1353 0.0732 -0.0034 -0.2151 
 (0.537) (0.803) (0.777) (0.401) (0.878) (0.634) (0.406) (0.973) (0.280) 
          -0.0147 0.0259 0.0283 0.0958 0.0406 0.0602 0.1025 0.0191 0.0222 
 (0.884) (0.762) (0.897) (0.350) (0.438) (0.716) (0.204) (0.705) (0.869) 
                     0.1715    0.1504    0.3789 
    (0.192)    (0.624)    (0.248) 
                      -0.1111    0.0049    0.1555 
    (0.355)    (0.975)    (0.265) 
                       -0.0441    0.0532    0.0804 
    (0.571)    (0.608)    (0.316) 
                       -0.0053    -0.0281    -0.0200 
    (0.948)    (0.684)    (0.726) 
                       -0.0311**    -0.1014*    -0.0917*** 
    (0.018)    (0.055)    (0.006) 
                     0.0911    0.1122    -0.0054 
    (0.115)    (0.253)    (0.938) 
                     -0.0195    -0.1102**    -0.0934** 
    (0.612)    (0.027)    (0.015) 
       -0.0879 -0.0899   -0.0139 -0.0519   0.1069 0.0562 
   (0.514) (0.513)   (0.966) (0.875)   (0.463) (0.682) 
       -0.1692 -0.1580   -0.0725 -0.0292   -0.0646 -0.0197 
 
  (0.312) (0.363)   (0.523) (0.749)   (0.537) (0.828) 
R2 within 0.0130 0.1128 0.1224 0.0152 0.0183 0.0310 0.0140 0.0306 0.0445 
F-statistic 5.0675 6.8113 10.6196 7.2388 8.5702 18.7943 13.9311 11.6174 13.9865 
p-value 0.0006 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Funds 705 705 705 705 705 705 705 705 705 
Observations 4358 4358 4358 4358 4358 4358 4358 4358 4358 
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Table F2.D. Results for the equity funds sample with             (        ). The PPB is the benchmark. The 
panel observations have a yearly frequency. The results are obtained using Driscoll-Kraay standard errors and 
fund fixed effects. P-values are in parentheses (* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent  Sharpe   RFund-RPPB   M2  
Specification (2) (3) (4) (2) (3) (4) (2) (3) (4) 
Constant -0.0568 0.1328 0.1492 -0.1820 -0.1248 -0.0419 -0.3160* 0.0316 0.0971 
 
(0.801) (0.168) (0.149) (0.124) (0.718) (0.907) (0.066) (0.923) (0.781) 
          0.0247 0.0328 0.0099 0.0715** 0.0894** 0.0204 0.1211** 0.1190** 0.0854 
 
(0.803) (0.367) (0.836) (0.050) (0.022) (0.696) (0.019) (0.036) (0.325) 
          -0.5780*** -0.6418***   -0.0128 -0.1773   -0.0902 -0.2180 
 
  (0.000) (0.000)   (0.850) (0.139)   (0.180) (0.102) 
          0.0528 0.0480   0.0382 0.0351   -0.1974*** -0.1801 
 
  (0.484) (0.548)   (0.526) (0.740)   (0.006) (0.184) 
          0.0063 0.0067 0.0254 -0.0015 0.0056 0.0560 0.0389* 0.0280 0.0335 
 
(0.792) (0.492) (0.166) (0.911) (0.638) (0.139) (0.057) (0.103) (0.398) 
           0.0111** 0.0025 0.0014 0.0106** 0.0086** 0.0055 -0.0040 -0.0024 -0.0032 
 
(0.031) (0.426) (0.621) (0.023) (0.046) (0.215) (0.468) (0.621) (0.487) 
              -0.0030 -0.0029 -0.0028 0.0179** 0.0182** 0.0178** 0.0206*** 0.0224*** 0.0220*** 
 
(0.567) (0.483) (0.497) (0.017) (0.021) (0.017) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
        0.1619 0.0630 -0.0773 0.2060 0.1207 -0.3168 0.4172* 0.2202 0.1356 
 (0.521) (0.496) (0.508) (0.345) (0.569) (0.302) (0.066) (0.269) (0.638) 
         -0.0024 0.0360 -0.0227 -0.1279 -0.1936 -0.6891** 0.1505 -0.0468 -0.1778 
 (0.991) (0.609) (0.819) (0.418) (0.220) (0.019) (0.282) (0.728) (0.526) 
          0.0247 0.0302 -0.0683 -0.0258 -0.0873 -0.4696** 0.1236 0.0126 -0.2120 
 (0.886) (0.675) (0.576) (0.802) (0.457) (0.033) (0.251) (0.908) (0.401) 
          -0.0002 0.0304 -0.0178 0.0315 -0.0128 -0.0912 0.1637** 0.0570 0.0247 
 (0.999) (0.467) (0.762) (0.668) (0.885) (0.466) (0.035) (0.338) (0.799) 
                     0.1103*    0.3576*    0.0669 
    (0.063)    (0.058)    (0.647) 
                      0.0358    0.3179**    0.0871 
    (0.537)    (0.019)    (0.522) 
                       0.0490    0.1860**    0.1160 
    (0.257)    (0.018)    (0.265) 
                       0.0218    0.0292    0.0129 
    (0.319)    (0.567)    (0.783) 
                       -0.0061    -0.0163    -0.0013 
    (0.299)    (0.250)    (0.928) 
                     0.0379    0.0986**    0.0751 
    (0.108)    (0.048)    (0.198) 
                     0.0029    0.0021    -0.0090 
    (0.898)    (0.962)    (0.880) 
       -0.0363 -0.0401   0.0096 -0.0226   -0.1239 -0.1357 
   (0.636) (0.597)   (0.974) (0.937)   (0.645) (0.611) 
       0.0034 0.0088   -0.1404 -0.1191   -0.0895 -0.0856 
 
  (0.958) (0.895)   (0.169) (0.266)   (0.388) (0.434) 
R2 within 0.0100 0.5418 0.5437 0.0073 0.0098 0.0143 0.0250 0.0408 0.0428 
F-statistic 1.4394 36.7427 185.2879 2.0225 1.6854 25.2323 2.4554 22.2998 19.4512 
p-value 0.2241 0.0000 0.0000 0.0805 0.1244 0.0000 0.0375 0.0000 0.0000 
Funds 3571 3571 3571 3571 3571 3571 3571 3571 3571 
Observations 20985 20985 20985 20985 20985 20985 20985 20985 20985 
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Table F2.E. Results for the emerging equity funds sample with             (        ). The PPB is the 
benchmark. The panel observations have a yearly frequency. The results are obtained using Driscoll-Kraay 
standard errors and fund fixed effects. P-values are in parentheses (* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent  Sharpe   RFund-RPPB   M2  
Specification (2) (3) (4) (2) (3) (4) (2) (3) (4) 
Constant -0.5312 -0.2749 -0.1884 -0.5956* -0.3391 -0.9205*** -1.2098*** -0.2889 -0.6688*** 
 
(0.130) (0.159) (0.288) (0.082) (0.178) (0.009) (0.009) (0.315) (0.009) 
          0.0830 0.2210*** 0.2395** 0.1931 0.3661 0.4413 0.3341* 0.4574* 0.4603 
 
(0.621) (0.006) (0.024) (0.140) (0.107) (0.154) (0.077) (0.059) (0.138) 
          -0.7935*** -0.8816***   -0.0491 -0.2876   -0.4325*** -0.6356*** 
 
  (0.000) (0.000)   (0.497) (0.179)   (0.000) (0.006) 
          0.0691 0.2182**   0.3177 0.6189   -0.1402 0.0782 
 
  (0.302) (0.012)   (0.114) (0.116)   (0.522) (0.837) 
          0.0870** 0.0272** -0.0514 0.0530** 0.0510** 0.3650*** 0.1502*** 0.1254*** 0.3505*** 
 
(0.032) (0.028) (0.277) (0.019) (0.046) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.000) 
           0.0156*** 0.0006 0.0036 0.0060 -0.0007 -0.0162* 0.0105 0.0034 -0.0087 
 
(0.009) (0.809) (0.300) (0.290) (0.899) (0.078) (0.159) (0.634) (0.384) 
              -0.0057 0.0265** 0.0277** 0.0337 0.0392 0.0355 0.0455 0.0374 0.0395* 
 
(0.620) (0.028) (0.028) (0.308) (0.262) (0.143) (0.164) (0.153) (0.094) 
        0.1910 0.7314*** 0.4959** 0.3640 0.3953 1.2854** 0.6083 0.5529 1.2100** 
 (0.581) (0.000) (0.012) (0.590) (0.528) (0.038) (0.473) (0.388) (0.036) 
         -0.3028 0.5697*** -0.4403 -0.3958 -0.1334 -1.2890 0.1485 0.1431 -1.5382 
 (0.479) (0.002) (0.246) (0.497) (0.818) (0.402) (0.842) (0.820) (0.433) 
          -0.3807 0.3480* 0.3070 -0.4791 -0.4340 -0.1586 -0.4440 -0.5481 -0.8639** 
 (0.300) (0.083) (0.173) (0.279) (0.326) (0.801) (0.382) (0.137) (0.049) 
          -0.1696 0.1422 0.1524 -0.3736* -0.4588** -0.3901 -0.2071 -0.5386** -0.6170 
 (0.383) (0.513) (0.643) (0.089) (0.026) (0.361) (0.589) (0.010) (0.225) 
                     0.2210    -0.6319***    -0.2513* 
    (0.178)    (0.000)    (0.060) 
                      0.8496**    1.5000    1.9264 
    (0.018)    (0.174)    (0.204) 
                       -0.0291    0.0932    0.4036** 
    (0.638)    (0.776)    (0.030) 
                       -0.0193    0.0257    0.0866 
    (0.857)    (0.927)    (0.789) 
                       0.0308    -0.1254***    -0.0886** 
    (0.110)    (0.004)    (0.034) 
                     0.0639    0.2158*    0.1728 
    (0.442)    (0.089)    (0.255) 
                     -0.0901    -0.1802    -0.1352 
    (0.162)    (0.213)    (0.345) 
                 
             
       0.0642 0.0649   -0.5917 -0.5621   -0.6938 -0.6414 
 
  (0.694) (0.710)   (0.156) (0.130)   (0.154) (0.168) 
R2 within 0.1268 0.7958 0.8084 0.0547 0.0923 0.1424 0.2243 0.2956 0.3298 
F-statistic 17.4359 369.4180 518.1603 30.2152 355.0322 2354.6127 5.7270 39.8726 9906.5290 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0006 0.0000 0.0000 
Funds 183 183 183 183 183 183 183 183 183 
Observations 713 713 713 713 713 713 713 713 713 
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Table F2.F. Results for the international equity funds sample with             (        ).  The PPB is the 
benchmark. The panel observations have a yearly frequency. The results are obtained using Driscoll-Kraay 
standard errors and fund fixed effects. P-values are in parentheses (* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent  Sharpe   RFund-RPPB   M2  
Specification (2) (3) (4) (2) (3) (4) (2) (3) (4) 
Constant -0.2230 0.0867 0.0919 -0.4966*** -0.5028 -0.3620 -0.5257*** 0.0160 0.0891 
 
(0.316) (0.430) (0.492) (0.005) (0.147) (0.302) (0.007) (0.960) (0.764) 
          0.0354 0.0555 0.0502 0.0924 0.1040* 0.0616 0.1183* 0.1213** 0.1197 
 
(0.642) (0.118) (0.344) (0.124) (0.054) (0.389) (0.061) (0.044) (0.167) 
          -0.4427*** -0.4871***   -0.1115 -0.3127   -0.2519** -0.3937*** 
 
  (0.000) (0.000)   (0.435) (0.116)   (0.024) (0.007) 
          0.1184* 0.1313*   0.0309 0.0685   -0.2263*** -0.1403 
 
  (0.077) (0.094)   (0.706) (0.382)   (0.009) (0.163) 
          0.0084 0.0175* 0.0426 0.0188 0.0329** 0.0917 0.0631** 0.0519*** 0.0790* 
 
(0.684) (0.071) (0.196) (0.371) (0.017) (0.148) (0.022) (0.001) (0.077) 
           0.0090 -0.0017 -0.0041 0.0302** 0.0232* 0.0161 -0.0004 0.0008 -0.0028 
 
(0.312) (0.730) (0.429) (0.047) (0.075) (0.291) (0.977) (0.945) (0.829) 
              0.0161* 0.0053 0.0050 0.0315*** 0.0250** 0.0214** 0.0353*** 0.0259** 0.0231** 
 
(0.061) (0.206) (0.262) (0.006) (0.034) (0.046) (0.006) (0.028) (0.028) 
        0.1376 0.0241 -0.1381 0.0340 -0.0542 -0.4187 0.3239 0.1016 0.0103 
 (0.501) (0.792) (0.444) (0.900) (0.861) (0.392) (0.203) (0.692) (0.984) 
         0.0282 0.0279 -0.0812 -0.1536 -0.2391 -0.8954** 0.1136 -0.1045 -0.5786* 
 (0.859) (0.692) (0.504) (0.445) (0.306) (0.024) (0.444) (0.527) (0.078) 
          0.0569 0.0221 -0.0043 0.0357 -0.0607 -0.1962 0.2049 0.0654 0.1002 
 (0.704) (0.765) (0.978) (0.818) (0.729) (0.521) (0.108) (0.601) (0.760) 
          0.0220 0.0106 0.0309 0.0690 -0.0130 -0.0050 0.2137* 0.0707 0.1120 
 (0.822) (0.805) (0.696) (0.584) (0.926) (0.979) (0.059) (0.429) (0.497) 
                     0.1274    0.3030    0.0815 
    (0.215)    (0.258)    (0.782) 
                      0.0660    0.4256**    0.3143* 
    (0.340)    (0.028)    (0.050) 
                       0.0063    0.0465    -0.0348 
    (0.921)    (0.703)    (0.802) 
                       -0.0135    -0.0144    -0.0258 
    (0.676)    (0.854)    (0.689) 
                       -0.0087    -0.0200    -0.0098 
    (0.409)    (0.351)    (0.535) 
                     0.0268    0.1176*    0.0838 
    (0.276)    (0.077)    (0.204) 
                     -0.0059    -0.0188    -0.0443 
    (0.810)    (0.695)    (0.489) 
       -0.0977 -0.1136   0.2534 0.1667   -0.1239 -0.1906 
   (0.283) (0.199)   (0.354) (0.516)   (0.627) (0.426) 
       -0.1024 -0.0986   -0.2434* -0.2285*   -0.1694* -0.1636* 
 
  (0.176) (0.205)   (0.060) (0.085)   (0.058) (0.073) 
R2 within 0.0147 0.4818 0.4838 0.0202 0.0335 0.0398 0.0422 0.0711 0.0763 
F-statistic 5.3953 30.1527 105.6986 3.0218 4.2883 62.3107 2.8964 3.5267 26.4655 
p-value 0.0004 0.0000 0.0000 0.0141 0.0007 0.0000 0.0174 0.0029 0.0000 
Funds 1892 1892 1892 1892 1892 1892 1892 1892 1892 
Observations 11574 11574 11574 11574 11574 11574 11574 11574 11574 
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Table F2.G. Results for the UK equity funds sample with             (        ). The PPB is the benchmark. 
The panel observations have a yearly frequency. The results are obtained using Driscoll-Kraay standard errors 
and fund fixed effects. P-values are in parentheses (* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent  Sharpe   RFund-RPPB   M2  
Specification (2) (3) (4) (2) (3) (4) (2) (3) (4) 
Constant 0.1835 0.1513 0.1503 0.0778 0.3493 0.4843 -0.0518 0.2201 0.4501 
 
(0.461) (0.233) (0.222) (0.705) (0.457) (0.328) (0.817) (0.605) (0.316) 
          0.0151 0.0027 -0.0203 0.0688 0.0746 -0.0071 0.1307* 0.1211 0.0553 
 
(0.910) (0.948) (0.643) (0.242) (0.280) (0.940) (0.062) (0.168) (0.638) 
          -0.7346*** -0.7425***   0.1301* 0.0143   0.1476 0.0226 
 
  (0.000) (0.000)   (0.085) (0.880)   (0.290) (0.904) 
          -0.0247 -0.0165   0.0283 -0.0529   -0.1674 -0.2665 
 
  (0.780) (0.850)   (0.781) (0.771)   (0.133) (0.139) 
          -0.0003 -0.0103 0.0013 -0.0458*** -0.0463*** -0.0664 -0.0057 -0.0195 -0.1134* 
 
(0.992) (0.440) (0.956) (0.000) (0.003) (0.141) (0.703) (0.336) (0.064) 
           0.0204*** 0.0085* 0.0077 0.0124** 0.0146** 0.0148** -0.0040 0.0038 0.0081 
 
(0.005) (0.076) (0.115) (0.050) (0.033) (0.043) (0.556) (0.577) (0.245) 
              -0.0222 -0.0151** -0.0143** 0.0075 0.0023 0.0040 0.0100 0.0067 0.0061 
 
(0.118) (0.017) (0.024) (0.468) (0.810) (0.670) (0.264) (0.308) (0.369) 
        0.0825 0.1195 0.0737 0.3336 0.2083 -0.2192 0.4339 0.3065 0.2792 
 (0.794) (0.427) (0.583) (0.253) (0.409) (0.489) (0.129) (0.213) (0.328) 
         -0.1222 0.0452 0.0863 -0.0976 -0.1737 -0.1344 0.1348 -0.0228 0.4274 
 (0.645) (0.696) (0.611) (0.654) (0.341) (0.630) (0.511) (0.908) (0.209) 
          -0.0896 0.0309 -0.1771 -0.1254 -0.1359 -0.6448*** -0.0452 -0.1050 -0.5232** 
 (0.648) (0.737) (0.116) (0.226) (0.385) (0.001) (0.748) (0.542) (0.034) 
          -0.0647 0.0706 -0.0673 -0.0315 -0.0309 -0.0937 0.0792 0.0077 -0.0202 
 (0.620) (0.226) (0.348) (0.617) (0.630) (0.437) (0.260) (0.910) (0.870) 
                     0.0435    0.3272    0.0003 
    (0.527)    (0.207)    (0.999) 
                      -0.0184    -0.0293    -0.2813 
    (0.808)    (0.872)    (0.190) 
                       0.1175***    0.2732***    0.2436** 
    (0.001)    (0.002)    (0.014) 
                       0.0719**    0.0253    0.0150 
    (0.024)    (0.740)    (0.855) 
                       -0.0027    0.0093    0.0347* 
    (0.635)    (0.543)    (0.082) 
                     0.0039    0.0656    0.0669 
    (0.901)    (0.131)    (0.228) 
                     -0.0056    0.0453    0.0544 
    (0.892)    (0.490)    (0.319) 
       0.0789 0.0841   -0.3068 -0.3000   -0.1977 -0.1885 
   (0.402) (0.380)   (0.432) (0.437)   (0.588) (0.603) 
       0.2122** 0.2179**   0.0365 0.0363   0.0367 0.0199 
 
  (0.025) (0.021)   (0.841) (0.849)   (0.836) (0.913) 
R2 within 0.0217 0.6377 0.6396 0.0113 0.0183 0.0215 0.0095 0.0457 0.0517 
F-statistic 3.5466 80.5344 169.0617 13.6207 21.9433 38.9441 2.7024 15.0044 28.7790 
p-value 0.0059 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0244 0.0000 0.0000 
Funds 1496 1496 1496 1496 1496 1496 1496 1496 1496 
Observations 8698 8698 8698 8698 8698 8698 8698 8698 8698 
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Table F3.A. Results for the all-funds sample with           √      
 . The PPB is the benchmark. The panel 
observations have a yearly frequency. The results are obtained using Driscoll-Kraay standard errors and fund 
fixed effects. P-values are in parentheses (* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent  Sharpe   RFund-RPPB   M2  
Specification (2) (3) (4) (2) (3) (4) (2) (3) (4) 
Constant -0.0966 0.0508 0.0025 -0.1085 -0.0289 -0.0646 -0.2503 0.0501 0.0423 
 
(0.724) (0.603) (0.981) (0.453) (0.929) (0.855) (0.246) (0.853) (0.891) 
          0.0188 0.0684 0.0703 0.0438 0.0884 0.0414 0.1046 0.1248 0.0906 
 
(0.891) (0.357) (0.477) (0.429) (0.192) (0.655) (0.118) (0.135) (0.449) 
          -0.5291*** -0.5934***   0.0487 -0.1103   -0.0440 -0.1973 
 
  (0.000) (0.000)   (0.250) (0.191)   (0.436) (0.124) 
          0.0685 0.1492*   0.0573 0.1404   -0.1446** -0.1184 
 
  (0.339) (0.071)   (0.355) (0.243)   (0.022) (0.371) 
          0.0109 0.0143 0.0560** 0.0116 0.0175 0.1327*** 0.0392* 0.0309 0.0972** 
 
(0.674) (0.309) (0.033) (0.459) (0.323) (0.008) (0.084) (0.150) (0.024) 
           0.0064** 0.0007 -0.0004 0.0074** 0.0063** 0.0032 0.0005 0.0009 -0.0010 
 
(0.024) (0.760) (0.856) (0.019) (0.031) (0.277) (0.894) (0.797) (0.771) 
              0.0012 0.0004 0.0001 0.0138*** 0.0127*** 0.0113*** 0.0150** 0.0144* 0.0135* 
 
(0.703) (0.894) (0.981) (0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.044) (0.057) (0.073) 
        0.1107 0.0599 -0.2401 0.1775 0.0975 -0.5675 0.3182 0.1488 -0.1165 
 (0.643) (0.563) (0.179) (0.349) (0.559) (0.199) (0.103) (0.421) (0.758) 
         0.0121 0.0672 0.0207 -0.1137 -0.1753 -0.8060** 0.1027 -0.0677 -0.3352 
 (0.952) (0.403) (0.907) (0.514) (0.226) (0.013) (0.425) (0.597) (0.304) 
          0.0441 0.0601 -0.0449 0.0280 -0.0184 -0.4631** 0.1380 0.0384 -0.2279 
 (0.777) (0.373) (0.772) (0.738) (0.830) (0.042) (0.147) (0.681) (0.391) 
          0.0255 0.0583 0.0141 0.0482 0.0137 -0.0513 0.1381* 0.0516 0.0551 
 (0.820) (0.231) (0.889) (0.480) (0.849) (0.737) (0.087) (0.380) (0.590) 
                     0.2163**    0.4897*    0.1920 
    (0.048)    (0.083)    (0.305) 
                      0.0259    0.3890**    0.1619 
    (0.805)    (0.013)    (0.339) 
                       0.0509    0.2186**    0.1315 
    (0.443)    (0.023)    (0.277) 
                       0.0187    0.0177    -0.0120 
    (0.676)    (0.776)    (0.788) 
                       -0.0165*    -0.0455**    -0.0265** 
    (0.099)    (0.010)    (0.042) 
                     0.0411    0.0993**    0.0930 
    (0.303)    (0.030)    (0.129) 
                     -0.0433    -0.0444    -0.0134 
    (0.288)    (0.342)    (0.822) 
       -0.0739 -0.0784   -0.0786 -0.0973   -0.1252 -0.1308 
   (0.341) (0.311)   (0.781) (0.726)   (0.529) (0.506) 
       -0.0489 -0.0385   -0.1346 -0.0942   -0.1033 -0.0825 
 
  (0.515) (0.629)   (0.167) (0.361)   (0.314) (0.448) 
R2 within 0.0064 0.3974 0.4008 0.0047 0.0067 0.0109 0.0149 0.0239 0.0259 
F-statistic 1.9198 28.1731 140.4861 2.1225 1.5200 197.5986 1.0758 5.4419 33.3809 
p-value 0.0966 0.0000 0.0000 0.0674 0.1753 0.0000 0.4076 0.0001 0.0000 
Funds 4897 4897 4897 4897 4897 4897 4897 4897 4897 
Observations 28408 28408 28408 28408 28408 28408 28408 28408 28408 
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Table F3.B. Results for the allocation funds sample with           √      
 . The PPB is the benchmark. The 
panel observations have a yearly frequency. The results are obtained using Driscoll-Kraay standard errors and 
fund fixed effects. P-values are in parentheses (* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent  Sharpe   RFund-RPPB   M2  
Specification (2) (3) (4) (2) (3) (4) (2) (3) (4) 
Constant -0.0553 0.0281 -0.1621 0.1043 -0.7793*** -1.5775*** -0.2308 -0.5707** -0.8385* 
 
(0.862) (0.841) (0.289) (0.708) (0.009) (0.000) (0.494) (0.017) (0.099) 
          -0.0902 -0.0693 -0.0326 -0.0756 -0.0940 0.1869 0.1041 0.0678 0.2119 
 
(0.600) (0.490) (0.802) (0.497) (0.433) (0.429) (0.416) (0.682) (0.530) 
          -0.6506*** -0.5891***   0.3552*** 0.6779***   -0.0526 -0.0252 
 
  (0.000) (0.000)   (0.001) (0.001)   (0.666) (0.949) 
          -0.0341 -0.0031   0.3055 0.4443   -0.1006 -0.2567 
 
  (0.770) (0.982)   (0.133) (0.110)   (0.509) (0.511) 
          0.0501 0.0381 0.1709*** 0.0572 0.1009 0.3683*** 0.0850** 0.0700 0.0799 
 
(0.260) (0.109) (0.000) (0.118) (0.117) (0.000) (0.030) (0.111) (0.304) 
           0.0010 -0.0123 -0.0176* -0.0325** -0.0409 -0.0452* -0.0294* -0.0196 -0.0147 
 
(0.937) (0.211) (0.081) (0.019) (0.120) (0.098) (0.097) (0.260) (0.389) 
              0.0110 0.0202 0.0189 0.0289 0.0408 0.0385 0.0225 0.0150 0.0122 
 
(0.623) (0.158) (0.167) (0.420) (0.367) (0.385) (0.480) (0.653) (0.708) 
        0.0537 0.1394 0.6578 -0.1075 0.0021 2.0171** 0.3623 0.4390* 1.6457** 
 (0.866) (0.198) (0.328) (0.588) (0.991) (0.027) (0.115) (0.056) (0.048) 
         -0.0643 0.1148 -0.0863 -0.4524* -0.3415 0.0942 0.0280 0.1284 0.6037 
 (0.809) (0.361) (0.714) (0.087) (0.127) (0.870) (0.868) (0.439) (0.376) 
          0.0193 0.1096 -0.1440 0.0586 0.1339 1.1026 0.3177* 0.3408** 1.5773* 
 (0.894) (0.148) (0.620) (0.788) (0.470) (0.170) (0.067) (0.033) (0.090) 
          0.0518 0.0734 0.3120 -0.0168 0.1351 1.1507** 0.2331 0.2394* 1.4690*** 
 (0.783) (0.387) (0.187) (0.897) (0.413) (0.013) (0.114) (0.071) (0.005) 
                     -0.3941    -1.6624**    -1.1691** 
    (0.369)    (0.011)    (0.015) 
                      0.0972    -0.4639    -0.5412 
    (0.554)    (0.307)    (0.255) 
                       0.0974    -0.6888    -0.8420 
    (0.577)    (0.129)    (0.125) 
                       -0.1537    -0.6281***    -0.7389** 
    (0.221)    (0.009)    (0.022) 
                       -0.0562***    -0.1214***    -0.0155 
    (0.000)    (0.000)    (0.722) 
                     -0.0356    -0.1939*    -0.0233 
    (0.278)    (0.082)    (0.906) 
                     -0.0193    -0.0815    0.0905 
    (0.671)    (0.518)    (0.650) 
       -0.0020 -0.0098   0.5341 0.6251*   0.3901 0.5280* 
   (0.991) (0.948)   (0.150) (0.062)   (0.182) (0.058) 
       0.1147 0.1390   -0.0893 -0.0494   0.1364 0.1239 
 
  (0.341) (0.234)   (0.709) (0.832)   (0.564) (0.590) 
R2 within 0.0246 0.5048 0.5131 0.0184 0.0492 0.0633 0.0433 0.0466 0.0579 
F-statistic 1.4676 42.9000 93.7324 2.7271 25.4584 84.0973 2.1000 5.6234 107.8780 
p-value 0.2229 0.0000 0.0000 0.0284 0.0000 0.0000 0.0784 0.0002 0.0000 
Funds 320 320 320 320 320 320 320 320 320 
Observations 1572 1572 1572 1572 1572 1572 1572 1572 1572 
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Table F3.C. Results for the fixed income funds sample with           √      
 . The PPB is the benchmark. The 
panel observations have a yearly frequency. The results are obtained using Driscoll-Kraay standard errors and 
fund fixed effects. P-values are in parentheses (* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent  Sharpe   RFund-RPPB   M2  
Specification (2) (3) (4) (2) (3) (4) (2) (3) (4) 
Constant -0.0177 -0.0402 -0.1624 0.2597 0.3634 -0.0005 0.3670 0.4301* 0.1586 
 
(0.952) (0.850) (0.481) (0.500) (0.402) (0.999) (0.216) (0.091) (0.627) 
          -0.0856 0.0355 0.0533 -0.2450* -0.2574* -0.1808 -0.2288** -0.2808** -0.2303* 
 
(0.447) (0.842) (0.794) (0.065) (0.073) (0.235) (0.040) (0.021) (0.071) 
          -0.2572** -0.4876**   0.1027 -0.1664   0.1959*** 0.1888 
 
  (0.031) (0.017)   (0.371) (0.542)   (0.002) (0.329) 
          0.1298 0.1828   -0.0397 0.2452   -0.0871* 0.1531 
 
  (0.251) (0.182)   (0.509) (0.148)   (0.057) (0.199) 
          0.0366* 0.0539*** 0.1660*** 0.0805** 0.0756** 0.4000** 0.0643** 0.0554* 0.3404*** 
 
(0.058) (0.006) (0.002) (0.029) (0.034) (0.042) (0.032) (0.059) (0.008) 
           0.0045* 0.0031 0.0009 0.0024 0.0022 -0.0036 -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0050 
 
(0.051) (0.212) (0.758) (0.722) (0.741) (0.503) (0.969) (0.981) (0.247) 
              0.0047 -0.0072 -0.0104 0.0343 0.0309 0.0171 0.0213 0.0199 0.0048 
 
(0.788) (0.476) (0.297) (0.185) (0.173) (0.398) (0.206) (0.223) (0.710) 
        -0.2353 -0.0872 -0.4726 -0.0561 -0.1358 -0.4726 -0.1077 -0.2075 -1.0236 
 (0.177) (0.617) (0.210) (0.710) (0.399) (0.547) (0.382) (0.151) (0.204) 
         -0.1261 -0.0112 0.2199 -0.1896 -0.2605 -0.3221 -0.1627 -0.2501** -0.6675* 
 (0.387) (0.934) (0.488) (0.581) (0.280) (0.421) (0.154) (0.023) (0.062) 
          -0.0772 -0.0252 0.0289 0.0355 -0.0138 -0.2591 0.0352 -0.0323 -0.3313 
 (0.407) (0.791) (0.896) (0.703) (0.898) (0.521) (0.691) (0.753) (0.237) 
          -0.0252 0.0255 0.0150 0.0712 0.0240 0.0550 0.0801 0.0031 0.0260 
 (0.798) (0.768) (0.952) (0.470) (0.645) (0.763) (0.302) (0.951) (0.871) 
                     0.2862    0.2828    0.6145 
    (0.153)    (0.565)    (0.225) 
                      -0.1378    0.0375    0.2436 
    (0.395)    (0.870)    (0.229) 
                       -0.0372    0.0984    0.1259 
    (0.702)    (0.550)    (0.298) 
                       -0.0022    -0.0412    -0.0352 
    (0.983)    (0.635)    (0.640) 
                       -0.0468***    -0.1339**    -0.1164*** 
    (0.008)    (0.049)    (0.007) 
                     0.1321*    0.1583    0.0099 
    (0.074)    (0.205)    (0.909) 
                     -0.0248    -0.1459**    -0.1252** 
    (0.612)    (0.033)    (0.018) 
       -0.0878 -0.0867   0.0021 -0.0260   0.1226 0.0804 
   (0.531) (0.543)   (0.995) (0.937)   (0.404) (0.563) 
       -0.1710 -0.1473   -0.0513 0.0187   -0.0424 0.0244 
 
  (0.331) (0.410)   (0.659) (0.828)   (0.685) (0.780) 
R2 within 0.0137 0.1127 0.1241 0.0160 0.0189 0.0321 0.0150 0.0314 0.0453 
F-statistic 5.3400 7.9423 15.8912 7.6475 9.2861 20.2366 15.0926 10.5889 16.5984 
p-value 0.0004 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Funds 705 705 705 705 705 705 705 705 705 
Observations 4358 4358 4358 4358 4358 4358 4358 4358 4358 
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Table F3.D. Results for the equity funds sample with           √      
 . The PPB is the benchmark. The panel 
observations have a yearly frequency. The results are obtained using Driscoll-Kraay standard errors and fund 
fixed effects. P-values are in parentheses (* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent  Sharpe   RFund-RPPB   M2  
Specification (2) (3) (4) (2) (3) (4) (2) (3) (4) 
Constant -0.0609 0.1162 0.1481 -0.2233 -0.1899 -0.0519 -0.4003* -0.0609 0.0232 
 
(0.837) (0.260) (0.193) (0.124) (0.585) (0.887) (0.054) (0.855) (0.950) 
          0.0248 0.0415 0.0031 0.0935 0.1347** 0.0346 0.1689** 0.1857** 0.1388 
 
(0.868) (0.477) (0.967) (0.110) (0.035) (0.685) (0.029) (0.036) (0.277) 
          -0.5782*** -0.6698***   -0.0127 -0.2276   -0.0898 -0.2558 
 
  (0.000) (0.000)   (0.852) (0.109)   (0.181) (0.110) 
          0.0524 0.0427   0.0379 0.0382   -0.1974*** -0.1751 
 
  (0.488) (0.611)   (0.528) (0.762)   (0.005) (0.284) 
          0.0076 0.0074 0.0347 -0.0005 0.0051 0.0544 0.0393* 0.0266 0.0335 
 
(0.760) (0.429) (0.129) (0.968) (0.672) (0.213) (0.053) (0.119) (0.465) 
           0.0111** 0.0025 0.0013 0.0106** 0.0087** 0.0060 -0.0039 -0.0023 -0.0031 
 
(0.030) (0.426) (0.662) (0.025) (0.046) (0.177) (0.477) (0.641) (0.511) 
              -0.0028 -0.0028 -0.0027 0.0181** 0.0184** 0.0179** 0.0209*** 0.0225*** 0.0221*** 
 
(0.589) (0.503) (0.513) (0.017) (0.021) (0.017) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
        0.1492 0.0580 -0.1895 0.2017 0.1322 -0.6446 0.4257* 0.2428 0.0950 
 (0.570) (0.532) (0.223) (0.361) (0.527) (0.138) (0.059) (0.220) (0.808) 
         -0.0106 0.0332 -0.0708 -0.1285 -0.1835 -0.9437** 0.1605 -0.0282 -0.2390 
 (0.961) (0.637) (0.618) (0.417) (0.231) (0.015) (0.256) (0.830) (0.528) 
          0.0206 0.0295 -0.1225 -0.0235 -0.0785 -0.5923** 0.1342 0.0275 -0.2823 
 (0.909) (0.684) (0.419) (0.824) (0.494) (0.030) (0.218) (0.799) (0.375) 
          -0.0026 0.0297 -0.0413 0.0328 -0.0086 -0.1066 0.1698** 0.0644 0.0225 
 (0.982) (0.479) (0.555) (0.665) (0.922) (0.478) (0.033) (0.270) (0.852) 
                     0.1792*    0.5762**    0.1087 
    (0.055)    (0.048)    (0.628) 
                      0.0624    0.4825**    0.1369 
    (0.473)    (0.018)    (0.501) 
                       0.0791    0.2663**    0.1684 
    (0.208)    (0.020)    (0.254) 
                       0.0339    0.0403    0.0183 
    (0.267)    (0.561)    (0.772) 
                       -0.0102    -0.0179    -0.0020 
    (0.212)    (0.315)    (0.910) 
                     0.0550*    0.1295*    0.0987 
    (0.085)    (0.051)    (0.202) 
                     0.0061    0.0009    -0.0120 
    (0.840)    (0.988)    (0.880) 
       -0.0353 -0.0371   0.0054 -0.0246   -0.1316 -0.1429 
   (0.652) (0.632)   (0.985) (0.932)   (0.625) (0.593) 
       0.0019 0.0118   -0.1485 -0.1213   -0.1014 -0.0953 
 
  (0.977) (0.865)   (0.149) (0.269)   (0.343) (0.402) 
R2 within 0.0098 0.5416 0.5438 0.0071 0.0098 0.0140 0.0247 0.0409 0.0427 
F-statistic 1.4524 34.4862 184.4151 1.9979 1.6484 21.3407 2.3349 20.3399 21.0985 
p-value 0.2191 0.0000 0.0000 0.0841 0.1344 0.0000 0.0463 0.0000 0.0000 
Funds 3571 3571 3571 3571 3571 3571 3571 3571 3571 
Observations 20985 20985 20985 20985 20985 20985 20985 20985 20985 
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Table F3.E. Results for the emerging equity funds sample with           √      
 . The PPB is the benchmark. 
The panel observations have a yearly frequency. The results are obtained using Driscoll-Kraay standard errors 
and fund fixed effects. P-values are in parentheses (* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent  Sharpe   RFund-RPPB   M2  
Specification (2) (3) (4) (2) (3) (4) (2) (3) (4) 
Constant -0.6202 -0.4492** -0.3854* -0.7275* -0.5964 -1.2181** -1.3945** -0.5974 -1.0065** 
 
(0.149) (0.046) (0.059) (0.075) (0.120) (0.022) (0.015) (0.111) (0.014) 
          0.1464 0.3463*** 0.3653** 0.2705 0.5353 0.5363 0.4275 0.6529* 0.5592 
 
(0.568) (0.005) (0.022) (0.159) (0.115) (0.214) (0.128) (0.068) (0.201) 
          -0.7948*** -0.9226***   -0.0524 -0.3848   -0.4371*** -0.7192** 
 
  (0.000) (0.000)   (0.463) (0.193)   (0.000) (0.029) 
          0.0662 0.2344**   0.3090 0.7191   -0.1526 0.1144 
 
  (0.313) (0.036)   (0.117) (0.120)   (0.476) (0.790) 
          0.0841** 0.0248** -0.0526 0.0543** 0.0507** 0.4959*** 0.1569*** 0.1266*** 0.4934*** 
 
(0.045) (0.042) (0.342) (0.021) (0.045) (0.000) (0.001) (0.003) (0.000) 
           0.0157*** 0.0008 0.0030 0.0061 -0.0004 -0.0169* 0.0107 0.0038 -0.0107 
 
(0.008) (0.741) (0.376) (0.279) (0.947) (0.059) (0.157) (0.590) (0.266) 
              -0.0058 0.0253** 0.0267** 0.0328 0.0373 0.0350 0.0438 0.0349 0.0382 
 
(0.595) (0.035) (0.037) (0.319) (0.281) (0.151) (0.193) (0.182) (0.111) 
        0.2209 0.7513*** 0.4293 0.3501 0.3900 1.4924** 0.5360 0.5304 1.2558** 
 (0.538) (0.000) (0.124) (0.605) (0.536) (0.013) (0.534) (0.411) (0.040) 
         -0.2779 0.5905*** -1.1666* -0.3970 -0.1276 -2.8207 0.1119 0.1384 -3.4175 
 (0.531) (0.002) (0.087) (0.501) (0.828) (0.233) (0.884) (0.829) (0.286) 
          -0.3639 0.3647* 0.3463 -0.4710 -0.4180 -0.3533 -0.4480 -0.5330 -1.3000** 
 (0.342) (0.073) (0.183) (0.295) (0.353) (0.674) (0.395) (0.156) (0.019) 
          -0.1573 0.1531 0.1525 -0.3650 -0.4458** -0.4678 -0.2037 -0.5245** -0.7231 
 (0.439) (0.484) (0.704) (0.101) (0.031) (0.442) (0.609) (0.014) (0.317) 
                     0.2986    -0.7168***    -0.2400 
    (0.232)    (0.007)    (0.255) 
                      1.3615**    2.4670    3.1497 
    (0.015)    (0.137)    (0.176) 
                       -0.0213    0.1933    0.6860** 
    (0.817)    (0.693)    (0.013) 
                       -0.0069    0.0537    0.1427 
    (0.965)    (0.891)    (0.756) 
                       0.0338    -0.1932***    -0.1577*** 
    (0.173)    (0.002)    (0.005) 
                     0.0861    0.2776    0.2266 
    (0.454)    (0.125)    (0.299) 
                     -0.1059    -0.2392    -0.1588 
    (0.204)    (0.221)    (0.402) 
                 
             
       0.0503 0.0517   -0.6013 -0.5208   -0.7002 -0.6007 
 
  (0.763) (0.773)   (0.161) (0.143)   (0.158) (0.184) 
R2 within 0.1275 0.7960 0.8069 0.0540 0.0909 0.1421 0.2205 0.2925 0.3311 
F-statistic 17.6804 377.4719 6521.2353 28.3139 317.6604 1699.4745 5.5521 39.8424 7245.6789 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0008 0.0000 0.0000 
Funds 183 183 183 183 183 183 183 183 183 
Observations 713 713 713 713 713 713 713 713 713 
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Table F3.F. Results for the international equity funds sample with          √      
 .  The PPB is the 
benchmark. The panel observations have a yearly frequency. The results are obtained using Driscoll-Kraay 
standard errors and fund fixed effects. P-values are in parentheses (* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent  Sharpe   RFund-RPPB   M2  
Specification (2) (3) (4) (2) (3) (4) (2) (3) (4) 
Constant -0.2374 0.0467 0.0625 -0.5385** -0.5800* -0.4046 -0.5895** -0.0793 -0.0091 
 
(0.382) (0.656) (0.649) (0.015) (0.088) (0.233) (0.015) (0.800) (0.976) 
          0.0415 0.0809 0.0658 0.1115 0.1540* 0.0830 0.1498 0.1854* 0.1774 
 
(0.717) (0.174) (0.443) (0.244) (0.079) (0.461) (0.110) (0.053) (0.173) 
          -0.4428*** -0.5081***   -0.1116 -0.3792*   -0.2519** -0.4381** 
 
  (0.000) (0.000)   (0.435) (0.092)   (0.024) (0.011) 
          0.1181* 0.1308   0.0304 0.0686   -0.2267*** -0.1223 
 
  (0.078) (0.131)   (0.711) (0.448)   (0.009) (0.338) 
          0.0094 0.0175* 0.0506 0.0212 0.0325** 0.1062 0.0653** 0.0509*** 0.0907* 
 
(0.654) (0.070) (0.192) (0.308) (0.023) (0.121) (0.016) (0.002) (0.062) 
           0.0088 -0.0017 -0.0042 0.0299* 0.0233* 0.0162 -0.0007 0.0011 -0.0029 
 
(0.323) (0.736) (0.424) (0.050) (0.075) (0.274) (0.963) (0.929) (0.820) 
              0.0165* 0.0056 0.0051 0.0326*** 0.0255** 0.0216** 0.0365*** 0.0264** 0.0236** 
 
(0.061) (0.192) (0.250) (0.005) (0.032) (0.042) (0.005) (0.026) (0.025) 
        0.1269 0.0273 -0.2576 0.0106 -0.0453 -0.7039 0.3049 0.1191 -0.0594 
 (0.550) (0.755) (0.331) (0.970) (0.881) (0.299) (0.230) (0.634) (0.936) 
         0.0219 0.0314 -0.1454 -0.1670 -0.2305 -1.2470** 0.1042 -0.0895 -0.8251* 
 (0.894) (0.643) (0.407) (0.422) (0.311) (0.016) (0.490) (0.575) (0.060) 
          0.0544 0.0261 -0.0210 0.0313 -0.0521 -0.2241 0.2039 0.0785 0.1402 
 (0.726) (0.720) (0.918) (0.846) (0.761) (0.563) (0.112) (0.516) (0.741) 
          0.0210 0.0126 0.0291 0.0674 -0.0086 -0.0030 0.2142* 0.0774 0.1319 
 (0.832) (0.765) (0.764) (0.604) (0.950) (0.989) (0.066) (0.377) (0.508) 
                     0.2056    0.4908    0.1355 
    (0.201)    (0.235)    (0.763) 
                      0.1069    0.6490**    0.4765** 
    (0.305)    (0.025)    (0.046) 
                       0.0161    0.0648    -0.0546 
    (0.863)    (0.718)    (0.785) 
                       -0.0136    -0.0165    -0.0359 
    (0.762)    (0.881)    (0.685) 
                       -0.0129    -0.0283    -0.0160 
    (0.353)    (0.273)    (0.399) 
                     0.0395    0.1584*    0.1112 
    (0.248)    (0.074)    (0.210) 
                     -0.0058    -0.0192    -0.0558 
    (0.865)    (0.763)    (0.515) 
       -0.0983 -0.1131   0.2512 0.1692   -0.1286 -0.1920 
   (0.293) (0.215)   (0.362) (0.516)   (0.617) (0.429) 
       -0.1069 -0.0992   -0.2523* -0.2283*   -0.1808** -0.1700* 
 
  (0.169) (0.220)   (0.051) (0.087)   (0.047) (0.068) 
R2 within 0.0144 0.4816 0.4838 0.0198 0.0334 0.0395 0.0416 0.0711 0.0760 
F-statistic 5.5199 30.3687 104.8222 3.0363 4.3208 57.8209 2.9754 3.4857 26.9250 
p-value 0.0003 0.0000 0.0000 0.0137 0.0007 0.0000 0.0152 0.0032 0.0000 
Funds 1892 1892 1892 1892 1892 1892 1892 1892 1892 
Observations 11574 11574 11574 11574 11574 11574 11574 11574 11574 
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Table F3.G. Results for the UK equity funds sample with           √      
 . The PPB is the benchmark. The 
panel observations have a yearly frequency. The results are obtained using Driscoll-Kraay standard errors and 
fund fixed effects. P-values are in parentheses (* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent  Sharpe   RFund-RPPB   M2  
Specification (2) (3) (4) (2) (3) (4) (2) (3) (4) 
Constant 0.1768 0.1650 0.1678 0.0027 0.2816 0.4780 -0.1808 0.1132 0.3742 
 
(0.615) (0.238) (0.207) (0.991) (0.558) (0.349) (0.498) (0.797) (0.427) 
          0.0184 -0.0130 -0.0491 0.1190 0.1297 0.0302 0.2154** 0.2074 0.1337 
 
(0.928) (0.842) (0.460) (0.176) (0.243) (0.833) (0.047) (0.137) (0.447) 
          -0.7351*** -0.7478***   0.1309* -0.0132   0.1489 -0.0117 
 
  (0.000) (0.000)   (0.081) (0.905)   (0.284) (0.954) 
          -0.0252 -0.0146   0.0287 -0.0585   -0.1670 -0.2923 
 
  (0.777) (0.878)   (0.779) (0.781)   (0.136) (0.143) 
          0.0001 -0.0083 0.0153 -0.0483*** -0.0487*** -0.0967* -0.0091 -0.0230 -0.1405** 
 
(0.998) (0.514) (0.602) (0.000) (0.003) (0.086) (0.570) (0.273) (0.044) 
           0.0204*** 0.0084* 0.0072 0.0127** 0.0148** 0.0158** -0.0035 0.0041 0.0084 
 
(0.004) (0.074) (0.129) (0.046) (0.032) (0.037) (0.611) (0.545) (0.248) 
              -0.0222 -0.0150** -0.0140** 0.0070 0.0021 0.0037 0.0093 0.0063 0.0058 
 
(0.113) (0.018) (0.024) (0.493) (0.827) (0.696) (0.291) (0.331) (0.393) 
        0.0799 0.1009 0.0027 0.3724 0.2373 -0.4654 0.4921* 0.3501 0.3725 
 (0.813) (0.502) (0.986) (0.195) (0.342) (0.339) (0.081) (0.153) (0.374) 
         -0.1235 0.0324 0.0661 -0.0681 -0.1515 -0.0702 0.1800 0.0108 0.6996 
 (0.662) (0.779) (0.760) (0.747) (0.383) (0.863) (0.376) (0.955) (0.157) 
          -0.0899 0.0233 -0.2893** -0.1055 -0.1205 -0.8066*** -0.0140 -0.0815 -0.6678** 
 (0.671) (0.801) (0.024) (0.306) (0.423) (0.001) (0.921) (0.631) (0.025) 
          -0.0650 0.0661 -0.1211 -0.0204 -0.0231 -0.0913 0.0965 0.0196 -0.0156 
 (0.626) (0.257) (0.162) (0.746) (0.709) (0.589) (0.162) (0.768) (0.928) 
                     0.0777    0.5084    -0.0241 
    (0.481)    (0.204)    (0.941) 
                      -0.0166    -0.0532    -0.4255 
    (0.884)    (0.846)    (0.186) 
                       0.1782***    0.3882***    0.3547** 
    (0.001)    (0.002)    (0.011) 
                       0.1005**    0.0318    0.0231 
    (0.024)    (0.763)    (0.836) 
                       -0.0079    0.0217    0.0486** 
    (0.356)    (0.288)    (0.045) 
                     0.0070    0.0833    0.0892 
    (0.866)    (0.149)    (0.203) 
                     -0.0069    0.0497    0.0700 
    (0.896)    (0.554)    (0.306) 
       0.0831 0.0908   -0.3162 -0.3138   -0.2121 -0.2106 
   (0.384) (0.353)   (0.417) (0.415)   (0.561) (0.559) 
       0.2151** 0.2259**   0.0272 0.0203   0.0221 -0.0059 
 
  (0.025) (0.018)   (0.884) (0.919)   (0.903) (0.975) 
R2 within 0.0217 0.6377 0.6399 0.0115 0.0185 0.0217 0.0099 0.0462 0.0524 
F-statistic 3.4711 71.3749 198.4291 13.4490 23.6947 33.3012 2.9421 14.8333 31.4113 
p-value 0.0067 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0161 0.0000 0.0000 
Funds 1496 1496 1496 1496 1496 1496 1496 1496 1496 
Observations 8698 8698 8698 8698 8698 8698 8698 8698 8698 
          
205 
 
 
Table F4.A. Results for the all-funds sample with operational year dummies. The PPB is the benchmark. The 
panel observations have a yearly frequency. The results are obtained using Driscoll-Kraay standard errors and 
fund fixed effects. P-values are in parentheses (* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01).  
 
Dependent Sharpe RFund-RPPB M2 
Specification (2) (3) (2) (3) (2) (3) 
Constant -0.0480 0.1190 0.0105 0.1233 -0.0404 0.2403 
 
(0.680) (0.295) (0.889) (0.710) (0.710) (0.342) 
          -0.5206***   0.0621   -0.0354 
 
  (0.000)   (0.153)   (0.545) 
          0.0757   0.0629   -0.1401** 
 
  (0.279)   (0.311)   (0.028) 
          0.0086 0.0193 0.0086 0.0182 0.0409* 0.0339 
 
(0.749) (0.272) (0.597) (0.349) (0.077) (0.136) 
           0.0051 -0.0003 0.0050 0.0039 -0.0009 -0.0002 
 
(0.134) (0.910) (0.107) (0.203) (0.794) (0.959) 
              -0.0009 -0.0005 0.0093*** 0.0089** 0.0129** 0.0133** 
 
(0.809) (0.864) (0.009) (0.016) (0.040) (0.044) 
        0.0088 -0.0548 0.0670 -0.0251 0.1732 0.0433 
 
(0.939) (0.526) (0.686) (0.865) (0.271) (0.775) 
         -0.0504 -0.0048 -0.2013 -0.2645* -0.0184 -0.1463 
 (0.646) (0.941) (0.242) (0.062) (0.868) (0.229) 
          -0.0048 0.0104 -0.0433 -0.0868 0.0428 -0.0257 
 (0.952) (0.841) (0.522) (0.273) (0.519) (0.739) 
          -0.0170 0.0249 0.0047 -0.0251 0.0821 0.0174 
 (0.830) (0.481) (0.929) (0.690) (0.163) (0.734) 
       -0.0567   -0.0635   -0.1052 
   (0.426)   (0.824)   (0.587) 
       -0.0306   -0.1099   -0.0662 
   (0.657)   (0.261)   (0.495) 
      -0.0538 -0.0443 -0.1387 -0.1648* -0.1128 -0.1257 
 (0.521) (0.413) (0.110) (0.092) (0.156) (0.134) 
      0.0302 -0.0008 0.0644 0.0426 -0.0308 -0.0470 
 (0.707) (0.984) (0.104) (0.345) (0.437) (0.368) 
      0.0530 0.0617 0.0593 0.0417 0.0107 -0.0207 
 (0.339) (0.125) (0.109) (0.318) (0.756) (0.628) 
      0.1339 0.0854* 0.1341** 0.1182* 0.0901* 0.0595 
 (0.180) (0.062) (0.032) (0.081) (0.058) (0.276) 
      0.0423 0.0099 0.0536 0.0316 -0.0121 -0.0335 
 (0.419) (0.747) (0.151) (0.485) (0.754) (0.453) 
      0.0142 0.0124 0.0682* 0.0451 0.0185 -0.0131 
 (0.743) (0.660) (0.081) (0.309) (0.643) (0.770) 
      0.0354 0.0093 0.0787*** 0.0537 0.0623 0.0305 
 (0.476) (0.791) (0.005) (0.126) (0.104) (0.427) 
      -0.0208 0.0087 -0.0031 -0.0286 0.0465 0.0070 
 (0.736) (0.798) (0.960) (0.680) (0.396) (0.909) 
      0.0825 0.0588** 0.0523 0.0295 0.0936** 0.0543 
 (0.172) (0.038) (0.141) (0.533) (0.029) (0.232) 
       0.0700 0.0426 0.0461 0.0250 0.0926** 0.0644 
 
(0.222) (0.176) (0.235) (0.590) (0.016) (0.104) 
R2 within 0.0192 0.4011 0.0102 0.0120 0.0185 0.0262 
F-statistic 8.7318 1206.4241 3.3089 5.3366 8.4361 22.9550 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0025 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Funds 4897 4897 4897 4897 4897 4897 
Observations 28408 28408 28408 28408 28408 28408 
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Table F4.B. Results for the allocation funds sample with operational year dummies. The PPB is the benchmark. 
The panel observations have a yearly frequency. The results are obtained using Driscoll-Kraay standard errors 
and fund fixed effects. P-values are in parentheses (* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01).  
 
Dependent Sharpe RFund-RPPB M2 
Specification (2) (3) (2) (3) (2) (3) 
Constant -0.2054 -0.1389 0.0207 -0.9257** -0.0119 -0.4962 
 
(0.507) (0.555) (0.940) (0.024) (0.953) (0.184) 
          -0.6439***   0.3674***   -0.0436 
 
  (0.000)   (0.001)   (0.719) 
          -0.0277   0.3157   -0.1005 
 
  (0.805)   (0.123)   (0.511) 
          0.0389 0.0339 0.0557* 0.0969 0.0902** 0.0711 
 
(0.372) (0.237) (0.054) (0.133) (0.010) (0.115) 
           0.0082 -0.0084 -0.0362*** -0.0440 -0.0288 -0.0166 
 
(0.568) (0.503) (0.009) (0.116) (0.109) (0.396) 
              0.0073 0.0175* 0.0104 0.0197 0.0178 0.0093 
 
(0.619) (0.094) (0.703) (0.578) (0.459) (0.717) 
        0.0912 0.1065 -0.3706** -0.2638 0.2126 0.3434 
 
(0.626) (0.301) (0.035) (0.271) (0.333) (0.194) 
         -0.0285 0.0965 -0.5814** -0.4539* -0.0826 0.0636 
 (0.854) (0.418) (0.040) (0.087) (0.605) (0.751) 
          0.0410 0.0944 -0.0410 0.0216 0.2457* 0.2851** 
 (0.626) (0.160) (0.836) (0.905) (0.070) (0.036) 
          0.0458 0.0561 -0.0942 0.0566 0.1798 0.2010 
 (0.724) (0.347) (0.510) (0.726) (0.220) (0.143) 
       -0.0099   0.4747   0.4116 
   (0.955)   (0.200)   (0.169) 
       0.1226   -0.0320   0.1770 
   (0.234)   (0.891)   (0.422) 
      0.0786 0.1219 0.0734 0.1297 -0.0697 -0.0181 
 (0.515) (0.240) (0.585) (0.489) (0.672) (0.929) 
      0.0042 0.0478 0.2745 0.3393* -0.0809 -0.0383 
 (0.979) (0.545) (0.158) (0.086) (0.669) (0.850) 
      -0.0005 0.0800 0.1757 0.2544 -0.0778 -0.0457 
 (0.997) (0.267) (0.270) (0.158) (0.636) (0.800) 
      0.1556 0.1726** 0.2858* 0.3874** 0.0895 0.1250 
 (0.329) (0.035) (0.052) (0.020) (0.570) (0.477) 
      0.0893 0.0966 0.2079 0.2798* 0.0606 0.1031 
 (0.595) (0.223) (0.184) (0.074) (0.720) (0.537) 
      -0.0141 0.0570 0.2560 0.3189** 0.0077 0.0444 
 (0.816) (0.264) (0.109) (0.048) (0.950) (0.692) 
      0.0028 0.0191 0.1799 0.2596 0.0424 0.0794 
 (0.977) (0.748) (0.260) (0.126) (0.809) (0.657) 
      -0.0691 0.0061 -0.1325 -0.0881 -0.1636 -0.1329 
 (0.394) (0.900) (0.329) (0.496) (0.125) (0.234) 
      -0.0640 0.0480 0.0473 0.0972 -0.0150 0.0051 
 (0.329) (0.267) (0.609) (0.263) (0.787) (0.947) 
       0.0778 0.0636 -0.0442 0.0536 -0.0567 -0.0444 
 
(0.408) (0.139) (0.426) (0.458) (0.441) (0.615) 
R2 within 0.0449 0.5134 0.0334 0.0665 0.0511 0.0551 
F-statistic 234.7883 662.3679 115.7904 91.9362 150.2226 6582.4553 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Funds 320 320 320 320 320 320 
Observations 1572 1572 1572 1572 1572 1572 
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Table F4.C. Results for the fixed income funds sample with operational year dummies. The PPB is the 
benchmark. The panel observations have a yearly frequency. The results are obtained using Driscoll-Kraay 
standard errors and fund fixed effects. P-values are in parentheses (* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01).  
 
Dependent Sharpe RFund-RPPB M2 
Specification (2) (3) (2) (3) (2) (3) 
Constant -0.1446 -0.0105 -0.1616 0.0166 -0.0280 0.0690 
 
(0.134) (0.965) (0.394) (0.969) (0.839) (0.751) 
          -0.2566**   0.0902   0.1835*** 
 
  (0.023)   (0.421)   (0.003) 
          0.1327   -0.0337   -0.0829* 
 
  (0.235)   (0.555)   (0.058) 
          0.0266 0.0556** 0.0522 0.0510 0.0379 0.0299 
 
(0.179) (0.021) (0.110) (0.113) (0.152) (0.229) 
           0.0036 0.0020 0.0029 0.0024 0.0001 -0.0001 
 
(0.145) (0.433) (0.648) (0.708) (0.985) (0.981) 
              0.0010 -0.0096 0.0311* 0.0260 0.0166* 0.0138 
 
(0.940) (0.299) (0.060) (0.143) (0.084) (0.224) 
        -0.1608 -0.1591 0.1977 0.0853 0.1532 0.0448 
 
(0.214) (0.380) (0.343) (0.702) (0.345) (0.812) 
         -0.0338 -0.0300 0.0053 -0.0796 0.0137 -0.0616 
 (0.765) (0.818) (0.988) (0.768) (0.916) (0.664) 
          -0.0174 -0.0338 0.1667 0.1062 0.1501* 0.0909 
 (0.817) (0.749) (0.115) (0.382) (0.079) (0.387) 
          -0.0000 0.0156 0.1327* 0.0778 0.1408** 0.0679 
 (1.000) (0.819) (0.092) (0.114) (0.030) (0.202) 
       -0.0668   -0.0448   0.0540 
   (0.582)   (0.895)   (0.702) 
       -0.1520   -0.1017   -0.0994 
   (0.311)   (0.265)   (0.277) 
      -0.0227 -0.0442 0.1222 0.1196 0.1140 0.1257 
 (0.835) (0.726) (0.411) (0.418) (0.339) (0.299) 
      0.0418 0.0065 0.0225 0.0224 0.0549 0.0716 
 (0.557) (0.940) (0.705) (0.661) (0.320) (0.186) 
      0.0835 0.0982 0.1018 0.0838 0.1037 0.0840 
 (0.188) (0.128) (0.449) (0.514) (0.277) (0.406) 
      0.1096 0.0947 0.2379 0.2225 0.2073* 0.1982* 
 (0.230) (0.216) (0.148) (0.167) (0.069) (0.088) 
      -0.0071 -0.0177 0.0539 0.0352 0.0388 0.0220 
 (0.908) (0.781) (0.516) (0.664) (0.623) (0.790) 
      -0.0475 -0.0384 -0.0290 -0.0612 0.0145 -0.0273 
 (0.525) (0.625) (0.739) (0.406) (0.844) (0.707) 
      -0.0063 0.0041 0.0803 0.0448 0.0809 0.0332 
 (0.947) (0.967) (0.496) (0.657) (0.412) (0.712) 
      -0.0608 -0.0295 0.0425 0.0001 0.0806 0.0159 
 (0.481) (0.695) (0.722) (0.999) (0.407) (0.877) 
      0.0886 0.0979 0.1119 0.0711 0.1083 0.0514 
 (0.268) (0.179) (0.222) (0.348) (0.232) (0.516) 
       0.0709 0.0782 0.0421 0.0099 0.1033 0.0571 
 
(0.517) (0.472) (0.702) (0.917) (0.217) (0.424) 
R2 within 0.0269 0.1273 0.0189 0.0217 0.0167 0.0315 
F-statistic 21.5094 24.3609 25.1748 36.5129 15.7865 22.9235 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Funds 705 705 705 705 705 705 
Observations 4358 4358 4358 4358 4358 4358 
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Table F4.D. Results for the equity funds sample with operational year dummies. The PPB is the benchmark. The 
panel observations have a yearly frequency. The results are obtained using Driscoll-Kraay standard errors and 
fund fixed effects. P-values are in parentheses (* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01).  
 
Dependent Sharpe RFund-RPPB M2 
Specification (2) (3) (2) (3) (2) (3) 
Constant -0.0005 0.1481 -0.0204 0.0186 -0.0987 0.1797 
 
(0.997) (0.174) (0.796) (0.959) (0.307) (0.587) 
          -0.5702***   0.0019   -0.0839 
 
  (0.000)   (0.976)   (0.221) 
          0.0597   0.0452   -0.1945*** 
 
  (0.417)   (0.448)   (0.007) 
          0.0053 0.0106 0.0015 0.0110 0.0473** 0.0352* 
 
(0.840) (0.370) (0.912) (0.378) (0.024) (0.051) 
           0.0093* 0.0015 0.0075* 0.0056 -0.0056 -0.0034 
 
(0.094) (0.622) (0.081) (0.157) (0.297) (0.486) 
              -0.0049 -0.0035 0.0140** 0.0149** 0.0197*** 0.0220*** 
 
(0.420) (0.389) (0.033) (0.040) (0.002) (0.002) 
        0.0405 -0.0263 0.0430 -0.0165 0.2014 0.0862 
 
(0.762) (0.740) (0.827) (0.932) (0.321) (0.628) 
         -0.0879 -0.0236 -0.2620* -0.3013* -0.0237 -0.1496 
 (0.482) (0.705) (0.092) (0.051) (0.849) (0.252) 
          -0.0413 -0.0114 -0.1258 -0.1648 -0.0040 -0.0651 
 (0.685) (0.850) (0.177) (0.143) (0.962) (0.504) 
          -0.0523 0.0029 -0.0248 -0.0521 0.0897 0.0167 
 (0.540) (0.933) (0.693) (0.527) (0.130) (0.757) 
       -0.0250   0.0325   -0.0910 
   (0.728)   (0.912)   (0.730) 
       0.0148   -0.1159   -0.0475 
   (0.818)   (0.289)   (0.644) 
      -0.0536 -0.0229 -0.1591* -0.1820** -0.1250 -0.1252 
 (0.513) (0.636) (0.059) (0.045) (0.103) (0.133) 
      0.0291 0.0058 0.0482 0.0249 -0.0472 -0.0606 
 (0.726) (0.884) (0.309) (0.685) (0.325) (0.341) 
      0.0544 0.0633 0.0512 0.0331 0.0141 -0.0173 
 (0.303) (0.107) (0.209) (0.541) (0.709) (0.729) 
      0.1310 0.0742** 0.0995** 0.0779 0.0640* 0.0308 
 (0.172) (0.033) (0.050) (0.213) (0.073) (0.562) 
      0.0507 0.0170 0.0401 0.0137 -0.0234 -0.0397 
 (0.317) (0.520) (0.413) (0.822) (0.571) (0.463) 
      0.0265 0.0223 0.0576 0.0314 0.0224 -0.0050 
 (0.596) (0.448) (0.193) (0.568) (0.655) (0.928) 
      0.0536 0.0198 0.0928** 0.0619 0.0841** 0.0551 
 (0.282) (0.469) (0.018) (0.222) (0.044) (0.253) 
      -0.0153 0.0225 0.0066 -0.0212 0.0616 0.0247 
 (0.826) (0.452) (0.915) (0.762) (0.248) (0.682) 
      0.0898 0.0512* 0.0473 0.0173 0.1060** 0.0632 
 (0.198) (0.065) (0.180) (0.751) (0.018) (0.231) 
       0.0770 0.0449* 0.0473 0.0191 0.1079** 0.0823* 
 
(0.230) (0.061) (0.222) (0.698) (0.016) (0.084) 
R2 within 0.0238 0.5440 0.0127 0.0145 0.0283 0.0422 
F-statistic 9.5007 222.8151 7.1091 17.5993 5.0447 104.4478 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 
Funds 3571 3571 3571 3571 3571 3571 
Observations 20985 20985 20985 20985 20985 20985 
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Table F4.E. Results for the emerging equity funds sample with operational year dummies. The PPB is the 
benchmark. The panel observations have a yearly frequency. The results are obtained using Driscoll-Kraay 
standard errors and fund fixed effects. P-values are in parentheses (* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01).  
 
Dependent Sharpe RFund-RPPB M2 
Specification (2) (3) (2) (3) (2) (3) 
Constant -0.1375 0.0366 -0.1425 0.1919 -0.6897*** 0.2804 
 
(0.588) (0.821) (0.526) (0.412) (0.002) (0.381) 
          -0.7923***   -0.0204   -0.3976*** 
 
  (0.000)   (0.795)   (0.000) 
          0.0598   0.3324*   -0.1077 
 
  (0.416)   (0.062)   (0.569) 
          0.0792** 0.0442*** 0.0596*** 0.0756** 0.1547*** 0.1510*** 
 
(0.022) (0.001) (0.002) (0.018) (0.001) (0.001) 
           0.0145*** 0.0019 0.0060 -0.0004 0.0059 0.0010 
 
(0.001) (0.446) (0.384) (0.957) (0.423) (0.897) 
              -0.0109 0.0301** 0.0271 0.0351 0.0420 0.0417 
 
(0.276) (0.014) (0.267) (0.247) (0.115) (0.101) 
        0.2864 0.5261*** 0.2360 0.0990 0.5025 0.3659 
 
(0.230) (0.004) (0.729) (0.864) (0.524) (0.573) 
         -0.2680 0.4034** -0.6066 -0.5026 -0.1719 -0.1551 
 (0.332) (0.017) (0.219) (0.284) (0.784) (0.789) 
          -0.2905 0.2135 -0.5943 -0.6609* -0.6520 -0.7219** 
 (0.251) (0.245) (0.155) (0.075) (0.122) (0.034) 
          -0.1208 0.0777 -0.4121** -0.5463*** -0.3852 -0.6731*** 
 (0.426) (0.697) (0.046) (0.010) (0.216) (0.001) 
              
          
       0.1114   -0.5190   -0.5862 
   (0.450)   (0.119)   (0.149) 
      -0.3466** -0.2364*** -0.3883* -0.4690* -0.3445 -0.4922* 
 (0.041) (0.002) (0.060) (0.082) (0.233) (0.068) 
      -0.2500** -0.2122*** -0.2536** -0.2801** -0.0571 -0.2413* 
 (0.043) (0.003) (0.019) (0.028) (0.515) (0.061) 
      -0.1807 -0.1413** -0.0960 -0.0805 0.2187** -0.0008 
 (0.303) (0.011) (0.443) (0.601) (0.017) (0.995) 
      -0.1563 -0.1743** -0.1381 -0.1566 0.1736 -0.0967 
 (0.461) (0.015) (0.336) (0.380) (0.214) (0.589) 
      -0.2117*** -0.1095* -0.0920 -0.0784 0.1194 -0.0476 
 (0.008) (0.081) (0.541) (0.562) (0.343) (0.675) 
      -0.3838*** -0.0466 -0.0912 0.0222 0.2313** 0.1255 
 (0.000) (0.433) (0.535) (0.901) (0.036) (0.410) 
      0.0259 0.0513 0.0165 0.0635 0.3493*** 0.0964 
 (0.806) (0.412) (0.914) (0.689) (0.001) (0.491) 
      -0.2527*** -0.1105 -0.3428** -0.2948* 0.3197** 0.1484 
 (0.007) (0.215) (0.045) (0.059) (0.046) (0.357) 
      -0.1575 -0.0392 -0.1091 -0.0094 0.1265 0.0292 
 (0.163) (0.618) (0.510) (0.939) (0.303) (0.810) 
       -0.1209 0.0506 -0.1848 -0.0787 0.3480* 0.3322 
 
(0.269) (0.636) (0.172) (0.583) (0.053) (0.107) 
R2 within 0.1603 0.7964 0.0645 0.0996 0.2523 0.3056 
F-statistic 290.7758 70526.4848 3706.7113 43608.8637 207.8647 976.8938 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Funds 183 183 183 183 183 183 
Observations 713 713 713 713 713 713 
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Table F4.F. Results for the international equity funds sample with operational year dummies. The PPB is the 
benchmark. The panel observations have a yearly frequency. The results are obtained using Driscoll-Kraay 
standard errors and fund fixed effects. P-values are in parentheses (* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01).  
 
Dependent Sharpe RFund-RPPB M2 
Specification (2) (3) (2) (3) (2) (3) 
Constant -0.1412 0.1534 -0.2914*** -0.3671 -0.2922*** 0.1470 
 
(0.345) (0.279) (0.007) (0.338) (0.003) (0.679) 
          -0.4349***   -0.0989   -0.2432** 
 
  (0.000)   (0.474)   (0.026) 
          0.1235*   0.0354   -0.2209*** 
 
  (0.065)   (0.659)   (0.009) 
          0.0104 0.0244** 0.0226 0.0390*** 0.0692** 0.0589*** 
 
(0.646) (0.025) (0.348) (0.006) (0.021) (0.001) 
           0.0056 -0.0048 0.0266* 0.0195 -0.0025 -0.0001 
 
(0.588) (0.349) (0.095) (0.133) (0.871) (0.995) 
              0.0126* 0.0051 0.0230** 0.0210* 0.0293** 0.0245** 
 
(0.087) (0.185) (0.031) (0.067) (0.020) (0.038) 
        0.0024 -0.0947 -0.1961 -0.2294 0.0756 -0.0648 
 
(0.983) (0.299) (0.394) (0.424) (0.737) (0.783) 
         -0.0757 -0.0567 -0.3540** -0.3811* -0.1002 -0.2387 
 (0.383) (0.421) (0.045) (0.083) (0.399) (0.128) 
          -0.0208 -0.0336 -0.1261 -0.1696 0.0346 -0.0394 
 (0.810) (0.610) (0.307) (0.274) (0.712) (0.721) 
          -0.0353 -0.0240 -0.0228 -0.0636 0.1079 0.0157 
 (0.604) (0.512) (0.817) (0.605) (0.195) (0.848) 
       -0.0836   0.2816   -0.0935 
   (0.310)   (0.287)   (0.704) 
       -0.0906   -0.1986   -0.1125 
   (0.232)   (0.160)   (0.213) 
      -0.0511 -0.0532 -0.0998 -0.1149 -0.0799 -0.0753 
 (0.445) (0.267) (0.393) (0.292) (0.439) (0.470) 
      0.0319 -0.0048 0.0507 0.0264 -0.0210 -0.0421 
 (0.650) (0.920) (0.485) (0.763) (0.733) (0.605) 
      0.0647 0.0518 0.0503 0.0269 0.0282 -0.0032 
 (0.246) (0.282) (0.518) (0.763) (0.581) (0.967) 
      0.1237 0.0515 0.1450 0.1012 0.1281** 0.0736 
 (0.137) (0.265) (0.116) (0.313) (0.044) (0.384) 
      0.0644 0.0110 0.1073 0.0594 0.0390 0.0107 
 (0.275) (0.784) (0.198) (0.549) (0.561) (0.903) 
      0.0416 0.0095 0.0995 0.0493 0.0684 0.0298 
 (0.484) (0.805) (0.158) (0.541) (0.315) (0.700) 
      0.0497 0.0103 0.2072*** 0.1476** 0.1663*** 0.1109 
 (0.384) (0.773) (0.001) (0.043) (0.006) (0.137) 
      0.0013 0.0140 0.1168* 0.0679 0.1532** 0.0972 
 (0.985) (0.729) (0.095) (0.404) (0.020) (0.197) 
      0.0701 0.0399 0.1056* 0.0449 0.1594*** 0.0794 
 (0.322) (0.312) (0.054) (0.527) (0.007) (0.259) 
       0.1011* 0.0531* 0.1428** 0.0840 0.1949** 0.1276** 
 
(0.080) (0.099) (0.021) (0.222) (0.014) (0.033) 
R2 within 0.0285 0.4834 0.0260 0.0363 0.0491 0.0727 
F-statistic 15.0885 36.4570 6.8294 36.3897 10.5481 46.0281 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Funds 1892 1892 1892 1892 1892 1892 
Observations 11574 11574 11574 11574 11574 11574 
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Table F4.G. Results for the UK funds sample with operational year dummies. The PPB is the benchmark. The 
panel observations have a yearly frequency. The results are obtained using Driscoll-Kraay standard errors and 
fund fixed effects. P-values are in parentheses (* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01).  
 
Dependent Sharpe RFund-RPPB M2 
Specification (2) (3) (2) (3) (2) (3) 
Constant 0.2219** 0.1124 0.2734* 0.5505 0.2145 0.4670 
 
(0.022) (0.393) (0.086) (0.244) (0.204) (0.288) 
          -0.7271***   0.1467*   0.1490 
 
  (0.000)   (0.083)   (0.313) 
          -0.0140   0.0424   -0.1692 
 
  (0.868)   (0.671)   (0.125) 
          -0.0034 -0.0095 -0.0394*** -0.0392*** 0.0063 -0.0121 
 
(0.922) (0.539) (0.000) (0.006) (0.635) (0.515) 
           0.0187** 0.0075 0.0082 0.0100 -0.0056 0.0027 
 
(0.013) (0.123) (0.211) (0.132) (0.403) (0.684) 
              -0.0214 -0.0149** 0.0057 0.0004 0.0116 0.0079 
 
(0.128) (0.015) (0.560) (0.960) (0.200) (0.202) 
        0.0009 0.0874 0.2442 0.1194 0.3068 0.2272 
 
(0.996) (0.493) (0.320) (0.586) (0.210) (0.311) 
         -0.1604 0.0356 -0.1389 -0.2146 0.0573 -0.0633 
 (0.321) (0.726) (0.462) (0.178) (0.736) (0.726) 
          -0.1228 0.0195 -0.1478* -0.1636 -0.0932 -0.1370 
 (0.294) (0.798) (0.067) (0.220) (0.350) (0.351) 
          -0.0993 0.0584 -0.0509 -0.0545 0.0535 -0.0102 
 (0.352) (0.253) (0.372) (0.311) (0.419) (0.863) 
       0.0916   -0.2997   -0.1822 
   (0.339)   (0.434)   (0.607) 
       0.2148**   0.0276   0.0498 
   (0.023)   (0.883)   (0.780) 
      -0.0565 0.0057 -0.2493*** -0.2714*** -0.1925** -0.2011* 
 (0.592) (0.923) (0.008) (0.010) (0.025) (0.064) 
      -0.0009 0.0040 -0.0008 -0.0055 -0.1440* -0.1441 
 (0.993) (0.924) (0.992) (0.953) (0.076) (0.182) 
      0.0104 0.0621 -0.0013 -0.0104 -0.0798 -0.1160 
 (0.876) (0.134) (0.983) (0.892) (0.197) (0.127) 
      0.1101 0.0910** 0.0065 0.0093 -0.0727 -0.0862 
 (0.332) (0.027) (0.924) (0.915) (0.269) (0.321) 
      0.0100 0.0060 -0.0787 -0.0787 -0.1526** -0.1519* 
 (0.870) (0.854) (0.200) (0.296) (0.030) (0.078) 
      -0.0075 0.0204 -0.0306 -0.0336 -0.0934 -0.1064 
 (0.877) (0.560) (0.610) (0.663) (0.133) (0.163) 
      0.0106 0.0038 -0.0869 -0.0846 -0.0757 -0.0637 
 (0.820) (0.922) (0.109) (0.275) (0.322) (0.443) 
      -0.0645 0.0315 -0.1553 -0.1662 -0.1074 -0.1293 
 (0.441) (0.459) (0.101) (0.140) (0.207) (0.197) 
      0.0913 0.0582* -0.0541 -0.0389 0.0064 0.0236 
 (0.203) (0.058) (0.241) (0.625) (0.930) (0.794) 
       0.0143 0.0380 -0.1030 -0.1034 -0.0561 -0.0409 
 
(0.843) (0.267) (0.128) (0.244) (0.442) (0.642) 
R2 within 0.0341 0.6408 0.0207 0.0285 0.0106 0.0475 
F-statistic 38.4544 2200.1798 108.1899 160.3790 9.4423 72.0941 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Funds 1496 1496 1496 1496 1496 1496 
Observations 8698 8698 8698 8698 8698 8698 
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G.  Regression results for specification (1) in the restricted samples (Chapter 3) 
 
The estimated constant coefficient for specification (1) under the restriction that fund’s age is up to 5 years, 
sorted by sample and performance measure. The R
2
-within is in all cases 0 and the F-test for the significance of 
the regression is not applicable. The benchmark is the PPB and the panel has the yearly structure. The results are 
obtained using Driscoll-Kraay standard errors and fund fixed effects. P-values are in parentheses (* p<0.1, ** 
p<0.05, *** p<0.01). 
 
 
Constant Coefficient 
   
Sample Sharpe RFund-RPPB M2 Funds Obs. 
All Funds 0.0561 0.1837*** 0.2505*** 4713 15499 
(0.463) (0.000) (0.000) 
Allocation  0.0881 0.2249*** 0.3273*** 294 957 
(0.437) (0.004) (0.003) 
Fixed Income  0.0004 0.2187* 0.2421*** 665 2161 
(0.996) (0.082) (0.007) 
Equity  0.0673 0.1726*** 0.2457*** 3468 11599 
(0.386) (0.000) (0.000) 
Emerging Equity  0.2038* 0.0765 0.2936* 179 491 
(0.073) (0.281) (0.057) 
International 
Equity  
0.0518 0.1456*** 0.2137*** 1827 6078 
(0.368) (0.007) (0.001) 
UK Equity  0.0727 0.2146*** 0.2797*** 1462 5030 
(0.475) (0.000) (0.000) 
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H. Results of the restricted regressions with the linear, logarithmic, and cubic root age 
functions (Chapter 3) 
 
 
Table H.A. Results for the all-funds sample under the restriction that fund’s age is up to 5 years. The PPB is the benchmark. 
The panel observations have a yearly frequency. The results are obtained using Driscoll-Kraay standard errors and fund fixed 
effects. P-values are in parentheses (* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01). 
 
                              √      
  
Dependent Sharpe RFund-RPPB M2 Sharpe RFund-RPPB M2 Sharpe RFund-RPPB M2 
Constant -0.2134* -0.3682 0.1162 -0.3069** -0.3462 0.0465 -0.5770*** -0.4821* -0.1263 
 
(0.078) (0.127) (0.629) (0.022) (0.145) (0.839) (0.008) (0.088) (0.657) 
          0.0930** 0.0525** 0.0590* 0.3205** 0.1659** 0.2010* 0.4938** 0.2541** 0.3086* 
 
(0.012) (0.019) (0.066) (0.012) (0.033) (0.063) (0.011) (0.032) (0.065) 
        -0.4314*** -0.1166 -0.2126 -0.3590*** -0.2106* -0.2642 -0.2385 -0.3886** -0.3985 
 
(0.000) (0.167) (0.153) (0.002) (0.075) (0.200) (0.184) (0.035) (0.202) 
        0.4205*** 0.3858** 0.0915 0.6437*** 0.5968** 0.2586 1.0265*** 0.9523** 0.5377 
 
(0.000) (0.038) (0.596) (0.000) (0.023) (0.280) (0.000) (0.014) (0.136) 
          0.0588*** 0.1354*** 0.0660** 0.0335** 0.1035** 0.0598 0.0320 0.1093 0.0656 
 
(0.001) (0.000) (0.029) (0.046) (0.026) (0.241) (0.231) (0.160) (0.444) 
           0.0035 0.0074 0.0034 0.0055 0.0108** 0.0034 0.0054 0.0109** 0.0032 
 
(0.217) (0.138) (0.506) (0.131) (0.046) (0.533) (0.132) (0.046) (0.562) 
              -0.0069* 0.0276* 0.0267* -0.0086** 0.0239 0.0249* -0.0086** 0.0238 0.0250* 
 
(0.072) (0.073) (0.075) (0.039) (0.106) (0.073) (0.037) (0.105) (0.070) 
        -0.1008 -0.2418 -0.0175 -0.1160 -0.3552 -0.0314 -0.1913 -0.6384 -0.0876 
 (0.606) (0.489) (0.964) (0.551) (0.362) (0.939) (0.417) (0.275) (0.869) 
         -0.0133 -0.6320** -0.3436 0.0166 -0.8644*** -0.5041 -0.0126 -1.3836*** -0.9021** 
 (0.930) (0.011) (0.174) (0.913) (0.005) (0.101) (0.942) (0.003) (0.036) 
          -0.0896 -0.3181** -0.2287 -0.1145 -0.4008** -0.3245 -0.1609 -0.5619** -0.4565 
 (0.208) (0.016) (0.127) (0.193) (0.015) (0.115) (0.304) (0.025) (0.183) 
          0.0784 -0.1716* -0.0035 0.1252* -0.3109** -0.0176 0.2222** -0.5336** -0.0297 
 (0.121) (0.056) (0.972) (0.068) (0.017) (0.902) (0.033) (0.013) (0.901) 
                  0.0210 0.0714 0.0120 0.0865 0.3188 0.0601 0.1347 0.5094 0.0986 
 (0.448) (0.442) (0.869) (0.308) (0.280) (0.790) (0.304) (0.266) (0.777) 
                   0.0119 0.1629** 0.1409** 0.0311 0.5933*** 0.4590** 0.0500 0.9338*** 0.7179** 
 (0.617) (0.020) (0.015) (0.683) (0.006) (0.016) (0.665) (0.005) (0.015) 
                    0.0039 0.0319 0.0190 0.0492 0.1692 0.1337 0.0793 0.2760 0.2203 
 (0.904) (0.296) (0.704) (0.642) (0.171) (0.475) (0.628) (0.153) (0.448) 
                    -0.0383** 0.0595* -0.0013 -0.1178** 0.2509** 0.0055 -0.1806** 0.3949** 0.0126 
 (0.016) (0.064) (0.973) (0.018) (0.015) (0.963) (0.017) (0.014) (0.945) 
                    -0.0033 -0.0098 -0.0035 0.0016 -0.0113 -0.0058 0.0026 -0.0152 -0.0090 
 (0.306) (0.125) (0.617) (0.900) (0.748) (0.877) (0.901) (0.787) (0.883) 
                  -0.0361 0.0736*** 0.0664* -0.1337 0.2376*** 0.1855 -0.2121 0.3501*** 0.2698 
 (0.157) (0.002) (0.076) (0.131) (0.003) (0.149) (0.126) (0.004) (0.172) 
                  -0.1262*** -0.1114*** -0.0856** -0.4517*** -0.4101*** -0.3211** -0.6986*** -0.6398*** -0.5019** 
 (0.001) (0.008) (0.045) (0.001) (0.007) (0.033) (0.001) (0.006) (0.030) 
     -0.0731 -0.0286 -0.2059** -0.0732 -0.0336 -0.1992** -0.0727 -0.0344 -0.1986** 
 (0.215) (0.843) (0.027) (0.206) (0.815) (0.035) (0.209) (0.811) (0.035) 
     0.0309 -0.3126*** -0.2049** 0.0278 -0.3227*** -0.2056** 0.0291 -0.3204*** -0.2030** 
 
(0.701) (0.000) (0.029) (0.730) (0.000) (0.028) (0.716) (0.000) (0.028) 
R2 within 0.4869 0.0320 0.0346 0.4906 0.0339 0.0357 0.4906 0.0339 0.0357 
F-statistic 64.7670 35.6023 31.0003 62.1465 40.4355 20.1603 64.9118 45.2075 17.9065 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Funds 4708 4708 4708 4708 4708 4708 4708 4708 4708 
Observations 15372 15372 15372 15372 15372 15372 15372 15372 15372 
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Table H.B. Results for the allocation funds sample under the restriction that fund’s age is up to 5 years. The PPB is the 
benchmark. The panel observations have a yearly frequency. The results are obtained using Driscoll-Kraay standard errors and 
fund fixed effects. P-values are in parentheses (* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01). 
 
                              √      
  
Dependent Sharpe RFund-RPPB M2 Sharpe RFund-RPPB M2 Sharpe RFund-RPPB M2 
Constant -0.6182** -1.5015*** -0.9103** -0.9456*** -1.9593*** -1.2753*** -1.4040*** -2.8135*** -1.7848** 
 
(0.029) (0.009) (0.023) (0.005) (0.004) (0.009) (0.004) (0.001) (0.021) 
          0.1543*** 0.2804*** 0.2112** 0.5292** 0.9949*** 0.6232* 0.8176** 1.5375*** 0.9311 
 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.042) (0.011) (0.003) (0.094) (0.011) (0.003) (0.111) 
        -0.4300*** 0.6562** -0.2043 -0.2919 0.7329* -0.2083 -0.0852 0.8977 -0.3235 
 
(0.002) (0.018) (0.500) (0.115) (0.080) (0.596) (0.748) (0.157) (0.579) 
        0.5174*** 1.2177*** 0.4020 0.9031*** 1.7801*** 0.7754* 1.5383*** 2.7205*** 1.3958** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.151) (0.004) (0.003) (0.079) (0.005) (0.002) (0.048) 
          0.1349** 0.3635*** -0.0279 0.1484*** 0.3445*** -0.0500 0.1845*** 0.4233*** -0.0812 
 
(0.027) (0.000) (0.712) (0.000) (0.000) (0.693) (0.000) (0.001) (0.678) 
           -0.0334 -0.0609 0.0343 -0.0321 -0.0477 0.0199 -0.0330 -0.0489 0.0171 
 
(0.274) (0.118) (0.121) (0.252) (0.138) (0.421) (0.239) (0.129) (0.485) 
              0.0334 0.0292 -0.0004 0.0339 0.0226 0.0040 0.0344 0.0231 0.0052 
 
(0.207) (0.284) (0.985) (0.147) (0.287) (0.847) (0.142) (0.278) (0.803) 
        0.3721 0.1596 0.7375 0.4468 0.7750 0.9604 0.7260 1.8424 1.6991* 
 (0.400) (0.879) (0.385) (0.365) (0.487) (0.287) (0.252) (0.105) (0.098) 
         -0.0267 -1.4812** 0.0700 -0.0470 -1.2824* 0.0878 -0.1646 -1.4286 0.0719 
 (0.933) (0.024) (0.908) (0.874) (0.056) (0.889) (0.621) (0.108) (0.932) 
          -0.1962 0.0012 0.6586* -0.1951 0.4107 0.6837 -0.1950 1.0806 1.1029 
 (0.296) (0.998) (0.074) (0.278) (0.454) (0.157) (0.411) (0.186) (0.184) 
          0.4029*** 0.7284*** 1.1104*** 0.4915*** 0.8586*** 1.3216*** 0.7279** 1.1232** 1.8546*** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.006) (0.005) (0.000) (0.010) (0.031) (0.003) 
                  -0.0839 -0.3460*** -0.3184*** -0.3182 -1.2570*** -0.9301*** -0.4977 -1.9371*** -1.3990*** 
 (0.347) (0.000) (0.001) (0.277) (0.000) (0.004) (0.269) (0.000) (0.005) 
                   0.0591 0.0874 -0.0139 0.1266 0.1225 -0.0590 0.2070 0.2274 -0.0446 
 (0.213) (0.462) (0.919) (0.363) (0.754) (0.895) (0.343) (0.706) (0.949) 
                    -0.0042 -0.2555** -0.2150 -0.0173 -0.8140** -0.5649 -0.0160 -1.2417** -0.8391 
 (0.922) (0.042) (0.147) (0.883) (0.044) (0.218) (0.931) (0.048) (0.240) 
                    -0.0987** -0.1271 -0.1961* -0.2869** -0.3353 -0.6578* -0.4398** -0.5048 -1.0094* 
 (0.029) (0.142) (0.086) (0.049) (0.258) (0.066) (0.045) (0.263) (0.066) 
                    -0.0119*** -0.0334*** 0.0099 -0.0347** -0.0853* 0.0471 -0.0567** -0.1344* 0.0707 
 (0.004) (0.001) (0.587) (0.024) (0.088) (0.526) (0.021) (0.087) (0.552) 
                  -0.0617** -0.0406 0.0795 -0.2359** -0.1371 0.1788 -0.3699** -0.2488 0.2494 
 (0.021) (0.537) (0.332) (0.027) (0.583) (0.454) (0.026) (0.527) (0.491) 
                  -0.2019*** -0.3007*** -0.2140*** -0.7452*** -1.1027*** -0.7571** -1.1553*** -1.7099*** -1.1558** 
 (0.004) (0.000) (0.003) (0.008) (0.001) (0.024) (0.009) (0.001) (0.026) 
     0.0216 0.4446 0.7571*** 0.0889 0.5373 0.8838*** 0.0896 0.5358 0.8864*** 
 (0.907) (0.242) (0.006) (0.629) (0.173) (0.003) (0.628) (0.175) (0.003) 
     -0.0191 -0.7411*** -0.2160 -0.0275 -0.7613*** -0.1591 -0.0257 -0.7566*** -0.1494 
 
(0.894) (0.001) (0.294) (0.849) (0.001) (0.398) (0.858) (0.001) (0.430) 
R2 within 0.5263 0.1541 0.1205 0.5339 0.1559 0.1147 0.5349 0.1560 0.1134 
F-statistic 1041.2383 308.0641 56.3050 581.6588 166.5634 484.0542 543.6589 153.4805 985.3943 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Funds 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 
Observations 950 950 950 950 950 950 950 950 950 
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Table H.C. Results for the fixed income funds sample under the restriction that fund’s age is up to 5 years. The PPB is the 
benchmark. The panel observations have a yearly frequency. The results are obtained using Driscoll-Kraay standard errors and 
fund fixed effects. P-values are in parentheses (* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01). 
 
                              √      
  
Dependent Sharpe RFund-RPPB M2 Sharpe RFund-RPPB M2 Sharpe RFund-RPPB M2 
Constant -0.4874*** -0.4994 -0.6709 -0.4673*** -0.2933 -0.6152 -0.6153** -0.0218 -0.4961 
 
(0.004) (0.388) (0.176) (0.008) (0.570) (0.210) (0.023) (0.968) (0.381) 
          0.0624 -0.0560 -0.0302 0.1844 -0.3095* -0.1558 0.2768 -0.4875** -0.2352 
 
(0.308) (0.142) (0.469) (0.298) (0.050) (0.330) (0.290) (0.046) (0.339) 
        -0.4187*** -0.4504** -0.0216 -0.5325*** -0.8166** -0.2775 -0.6954** -1.4386** -0.6692 
 
(0.002) (0.041) (0.897) (0.003) (0.030) (0.300) (0.014) (0.022) (0.135) 
        0.5149*** 0.4029 0.2359 0.7341*** 0.5675 0.3397 1.1253*** 0.8778 0.5520 
 
(0.000) (0.192) (0.298) (0.000) (0.192) (0.295) (0.001) (0.182) (0.274) 
          0.1079*** 0.2452** 0.2109** 0.0487 0.1825** 0.2171*** 0.0300 0.1612* 0.2534*** 
 
(0.001) (0.044) (0.011) (0.437) (0.024) (0.001) (0.759) (0.099) (0.004) 
           0.0040 -0.0045 -0.0068 0.0066* 0.0001 -0.0041 0.0066* 0.0004 -0.0040 
 
(0.177) (0.584) (0.375) (0.092) (0.990) (0.645) (0.092) (0.970) (0.651) 
              -0.0200 0.0026 0.0283 -0.0226 0.0100 0.0344 -0.0224 0.0100 0.0346 
 
(0.311) (0.953) (0.393) (0.239) (0.819) (0.270) (0.241) (0.817) (0.267) 
        -0.1415 -1.6597 -1.1095 -0.2169 -1.8842 -1.1868 -0.3367 -2.1757 -1.2603 
 (0.659) (0.148) (0.199) (0.511) (0.128) (0.200) (0.414) (0.146) (0.250) 
         0.4364* -0.1931 -0.7446 0.4549* -0.2578 -0.9874 0.5612 0.1547 -1.1431 
 (0.054) (0.795) (0.148) (0.069) (0.791) (0.113) (0.107) (0.919) (0.188) 
          0.2176** -0.1105 -0.0057 0.2003* -0.2003 0.0276 0.2088 -0.1774 0.2525 
 (0.041) (0.730) (0.979) (0.098) (0.541) (0.899) (0.250) (0.649) (0.482) 
          0.0746 -0.1168 -0.0672 0.0916 -0.1767 -0.0193 0.1088 -0.2335 0.0661 
 (0.563) (0.229) (0.472) (0.548) (0.264) (0.896) (0.645) (0.373) (0.785) 
                  0.0379 0.0718 0.0280 0.1415 0.3543 0.1194 0.2172 0.5422 0.1598 
 (0.398) (0.552) (0.742) (0.313) (0.395) (0.663) (0.310) (0.392) (0.699) 
                   -0.0569 -0.2367 0.0171 -0.1426 -0.5069 0.2090 -0.2107 -0.7709 0.3064 
 (0.336) (0.359) (0.887) (0.419) (0.523) (0.587) (0.434) (0.528) (0.603) 
                    -0.0105 -0.0225 -0.0869 -0.0214 -0.0429 -0.2609 -0.0270 -0.0569 -0.4060 
 (0.810) (0.757) (0.280) (0.852) (0.854) (0.314) (0.877) (0.874) (0.312) 
                    0.0014 0.0256 -0.0125 -0.0267 0.0574 -0.0976 -0.0382 0.0932 -0.1529 
 (0.971) (0.579) (0.723) (0.823) (0.683) (0.409) (0.832) (0.666) (0.405) 
                    -0.0020 -0.0074 -0.0164** 0.0213 0.0188 -0.0418 0.0336 0.0323 -0.0652 
 (0.810) (0.373) (0.030) (0.560) (0.688) (0.277) (0.575) (0.667) (0.285) 
                  0.0541 0.2174** 0.1243** 0.2050 0.7610** 0.4743** 0.3100 1.1607** 0.7260** 
 (0.217) (0.016) (0.044) (0.184) (0.027) (0.044) (0.189) (0.023) (0.041) 
                  -0.1376** -0.1126 -0.0735 -0.4694** -0.3673 -0.2399 -0.7212** -0.5666 -0.3774 
 (0.018) (0.171) (0.264) (0.019) (0.188) (0.279) (0.018) (0.181) (0.266) 
     -0.0610 0.0898 0.3970 -0.0623 0.0759 0.3915 -0.0613 0.0771 0.3958 
 (0.440) (0.731) (0.159) (0.407) (0.770) (0.159) (0.415) (0.766) (0.154) 
     -0.0073 -0.0189 -0.0631 0.0100 0.0437 -0.0310 0.0115 0.0466 -0.0312 
 
(0.952) (0.873) (0.505) (0.930) (0.727) (0.734) (0.918) (0.709) (0.732) 
R2 within 0.1920 0.0474 0.0505 0.1963 0.0488 0.0523 0.1960 0.0488 0.0523 
F-statistic 56.2242 34.9221 26.3166 18.1240 31.6109 21.2472 17.7566 32.3713 21.9987 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Funds 665 665 665 665 665 665 665 665 665 
Observations 2143 2143 2143 2143 2143 2143 2143 2143 2143 
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Table H.D. Results for the equity funds sample under the restriction that fund’s age is up to 5 years. The PPB is the 
benchmark. The panel observations have a yearly frequency. The results are obtained using Driscoll-Kraay standard errors and 
fund fixed effects. P-values are in parentheses (* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01). 
 
                              √      
  
Dependent Sharpe RFund-RPPB M2 Sharpe RFund-RPPB M2 Sharpe RFund-RPPB M2 
Constant -0.0647 -0.2118 0.3194 -0.1517 -0.2018 0.2258 -0.3986** -0.3289 0.0430 
 
(0.567) (0.329) (0.213) (0.223) (0.430) (0.452) (0.036) (0.338) (0.917) 
          0.0817*** 0.0374 0.0516 0.2921*** 0.1566 0.2128 0.4518*** 0.2414 0.3287 
 
(0.006) (0.237) (0.210) (0.008) (0.187) (0.176) (0.008) (0.193) (0.181) 
        -0.4905*** -0.1861* -0.2547 -0.4047*** -0.2242 -0.2458 -0.2686 -0.3454 -0.3078 
 
(0.000) (0.085) (0.152) (0.001) (0.138) (0.345) (0.127) (0.121) (0.438) 
        0.3029*** 0.2471 -0.0794 0.4938*** 0.4544** 0.0667 0.8060*** 0.7631** 0.2727 
 
(0.001) (0.116) (0.633) (0.001) (0.042) (0.790) (0.001) (0.024) (0.486) 
          0.0256 0.0571 0.0182 0.0037 0.0293 0.0226 0.0015 0.0239 0.0288 
 
(0.125) (0.148) (0.613) (0.838) (0.675) (0.711) (0.949) (0.823) (0.756) 
           0.0086 0.0245** 0.0098 0.0109* 0.0272*** 0.0081 0.0108* 0.0272*** 0.0077 
 
(0.122) (0.018) (0.312) (0.094) (0.010) (0.398) (0.093) (0.010) (0.422) 
              -0.0105* 0.0291* 0.0276* -0.0123* 0.0251 0.0258* -0.0123* 0.0249 0.0258* 
 
(0.082) (0.073) (0.093) (0.056) (0.100) (0.096) (0.055) (0.100) (0.094) 
        -0.0948 -0.1881 0.1579 -0.0761 -0.3086 0.1813 -0.1229 -0.7038 0.1160 
 (0.663) (0.609) (0.690) (0.714) (0.383) (0.642) (0.605) (0.158) (0.816) 
         -0.0616 -0.6977*** -0.3186 -0.0153 -0.9630*** -0.4649 -0.0388 -1.5967*** -0.8954* 
 (0.715) (0.004) (0.244) (0.927) (0.001) (0.157) (0.835) (0.001) (0.057) 
          -0.1118 -0.4594*** -0.3731** -0.1439* -0.5777*** -0.5047** -0.2031 -0.8394** -0.7456* 
 (0.136) (0.004) (0.034) (0.092) (0.009) (0.048) (0.187) (0.015) (0.080) 
          0.0303 -0.2979** -0.0833 0.0625 -0.4801*** -0.1334 0.1294 -0.7999*** -0.2240 
 (0.469) (0.013) (0.480) (0.265) (0.005) (0.393) (0.146) (0.004) (0.368) 
                  0.0099 0.1153 0.0200 0.0527 0.4475 0.0712 0.0832 0.7116 0.1177 
 (0.729) (0.261) (0.818) (0.535) (0.166) (0.790) (0.527) (0.154) (0.775) 
                   0.0099 0.2065*** 0.1553** 0.0268 0.7297*** 0.4961** 0.0422 1.1445*** 0.7775** 
 (0.672) (0.005) (0.021) (0.718) (0.001) (0.021) (0.710) (0.001) (0.020) 
                    0.0055 0.0675* 0.0580 0.0667 0.2908* 0.2671 0.1051 0.4625* 0.4244 
 (0.871) (0.083) (0.313) (0.547) (0.070) (0.232) (0.538) (0.065) (0.220) 
                    -0.0282* 0.0921** 0.0234 -0.0816* 0.3635*** 0.0963 -0.1247* 0.5706*** 0.1547 
 (0.053) (0.021) (0.538) (0.072) (0.005) (0.400) (0.074) (0.005) (0.382) 
                    -0.0025 -0.0037 -0.0010 0.0020 0.0016 -0.0051 0.0033 0.0047 -0.0084 
 (0.336) (0.659) (0.876) (0.830) (0.968) (0.878) (0.827) (0.940) (0.876) 
                  -0.0413* 0.0593** 0.0458 -0.1543* 0.1642* 0.0938 -0.2424* 0.2410* 0.1322 
 (0.066) (0.018) (0.303) (0.056) (0.077) (0.563) (0.053) (0.092) (0.598) 
                  -0.0990*** -0.0862** -0.0546 -0.3653*** -0.3511** -0.2348 -0.5669*** -0.5509*** -0.3684 
 (0.004) (0.023) (0.201) (0.004) (0.010) (0.165) (0.004) (0.009) (0.162) 
     -0.0586 -0.0698 -0.3260*** -0.0668 -0.0855 -0.3294*** -0.0667 -0.0869 -0.3298*** 
 (0.378) (0.626) (0.004) (0.308) (0.548) (0.004) (0.310) (0.543) (0.004) 
     0.0929 -0.2546*** -0.1280 0.0848 -0.2803*** -0.1424 0.0854 -0.2792*** -0.1412 
 
(0.280) (0.000) (0.146) (0.332) (0.000) (0.122) (0.327) (0.000) (0.124) 
R2 within 0.5934 0.0376 0.0443 0.5966 0.0412 0.0455 0.5965 0.0415 0.0456 
F-statistic 315.0963 31.7705 26.2101 450.2098 53.7277 21.5626 477.9446 56.1849 22.1569 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Funds 3468 3468 3468 3468 3468 3468 3468 3468 3468 
Observations 11512 11512 11512 11512 11512 11512 11512 11512 11512 
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Table H.E. Results for the emerging equity funds sample under the restriction that fund’s age is up to 5 years. The PPB is the 
benchmark. The panel observations have a yearly frequency. The results are obtained using Driscoll-Kraay standard errors and 
fund fixed effects. P-values are in parentheses (* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01). 
 
                              √      
  
Dependent Sharpe RFund-RPPB M2 Sharpe RFund-RPPB M2 Sharpe RFund-RPPB M2 
Constant -0.0800 -0.8062*** -0.7550*** -0.0546 -1.2414*** -1.2532*** -0.1056 -2.0833*** -2.2848*** 
 
(0.599) (0.000) (0.005) (0.808) (0.000) (0.000) (0.804) (0.000) (0.000) 
          0.0261 0.2528*** 0.2747** 0.0824 1.1006*** 1.2715*** 0.0916 1.4870*** 1.7836** 
 
(0.688) (0.004) (0.026) (0.782) (0.002) (0.004) (0.839) (0.009) (0.015) 
        -0.9425*** -0.4575** -0.6757*** -0.9138*** -0.2623 -0.4223 -0.9655** -0.6007 -0.5687 
 
(0.000) (0.011) (0.009) (0.000) (0.346) (0.209) (0.015) (0.191) (0.331) 
        0.1582 1.3641*** 0.7457** 0.2240 2.1963*** 1.5316*** 0.2400 2.9234*** 2.1940** 
 
(0.214) (0.000) (0.027) (0.443) (0.000) (0.002) (0.615) (0.000) (0.018) 
          -0.0666* 0.0682 0.2435*** -0.1044* 0.0260 0.2343*** -0.1425* 0.0538 0.3402** 
 
(0.069) (0.112) (0.000) (0.065) (0.765) (0.007) (0.074) (0.655) (0.015) 
           0.0043 0.0208** 0.0008 0.0036 0.0167** -0.0014 0.0027 0.0119* -0.0067 
 
(0.416) (0.030) (0.947) (0.535) (0.042) (0.885) (0.645) (0.098) (0.521) 
              0.0765*** 0.0082 0.0138 0.0767*** -0.0075 0.0022 0.0769*** -0.0037 0.0059 
 
(0.001) (0.778) (0.732) (0.002) (0.834) (0.960) (0.002) (0.922) (0.893) 
        0.3139 0.1956 0.2190 0.1615 0.5938 0.7845 -0.1715 1.0988 1.1727 
 (0.287) (0.772) (0.696) (0.664) (0.444) (0.245) (0.712) (0.285) (0.178) 
         -0.4378 -0.7363 -0.8210 -0.9532 -0.6852 -0.9233 -1.9242 -1.6566 -2.2298 
 (0.406) (0.275) (0.370) (0.228) (0.429) (0.413) (0.110) (0.202) (0.209) 
          0.5660** -1.1126* -0.5516 0.6924** -1.2091 -0.5470 1.0497** -1.5925 -0.4673 
 (0.024) (0.098) (0.325) (0.036) (0.191) (0.413) (0.022) (0.242) (0.661) 
          -0.4987* -0.0189 -0.8900** -0.8657 0.0898 -1.3412** -1.5715* -0.0118 -2.6089** 
 (0.059) (0.972) (0.042) (0.103) (0.909) (0.048) (0.083) (0.993) (0.032) 
                  0.1694** -0.3324*** -0.1077 0.4517** -0.6205 -0.3586 0.6919** -0.7596 -0.4518 
 (0.045) (0.003) (0.245) (0.018) (0.102) (0.231) (0.012) (0.210) (0.336) 
                   0.3385** 0.3327 0.4581 1.0835** 0.8865 1.3232 1.7452** 1.6446* 2.3024* 
 (0.040) (0.130) (0.168) (0.038) (0.137) (0.126) (0.030) (0.071) (0.082) 
                    -0.1271** 0.1479 -0.0491 -0.3935* 0.6214 0.1057 -0.5967* 0.9795 0.1686 
 (0.037) (0.357) (0.806) (0.065) (0.288) (0.841) (0.069) (0.290) (0.839) 
                    0.1792** -0.2508 0.1716 0.6757 -0.5417 0.8136 1.1469* -0.4099 1.7002* 
 (0.019) (0.240) (0.104) (0.112) (0.440) (0.131) (0.090) (0.681) (0.059) 
                    0.0147** 0.0077 -0.0129 0.0571** 0.0440 -0.0341 0.0843** 0.0430 -0.0845 
 (0.012) (0.384) (0.150) (0.026) (0.400) (0.544) (0.039) (0.571) (0.342) 
                  0.0529 0.3278*** 0.2320** 0.0972 0.5646** 0.3075 0.1228 0.7465** 0.3709 
 (0.193) (0.000) (0.017) (0.612) (0.014) (0.240) (0.682) (0.036) (0.383) 
                  -0.0141 -0.2337*** -0.1986* -0.0716 -1.1392*** -1.0298** -0.0819 -1.6052*** -1.4555* 
 (0.760) (0.004) (0.085) (0.752) (0.002) (0.023) (0.814) (0.006) (0.055) 
                 
             
     0.2125 -0.8410*** -0.7360* 0.1896 -0.9960*** -0.9747*** 0.2030 -0.9126*** -0.9008** 
 
(0.211) (0.002) (0.059) (0.369) (0.000) (0.008) (0.327) (0.000) (0.016) 
R2 within 0.8803 0.2541 0.3937 0.8775 0.2446 0.3924 0.8760 0.2355 0.3856 
F-statistic 507056.3203 4585.0386 50841.0467 4378.0277 26603.0972 34108.4242 2919.9127 446397.2402 27287.6069 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Funds 179 179 179 179 179 179 179 179 179 
Observations 490 490 490 490 490 490 490 490 490 
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Table H.F. Results for the international equity funds sample under the restriction that fund’s age is up to 5 years. The PPB is 
the benchmark. The panel observations have a yearly frequency. The results are obtained using Driscoll-Kraay standard errors 
and fund fixed effects. P-values are in parentheses (* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01). 
 
                              √      
  
Dependent Sharpe RFund-RPPB M2 Sharpe RFund-RPPB M2 Sharpe RFund-RPPB M2 
Constant -0.1314 -0.1627 0.7723*** -0.2179 -0.1402 0.6494*** -0.4662** -0.2794 0.4223 
 
(0.400) (0.598) (0.000) (0.170) (0.660) (0.010) (0.014) (0.454) (0.189) 
          0.0818*** 0.0493 0.0674 0.2938*** 0.1860 0.2706 0.4532*** 0.2816 0.4161 
 
(0.003) (0.276) (0.149) (0.002) (0.285) (0.124) (0.002) (0.294) (0.125) 
        -0.3506*** -0.2512* -0.3902*** -0.2622** -0.2096 -0.2950* -0.1229 -0.2180 -0.2509 
 
(0.000) (0.076) (0.001) (0.013) (0.163) (0.063) (0.417) (0.246) (0.308) 
        0.3231*** 0.4188*** 0.0697 0.4708*** 0.7638*** 0.3418* 0.7074*** 1.2721*** 0.7354** 
 
(0.000) (0.007) (0.580) (0.000) (0.002) (0.076) (0.000) (0.001) (0.020) 
          0.0577** 0.0692 0.0290 0.0424 0.0237 0.0253 0.0522 -0.0099 0.0153 
 
(0.011) (0.303) (0.463) (0.174) (0.832) (0.751) (0.221) (0.952) (0.900) 
           -0.0050 0.0295 0.0116 -0.0016 0.0353 0.0095 -0.0018 0.0358 0.0089 
 
(0.555) (0.332) (0.639) (0.868) (0.251) (0.711) (0.852) (0.248) (0.730) 
              -0.0038 0.0133 -0.0019 -0.0076 0.0033 -0.0051 -0.0076 0.0025 -0.0051 
 
(0.474) (0.598) (0.934) (0.224) (0.901) (0.833) (0.225) (0.923) (0.836) 
        0.0566 -0.7304* -0.3869 0.0481 -0.9832** -0.4752 -0.0297 -1.4085** -0.6207 
 (0.826) (0.055) (0.262) (0.859) (0.042) (0.286) (0.929) (0.046) (0.376) 
         -0.0501 -1.2357*** -1.0034*** -0.0474 -1.7601*** -1.3783*** -0.1707 -2.8332*** -2.2807*** 
 (0.784) (0.001) (0.003) (0.800) (0.001) (0.002) (0.442) (0.000) (0.001) 
          -0.0745 -0.5679** -0.5005** -0.1122 -0.6757** -0.5963** -0.1954 -0.9276* -0.8323* 
 (0.474) (0.017) (0.015) (0.328) (0.032) (0.035) (0.302) (0.053) (0.075) 
          0.0992* -0.3330** -0.1503 0.1348* -0.6630** -0.3442* 0.2344* -1.1277** -0.5855* 
 (0.098) (0.040) (0.254) (0.097) (0.016) (0.097) (0.058) (0.013) (0.082) 
                  0.0231 0.0960 0.0212 0.0858 0.4702 0.1525 0.1363 0.7536 0.2536 
 (0.520) (0.402) (0.856) (0.408) (0.166) (0.662) (0.388) (0.149) (0.634) 
                   0.0527 0.3622*** 0.3298*** 0.1459 1.2397*** 1.0466*** 0.2252 1.9380*** 1.6334*** 
 (0.150) (0.003) (0.001) (0.173) (0.001) (0.001) (0.171) (0.001) (0.001) 
                    0.0159 0.0683 0.0613 0.0962 0.2780 0.2617 0.1500 0.4434 0.4164 
 (0.681) (0.234) (0.315) (0.451) (0.194) (0.273) (0.448) (0.184) (0.262) 
                    -0.0454** 0.1115* 0.0422 -0.1225** 0.5185** 0.2624* -0.1864** 0.8197** 0.4194* 
 (0.011) (0.072) (0.342) (0.029) (0.017) (0.089) (0.031) (0.016) (0.083) 
                    -0.0061* 0.0030 0.0035 -0.0112 0.0300 0.0128 -0.0173 0.0507 0.0198 
 (0.054) (0.813) (0.683) (0.340) (0.594) (0.753) (0.370) (0.575) (0.764) 
                  -0.0419* 0.0212 0.0176 -0.1605** 0.0193 -0.0368 -0.2506** 0.0245 -0.0662 
 (0.067) (0.391) (0.594) (0.031) (0.818) (0.752) (0.026) (0.851) (0.715) 
                  -0.0743*** -0.1434*** -0.1092*** -0.2780*** -0.5855*** -0.4542*** -0.4307*** -0.9139*** -0.7087*** 
 (0.001) (0.004) (0.009) (0.000) (0.001) (0.003) (0.000) (0.001) (0.003) 
     -0.0537 -0.0561 -0.5435*** -0.0603 -0.0762 -0.5493*** -0.0602 -0.0786 -0.5508*** 
 (0.496) (0.768) (0.001) (0.437) (0.672) (0.001) (0.439) (0.662) (0.001) 
     -0.0271 -0.2710 -0.1853 -0.0312 -0.2883 -0.1982 -0.0303 -0.2855 -0.1963 
 
(0.790) (0.268) (0.159) (0.760) (0.218) (0.122) (0.766) (0.220) (0.122) 
R2 within 0.5464 0.0797 0.0940 0.5495 0.0870 0.0975 0.5494 0.0875 0.0978 
F-statistic 117.4602 20.4442 50.0041 252.6369 28.1186 46.0814 243.0890 27.4352 48.1533 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Funds 1827 1827 1827 1827 1827 1827 1827 1827 1827 
Observations 6041 6041 6041 6041 6041 6041 6041 6041 6041 
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Table H.G. Results for the UK equity funds sample under the restriction that fund’s age is up to 5 years. The PPB is the 
benchmark. The panel observations have a yearly frequency. The results are obtained using Driscoll-Kraay standard errors and 
fund fixed effects. P-values are in parentheses (* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01). 
 
                              √      
  
Dependent Sharpe RFund-RPPB M2 Sharpe RFund-RPPB M2 Sharpe RFund-RPPB M2 
Constant -0.0721 0.2801 0.2978 -0.1516 0.2884 0.2379 -0.3904 0.1478 0.0839 
 
(0.525) (0.530) (0.407) (0.290) (0.555) (0.557) (0.145) (0.814) (0.876) 
          0.0783* 0.0384 0.0465 0.2806 0.1688 0.1848 0.4354 0.2663 0.2865 
 
(0.081) (0.585) (0.463) (0.104) (0.472) (0.414) (0.105) (0.470) (0.422) 
        -0.6215*** 0.0265 0.0316 -0.5521*** -0.0428 0.0166 -0.4284 -0.1509 -0.0199 
 
(0.000) (0.816) (0.910) (0.002) (0.794) (0.967) (0.112) (0.549) (0.973) 
        0.2826** -0.0401 -0.3517 0.5205** 0.0071 -0.3595 0.9161** 0.0776 -0.3945 
 
(0.048) (0.870) (0.130) (0.037) (0.983) (0.315) (0.037) (0.881) (0.480) 
          -0.0035 -0.0039 -0.0901* -0.0323 -0.0161 -0.0745 -0.0429 0.0022 -0.0672 
 
(0.914) (0.906) (0.082) (0.275) (0.766) (0.307) (0.152) (0.979) (0.507) 
           0.0171* 0.0370*** 0.0278** 0.0198* 0.0385*** 0.0236** 0.0197* 0.0387*** 0.0235** 
 
(0.083) (0.006) (0.016) (0.080) (0.004) (0.037) (0.078) (0.005) (0.039) 
              -0.0136 0.0238 0.0234 -0.0141 0.0214 0.0223 -0.0141 0.0213 0.0222 
 
(0.115) (0.320) (0.198) (0.111) (0.345) (0.192) (0.110) (0.344) (0.191) 
        -0.3531 0.1781 0.7166 -0.3005 0.2489 0.8813* -0.2966 -0.0923 0.8995* 
 (0.134) (0.785) (0.203) (0.148) (0.673) (0.079) (0.193) (0.894) (0.099) 
         -0.1169 -0.2261 0.4509 0.0100 -0.1539 0.5616 0.1593 -0.2406 0.6592 
 (0.483) (0.470) (0.153) (0.952) (0.670) (0.105) (0.496) (0.682) (0.222) 
          -0.1903** -0.3722** -0.2640 -0.2081** -0.5164** -0.4874 -0.2398* -0.7980** -0.8207 
 (0.011) (0.032) (0.216) (0.011) (0.030) (0.105) (0.098) (0.049) (0.101) 
          -0.0176 -0.3408 -0.0958 0.0309 -0.4111 -0.0485 0.1001 -0.6263 -0.0353 
 (0.756) (0.105) (0.635) (0.672) (0.107) (0.845) (0.410) (0.110) (0.929) 
                  -0.0108 0.1176 0.0067 -0.0016 0.3997 -0.0115 -0.0040 0.6354 -0.0155 
 (0.800) (0.413) (0.955) (0.990) (0.393) (0.975) (0.985) (0.381) (0.978) 
                   -0.0622* -0.0069 -0.0620 -0.1827 0.0846 -0.1319 -0.2779 0.1523 -0.1866 
 (0.097) (0.951) (0.519) (0.161) (0.805) (0.676) (0.168) (0.773) (0.703) 
                    -0.0060 0.0533 0.0707 0.0312 0.3153 0.3748 0.0517 0.5024 0.5936 
 (0.841) (0.389) (0.341) (0.760) (0.155) (0.157) (0.740) (0.145) (0.147) 
                    -0.0220 0.0834 0.0135 -0.0796 0.2544 -0.0175 -0.1251 0.3937 -0.0263 
 (0.248) (0.134) (0.828) (0.215) (0.124) (0.925) (0.209) (0.125) (0.926) 
                    0.0003 -0.0099 -0.0000 0.0126 -0.0264 -0.0090 0.0195 -0.0389 -0.0136 
 (0.916) (0.268) (0.997) (0.144) (0.440) (0.799) (0.147) (0.477) (0.813) 
                  -0.0412 0.0386 0.0198 -0.1380 0.1445 0.0584 -0.2181 0.2135 0.0809 
 (0.231) (0.205) (0.749) (0.280) (0.175) (0.799) (0.275) (0.197) (0.819) 
                  -0.1263** -0.0167 0.0164 -0.4622** -0.0691 0.0462 -0.7177** -0.1151 0.0685 
 (0.040) (0.788) (0.781) (0.038) (0.750) (0.844) (0.039) (0.733) (0.853) 
     -0.0049 -0.3131* -0.0617 -0.0237 -0.3425* -0.0893 -0.0244 -0.3466* -0.0918 
 (0.946) (0.087) (0.730) (0.745) (0.056) (0.627) (0.738) (0.054) (0.618) 
     0.2743** -0.2941 -0.1343 0.2615** -0.3213 -0.1422 0.2617** -0.3231 -0.1424 
 
(0.017) (0.181) (0.436) (0.024) (0.133) (0.432) (0.024) (0.130) (0.433) 
R2 within 0.6566 0.0347 0.0623 0.6596 0.0368 0.0630 0.6597 0.0370 0.0629 
F-statistic 884.1859 78.6325 80.8514 1080.0429 125.1562 76.2454 1076.1438 127.5000 74.2406 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Funds 1462 1462 1462 1462 1462 1462 1462 1462 1462 
Observations 4981 4981 4981 4981 4981 4981 4981 4981 4981 
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I. Results for the inception decades with the linear, logarithmic, and cubic root functions 
(Chapter 3) 
 
 
Table I1.A. Results for the all-funds sample with                  sorted by the fund’s foundation decade. The PPB is the 
benchmark. The panel observations have a yearly frequency. The results are obtained using Driscoll-Kraay standard errors and 
fund fixed effects. P-values are in parentheses (* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01).  
 
 
Dependent     Sharpe      
Foundation Decade All 2000s 1990s 1980s 1970s All 2000s 1990s 1980s 1970s 
Constant 0.0486 0.1184* -0.0363 -0.0886 0.2819 0.0035 -0.0609 -0.1301 -0.0684 0.3457** 
 
(0.434) (0.083) (0.670) (0.394) (0.130) (0.964) (0.530) (0.238) (0.526) (0.039) 
          -0.0029 -0.0149 0.0099 0.0018 -0.0118 -0.0003 0.0150 0.0226** 0.0033 -0.0143 
 
(0.656) (0.326) (0.268) (0.773) (0.107) (0.966) (0.276) (0.031) (0.644) (0.131) 
        -0.5333*** -0.5884*** -0.4457*** -0.4328*** -0.3517*** -0.5564*** -0.5259*** -0.2962** -0.4164*** -0.4940*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.029) (0.000) (0.002) 
        0.0632 0.0095 0.1386* 0.1432** 0.2095** 0.0922 0.1683 0.3847*** 0.3413*** 0.5084** 
 
(0.396) (0.900) (0.098) (0.037) (0.036) (0.172) (0.125) (0.000) (0.008) (0.018) 
          0.0230 0.0407** -0.0065 0.0010 0.0550* 0.0413* 0.0781** -0.0388 -0.0741 -0.1495 
 
(0.139) (0.010) (0.627) (0.939) (0.073) (0.069) (0.013) (0.175) (0.121) (0.246) 
           0.0005 -0.0003 0.0010 0.0012 0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0056 0.0025 0.0025 -0.0008 
 
(0.813) (0.958) (0.607) (0.429) (0.929) (0.869) (0.400) (0.129) (0.106) (0.878) 
              0.0012 -0.0040 -0.0004 0.0058 -0.0152 0.0004 -0.0001 0.0002 0.0062 -0.0071 
 
(0.699) (0.507) (0.856) (0.243) (0.240) (0.876) (0.982) (0.933) (0.188) (0.564) 
        -0.0116 -0.3613* 0.2534* 0.0610 -0.0547 -0.0943 -0.5261* 0.5077 -0.0193 -0.3585 
 (0.917) (0.065) (0.086) (0.626) (0.803) (0.484) (0.078) (0.169) (0.896) (0.124) 
         0.0182 -0.2341 0.1267 0.0517 -0.0531 0.0177 -0.4398** 0.0863 -0.0699 -0.1934 
 (0.840) (0.159) (0.133) (0.636) (0.758) (0.861) (0.029) (0.452) (0.625) (0.568) 
          0.0262 -0.2368*** 0.1137 0.0709 -0.1050 -0.0230 -0.2400*** 0.0424 -0.0677 -0.0839 
 (0.710) (0.006) (0.199) (0.345) (0.372) (0.798) (0.006) (0.734) (0.545) (0.773) 
          0.0417 -0.0484 0.0388 0.0381 0.0851 0.0179 0.0435 -0.0240 -0.0244 -0.2159 
 (0.415) (0.307) (0.476) (0.410) (0.361) (0.752) (0.493) (0.686) (0.774) (0.243) 
                       0.0455 0.0850*** -0.0646 0.0125 0.0513** 
      (0.106) (0.009) (0.555) (0.619) (0.039) 
                        0.0050 0.0450 0.0211 0.0136 0.0078 
      (0.607) (0.178) (0.143) (0.463) (0.775) 
                         0.0073 -0.0181 0.0195* 0.0136 -0.0029 
      (0.131) (0.352) (0.086) (0.138) (0.876) 
                         0.0024 -0.0338 0.0114* 0.0035 0.0181** 
      (0.382) (0.164) (0.092) (0.527) (0.044) 
                         -0.0014** -0.0054** 0.0021 0.0032 0.0064 
      (0.025) (0.020) (0.190) (0.162) (0.115) 
                       0.0046 -0.0141 -0.0192** -0.0013 0.0056 
      (0.195) (0.213) (0.043) (0.861) (0.473) 
                       -0.0029 -0.0448*** -0.0308*** -0.0140* -0.0127 
           (0.350) (0.009) (0.000) (0.087) (0.217) 
R
2
 within 0.3960 0.4706 0.3755 0.2909 0.3525 0.4004 0.4805 0.4101 0.3112 0.3954 
F-statistic 41.8969 204254.9230 46.1868 29.9015 9.7116 57.8460 435.5905 643.8404 22.6813 17.6327 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Funds 4897 4207 326 326 38 4897 4207 326 326 38 
Observations 27978 17007 4159 6250 562 27978 17007 4159 6250 562 
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Table I1.B. Results for the all-funds sample with                  sorted by the fund’s foundation decade. The PPB is the 
benchmark. The panel observations have a yearly frequency. The results are obtained using Driscoll-Kraay standard errors and 
fund fixed effects. P-values are in parentheses (* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01).  
 
 
Dependent     RFund-RPPB      
Foundation Decade All 2000s 1990s 1980s 1970s All 2000s 1990s 1980s 1970s 
Constant -0.0139 -0.1259 0.0908 -0.0799 -0.0863 -0.0975 -0.2582 0.0840 -0.3085 -0.2078 
 
(0.907) (0.536) (0.534) (0.726) (0.815) (0.536) (0.182) (0.664) (0.267) (0.705) 
          -0.0140* -0.0317* 0.0052 -0.0068 -0.0109 -0.0083 -0.0200 0.0042 0.0075 -0.0117 
 
(0.065) (0.084) (0.469) (0.346) (0.396) (0.277) (0.447) (0.753) (0.444) (0.444) 
        0.0398 0.0075 0.1455 0.1297 -0.0824 0.0180 -0.1220* 0.1487 0.3853** -1.3831* 
 
(0.371) (0.899) (0.177) (0.186) (0.714) (0.702) (0.086) (0.456) (0.014) (0.060) 
        0.0475 0.0642 0.0646 0.0842 0.1251 0.0877 0.0525 0.2032 0.2831 0.8460 
 
(0.434) (0.555) (0.470) (0.267) (0.264) (0.306) (0.458) (0.212) (0.146) (0.215) 
          0.0361* 0.0745* -0.0238 0.0165 0.0458 0.0705* 0.1510*** -0.0910* 0.0866* 0.0867 
 
(0.098) (0.068) (0.309) (0.341) (0.119) (0.053) (0.003) (0.071) (0.065) (0.793) 
           0.0053* 0.0040 0.0062 0.0043 0.0074 0.0038 -0.0076 0.0084** 0.0044 -0.0017 
 
(0.067) (0.233) (0.132) (0.376) (0.625) (0.182) (0.119) (0.044) (0.377) (0.932) 
              0.0137*** 0.0081 0.0048 0.0270** 0.0349** 0.0120*** 0.0117* 0.0052 0.0282** 0.0568** 
 
(0.003) (0.159) (0.225) (0.016) (0.028) (0.005) (0.053) (0.193) (0.011) (0.041) 
        -0.1209 -0.5783* -0.1544 0.1642 0.2795 -0.2350 -0.7830 1.2037 0.1545 0.4501 
 (0.559) (0.061) (0.519) (0.501) (0.344) (0.504) (0.135) (0.113) (0.773) (0.379) 
         -0.3293* -0.4106** -0.3325** -0.3019 -0.1610 -0.4595* -0.9399** -0.1072 -0.5392 0.9993 
 (0.060) (0.035) (0.018) (0.171) (0.781) (0.053) (0.029) (0.690) (0.255) (0.368) 
          -0.1216 -0.2687* -0.2052 -0.0539 0.2020 -0.2531* -0.3932* -0.4638** -0.0624 0.5464 
 (0.200) (0.089) (0.178) (0.613) (0.321) (0.068) (0.062) (0.033) (0.742) (0.345) 
          -0.0340 -0.0863 -0.0719 -0.0273 0.0813 -0.0461 0.0806 -0.2552* -0.0017 -0.2844 
 (0.601) (0.135) (0.400) (0.720) (0.397) (0.586) (0.463) (0.069) (0.991) (0.745) 
                       0.0825 0.1298* -0.2923 0.0531 -0.0113 
      (0.261) (0.087) (0.160) (0.672) (0.877) 
                        0.0411* 0.1183 0.0389 0.0683 -0.1620 
      (0.086) (0.154) (0.428) (0.290) (0.135) 
                         0.0191** -0.0328 0.0801** 0.0042 -0.0285 
      (0.037) (0.314) (0.019) (0.769) (0.469) 
                         0.0003 -0.0572 0.0424** -0.0028 0.0230 
      (0.952) (0.162) (0.040) (0.752) (0.637) 
                         -0.0028** -0.0111*** 0.0047* -0.0033 -0.0016 
      (0.029) (0.000) (0.056) (0.113) (0.871) 
                       0.0052 0.0399*** -0.0009 -0.0188** 0.0555** 
      (0.173) (0.004) (0.951) (0.012) (0.028) 
                       -0.0038 -0.0004 -0.0170 -0.0152 -0.0304 
           (0.417) (0.982) (0.186) (0.154) (0.244) 
R
2
 within 0.0062 0.0084 0.0126 0.0163 0.0505 0.0093 0.0153 0.0241 0.0246 0.1796 
F-statistic 2.2117 222.4513 2.0354 1.8082 6.9635 66.5454 239.0277 38.2582 3.9806 104.7953 
p-value 0.0479 0.0000 0.0876 0.1056 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0006 0.0000 
Funds 4897 4207 326 326 38 4897 4207 326 326 38 
Observations 27978 17007 4159 6250 562 27978 17007 4159 6250 562 
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Table I1.C. Results for the all-funds sample with                  sorted by the fund’s foundation decade. The PPB is the 
benchmark. The panel observations have a yearly frequency. The results are obtained using Driscoll-Kraay standard errors and 
fund fixed effects. P-values are in parentheses (* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01).  
 
 
Dependent     M2      
Foundation Decade All 2000s 1990s 1980s 1970s All 2000s 1990s 1980s 1970s 
Constant 0.0378 0.0189 -0.0161 -0.0905 0.1130 -0.0223 0.0652 -0.0705 -0.3633 -0.0346 
 
(0.808) (0.942) (0.921) (0.636) (0.754) (0.913) (0.807) (0.724) (0.110) (0.940) 
          -0.0039 -0.0094 0.0189* -0.0013 -0.0088 -0.0003 -0.0192 0.0226 0.0157** -0.0099 
 
(0.575) (0.711) (0.061) (0.806) (0.451) (0.964) (0.536) (0.104) (0.046) (0.444) 
        -0.0534 -0.0994 0.0029 0.0531 0.1722 -0.0807 -0.2500* 0.0358 0.3482** -0.2387 
 
(0.362) (0.252) (0.978) (0.526) (0.141) (0.245) (0.062) (0.835) (0.017) (0.277) 
        -0.1556** -0.1683 -0.1282 -0.0828 0.0351 -0.1422* -0.1732 0.0121 0.1166 0.4722 
 
(0.014) (0.112) (0.180) (0.246) (0.662) (0.073) (0.104) (0.939) (0.356) (0.154) 
          0.0442* 0.0661 -0.0092 0.0237 0.0617** 0.0725* 0.0766 -0.0325 0.1078** 0.1617 
 
(0.083) (0.132) (0.733) (0.117) (0.020) (0.064) (0.113) (0.361) (0.024) (0.580) 
           0.0007 -0.0094 0.0069 0.0021 0.0054 -0.0005 -0.0123 0.0079* 0.0021 -0.0017 
 
(0.840) (0.247) (0.150) (0.622) (0.646) (0.871) (0.147) (0.079) (0.613) (0.908) 
              0.0160** 0.0228 0.0068 0.0245** 0.0086 0.0145** 0.0241 0.0068 0.0258** 0.0289 
 
(0.043) (0.153) (0.358) (0.021) (0.653) (0.049) (0.133) (0.403) (0.016) (0.186) 
        0.0521 -0.4117 0.1655 0.2462 0.1723 0.0222 -0.7612 1.4845* 0.2657 0.2499 
 (0.802) (0.207) (0.556) (0.200) (0.442) (0.942) (0.128) (0.051) (0.481) (0.573) 
         -0.1300 -0.1692 -0.1088 -0.1684 -0.2560 -0.1772 -0.4938 0.0944 -0.2873 -1.3335** 
 (0.357) (0.447) (0.357) (0.260) (0.342) (0.330) (0.148) (0.689) (0.334) (0.017) 
          -0.0031 -0.2111 -0.0642 0.0505 0.1186 -0.0999 -0.3712** -0.2446 0.1185 -0.1074 
 (0.973) (0.178) (0.671) (0.547) (0.396) (0.443) (0.019) (0.254) (0.370) (0.776) 
          0.0351 -0.0055 0.0011 0.0071 0.1176 0.0266 0.0802 -0.1396* 0.0927 -0.2194 
 (0.548) (0.927) (0.987) (0.899) (0.264) (0.680) (0.150) (0.085) (0.396) (0.717) 
                       0.0415 0.0650* -0.3191* 0.0419 -0.0385 
      (0.386) (0.094) (0.089) (0.617) (0.630) 
                        0.0196 0.0255 0.0240 0.0445 0.1391** 
      (0.368) (0.724) (0.550) (0.310) (0.033) 
                         0.0145 -0.0191 0.0582** -0.0051 0.0166 
      (0.156) (0.545) (0.035) (0.671) (0.533) 
                         0.0002 -0.0418* 0.0324** -0.0083 0.0191 
      (0.958) (0.092) (0.033) (0.210) (0.568) 
                         -0.0023** -0.0015 0.0017 -0.0040** -0.0029 
      (0.041) (0.456) (0.442) (0.044) (0.747) 
                       0.0054 0.0437** -0.0046 -0.0217*** 0.0169* 
      (0.245) (0.038) (0.733) (0.005) (0.086) 
                       -0.0006 -0.0007 -0.0178 -0.0154** -0.0187 
           (0.900) (0.974) (0.129) (0.040) (0.130) 
R
2
 within 0.0223 0.0358 0.0200 0.0166 0.0649 0.0244 0.0398 0.0286 0.0258 0.1168 
F-statistic 3.6566 3624.8435 3.8551 3.0085 14.9452 38.3135 492.6161 97.6977 4.0719 6.3188 
p-value 0.0032 0.0000 0.0056 0.0104 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0005 0.0000 
Funds 4897 4207 326 326 38 4897 4207 326 326 38 
Observations 27978 17007 4159 6250 562 27978 17007 4159 6250 562 
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Table I2.A. Results for the all-funds sample with             (        )  sorted by the fund’s foundation decade. The PPB is 
the benchmark. The panel observations have a yearly frequency. The results are obtained using Driscoll-Kraay standard errors 
and fund fixed effects. P-values are in parentheses (* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01).  
 
 
Dependent     Sharpe      
Foundation Decade All 2000s 1990s 1980s 1970s All 2000s 1990s 1980s 1970s 
Constant -0.0177 0.1263 -0.0660 -0.1385 0.6412** -0.0720 -0.1057 -0.2215 0.0059 1.1576** 
 
(0.834) (0.157) (0.484) (0.134) (0.049) (0.521) (0.420) (0.111) (0.979) (0.024) 
          0.0402 -0.0137 0.0516 0.0285 -0.1917** 0.0464 0.1353** 0.1500** -0.0108 -0.3580** 
 
(0.325) (0.831) (0.173) (0.332) (0.032) (0.403) (0.030) (0.021) (0.904) (0.049) 
        -0.5338*** -0.5899*** -0.4469*** -0.4326*** -0.3516*** -0.5746*** -0.4724*** -0.1482 -0.4656** -0.7091** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.384) (0.014) (0.027) 
        0.0641 0.0110 0.1368 0.1430** 0.2104** 0.1242* 0.2919** 0.5503*** 0.4228* 0.6172 
 
(0.375) (0.883) (0.103) (0.038) (0.033) (0.085) (0.042) (0.000) (0.056) (0.186) 
          0.0129 0.0295** -0.0015 0.0011 0.0460 0.0486** 0.0535* -0.0917 -0.1459 -0.3575 
 
(0.345) (0.042) (0.937) (0.947) (0.216) (0.032) (0.059) (0.188) (0.289) (0.377) 
           0.0011 0.0012 0.0006 0.0012 0.0016 -0.0001 -0.0012 0.0021 0.0021 -0.0005 
 
(0.632) (0.839) (0.795) (0.518) (0.641) (0.974) (0.855) (0.150) (0.174) (0.939) 
              0.0006 -0.0049 -0.0007 0.0057 -0.0179 0.0004 -0.0027 -0.0009 0.0057 -0.0106 
 
(0.818) (0.395) (0.740) (0.249) (0.153) (0.882) (0.642) (0.647) (0.241) (0.400) 
        0.1213 -0.2395 0.2100* 0.0873 -0.1503 -0.0435 -0.3903* 0.6302 -0.1294 -1.1932** 
 (0.224) (0.212) (0.083) (0.223) (0.438) (0.737) (0.062) (0.314) (0.625) (0.027) 
         0.1135 -0.1352 0.0901* 0.0697 -0.0802 0.0917 -0.2888* 0.0426 -0.1721 -0.7122 
 (0.166) (0.382) (0.093) (0.345) (0.511) (0.538) (0.070) (0.715) (0.529) (0.347) 
          0.0865 -0.1737** 0.0991 0.0806 -0.1068 0.0104 -0.0737 0.0181 -0.1694 -0.5928 
 (0.186) (0.017) (0.180) (0.147) (0.266) (0.934) (0.343) (0.910) (0.500) (0.367) 
          0.0770 -0.0072 0.0334 0.0432 0.0919 0.0376 0.1441 -0.0006 -0.0826 -1.0191** 
 (0.142) (0.891) (0.439) (0.203) (0.217) (0.672) (0.262) (0.993) (0.698) (0.028) 
                       0.1296* 0.2184*** -0.3016 0.0798 0.5185*** 
      (0.074) (0.003) (0.482) (0.536) (0.008) 
                        0.0117 0.1256 0.0439 0.0922 0.2247 
      (0.856) (0.245) (0.471) (0.470) (0.413) 
                         0.0343 -0.0735 0.0642 0.1006 0.1685 
      (0.397) (0.333) (0.364) (0.320) (0.464) 
                         0.0153 -0.1139 0.0225 0.0424 0.3865*** 
      (0.582) (0.268) (0.525) (0.597) (0.008) 
                         -0.0124* -0.0144** 0.0310 0.0465 0.1171 
      (0.098) (0.041) (0.219) (0.308) (0.313) 
                       0.0272 -0.0759 -0.1508** 0.0125 0.1138 
      (0.357) (0.174) (0.036) (0.871) (0.323) 
                       -0.0309 -0.1988** -0.2047*** -0.1088 -0.1300 
           (0.306) (0.013) (0.006) (0.213) (0.425) 
R
2
 within 0.3967 0.4693 0.3751 0.2912 0.3526 0.3998 0.4793 0.4043 0.3027 0.3783 
F-statistic 24.4388 17544.1757 18.8459 30.4101 9.8680 56.7350 858.3168 176.1749 24.4062 20.2289 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Funds 4897 4207 326 326 38 4897 4207 326 326 38 
Observations 27978 17007 4159 6250 562 27978 17007 4159 6250 562 
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Table I2.B. Results for the all-funds sample with             (        ) sorted by the fund’s foundation decade. The PPB is 
the benchmark. The panel observations have a yearly frequency. The results are obtained using Driscoll-Kraay standard errors 
and fund fixed effects. P-values are in parentheses (* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01).  
 
 
Dependent     RFund-RPPB      
Foundation Decade All 2000s 1990s 1980s 1970s All 2000s 1990s 1980s 1970s 
Constant -0.1484 -0.1185 0.0464 -0.2593 0.4424 -0.2269 -0.1861 0.1354 -0.4906 0.4864 
 
(0.351) (0.610) (0.825) (0.439) (0.676) (0.239) (0.293) (0.655) (0.297) (0.665) 
          0.0479 -0.0046 0.0435 0.0253 -0.2362 0.0209 -0.0408 0.0157 0.1143 -0.3102 
 
(0.216) (0.930) (0.451) (0.783) (0.458) (0.705) (0.710) (0.880) (0.405) (0.316) 
        0.0359 0.0042 0.1435 0.1283 -0.0813 -0.0829 -0.3011*** 0.1619 0.7165*** -3.2637** 
 
(0.420) (0.940) (0.175) (0.198) (0.717) (0.225) (0.004) (0.618) (0.005) (0.041) 
        0.0464 0.0677 0.0624 0.0832 0.1273 0.1001 -0.0002 0.3665 0.5768 2.0019 
 
(0.465) (0.567) (0.478) (0.271) (0.250) (0.297) (0.997) (0.165) (0.164) (0.232) 
          0.0122 0.0451 -0.0238 0.0059 0.0420 0.1257*** 0.1457*** -0.1990* 0.2129* 0.0721 
 
(0.498) (0.124) (0.277) (0.775) (0.162) (0.002) (0.002) (0.082) (0.051) (0.937) 
           0.0073** 0.0075** 0.0061 0.0053 0.0076 0.0034 -0.0037 0.0085* 0.0044 -0.0059 
 
(0.019) (0.033) (0.147) (0.285) (0.558) (0.256) (0.314) (0.053) (0.371) (0.795) 
              0.0134*** 0.0053 0.0045 0.0274** 0.0316** 0.0120*** 0.0090 0.0034 0.0275*** 0.0628** 
 
(0.002) (0.261) (0.236) (0.013) (0.045) (0.003) (0.115) (0.382) (0.009) (0.045) 
        0.2229 -0.2662 -0.1403 0.3448 0.1055 -0.1442 -0.4916 1.7303 0.0577 0.0370 
 (0.257) (0.287) (0.609) (0.115) (0.840) (0.701) (0.263) (0.134) (0.937) (0.977) 
         -0.0740 -0.1612 -0.3255* -0.1694 -0.2432 -0.5131 -0.8290* -0.1572 -0.8554 1.5276 
 (0.682) (0.353) (0.056) (0.306) (0.578) (0.106) (0.068) (0.737) (0.186) (0.457) 
          0.0493 -0.1094 -0.1947 0.0363 0.1631 -0.3152* -0.1189 -0.8124** -0.2373 0.1553 
 (0.573) (0.235) (0.234) (0.740) (0.552) (0.089) (0.623) (0.010) (0.491) (0.899) 
          0.0660 0.0206 -0.0657 0.0290 0.0664 -0.0177 0.1559 -0.5151** -0.0432 -1.5075 
 (0.384) (0.815) (0.497) (0.675) (0.535) (0.893) (0.547) (0.026) (0.886) (0.414) 
                       0.2961 0.3872* -1.1141 0.2236 0.1042 
      (0.141) (0.092) (0.156) (0.583) (0.869) 
                        0.2669** 0.4904* 0.1120 0.4039 -0.8869 
      (0.020) (0.070) (0.640) (0.166) (0.293) 
                         0.1632** -0.0872 0.4788*** 0.0989 0.0048 
      (0.013) (0.492) (0.004) (0.445) (0.991) 
                         0.0221 -0.1198 0.2911** 0.0024 0.5632 
      (0.593) (0.564) (0.012) (0.982) (0.373) 
                         -0.0392*** -0.0430* 0.0640* -0.0645* -0.0107 
      (0.002) (0.051) (0.084) (0.060) (0.967) 
                       0.0766** 0.2269*** -0.0144 -0.2336** 1.0302** 
      (0.033) (0.002) (0.906) (0.010) (0.030) 
                       -0.0271 0.0369 -0.1490 -0.1979 -0.5957 
           (0.397) (0.687) (0.154) (0.187) (0.246) 
R
2
 within 0.0054 0.0070 0.0128 0.0159 0.0514 0.0103 0.0139 0.0286 0.0273 0.1945 
F-statistic 1.8779 199.0063 3.0194 1.5157 5.3819 48.2014 1.3174 371.1363 4.8691 76.7434 
p-value 0.0921 0.0000 0.0184 0.1858 0.0002 0.0000 0.3461 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 
Funds 4897 4207 326 326 38 4897 4207 326 326 38 
Observations 27978 17007 4159 6250 562 27978 17007 4159 6250 562 
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Table I2.C. Results for the all-funds sample with             (        ) sorted by the fund’s foundation decade. The PPB is 
the benchmark. The panel observations have a yearly frequency. The results are obtained using Driscoll-Kraay standard errors 
and fund fixed effects. P-values are in parentheses (* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01).  
 
 
Dependent     M2      
Foundation Decade All 2000s 1990s 1980s 1970s All 2000s 1990s 1980s 1970s 
Constant -0.0712 0.0278 -0.1644 -0.1822 -0.1635 -0.0962 0.0832 -0.1644 -0.7330* 0.6528 
 
(0.733) (0.920) (0.390) (0.481) (0.850) (0.709) (0.749) (0.555) (0.061) (0.487) 
          0.0701 -0.0190 0.1511** 0.0252 0.0205 0.0483 -0.0560 0.1645 0.2267** -0.2927 
 
(0.144) (0.827) (0.020) (0.677) (0.932) (0.483) (0.692) (0.111) (0.049) (0.259) 
        -0.0539 -0.1003 -0.0039 0.0528 0.1693 -0.1725* -0.3987** 0.0926 0.7418** -0.6821 
 
(0.334) (0.240) (0.970) (0.531) (0.145) (0.089) (0.038) (0.750) (0.012) (0.162) 
        -0.1536** -0.1676 -0.1356 -0.0833 0.0322 -0.1397 -0.1504 0.1259 0.3880 1.0491 
 
(0.018) (0.119) (0.153) (0.243) (0.687) (0.173) (0.333) (0.607) (0.155) (0.194) 
          0.0281 0.0613* -0.0077 0.0201 0.0424* 0.0886** 0.0841* -0.1182 0.2900*** 0.4069 
 
(0.173) (0.082) (0.771) (0.262) (0.080) (0.019) (0.052) (0.206) (0.010) (0.621) 
           0.0017 -0.0087 0.0063 0.0024 0.0086 -0.0005 -0.0127* 0.0079* 0.0017 -0.0038 
 
(0.627) (0.249) (0.171) (0.574) (0.424) (0.886) (0.052) (0.086) (0.662) (0.815) 
              0.0150* 0.0226 0.0058 0.0246** 0.0088 0.0142* 0.0243 0.0047 0.0252** 0.0305 
 
(0.055) (0.142) (0.438) (0.020) (0.641) (0.068) (0.113) (0.564) (0.015) (0.188) 
        0.2615 -0.3576 0.1983 0.3247* 0.3379 0.1220 -0.7215* 2.2094** 0.3907 -0.1855 
 (0.194) (0.168) (0.499) (0.057) (0.368) (0.716) (0.058) (0.050) (0.438) (0.851) 
         0.0192 -0.1236 -0.0963 -0.1114 -0.1180 -0.1621 -0.4430 0.2353 -0.4097 -3.3108** 
 (0.888) (0.506) (0.431) (0.322) (0.625) (0.546) (0.271) (0.562) (0.336) (0.013) 
          0.0901 -0.1820* -0.0349 0.0878 0.2203 -0.1240 -0.2622 -0.4134 0.1631 -0.9560 
 (0.357) (0.084) (0.809) (0.330) (0.203) (0.578) (0.160) (0.149) (0.556) (0.244) 
          0.0896 0.0123 0.0192 0.0298 0.1813* 0.0727 0.2033 -0.2610** 0.2217 -1.3236 
 (0.204) (0.823) (0.787) (0.557) (0.078) (0.437) (0.112) (0.043) (0.352) (0.289) 
                       0.1088 0.1957 -1.3157* 0.0648 -0.0123 
      (0.423) (0.114) (0.068) (0.811) (0.980) 
                        0.1073 0.0968 -0.0505 0.2345 1.3390** 
      (0.337) (0.693) (0.809) (0.254) (0.023) 
                         0.0971 -0.0775 0.2998* -0.0411 0.3799 
      (0.225) (0.518) (0.050) (0.722) (0.196) 
                         -0.0025 -0.1830* 0.1835** -0.0952 0.4915 
      (0.928) (0.079) (0.020) (0.262) (0.244) 
                         -0.0212** -0.0111 0.0397 -0.0860** -0.0952 
      (0.039) (0.599) (0.204) (0.014) (0.681) 
                       0.0724 0.2199** -0.0514 -0.2747** 0.2717 
      (0.122) (0.031) (0.685) (0.011) (0.107) 
                       -0.0064 -0.0182 -0.1289 -0.1908* -0.3245 
           (0.879) (0.862) (0.163) (0.068) (0.190) 
R
2
 within 0.0229 0.0357 0.0222 0.0167 0.0633 0.0252 0.0412 0.0330 0.0295 0.1167 
F-statistic 4.2511 3027.6704 12.6030 2.9857 12.5562 22.2882 168.7397 93.4078 5.2733 8.1413 
p-value 0.0012 0.0000 0.0000 0.0109 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 
Funds 4897 4207 326 326 38 4897 4207 326 326 38 
Observations 27978 17007 4159 6250 562 27978 17007 4159 6250 562 
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Table I3.A. Results for the all-funds sample with           √       
  sorted by the fund’s foundation decade. The PPB is the 
benchmark. The panel observations have a yearly frequency. The results are obtained using Driscoll-Kraay standard errors and 
fund fixed effects. P-values are in parentheses (* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01).  
 
 
Dependent     Sharpe      
Foundation Decade All 2000s 1990s 1980s 1970s All 2000s 1990s 1980s 1970s 
Constant -0.0373 0.1415 -0.1134 -0.1494 0.7134** -0.0871 -0.2164 -0.3426* -0.0250 1.0697** 
 
(0.736) (0.277) (0.334) (0.224) (0.033) (0.533) (0.217) (0.063) (0.920) (0.030) 
          0.0501 -0.0261 0.0807 0.0363 -0.2414** 0.0514 0.1964** 0.2221** 0.0025 -0.3687* 
 
(0.429) (0.790) (0.173) (0.459) (0.029) (0.518) (0.034) (0.022) (0.982) (0.062) 
        -0.5341*** -0.5899*** -0.4470*** -0.4327*** -0.3514*** -0.5972*** -0.4165** -0.0559 -0.4518** -0.7119** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.021) (0.792) (0.049) (0.042) 
        0.0635 0.0109 0.1369 0.1430** 0.2107** 0.1408* 0.4489** 0.6990*** 0.5080* 0.7165 
 
(0.381) (0.884) (0.103) (0.038) (0.033) (0.077) (0.028) (0.000) (0.057) (0.154) 
          0.0137 0.0303** -0.0027 0.0009 0.0501 0.0624** 0.0736** -0.1069 -0.1688 -0.3858 
 
(0.305) (0.038) (0.879) (0.957) (0.160) (0.034) (0.043) (0.150) (0.234) (0.277) 
           0.0011 0.0011 0.0007 0.0012 0.0010 -0.0002 -0.0018 0.0023 0.0023 -0.0005 
 
(0.621) (0.847) (0.769) (0.494) (0.778) (0.916) (0.787) (0.125) (0.141) (0.938) 
              0.0008 -0.0048 -0.0007 0.0058 -0.0172 0.0004 -0.0023 -0.0008 0.0058 -0.0095 
 
(0.770) (0.405) (0.746) (0.247) (0.167) (0.875) (0.691) (0.695) (0.231) (0.448) 
        0.1152 -0.2474 0.2231* 0.0838 -0.1447 -0.1839 -0.5909** 0.9128 -0.1574 -1.2511** 
 (0.279) (0.202) (0.068) (0.311) (0.482) (0.314) (0.015) (0.357) (0.635) (0.020) 
         0.1106 -0.1413 0.1005* 0.0675 -0.0906 0.0511 -0.4076* 0.0099 -0.2235 -0.6461 
 (0.201) (0.367) (0.063) (0.401) (0.510) (0.788) (0.052) (0.953) (0.499) (0.434) 
          0.0862 -0.1776** 0.1047 0.0799 -0.1186 -0.0416 -0.0195 -0.0420 -0.2285 -0.4680 
 (0.205) (0.017) (0.163) (0.169) (0.242) (0.784) (0.861) (0.839) (0.414) (0.504) 
          0.0768 -0.0099 0.0358 0.0430 0.0828 0.0135 0.2387 -0.0406 -0.0930 -0.9713** 
 (0.157) (0.848) (0.425) (0.219) (0.294) (0.893) (0.257) (0.664) (0.682) (0.030) 
                       0.2128* 0.3363*** -0.4663 0.1042 0.6054** 
      (0.060) (0.003) (0.484) (0.561) (0.011) 
                        0.0307 0.1921 0.0783 0.1282 0.2268 
      (0.737) (0.247) (0.396) (0.451) (0.510) 
                         0.0603 -0.1145 0.1084 0.1392 0.1394 
      (0.281) (0.329) (0.277) (0.264) (0.616) 
                         0.0259 -0.1777 0.0487 0.0513 0.4151*** 
      (0.480) (0.268) (0.337) (0.588) (0.010) 
                         -0.0191* -0.0251** 0.0406 0.0598 0.1382 
      (0.066) (0.031) (0.174) (0.252) (0.219) 
                       0.0411 -0.1112 -0.2090** 0.0077 0.1264 
      (0.311) (0.179) (0.036) (0.940) (0.361) 
                       -0.0409 -0.2992** -0.2958*** -0.1564 -0.1796 
           (0.303) (0.015) (0.004) (0.175) (0.352) 
R
2
 within 0.3964 0.4694 0.3753 0.2911 0.3533 0.4000 0.4793 0.4063 0.3050 0.3832 
F-statistic 26.2836 19559.0656 19.5254 30.3310 9.9736 60.8411 835.0862 233.5815 23.9402 18.3469 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Funds 4897 4207 326 326 38 4897 4207 326 326 38 
Observations 27978 17007 4159 6250 562 27978 17007 4159 6250 562 
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Table I3.B. Results for the all-funds sample with           √       
  sorted by the fund’s foundation decade. The PPB is the 
benchmark. The panel observations have a yearly frequency. The results are obtained using Driscoll-Kraay standard errors and 
fund fixed effects. P-values are in parentheses (* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01).  
 
 
Dependent     RFund-RPPB      
Foundation Decade All 2000s 1990s 1980s 1970s All 2000s 1990s 1980s 1970s 
Constant -0.1547 -0.1112 0.0194 -0.2086 0.4748 -0.1962 -0.1592 0.0986 -0.5264 0.3811 
 
(0.391) (0.664) (0.937) (0.578) (0.641) (0.386) (0.484) (0.780) (0.300) (0.730) 
          0.0476 -0.0116 0.0604 0.0080 -0.2783 0.0025 -0.0671 0.0311 0.1408 -0.3078 
 
(0.417) (0.886) (0.473) (0.947) (0.419) (0.975) (0.685) (0.828) (0.399) (0.360) 
        0.0355 0.0042 0.1438 0.1284 -0.0813 -0.1164 -0.4768*** 0.1684 0.8080*** -3.3341** 
 
(0.425) (0.940) (0.174) (0.196) (0.717) (0.168) (0.003) (0.669) (0.006) (0.037) 
        0.0455 0.0677 0.0628 0.0835 0.1272 0.1250 -0.0235 0.4611 0.6462 2.0057 
 
(0.472) (0.567) (0.476) (0.268) (0.251) (0.283) (0.847) (0.157) (0.160) (0.227) 
          0.0146 0.0458 -0.0239 0.0073 0.0455 0.1477*** 0.1875*** -0.2219* 0.2137* 0.0632 
 
(0.417) (0.123) (0.269) (0.718) (0.142) (0.004) (0.003) (0.064) (0.059) (0.939) 
           0.0072** 0.0074** 0.0061 0.0051 0.0072 0.0034 -0.0041 0.0085** 0.0044 -0.0043 
 
(0.020) (0.034) (0.143) (0.300) (0.596) (0.244) (0.279) (0.046) (0.371) (0.844) 
              0.0137*** 0.0054 0.0046 0.0274** 0.0326** 0.0120*** 0.0093 0.0037 0.0276*** 0.0614** 
 
(0.002) (0.257) (0.234) (0.014) (0.037) (0.003) (0.109) (0.354) (0.009) (0.044) 
        0.1976 -0.2729 -0.1413 0.3035 0.1341 -0.4961 -0.8583 2.7612 -0.1486 0.2174 
 (0.313) (0.277) (0.606) (0.173) (0.770) (0.359) (0.149) (0.135) (0.889) (0.883) 
         -0.0902 -0.1663 -0.3253* -0.1989 -0.2405 -0.7834** -1.2697* -0.2588 -1.1630 2.4007 
 (0.612) (0.338) (0.056) (0.253) (0.603) (0.046) (0.052) (0.691) (0.182) (0.334) 
          0.0412 -0.1126 -0.1958 0.0177 0.1591 -0.4689** -0.0559 -1.1848*** -0.2543 0.4078 
 (0.641) (0.227) (0.234) (0.872) (0.540) (0.043) (0.840) (0.007) (0.524) (0.764) 
          0.0612 0.0182 -0.0666 0.0180 0.0614 -0.0542 0.2557 -0.7446** -0.0192 -1.3812 
 (0.421) (0.833) (0.492) (0.799) (0.550) (0.721) (0.553) (0.019) (0.954) (0.492) 
                       0.5011 0.6132* -1.7484 0.3548 0.0395 
      (0.116) (0.082) (0.155) (0.576) (0.960) 
                        0.4173** 0.7604* 0.1982 0.5994 -1.3904 
      (0.014) (0.069) (0.584) (0.172) (0.230) 
                         0.2436** -0.1376 0.7194*** 0.1170 -0.0994 
      (0.011) (0.478) (0.004) (0.488) (0.859) 
                         0.0347 -0.1879 0.4370** -0.0074 0.5822 
      (0.540) (0.560) (0.012) (0.955) (0.450) 
                         -0.0519*** -0.0675** 0.0812* -0.0723* -0.0091 
      (0.004) (0.043) (0.065) (0.072) (0.971) 
                       0.0980** 0.3385*** -0.0182 -0.2967*** 1.1646** 
      (0.043) (0.002) (0.913) (0.009) (0.027) 
                       -0.0406 0.0513 -0.2080 -0.2483 -0.6630 
           (0.373) (0.712) (0.153) (0.177) (0.240) 
R
2
 within 0.0053 0.0070 0.0128 0.0158 0.0514 0.0102 0.0140 0.0286 0.0270 0.1924 
F-statistic 1.8383 198.4431 2.8897 1.5289 5.6084 57.1964 608.2924 476.7415 4.6164 63.7747 
p-value 0.0995 0.0000 0.0224 0.1812 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002 0.0000 
Funds 4897 4207 326 326 38 4897 4207 326 326 38 
Observations 27978 17007 4159 6250 562 27978 17007 4159 6250 562 
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Table I3.C. Results for the all-funds sample with           √       
  sorted by the fund’s foundation decade. The PPB is the 
benchmark. The panel observations have a yearly frequency. The results are obtained using Driscoll-Kraay standard errors and 
fund fixed effects. P-values are in parentheses (* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01).  
 
 
Dependent     M2      
Foundation Decade All 2000s 1990s 1980s 1970s All 2000s 1990s 1980s 1970s 
Constant -0.1071 0.0453 -0.2815 -0.1755 0.0325 -0.1152 0.1275 -0.3046 -0.7913* 0.5392 
 
(0.644) (0.885) (0.214) (0.535) (0.971) (0.697) (0.704) (0.350) (0.056) (0.558) 
          0.0886 -0.0314 0.2236** 0.0255 -0.0434 0.0530 -0.0900 0.2454* 0.2763** -0.2856 
 
(0.204) (0.816) (0.021) (0.746) (0.876) (0.575) (0.674) (0.086) (0.043) (0.310) 
        -0.0544 -0.1003 -0.0035 0.0527 0.1703 -0.2043 -0.5678** 0.1152 0.8450** -0.7367 
 
(0.331) (0.241) (0.973) (0.530) (0.143) (0.101) (0.035) (0.748) (0.011) (0.146) 
        -0.1547** -0.1677 -0.1347 -0.0832 0.0335 -0.1343 -0.1327 0.2146 0.4637 1.0864 
 
(0.017) (0.119) (0.156) (0.243) (0.676) (0.273) (0.553) (0.472) (0.127) (0.172) 
          0.0293 0.0617* -0.0099 0.0203 0.0473* 0.1106** 0.0967 -0.1314 0.2793** 0.3237 
 
(0.162) (0.083) (0.714) (0.244) (0.065) (0.022) (0.101) (0.174) (0.016) (0.664) 
           0.0017 -0.0087 0.0064 0.0024 0.0077 -0.0007 -0.0130* 0.0081* 0.0019 -0.0029 
 
(0.626) (0.247) (0.163) (0.579) (0.490) (0.843) (0.051) (0.077) (0.641) (0.852) 
              0.0153* 0.0226 0.0059 0.0247** 0.0082 0.0142* 0.0245 0.0049 0.0253** 0.0303 
 
(0.053) (0.141) (0.431) (0.021) (0.665) (0.067) (0.110) (0.547) (0.015) (0.183) 
        0.2527 -0.3618 0.2164 0.3113* 0.2593 -0.0221 -0.8993** 3.3929* 0.2624 0.1720 
 (0.214) (0.170) (0.461) (0.073) (0.451) (0.960) (0.049) (0.053) (0.717) (0.885) 
         0.0154 -0.1270 -0.0804 -0.1208 -0.1730 -0.2904 -0.5256 0.2468 -0.6403 -3.7713** 
 (0.911) (0.501) (0.503) (0.307) (0.485) (0.395) (0.364) (0.657) (0.263) (0.016) 
          0.0904 -0.1842* -0.0283 0.0823 0.1835 -0.2263 -0.2103 -0.6608* 0.1896 -0.8851 
 (0.360) (0.086) (0.845) (0.356) (0.286) (0.394) (0.388) (0.090) (0.548) (0.320) 
          0.0898 0.0108 0.0213 0.0267 0.1600 0.0532 0.3383 -0.4245** 0.2657 -1.1889 
 (0.204) (0.841) (0.762) (0.606) (0.125) (0.600) (0.106) (0.022) (0.299) (0.383) 
                       0.1924 0.3026 -2.0413* 0.1382 -0.1697 
      (0.359) (0.110) (0.070) (0.745) (0.798) 
                        0.1786 0.1438 -0.0308 0.3746 1.7270** 
      (0.277) (0.702) (0.922) (0.218) (0.027) 
                         0.1524 -0.1133 0.4656** -0.0566 0.4056 
      (0.169) (0.537) (0.040) (0.699) (0.265) 
                         0.0033 -0.2693* 0.2884** -0.1238 0.5009 
      (0.930) (0.097) (0.015) (0.224) (0.334) 
                         -0.0321** -0.0179 0.0494 -0.0925** -0.0790 
      (0.026) (0.580) (0.181) (0.022) (0.733) 
                       0.0926 0.3271** -0.0662 -0.3469*** 0.3200* 
      (0.142) (0.033) (0.699) (0.009) (0.097) 
                       -0.0091 -0.0298 -0.1833 -0.2430* -0.3735 
           (0.873) (0.851) (0.153) (0.058) (0.166) 
R
2
 within 0.0227 0.0357 0.0221 0.0166 0.0633 0.0251 0.0411 0.0331 0.0290 0.1174 
F-statistic 4.6241 3043.3850 12.5500 2.9815 13.2553 29.1649 95.0213 118.0080 5.0568 7.7580 
p-value 0.0006 0.0000 0.0000 0.0110 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 
Funds 4897 4207 326 326 38 4897 4207 326 326 38 
Observations 27978 17007 4159 6250 562 27978 17007 4159 6250 562 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
229 
 
J. Regression results for the quarterly sample (Chapter 3) 
Table J.A. Results for the all-funds sample. The PPB is the benchmark. The panel observations have a quarterly frequency. The results are obtained using Driscoll-Kraay standard 
errors and fund fixed effects. P-values are in parentheses (* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01). 
                              √      
  √      
  
Dependent Sharpe RFund-RPPB M2 Sharpe RFund-RPPB M2 Sharpe RFund-RPPB M2 Sharpe RFund-RPPB M2 
Constant 0.0935 0.1689 0.5469 0.2238 0.1929 0.7149 -0.0088 0.2033 0.6242 -0.1335 0.2338 0.6589 
 
(0.722) (0.649) (0.189) (0.408) (0.604) (0.111) (0.976) (0.579) (0.142) (0.711) (0.533) (0.146) 
          0.0555 -0.0118 -0.0091 0.2941 -0.0291 0.0224 0.3048 -0.0418 0.0159 0.4991 -0.0544 0.0361 
 
(0.187) (0.419) (0.698) (0.169) (0.648) (0.842) (0.160) (0.483) (0.881) (0.164) (0.581) (0.840) 
        -0.6983*** 0.2867** -0.4725** -0.7914*** 0.2962** -0.4957* -0.7858*** 0.2951** -0.5091* -0.8669*** 0.3022* -0.5385* 
 
(0.001) (0.012) (0.044) (0.001) (0.046) (0.061) (0.001) (0.034) (0.053) (0.000) (0.074) (0.064) 
        1.2694*** -0.0460 0.0320 1.3301*** 0.0083 0.1000 1.3039*** -0.0047 0.0689 1.3447*** 0.0365 0.1099 
 
(0.000) (0.663) (0.814) (0.000) (0.946) (0.544) (0.000) (0.968) (0.664) (0.000) (0.783) (0.559) 
          0.1018 -0.0055 0.0205 -0.1512* 0.0034 -0.0988 -0.0352 0.0065 -0.0336 -0.1327 -0.0000 -0.0891 
 
(0.303) (0.847) (0.797) (0.099) (0.940) (0.365) (0.574) (0.862) (0.722) (0.145) (0.999) (0.456) 
           -0.0021 0.0008 -0.0092 0.0042 0.0008 -0.0055 0.0018 0.0006 -0.0073 0.0030 0.0009 -0.0063 
 
(0.701) (0.847) (0.346) (0.286) (0.847) (0.534) (0.665) (0.889) (0.434) (0.452) (0.832) (0.485) 
              0.0075 0.0106** 0.0224** 0.0050 0.0110** 0.0223** 0.0064 0.0109** 0.0228** 0.0056 0.0110** 0.0226** 
 
(0.256) (0.037) (0.046) (0.405) (0.031) (0.044) (0.310) (0.032) (0.043) (0.358) (0.031) (0.043) 
        0.0483 -0.2351 -0.2832 -0.2448 -0.2581 -0.3149 -0.0413 -0.3559 -0.3604 -0.3127 -0.4697 -0.5673 
 (0.871) (0.278) (0.389) (0.428) (0.344) (0.355) (0.913) (0.240) (0.372) (0.486) (0.230) (0.236) 
         0.3606 -0.3967** -0.1204 0.4516 -0.4938** -0.0760 0.6105 -0.5324** -0.0585 0.6574 -0.6512** -0.1096 
 (0.330) (0.011) (0.617) (0.339) (0.021) (0.808) (0.293) (0.012) (0.857) (0.330) (0.014) (0.782) 
          0.2351 -0.1579 -0.1337 0.3628 -0.1712 -0.0928 0.4430 -0.2080 -0.1230 0.4674 -0.2341 -0.1835 
 (0.432) (0.214) (0.540) (0.392) (0.259) (0.734) (0.364) (0.188) (0.668) (0.416) (0.209) (0.593) 
          0.2185 -0.0350 0.0378 0.3476 -0.0186 0.1459 0.3828 -0.0323 0.1247 0.4285 -0.0197 0.1613 
 (0.361) (0.658) (0.799) (0.282) (0.851) (0.463) (0.288) (0.738) (0.546) (0.294) (0.865) (0.525) 
                  0.1190 0.0553 0.0909 0.2596 0.2206 0.3026 0.2241 0.2057 0.2769 0.3642 0.3510 0.4774* 
 (0.139) (0.293) (0.118) (0.212) (0.184) (0.106) (0.235) (0.182) (0.114) (0.232) (0.167) (0.095) 
                   0.0007 0.0217 -0.0095 -0.1891 0.1747** 0.0017 -0.1398 0.1372** -0.0041 -0.2727 0.2683** 0.0282 
 (0.980) (0.176) (0.704) (0.379) (0.038) (0.990) (0.417) (0.036) (0.968) (0.394) (0.027) (0.881) 
                    0.0113 0.0095 0.0246* -0.0992 0.0690 0.1013 -0.0595 0.0574 0.0916 -0.1330 0.1036 0.1596 
 (0.477) (0.250) (0.097) (0.553) (0.196) (0.324) (0.637) (0.164) (0.238) (0.585) (0.183) (0.281) 
                    -0.0005 -0.0031 -0.0029 -0.0968 -0.0070 -0.0467 -0.0618 -0.0055 -0.0264 -0.1304 -0.0088 -0.0560 
 (0.956) (0.443) (0.779) (0.319) (0.835) (0.558) (0.390) (0.811) (0.650) (0.348) (0.849) (0.622) 
                    -0.0028 0.0002 -0.0001 0.0741* -0.0036 0.0374 0.0216 -0.0027 0.0110 0.0748 -0.0024 0.0388 
 (0.285) (0.854) (0.980) (0.094) (0.766) (0.252) (0.135) (0.686) (0.481) (0.102) (0.871) (0.321) 
                  0.0156*** -0.0009 0.0106 0.1175** -0.0094 0.0542 0.0836** -0.0064 0.0461 0.1632** -0.0130 0.0802 
 (0.007) (0.849) (0.130) (0.016) (0.842) (0.356) (0.011) (0.835) (0.246) (0.012) (0.838) (0.311) 
                  -0.0021 -0.0046 -0.0001 -0.0400 -0.0499* -0.0384 -0.0200 -0.0314* -0.0159 -0.0500 -0.0670* -0.0452 
 (0.677) (0.111) (0.988) (0.317) (0.090) (0.484) (0.460) (0.093) (0.665) (0.361) (0.088) (0.545) 
     -0.6456** -0.0072 -0.4179 -0.5468** -0.0456 -0.4585 -0.6221** -0.0304 -0.4632 -0.5818** -0.0420 -0.4656 
 (0.044) (0.983) (0.279) (0.036) (0.892) (0.215) (0.038) (0.928) (0.219) (0.036) (0.901) (0.211) 
     -0.4110 0.0227 0.1821 -0.3072 -0.0215 0.1317 -0.3945 -0.0018 0.1279 -0.3485 -0.0158 0.1265 
 
(0.228) (0.883) (0.504) (0.248) (0.852) (0.564) (0.219) (0.989) (0.610) (0.232) (0.896) (0.595) 
R2 within 0.2185 0.0106 0.0066 0.2208 0.0106 0.0068 0.2199 0.0107 0.0066 0.2204 0.0107 0.0067 
F-statistic 10.4481 3.9983 2.0590 10.1299 3.7325 2.1692 10.4660 3.7854 2.1599 10.2229 3.7299 2.2252 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0102 0.0000 0.0000 0.0063 0.0000 0.0000 0.0066 0.0000 0.0000 0.0049 
Funds 4998 4998 4998 4998 4998 4998 4998 4998 4998 4998 4998 4998 
Observations 111354 111354 111354 111354 111354 111354 111354 111354 111354 111354 111354 111354 
230 
 
Table J.B. Results for the allocation funds sample. The PPB is the benchmark. The panel observations have a quarterly frequency. The results are obtained using Driscoll-Kraay 
standard errors and fund fixed effects. P-values are in parentheses (* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01).  
                              √      
  √      
  
Dependent Sharpe RFund-RPPB M2 Sharpe RFund-RPPB M2 Sharpe RFund-RPPB M2 Sharpe RFund-RPPB M2 
Constant -0.1491 -0.9857* -2.1531*** 0.0379 -1.1433* -2.1834** -0.3754 -1.0940* -2.4720*** -0.4967 -1.1705* -2.6180*** 
 
(0.804) (0.081) (0.009) (0.944) (0.058) (0.015) (0.471) (0.065) (0.007) (0.344) (0.064) (0.010) 
          0.0581 -0.0170 0.0084 0.4612 0.0903 0.4332 0.4527 0.0220 0.3461 0.7672 0.1069 0.6780* 
 
(0.203) (0.523) (0.849) (0.140) (0.470) (0.107) (0.119) (0.824) (0.119) (0.130) (0.544) (0.097) 
        -0.9828*** 0.5340*** -0.8139 -1.2423*** 0.6733*** -1.1900* -1.1980*** 0.6697*** -1.1021 -1.3916*** 0.7889*** -1.3716 
 
(0.001) (0.000) (0.128) (0.001) (0.000) (0.096) (0.001) (0.000) (0.112) (0.001) (0.000) (0.100) 
        1.1859*** 0.0255 -0.0084 1.1229*** 0.1288 -0.1081 1.1069*** 0.1043 -0.1008 1.0631*** 0.1854 -0.1564 
 
(0.001) (0.848) (0.971) (0.002) (0.400) (0.721) (0.002) (0.484) (0.739) (0.004) (0.309) (0.674) 
          0.2394 0.0159 0.1948 -0.2157 -0.0491 -0.2659 -0.0065 -0.0008 -0.0065 -0.1882 -0.0505 -0.2191 
 
(0.165) (0.814) (0.216) (0.172) (0.708) (0.162) (0.957) (0.994) (0.972) (0.247) (0.731) (0.322) 
           -0.0512 -0.0151 -0.0267 -0.0290 -0.0001 0.0162 -0.0319 -0.0059 0.0045 -0.0296 -0.0011 0.0140 
 
(0.192) (0.360) (0.445) (0.280) (0.993) (0.586) (0.275) (0.699) (0.890) (0.281) (0.938) (0.649) 
              0.0371 0.0090 0.0086 0.0305 0.0086 0.0060 0.0377 0.0093 0.0117 0.0330 0.0087 0.0077 
 
(0.213) (0.703) (0.763) (0.259) (0.695) (0.837) (0.211) (0.682) (0.693) (0.243) (0.692) (0.794) 
        0.8609 0.4159 2.7112** 1.4165 0.8231 4.2033*** 1.9059* 0.7921 4.5390** 2.4117* 1.0920 5.6949** 
 (0.261) (0.466) (0.037) (0.130) (0.203) (0.009) (0.085) (0.287) (0.014) (0.088) (0.264) (0.015) 
         0.1414 0.1508 1.2167** 0.7737 0.5662 2.5214*** 0.9081* 0.4243 2.4001*** 1.1768 0.6675 3.0858*** 
 (0.691) (0.665) (0.026) (0.121) (0.153) (0.002) (0.096) (0.335) (0.004) (0.118) (0.236) (0.004) 
          -0.2983 -0.1456 0.0720 0.2782 0.0409 1.0348* 0.2791 -0.0929 0.7844 0.4365 -0.0537 1.1094 
 (0.387) (0.568) (0.855) (0.597) (0.893) (0.077) (0.618) (0.775) (0.186) (0.567) (0.894) (0.128) 
          -0.0609 0.0342 0.2914 0.3402 0.2491 0.9287** 0.3722 0.1736 0.8934* 0.5222 0.2872 1.2060** 
 (0.842) (0.855) (0.303) (0.239) (0.405) (0.039) (0.252) (0.566) (0.053) (0.189) (0.481) (0.045) 
                  -0.2779 -0.1028 -0.4902* -1.1032* -0.3819 -1.8960** -1.0107* -0.3162 -1.6554* -1.6692* -0.5619 -2.8140** 
 (0.116) (0.439) (0.094) (0.061) (0.367) (0.042) (0.064) (0.416) (0.052) (0.066) (0.381) (0.045) 
                   -0.0274 -0.0099 -0.0749 -0.4744 -0.1961 -0.8148** -0.3612 -0.1049 -0.5676* -0.6860 -0.2671 -1.1572** 
 (0.516) (0.848) (0.250) (0.178) (0.403) (0.036) (0.163) (0.593) (0.051) (0.181) (0.447) (0.038) 
                    0.0269 0.0316 0.0468 -0.1958 0.0827 -0.1811 -0.1017 0.1026 -0.0326 -0.2620 0.1355 -0.2188 
 (0.513) (0.243) (0.247) (0.528) (0.564) (0.381) (0.654) (0.380) (0.845) (0.559) (0.520) (0.473) 
                    -0.0047 -0.0002 -0.0234 -0.2206 -0.0817 -0.3423 -0.1545 -0.0387 -0.2426 -0.3138 -0.1082 -0.5035 
 (0.878) (0.994) (0.517) (0.116) (0.618) (0.109) (0.166) (0.761) (0.150) (0.129) (0.646) (0.108) 
                    -0.0080* -0.0007 -0.0113** 0.1066 0.0085 0.0749 0.0216 -0.0033 -0.0093 0.1080 0.0114 0.0665 
 (0.098) (0.744) (0.040) (0.103) (0.795) (0.143) (0.319) (0.853) (0.774) (0.123) (0.794) (0.326) 
                  0.0303*** -0.0229*** 0.0332 0.2623*** -0.1676** 0.3356 0.1763*** -0.1244** 0.2142 0.3542*** -0.2386** 0.4486 
 (0.005) (0.007) (0.170) (0.006) (0.030) (0.104) (0.005) (0.015) (0.133) (0.005) (0.023) (0.112) 
                  0.0110 -0.0097 0.0051 0.0790 -0.0968 0.0809 0.0657 -0.0622 0.0562 0.1153 -0.1319 0.1100 
 (0.122) (0.287) (0.752) (0.269) (0.194) (0.519) (0.153) (0.237) (0.536) (0.238) (0.204) (0.532) 
     -0.5682 0.7703 1.5226** -0.4538 0.7896 1.6150** -0.5870 0.7692 1.4870** -0.5262 0.7833 1.5512** 
 (0.394) (0.103) (0.022) (0.455) (0.104) (0.015) (0.382) (0.109) (0.026) (0.412) (0.106) (0.020) 
     -0.4150 0.3909* 0.7549* -0.3424 0.2972* 0.6356* -0.4730 0.3155* 0.5645 -0.4052 0.2995* 0.5900 
 
(0.345) (0.065) (0.079) (0.378) (0.064) (0.084) (0.299) (0.064) (0.154) (0.336) (0.065) (0.120) 
R2 within 0.2478 0.0310 0.0287 0.2537 0.0303 0.0315 0.2510 0.0304 0.0293 0.2526 0.0303 0.0306 
F-statistic 7.8585 4.4039 2.1755 7.2770 3.1940 2.0842 7.8199 3.7937 1.9501 7.4794 3.2643 2.0262 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0075 0.0000 0.0001 0.0110 0.0000 0.0000 0.0188 0.0000 0.0001 0.0139 
Funds 380 380 380 380 380 380 380 380 380 380 380 380 
Observations 7993 7993 7993 7993 7993 7993 7993 7993 7993 7993 7993 7993 
 
231 
 
Table J.C. Results for the fixed income funds sample. The PPB is the benchmark. The panel observations have a quarterly frequency. The results are obtained using Driscoll-Kraay 
standard errors and fund fixed effects. P-values are in parentheses (* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01). 
                              √      
  √      
  
Dependent Sharpe RFund-RPPB M2 Sharpe RFund-RPPB M2 Sharpe RFund-RPPB M2 Sharpe RFund-RPPB M2 
Constant -0.6021 -0.0972 -0.3749 -0.4446 -0.0676 -0.3105 -0.6866* -0.1055 -0.3997 -0.7183 -0.1195 -0.4227 
 
(0.118) (0.852) (0.397) (0.254) (0.896) (0.490) (0.086) (0.844) (0.374) (0.130) (0.836) (0.400) 
          0.0152 -0.0126 -0.0115 0.1685 0.0448 0.0813 0.1481 0.0023 0.0362 0.2832 0.0547 0.1199 
 
(0.692) (0.456) (0.653) (0.519) (0.804) (0.711) (0.514) (0.986) (0.832) (0.490) (0.834) (0.718) 
        -0.1756 0.3664** 0.0405 -0.1766 0.4537* 0.1145 -0.2247 0.4255* 0.0590 -0.2699 0.4833 0.0796 
 
(0.497) (0.033) (0.765) (0.530) (0.086) (0.584) (0.431) (0.078) (0.758) (0.384) (0.122) (0.762) 
        1.2146*** 0.0313 -0.0239 1.2371*** 0.1246 0.0203 1.1852*** 0.0972 -0.0210 1.1626*** 0.1646 -0.0120 
 
(0.000) (0.848) (0.856) (0.000) (0.607) (0.925) (0.000) (0.664) (0.915) (0.000) (0.562) (0.965) 
          0.1410 0.0574 0.0764 -0.1446 -0.0296 -0.0845 0.0429 0.0434 0.0300 -0.0863 -0.0087 -0.0532 
 
(0.169) (0.454) (0.409) (0.155) (0.700) (0.505) (0.634) (0.590) (0.783) (0.406) (0.922) (0.709) 
           0.0003 0.0014 -0.0092 0.0060 0.0039 -0.0050 0.0028 0.0023 -0.0073 0.0046 0.0034 -0.0058 
 
(0.969) (0.886) (0.450) (0.322) (0.659) (0.648) (0.669) (0.803) (0.530) (0.467) (0.709) (0.607) 
              0.0076 0.0255 0.0526*** 0.0185 0.0362* 0.0646*** 0.0163 0.0328* 0.0617*** 0.0188 0.0357* 0.0645*** 
 
(0.681) (0.109) (0.007) (0.423) (0.051) (0.006) (0.465) (0.073) (0.008) (0.417) (0.060) (0.008) 
        -0.3181 -0.6127 -0.6112 -0.4675 -0.7770 -0.7566 -0.4768 -0.9750 -0.9164 -0.7477 -1.3486 -1.2773* 
 (0.448) (0.128) (0.167) (0.298) (0.173) (0.132) (0.373) (0.124) (0.101) (0.238) (0.125) (0.078) 
         0.1025 -0.1809 -0.2609 0.4276 -0.0153 -0.1149 0.4038 -0.0921 -0.1901 0.5788 -0.0019 -0.1769 
 (0.723) (0.492) (0.390) (0.375) (0.975) (0.816) (0.431) (0.837) (0.690) (0.383) (0.998) (0.784) 
          -0.0060 0.0335 -0.1281 0.3251 0.2896 0.1633 0.2111 0.1756 0.0090 0.3316 0.3178 0.1042 
 (0.980) (0.821) (0.596) (0.356) (0.177) (0.639) (0.556) (0.385) (0.978) (0.456) (0.225) (0.808) 
          0.0271 0.0376 -0.0220 0.1244 0.1027 0.0812 0.0861 0.0708 0.0126 0.0888 0.1055 0.0208 
 (0.909) (0.754) (0.912) (0.773) (0.673) (0.824) (0.834) (0.739) (0.970) (0.866) (0.713) (0.963) 
                  0.1895** 0.1881 0.2043* 0.4557* 0.6576* 0.6536** 0.4429* 0.6163* 0.6193** 0.6783* 1.0282* 1.0068** 
 (0.033) (0.129) (0.067) (0.051) (0.099) (0.037) (0.051) (0.090) (0.036) (0.060) (0.091) (0.034) 
                   0.0086 0.0027 0.0263 -0.1949 -0.0176 0.0572 -0.1022 0.0070 0.0801 -0.2617 -0.0279 0.1061 
 (0.784) (0.926) (0.402) (0.412) (0.937) (0.804) (0.553) (0.964) (0.620) (0.443) (0.931) (0.745) 
                    0.0239 -0.0041 0.0243 -0.0713 -0.0897 -0.0004 0.0045 -0.0370 0.0541 -0.0649 -0.1127 0.0355 
 (0.103) (0.695) (0.207) (0.612) (0.245) (0.998) (0.961) (0.478) (0.572) (0.736) (0.290) (0.856) 
                    0.0163 -0.0030 0.0138 0.0374 -0.0110 0.0459 0.0465 -0.0048 0.0540 0.0646 -0.0149 0.0815 
 (0.261) (0.658) (0.371) (0.808) (0.896) (0.737) (0.641) (0.923) (0.550) (0.756) (0.892) (0.663) 
                    -0.0043 -0.0015 -0.0026 0.0737* 0.0180 0.0363 0.0053 -0.0042 -0.0016 0.0593 0.0125 0.0287 
 (0.271) (0.631) (0.527) (0.074) (0.492) (0.430) (0.779) (0.797) (0.947) (0.167) (0.701) (0.607) 
                  0.0187** -0.0049 0.0080 0.0842 -0.0682 -0.0047 0.0803* -0.0390 0.0186 0.1385 -0.0866 0.0148 
 (0.026) (0.577) (0.484) (0.180) (0.473) (0.965) (0.080) (0.513) (0.795) (0.118) (0.492) (0.920) 
                  0.0147 -0.0073 0.0070 0.0538 -0.0835 0.0063 0.0589 -0.0503 0.0206 0.0959 -0.1081 0.0241 
 (0.125) (0.359) (0.547) (0.503) (0.289) (0.952) (0.279) (0.318) (0.766) (0.384) (0.301) (0.865) 
     -0.2609 0.0710 0.3561 -0.2201 0.0069 0.3025 -0.2601 0.0199 0.3013 -0.2423 0.0082 0.2950 
 (0.495) (0.872) (0.357) (0.507) (0.988) (0.424) (0.471) (0.964) (0.438) (0.481) (0.985) (0.442) 
     -0.1755 0.0316 -0.0584 -0.2089 -0.0763 -0.1642 -0.2301 -0.0475 -0.1503 -0.2294 -0.0730 -0.1703 
 
(0.587) (0.826) (0.798) (0.458) (0.594) (0.452) (0.474) (0.757) (0.531) (0.448) (0.630) (0.464) 
R2 within 0.1506 0.0140 0.0044 0.1510 0.0141 0.0043 0.1499 0.0139 0.0040 0.1504 0.0140 0.0042 
F-statistic 5.2102 7.2050 2.1659 5.8984 5.9391 2.6964 5.3971 6.5953 2.5218 5.6833 6.0993 2.6593 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0064 0.0000 0.0000 0.0006 0.0000 0.0000 0.0013 0.0000 0.0000 0.0007 
Funds 737 737 737 737 737 737 737 737 737 737 737 737 
Observations 16805 16805 16805 16805 16805 16805 16805 16805 16805 16805 16805 16805 
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Table J.D. Results for the equity funds sample. The PPB is the benchmark. The panel observations have a quarterly frequency. The results are obtained using Driscoll-Kraay standard 
errors and fund fixed effects. P-values are in parentheses (* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01). 
                              √      
  √      
  
Dependent Sharpe RFund-RPPB M2 Sharpe RFund-RPPB M2 Sharpe RFund-RPPB M2 Sharpe RFund-RPPB M2 
Constant 0.3467 0.2493 0.8976* 0.4626 0.2145 0.9714* 0.2514 0.2608 0.9118* 0.1238 0.2878 0.9053* 
 
(0.235) (0.533) (0.077) (0.139) (0.589) (0.073) (0.399) (0.505) (0.074) (0.719) (0.465) (0.085) 
          0.0633 -0.0072 0.0111 0.2720 -0.0534 0.0420 0.3088 -0.0511 0.0610 0.4789 -0.0882 0.0807 
 
(0.138) (0.650) (0.630) (0.147) (0.392) (0.653) (0.131) (0.421) (0.531) (0.142) (0.384) (0.601) 
        -0.7255*** 0.1877 -0.5258** -0.8251*** 0.1703 -0.5285* -0.8060*** 0.1724 -0.5430* -0.8795*** 0.1574 -0.5533* 
 
(0.000) (0.182) (0.042) (0.000) (0.385) (0.064) (0.000) (0.343) (0.054) (0.000) (0.487) (0.071) 
        1.2948*** -0.0770 0.0609 1.3161*** -0.0447 0.1478 1.3043*** -0.0504 0.1227 1.3225*** -0.0254 0.1852 
 
(0.000) (0.583) (0.694) (0.000) (0.791) (0.422) (0.000) (0.756) (0.481) (0.000) (0.891) (0.365) 
          0.0835 -0.0205 -0.0093 -0.1563* 0.0301 -0.1017 -0.0623 0.0035 -0.0709 -0.1504* 0.0189 -0.1091 
 
(0.356) (0.449) (0.902) (0.094) (0.492) (0.390) (0.245) (0.925) (0.473) (0.092) (0.689) (0.390) 
           -0.0020 -0.0003 -0.0154 0.0069 -0.0026 -0.0121 0.0038 -0.0016 -0.0132 0.0052 -0.0020 -0.0128 
 
(0.784) (0.937) (0.280) (0.173) (0.521) (0.343) (0.487) (0.717) (0.330) (0.311) (0.632) (0.328) 
              0.0044 0.0105 0.0347** 0.0009 0.0113 0.0339** 0.0024 0.0109 0.0343** 0.0016 0.0111 0.0342** 
 
(0.537) (0.140) (0.010) (0.907) (0.115) (0.012) (0.740) (0.125) (0.011) (0.828) (0.120) (0.011) 
        0.1263 -0.0705 -0.1426 -0.2837 -0.1426 -0.3462 -0.0270 -0.1992 -0.3097 -0.3355 -0.2786 -0.5586 
 (0.692) (0.748) (0.709) (0.400) (0.596) (0.373) (0.946) (0.481) (0.503) (0.489) (0.419) (0.297) 
         0.3721 -0.4067** 0.0222 0.3330 -0.6096** -0.1082 0.5412 -0.6202** 0.0004 0.5206 -0.7914*** -0.1113 
 (0.352) (0.018) (0.926) (0.465) (0.013) (0.736) (0.352) (0.010) (0.999) (0.429) (0.009) (0.785) 
          0.2216 -0.1684 -0.0267 0.2379 -0.2687 -0.1438 0.3804 -0.2749 -0.0824 0.3590 -0.3346 -0.1938 
 (0.498) (0.262) (0.909) (0.574) (0.133) (0.615) (0.453) (0.138) (0.784) (0.540) (0.122) (0.587) 
          0.2323 -0.0166 0.1897 0.3433 -0.0391 0.2593 0.4078 -0.0375 0.2874 0.4636 -0.0369 0.3386 
 (0.309) (0.859) (0.179) (0.228) (0.731) (0.147) (0.223) (0.738) (0.125) (0.210) (0.783) (0.136) 
                  0.1057 0.0219 0.0810 0.2543 0.1284 0.2849 0.2020 0.1139 0.2411 0.3507 0.2092 0.4393 
 (0.202) (0.635) (0.227) (0.268) (0.345) (0.178) (0.324) (0.373) (0.230) (0.296) (0.311) (0.173) 
                   0.0041 0.0219 -0.0199 -0.1420 0.2042** -0.0041 -0.1170 0.1515* -0.0335 -0.2116 0.3135** 0.0096 
 (0.886) (0.297) (0.514) (0.491) (0.042) (0.977) (0.501) (0.061) (0.772) (0.498) (0.033) (0.964) 
                    0.0068 0.0083 0.0164 -0.0885 0.0833 0.0945 -0.0689 0.0602 0.0637 -0.1287 0.1204 0.1346 
 (0.732) (0.422) (0.343) (0.609) (0.189) (0.393) (0.619) (0.230) (0.458) (0.618) (0.196) (0.402) 
                    -0.0078 -0.0041 -0.0145 -0.1350 -0.0059 -0.1060 -0.0972 -0.0081 -0.0818 -0.1904 -0.0093 -0.1499 
 (0.380) (0.425) (0.150) (0.132) (0.893) (0.165) (0.166) (0.788) (0.143) (0.148) (0.879) (0.167) 
                    -0.0014 0.0008 0.0015 0.0791* -0.0126 0.0408 0.0300** -0.0022 0.0208 0.0852* -0.0097 0.0488 
 (0.478) (0.430) (0.352) (0.091) (0.340) (0.252) (0.049) (0.768) (0.212) (0.078) (0.551) (0.249) 
                  0.0103* 0.0021 0.0068 0.1020* 0.0188 0.0288 0.0658* 0.0133 0.0273 0.1349* 0.0267 0.0439 
 (0.065) (0.746) (0.276) (0.052) (0.769) (0.627) (0.051) (0.751) (0.477) (0.051) (0.758) (0.575) 
                  -0.0012 -0.0030 -0.0053 -0.0133 -0.0307 -0.0692 -0.0065 -0.0201 -0.0414 -0.0181 -0.0423 -0.0925 
 (0.754) (0.468) (0.441) (0.755) (0.439) (0.266) (0.805) (0.431) (0.315) (0.750) (0.425) (0.273) 
     -0.7425** -0.0208 -0.8283* -0.6252** -0.0297 -0.8063* -0.7084** -0.0193 -0.8293* -0.6622** -0.0263 -0.8185* 
 (0.020) (0.954) (0.061) (0.016) (0.932) (0.059) (0.017) (0.956) (0.056) (0.016) (0.940) (0.057) 
     -0.4655 -0.0254 0.1412 -0.3175 -0.0290 0.1819 -0.4193 -0.0167 0.1509 -0.3619 -0.0229 0.1703 
 
(0.216) (0.892) (0.647) (0.266) (0.845) (0.482) (0.221) (0.919) (0.590) (0.245) (0.882) (0.524) 
R2 within 0.2561 0.0085 0.0103 0.2580 0.0088 0.0104 0.2576 0.0087 0.0104 0.2578 0.0088 0.0104 
F-statistic 9.2214 3.5571 2.5101 8.3306 3.4554 2.7325 8.6302 3.4769 2.7131 8.4081 3.4639 2.7637 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0014 0.0000 0.0000 0.0005 0.0000 0.0000 0.0005 0.0000 0.0000 0.0004 
Funds 3617 3617 3617 3617 3617 3617 3617 3617 3617 3617 3617 3617 
Observations 82149 82149 82149 82149 82149 82149 82149 82149 82149 82149 82149 82149 
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Table J.E. Results for the emerging equity funds sample. The PPB is the benchmark. The panel observations have a quarterly frequency. The results are obtained using Driscoll-
Kraay standard errors and fund fixed effects. P-values are in parentheses (* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01). 
                              √      
  √      
  
Dependent Sharpe RFund-RPPB M2 Sharpe RFund-RPPB M2 Sharpe RFund-RPPB M2 Sharpe RFund-RPPB M2 
Constant 0.0352 0.1441 -0.2912 0.0978 -0.0842 0.3714 -0.0395 -0.0740 -0.4729 -0.2114 -0.1689 -0.9238 
 
(0.917) (0.752) (0.621) (0.806) (0.847) (0.711) (0.896) (0.863) (0.441) (0.517) (0.706) (0.216) 
          0.0875 -0.0074 0.1711 0.3153 0.1705 1.1493** 0.3469 0.0487 1.0695* 0.5286 0.2113 1.8716** 
 
(0.123) (0.851) (0.229) (0.159) (0.192) (0.028) (0.179) (0.672) (0.090) (0.178) (0.271) (0.044) 
        -0.8542*** 0.0665 -0.8413*** -0.9062*** 0.0429 -0.8329** -0.9151*** 0.0962 -0.8261** -0.9519*** 0.1164 -0.7448* 
 
(0.000) (0.657) (0.009) (0.000) (0.827) (0.026) (0.000) (0.637) (0.029) (0.000) (0.652) (0.098) 
        1.3092*** 0.0097 0.5951 1.3940*** 0.0141 0.7751 1.3651*** 0.0109 0.7195 1.4331*** 0.0228 0.8853 
 
(0.000) (0.925) (0.409) (0.000) (0.927) (0.284) (0.000) (0.943) (0.327) (0.000) (0.913) (0.258) 
          0.0294 0.1145** 0.5220** -0.1112 0.2240*** -0.0174 -0.0769 0.2382*** 0.2990* -0.1271 0.2775*** 0.1011 
 
(0.736) (0.023) (0.011) (0.446) (0.001) (0.962) (0.326) (0.000) (0.091) (0.386) (0.001) (0.777) 
           -0.0077 -0.0163** -0.0236 -0.0038 -0.0189** -0.0041 -0.0047 -0.0193*** -0.0136 -0.0043 -0.0186** -0.0085 
 
(0.341) (0.015) (0.173) (0.712) (0.015) (0.855) (0.611) (0.010) (0.486) (0.658) (0.014) (0.680) 
              0.0080 0.0045 -0.0015 0.0204 -0.0021 0.0079 0.0138 0.0004 -0.0065 0.0181 -0.0035 0.0012 
 
(0.802) (0.903) (0.985) (0.477) (0.954) (0.922) (0.655) (0.992) (0.938) (0.539) (0.926) (0.988) 
        0.8034 -0.1044 0.0153 0.3933 0.5172 -0.0834 0.7357 0.2532 0.6938 0.6154 0.4757 0.5476 
 (0.163) (0.873) (0.991) (0.567) (0.496) (0.960) (0.282) (0.753) (0.679) (0.488) (0.632) (0.802) 
         0.5935 -1.5104** -0.4346 0.0591 -1.4489 -0.9916 0.2608 -2.0390* -0.6485 -0.0660 -2.5878* -1.5311 
 (0.344) (0.036) (0.782) (0.933) (0.107) (0.578) (0.766) (0.052) (0.773) (0.953) (0.072) (0.605) 
          -0.0094 -0.3900 -0.4945 -0.5658 0.0395 -0.7546 -0.4186 -0.1441 -0.2551 -0.7555 0.0050 -0.5090 
 (0.982) (0.485) (0.543) (0.334) (0.958) (0.544) (0.418) (0.846) (0.795) (0.255) (0.996) (0.685) 
          0.1784 -0.5272 0.4460 0.1957 -0.4959 1.0477 0.2821 -0.5912 1.2335 0.3375 -0.6242 1.6642 
 (0.656) (0.194) (0.643) (0.707) (0.345) (0.370) (0.622) (0.270) (0.366) (0.630) (0.376) (0.305) 
                  -0.0614 0.0388 0.1265 -0.0783 -0.0820 0.0377 -0.1491 0.0178 -0.1072 -0.1771 -0.0770 -0.2449 
 (0.773) (0.836) (0.793) (0.879) (0.875) (0.975) (0.742) (0.970) (0.925) (0.798) (0.919) (0.891) 
                   0.1322 0.5157* 0.4646 0.3511 1.3109* 1.1330 0.2938 1.3196* 1.0402 0.4726 2.0076* 1.6536 
 (0.606) (0.052) (0.472) (0.588) (0.077) (0.502) (0.631) (0.060) (0.522) (0.615) (0.078) (0.512) 
                    0.0907** 0.0108 0.0619 0.3417 -0.0445 0.0271 0.2907 0.0011 0.0273 0.5121 -0.0519 0.0330 
 (0.038) (0.883) (0.558) (0.132) (0.901) (0.948) (0.100) (0.997) (0.940) (0.121) (0.922) (0.958) 
                    -0.0160 0.0272 -0.0931 -0.1586 0.1651 -0.7044 -0.1204 0.1364 -0.5381 -0.2229 0.2286 -1.0221 
 (0.670) (0.591) (0.314) (0.514) (0.570) (0.221) (0.521) (0.546) (0.242) (0.525) (0.590) (0.222) 
                    -0.0029 -0.0076*** -0.0254*** 0.0464 -0.0848*** 0.0717 0.0207 -0.0638*** -0.0412 0.0566 -0.1170*** 0.0244 
 (0.418) (0.007) (0.001) (0.475) (0.004) (0.672) (0.378) (0.000) (0.510) (0.422) (0.001) (0.893) 
                  0.0149*** -0.0244 -0.0035 0.0904* -0.0611 -0.0300 0.0699** -0.0730 -0.0266 0.1179* -0.1091 -0.0850 
 (0.009) (0.165) (0.901) (0.061) (0.544) (0.871) (0.033) (0.358) (0.845) (0.069) (0.449) (0.749) 
                  -0.0014 0.0012 -0.0124 -0.0679 0.0021 -0.1807 -0.0352 0.0034 -0.1007 -0.0909 -0.0043 -0.2434 
 (0.900) (0.926) (0.615) (0.425) (0.981) (0.355) (0.547) (0.959) (0.436) (0.443) (0.973) (0.366) 
                     
                 
     -0.2483 -0.0848 -1.5403 -0.0795 -0.2490 -1.6094 -0.1823 -0.1679 -1.7660 -0.1158 -0.2289 -1.6949 
 
(0.619) (0.826) (0.207) (0.852) (0.491) (0.117) (0.710) (0.645) (0.147) (0.797) (0.528) (0.124) 
R2 within 0.3363 0.0203 0.0874 0.3376 0.0189 0.0900 0.3375 0.0202 0.0882 0.3376 0.0193 0.0895 
F-statistic 8.4273 2.6890 2.6273 9.4487 2.6307 4.4298 8.8763 3.1179 4.4452 9.3365 2.9376 4.4702 
p-value 0.0000 0.0012 0.0015 0.0000 0.0015 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002 0.0000 0.0000 0.0004 0.0000 
Funds 186 186 186 186 186 186 186 186 186 186 186 186 
Observations 2767 2767 2767 2767 2767 2767 2767 2767 2767 2767 2767 2767 
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Table J.F. Results for the international equity funds sample. The PPB is the benchmark. The panel observations have a quarterly frequency. The results are obtained using Driscoll-
Kraay standard errors and fund fixed effects. P-values are in parentheses (* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01). 
                              √      
  √      
  
Dependent Sharpe RFund-RPPB M2 Sharpe RFund-RPPB M2 Sharpe RFund-RPPB M2 Sharpe RFund-RPPB M2 
Constant -0.4484 -0.1363 0.3446 -0.3216 -0.1508 0.3495 -0.6021 -0.1627 0.2859 -0.7633 -0.1831 0.2199 
 
(0.288) (0.765) (0.545) (0.429) (0.740) (0.533) (0.221) (0.714) (0.604) (0.187) (0.682) (0.688) 
          0.0641 0.0088 0.0191 0.3797 0.0455 0.1404 0.3700 0.0424 0.1339 0.6255 0.0681 0.2177 
 
(0.174) (0.669) (0.473) (0.102) (0.515) (0.186) (0.113) (0.580) (0.234) (0.106) (0.560) (0.219) 
        -0.7000*** 0.2079 -0.4621** -0.8335*** 0.1688 -0.4862* -0.8092*** 0.1739 -0.4833* -0.9147*** 0.1394 -0.5050 
 
(0.000) (0.237) (0.040) (0.000) (0.443) (0.085) (0.000) (0.410) (0.076) (0.000) (0.577) (0.112) 
        1.3309*** -0.0491 0.0275 1.3206*** 0.0001 0.0722 1.3162*** -0.0122 0.0638 1.3100*** 0.0228 0.0971 
 
(0.001) (0.656) (0.842) (0.001) (0.999) (0.665) (0.001) (0.926) (0.679) (0.002) (0.882) (0.607) 
          0.1678 0.0063 0.0136 -0.1249 -0.0053 -0.0911 0.0173 -0.0022 -0.0582 -0.0900 -0.0052 -0.0922 
 
(0.131) (0.858) (0.780) (0.115) (0.933) (0.399) (0.810) (0.966) (0.501) (0.266) (0.939) (0.421) 
           -0.0233 0.0185 0.0061 0.0029 0.0188 0.0163 -0.0074 0.0190 0.0137 -0.0022 0.0187 0.0145 
 
(0.340) (0.186) (0.811) (0.859) (0.200) (0.563) (0.699) (0.200) (0.619) (0.899) (0.202) (0.601) 
              0.0551* 0.0040 0.0494* 0.0372 0.0031 0.0427 0.0464* 0.0034 0.0458 0.0415 0.0032 0.0441 
 
(0.076) (0.744) (0.084) (0.120) (0.809) (0.146) (0.094) (0.789) (0.114) (0.107) (0.802) (0.130) 
        -0.1567 -0.1850 -0.1093 -0.3169 -0.2797 -0.0608 -0.2073 -0.3379 -0.1184 -0.5033 -0.5166 -0.3256 
 (0.661) (0.526) (0.814) (0.493) (0.452) (0.901) (0.678) (0.368) (0.834) (0.440) (0.258) (0.622) 
         0.4881 -0.3741** 0.0442 0.7699 -0.5407* 0.0793 0.9103 -0.5221* 0.1456 1.0619 -0.6942* 0.0722 
 (0.216) (0.044) (0.844) (0.143) (0.067) (0.822) (0.147) (0.059) (0.668) (0.154) (0.065) (0.876) 
          0.3530 0.0841 0.3115 0.6350 0.1352 0.3790 0.7118 0.1593 0.4373 0.8205 0.2134 0.4322 
 (0.333) (0.675) (0.276) (0.223) (0.602) (0.309) (0.230) (0.539) (0.262) (0.250) (0.498) (0.374) 
          0.3283 0.0712 0.3055* 0.5508 0.1370 0.4328* 0.5851 0.1445 0.4705** 0.6889 0.1970 0.5548* 
 (0.226) (0.565) (0.092) (0.129) (0.384) (0.058) (0.145) (0.346) (0.043) (0.133) (0.303) (0.053) 
                  0.1693 0.1021 0.1546 0.3727 0.2845 0.3282 0.3458 0.2687 0.3252 0.5438 0.4407 0.5089 
 (0.120) (0.118) (0.123) (0.211) (0.135) (0.241) (0.207) (0.135) (0.227) (0.218) (0.127) (0.229) 
                   -0.0257 0.0293 -0.0073 -0.3264 0.1775 -0.0260 -0.2506 0.1363 -0.0318 -0.4710 0.2781 -0.0128 
 (0.454) (0.350) (0.835) (0.188) (0.248) (0.887) (0.222) (0.279) (0.823) (0.205) (0.223) (0.962) 
                    -0.0057 -0.0167 -0.0047 -0.2124 -0.0990 -0.0532 -0.1505 -0.0807 -0.0486 -0.2998 -0.1456 -0.0790 
 (0.844) (0.357) (0.868) (0.341) (0.329) (0.746) (0.399) (0.334) (0.712) (0.366) (0.334) (0.746) 
                    -0.0112 -0.0124 -0.0238* -0.1763 -0.0886 -0.1603* -0.1225 -0.0669 -0.1260* -0.2454 -0.1246 -0.2304* 
 (0.330) (0.203) (0.069) (0.122) (0.227) (0.098) (0.158) (0.211) (0.074) (0.137) (0.229) (0.094) 
                    -0.0043* -0.0004 0.0003 0.0745* 0.0023 0.0351 0.0163 0.0005 0.0165 0.0694* 0.0025 0.0402 
 (0.088) (0.671) (0.773) (0.063) (0.897) (0.221) (0.198) (0.956) (0.265) (0.081) (0.910) (0.263) 
                  0.0151** 0.0054 0.0039 0.1428** 0.0450 0.0313 0.0930** 0.0310 0.0212 0.1914** 0.0628 0.0427 
 (0.022) (0.466) (0.661) (0.017) (0.497) (0.682) (0.017) (0.484) (0.683) (0.016) (0.485) (0.679) 
                  0.0006 -0.0040 -0.0047 0.0137 -0.0430 -0.0409 0.0094 -0.0270 -0.0281 0.0186 -0.0570 -0.0567 
 (0.924) (0.272) (0.540) (0.793) (0.223) (0.569) (0.787) (0.222) (0.549) (0.792) (0.219) (0.557) 
     -0.5150* 0.2108 -0.6670 -0.4536* 0.2182 -0.6557 -0.5225* 0.2116 -0.6807 -0.4890* 0.2138 -0.6690 
 (0.079) (0.595) (0.158) (0.061) (0.565) (0.151) (0.059) (0.583) (0.142) (0.058) (0.575) (0.145) 
     -0.4509 -0.1859 0.1233 -0.3428 -0.1678 0.1609 -0.4390 -0.1770 0.1189 -0.3893 -0.1709 0.1441 
 
(0.271) (0.452) (0.705) (0.269) (0.382) (0.542) (0.233) (0.402) (0.681) (0.247) (0.388) (0.597) 
R2 within 0.2429 0.0107 0.0083 0.2461 0.0108 0.0085 0.2448 0.0108 0.0084 0.2455 0.0108 0.0084 
F-statistic 9.1306 1.9139 1.5613 8.4894 1.7641 1.6007 8.6954 1.8157 1.5925 8.5385 1.7854 1.5756 
p-value 0.0000 0.0189 0.0777 0.0000 0.0351 0.0669 0.0000 0.0284 0.0690 0.0000 0.0322 0.0736 
Funds 1918 1918 1918 1918 1918 1918 1918 1918 1918 1918 1918 1918 
Observations 45246 45246 45246 45246 45246 45246 45246 45246 45246 45246 45246 45246 
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Table J.G. Results for the UK equity funds sample. The PPB is the benchmark. The panel observations have a quarterly frequency.  The results are obtained using Driscoll-Kraay 
standard errors and fund fixed effects. P-values are in parentheses (* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01). 
                              √      
  √      
  
Dependent Sharpe RFund-RPPB M2 Sharpe RFund-RPPB M2 Sharpe RFund-RPPB M2 Sharpe RFund-RPPB M2 
Constant 1.2990*** 0.6098 1.7156** 1.2963** 0.5856 1.8396** 1.1730*** 0.6631 1.7769** 1.0595** 0.7513 1.8475** 
 
(0.007) (0.203) (0.026) (0.014) (0.264) (0.034) (0.008) (0.183) (0.026) (0.011) (0.151) (0.026) 
          0.0686* -0.0188 0.0154 0.1681 -0.1606* -0.1059 0.2522 -0.1370 -0.0104 0.3350 -0.2452* -0.1062 
 
(0.083) (0.324) (0.606) (0.277) (0.079) (0.404) (0.171) (0.114) (0.938) (0.232) (0.088) (0.612) 
        -0.7674** 0.1597 -0.5494 -0.8259** 0.1527 -0.5170 -0.8087** 0.1551 -0.5495 -0.8435** 0.1523 -0.5335 
 
(0.011) (0.470) (0.236) (0.013) (0.589) (0.259) (0.015) (0.560) (0.235) (0.019) (0.628) (0.253) 
        1.2351*** -0.1463 0.0274 1.2919*** -0.1534 0.1541 1.2765*** -0.1465 0.1095 1.3266*** -0.1473 0.1986 
 
(0.000) (0.531) (0.920) (0.000) (0.573) (0.627) (0.000) (0.582) (0.722) (0.000) (0.624) (0.570) 
          -0.0098 -0.0782** -0.1259 -0.1920 0.0148 -0.2332 -0.1489** -0.0377 -0.2171 -0.2120* -0.0114 -0.2648 
 
(0.905) (0.022) (0.231) (0.139) (0.799) (0.239) (0.038) (0.386) (0.145) (0.099) (0.852) (0.196) 
           0.0068 0.0016 0.0044 0.0117 -0.0028 0.0068 0.0109 -0.0008 0.0063 0.0107 -0.0016 0.0059 
 
(0.421) (0.847) (0.718) (0.198) (0.714) (0.596) (0.175) (0.924) (0.612) (0.207) (0.839) (0.637) 
              -0.0240 0.0077 -0.0054 -0.0215 0.0085 -0.0040 -0.0228 0.0086 -0.0043 -0.0217 0.0086 -0.0035 
 
(0.198) (0.459) (0.761) (0.234) (0.410) (0.824) (0.221) (0.406) (0.811) (0.234) (0.403) (0.844) 
        0.1618 0.0515 -0.0411 -0.5463* -0.0511 -0.7469 -0.1576 -0.0832 -0.4842 -0.4835 -0.0875 -0.8341 
 (0.622) (0.866) (0.938) (0.095) (0.872) (0.162) (0.687) (0.808) (0.460) (0.283) (0.832) (0.262) 
         0.1436 -0.1990 0.1681 -0.1908 -0.3597 -0.2474 0.0810 -0.3580 0.0192 -0.0668 -0.4257 -0.1309 
 (0.713) (0.274) (0.649) (0.643) (0.138) (0.559) (0.884) (0.166) (0.969) (0.915) (0.193) (0.817) 
          0.0298 -0.3572** -0.3796 -0.1693 -0.6138*** -0.7911** 0.0227 -0.6261*** -0.6505* -0.0814 -0.8034*** -0.9158** 
 (0.916) (0.013) (0.189) (0.628) (0.000) (0.022) (0.959) (0.001) (0.081) (0.869) (0.000) (0.031) 
          0.1328 -0.0706 0.0729 0.1571 -0.1742 0.0441 0.2403 -0.1683 0.0943 0.2733 -0.2152 0.0955 
 (0.500) (0.399) (0.633) (0.504) (0.136) (0.824) (0.406) (0.159) (0.672) (0.390) (0.141) (0.726) 
                  0.0290 -0.0575 -0.0240 0.1364 -0.0147 0.2010 0.0482 -0.0369 0.0806 0.1583 -0.0069 0.2864 
 (0.664) (0.339) (0.783) (0.501) (0.932) (0.474) (0.782) (0.815) (0.766) (0.588) (0.978) (0.509) 
                   0.0207 -0.0221 -0.0555 -0.0256 0.0548 -0.0825 -0.0430 0.0147 -0.1444 -0.0539 0.0830 -0.1357 
 (0.572) (0.369) (0.213) (0.907) (0.659) (0.692) (0.821) (0.885) (0.416) (0.872) (0.656) (0.662) 
                    0.0127 0.0304*** 0.0373** -0.0233 0.2513*** 0.2385* -0.0300 0.1826*** 0.1581 -0.0408 0.3604*** 0.3329* 
 (0.410) (0.001) (0.034) (0.878) (0.000) (0.063) (0.801) (0.000) (0.106) (0.855) (0.000) (0.073) 
                    -0.0062 0.0023 -0.0044 -0.1262 0.0612 -0.0659 -0.0916 0.0368 -0.0497 -0.1775 0.0824 -0.0882 
 (0.528) (0.671) (0.770) (0.152) (0.195) (0.539) (0.183) (0.256) (0.538) (0.168) (0.207) (0.567) 
                    0.0020 0.0026** 0.0057*** 0.0839 -0.0168 0.0767 0.0454** 0.0016 0.0488* 0.1008 -0.0084 0.0985 
 (0.158) (0.034) (0.002) (0.143) (0.405) (0.220) (0.033) (0.860) (0.078) (0.106) (0.717) (0.174) 
                  0.0026 -0.0007 0.0068 0.0489 0.0037 0.0096 0.0268 0.0015 0.0206 0.0593 0.0036 0.0194 
 (0.692) (0.917) (0.389) (0.423) (0.960) (0.908) (0.505) (0.975) (0.687) (0.465) (0.971) (0.859) 
                  -0.0055 -0.0008 -0.0040 -0.0528 0.0022 -0.0891 -0.0337 -0.0015 -0.0474 -0.0744 -0.0015 -0.1168 
 (0.499) (0.892) (0.687) (0.519) (0.971) (0.312) (0.523) (0.969) (0.417) (0.499) (0.985) (0.326) 
     -1.0458** -0.2432 -1.0642* -0.8346** -0.2572 -0.9542 -0.9331** -0.2342 -0.9957 -0.8724** -0.2477 -0.9693 
 (0.015) (0.559) (0.087) (0.020) (0.530) (0.112) (0.018) (0.572) (0.103) (0.020) (0.548) (0.109) 
     -0.4554 0.1782 0.2664 -0.2487 0.1785 0.3998 -0.3543 0.1996 0.3466 -0.2893 0.1892 0.3837 
 
(0.202) (0.393) (0.526) (0.371) (0.298) (0.263) (0.280) (0.296) (0.367) (0.335) (0.292) (0.297) 
R2 within 0.2764 0.0152 0.0141 0.2760 0.0156 0.0139 0.2765 0.0154 0.0139 0.2760 0.0154 0.0139 
F-statistic 6.8098 3.0822 2.4620 5.6220 3.3254 1.6291 5.9280 3.3806 2.1012 5.6968 3.4406 1.7816 
p-value 0.0000 0.0001 0.0017 0.0000 0.0000 0.0599 0.0000 0.0000 0.0085 0.0000 0.0000 0.0327 
Funds 1513 1513 1513 1513 1513 1513 1513 1513 1513 1513 1513 1513 
Observations 34136 34136 34136 34136 34136 34136 34136 34136 34136 34136 34136 34136 
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K. Results with the FTSE All Shares index as benchmark with the linear, logarithmic, 
and cubic root age functions (Chapter 3) 
 
 
Table K1.A. Results for the equity fund samples with                 . The FTSE All Shares index is the 
benchmark. The panel observations have a yearly frequency. The results are obtained using Driscoll-Kraay 
standard errors and fund fixed effects. P-values are in parentheses (* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01).  
 
Sample Equity Emerging International UK 
Dependent RFund-RFTSE M2-FTSE RFund-RFTSE M2-FTSE RFund-RFTSE M2-FTSE RFund-RFTSE M2-FTSE 
Constant -0.3191 -0.4680 -0.2789 -0.5492 -1.2492 -1.7320* 0.4223 0.5510 
 
(0.611) (0.453) (0.766) (0.177) (0.195) (0.082) (0.380) (0.205) 
          0.0118 0.0093 0.1863 0.1752** 0.0443 0.0185 -0.0125 0.0096 
 
(0.700) (0.791) (0.174) (0.048) (0.389) (0.717) (0.474) (0.567) 
        -0.0161 0.5119 -3.3293*** -0.5636** 0.4916 1.1258* -0.2137* 0.0043 
 
(0.946) (0.162) (0.000) (0.025) (0.347) (0.062) (0.070) (0.980) 
        0.2454 0.0627 0.0444 -0.1688 0.5368** 0.4038 -0.0490 -0.2582* 
 
(0.114) (0.745) (0.895) (0.688) (0.048) (0.124) (0.646) (0.075) 
          0.0207 0.0004 0.2122** 0.1928*** 0.0280 0.0282 -0.0200 -0.0418 
 
(0.683) (0.994) (0.019) (0.004) (0.826) (0.806) (0.638) (0.351) 
           0.0073 -0.0087 0.0186 -0.0016 -0.0022 -0.0317 0.0153* 0.0084 
 
(0.466) (0.279) (0.287) (0.884) (0.943) (0.221) (0.061) (0.257) 
              0.0065 0.0069 -0.0651 -0.0768 0.0341* 0.0381** -0.0001 0.0008 
 
(0.571) (0.523) (0.373) (0.181) (0.082) (0.039) (0.994) (0.921) 
        0.2630 0.5643* 3.4895*** 3.3570*** 0.7995 0.8931 -0.3586 0.1988 
 (0.510) (0.098) (0.006) (0.000) (0.249) (0.169) (0.138) (0.324) 
         -0.1376 0.2730 -0.6006 1.2774 0.1230 0.4561 -0.2480 0.1117 
 (0.690) (0.301) (0.800) (0.262) (0.799) (0.259) (0.175) (0.497) 
          -0.1366 -0.0491 -0.2060 0.8669* 0.1928 0.2384 -0.5117*** -0.4485*** 
 (0.670) (0.863) (0.771) (0.075) (0.698) (0.578) (0.000) (0.001) 
          -0.1403 -0.0009 -0.4512 0.5235 -0.1781 0.0368 -0.0895 -0.0168 
 (0.395) (0.995) (0.525) (0.301) (0.474) (0.868) (0.312) (0.806) 
                  0.0473 -0.0045 -1.1329*** -0.4591** -0.1113 -0.1363 0.1369 0.0311 
 (0.543) (0.953) (0.001) (0.015) (0.499) (0.429) (0.110) (0.679) 
                   0.0359 -0.0085 1.0443 0.5363* 0.0139 -0.0315 -0.0097 -0.0365 
 (0.247) (0.804) (0.140) (0.069) (0.804) (0.560) (0.785) (0.352) 
                    0.0181 0.0194 0.1649 0.0588 -0.0110 -0.0113 0.0431*** 0.0534*** 
 (0.497) (0.461) (0.107) (0.505) (0.815) (0.787) (0.003) (0.000) 
                    0.0052 0.0020 -0.0419 -0.0678 0.0134 0.0035 0.0019 0.0038 
 (0.603) (0.849) (0.616) (0.198) (0.423) (0.843) (0.848) (0.678) 
                    -0.0005 0.0012 -0.0141*** -0.0116*** 0.0000 0.0013 0.0002 0.0016 
 (0.776) (0.516) (0.006) (0.001) (0.999) (0.734) (0.908) (0.345) 
                  0.0113 0.0101 0.1021*** 0.0308 -0.0105 -0.0049 0.0138** 0.0087* 
 (0.338) (0.253) (0.001) (0.143) (0.505) (0.734) (0.019) (0.090) 
                  -0.0023 -0.0009 -0.0133 -0.0219 -0.0088 -0.0121 -0.0003 0.0043 
 (0.759) (0.913) (0.642) (0.319) (0.505) (0.323) (0.948) (0.525) 
     0.3102 0.5242    0.8601 1.3399 -0.1980 -0.2284 
 (0.594) (0.381)    (0.337) (0.164) (0.608) (0.520) 
     -0.1129 -0.0569 0.4192 0.4332 -0.3825 -0.1087 0.1241 0.0145 
 
(0.731) (0.846) (0.697) (0.575) (0.437) (0.777) (0.571) (0.940) 
R2 within 0.0140 0.0764 0.5592 0.3316 0.0358 0.1507 0.0208 0.0583 
F-statistic 5.4983 11.3600 42402485.5
940 
134334.034
1 
10.5944 4.2066 15.0895 20.7716 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0003 0.0000 0.0000 
Funds 3571 3571 183 183 1892 1892 1496 1496 
Observations 20985 20985 713 713 11574 11574 8698 8698 
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Table K2.B. Results for the equity fund samples with                 . The FTSE All Shares index is the 
benchmark. The panel observations have a quarterly frequency. The results are obtained using Driscoll-Kraay 
standard errors and fund fixed effects. P-values are in parentheses (* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01). 
 
Sample Equity Emerging International UK 
Dependent RFund-RFTSE M2-FTSE RFund-RFTSE M2-FTSE RFund-RFTSE M2-FTSE RFund-RFTSE M2-FTSE 
Constant -0.0065 -0.3950 0.9843 0.3443 -0.7931 -2.3727* 0.7469 1.9773** 
 
(0.993) (0.630) (0.460) (0.783) (0.476) (0.066) (0.140) (0.025) 
          -0.0064 0.0123 0.2068 0.0312 0.0093 0.0285 -0.0234 0.0120 
 
(0.880) (0.795) (0.217) (0.825) (0.879) (0.681) (0.291) (0.723) 
        -0.3041 0.0771 -3.9274*** -1.2866* -0.0886 0.5199 -0.2686 -0.4655 
 
(0.103) (0.817) (0.000) (0.091) (0.730) (0.226) (0.457) (0.456) 
        0.0055 0.8827*** -0.4493 0.1290 0.1801 1.2813*** -0.2265 0.3093 
 
(0.979) (0.000) (0.475) (0.842) (0.412) (0.003) (0.493) (0.366) 
          0.0070 0.0333 0.0433 -0.0337 0.0319 0.2302** -0.0471 -0.2001* 
 
(0.917) (0.662) (0.776) (0.826) (0.782) (0.011) (0.519) (0.072) 
           -0.0047 -0.0089 0.0014 -0.0617*** -0.0144 -0.0373 0.0025 0.0090 
 
(0.708) (0.544) (0.949) (0.004) (0.754) (0.380) (0.802) (0.530) 
              0.0004 0.0128 -0.0476 0.1120 0.0140 0.0793** 0.0001 -0.0183 
 
(0.970) (0.365) (0.693) (0.370) (0.682) (0.027) (0.991) (0.306) 
        0.4672 0.3058 3.7465** 6.1919*** 0.5717 0.1367 0.0042 -0.2611 
 (0.173) (0.583) (0.015) (0.000) (0.216) (0.850) (0.987) (0.691) 
         -0.1350 0.5795 -0.2442 2.1285 0.0016 0.9235* -0.1366 0.0626 
 (0.717) (0.188) (0.914) (0.235) (0.997) (0.088) (0.529) (0.871) 
          0.0834 0.2181 0.7425 1.6869 0.4409 0.7488 -0.3934** -0.5499* 
 (0.824) (0.601) (0.613) (0.183) (0.405) (0.169) (0.028) (0.076) 
          -0.0396 0.2493 -0.3392 0.2615 -0.0081 0.4710 -0.0849 0.0154 
 (0.856) (0.286) (0.738) (0.716) (0.980) (0.165) (0.468) (0.927) 
                  -0.0863 0.0334 -1.0547*** -1.2882** -0.1425 0.1242 -0.0379 -0.0478 
 (0.292) (0.780) (0.004) (0.012) (0.245) (0.485) (0.630) (0.695) 
                   0.0100 -0.0625 0.7221 0.6360 -0.0138 -0.1060 -0.0304 -0.0679 
 (0.768) (0.137) (0.363) (0.330) (0.794) (0.100) (0.255) (0.206) 
                    -0.0099 -0.0055 0.0972 0.2366 -0.0552 -0.0590 0.0342*** 0.0431** 
 (0.724) (0.856) (0.594) (0.105) (0.250) (0.242) (0.003) (0.032) 
                    -0.0033 -0.0209 -0.0037 0.0458 -0.0084 -0.0352 0.0039 -0.0068 
 (0.778) (0.129) (0.975) (0.630) (0.677) (0.142) (0.573) (0.700) 
                    0.0001 0.0011 -0.0104 -0.0064 -0.0001 -0.0057** 0.0013 0.0087*** 
 (0.954) (0.587) (0.178) (0.253) (0.984) (0.018) (0.618) (0.000) 
                  0.0094 0.0181* 0.0576* 0.0409 -0.0084 0.0188 0.0156 0.0038 
 (0.378) (0.063) (0.073) (0.197) (0.472) (0.185) (0.136) (0.707) 
                  0.0066 -0.0006 0.0502 0.0386 0.0088 0.0011 0.0016 -0.0144 
 (0.378) (0.952) (0.126) (0.154) (0.311) (0.933) (0.850) (0.340) 
     0.3083 -0.1857    0.9061 0.6183 -0.2659 -1.1994* 
 (0.605) (0.766)    (0.296) (0.511) (0.541) (0.070) 
     0.0660 0.2069 0.3006 1.4348 -0.1151 0.1099 0.2188 0.3373 
 
(0.896) (0.708) (0.837) (0.250) (0.878) (0.893) (0.356) (0.455) 
R2 within 0.0047 0.0179 0.2656 0.0612 0.0081 0.0333 0.0096 0.0167 
F-statistic 1.8603 3.0151 8.0506 5.2448 0.9655 3.0715 3.2948 2.7329 
p-value 0.0236 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.5060 0.0001 0.0000 0.0005 
Funds 3617 3617 186 186 1918 1918 1513 1513 
Observations 82149 82149 2767 2767 45246 45246 34136 34136 
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Table K2.A. Results for the equity fund samples with                       . The FTSE All Shares index is 
the benchmark. The panel observations have a yearly frequency. The results are obtained using Driscoll-Kraay 
standard errors and fund fixed effects. P-values are in parentheses (* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01).  
 
Sample Equity Emerging International UK 
Dependent RFund-RFTSE M2-FTSE RFund-RFTSE M2-FTSE RFund-RFTSE M2-FTSE RFund-RFTSE M2-FTSE 
Constant -0.3624 -0.4185 -0.2791 -0.9823 -1.4549 -1.7872* 0.4924 0.5998 
 
(0.560) (0.499) (0.762) (0.144) (0.149) (0.082) (0.306) (0.181) 
          0.1286 0.0534 1.0164* 1.0010** 0.3791 0.1929 -0.0885 -0.0408 
 
(0.446) (0.790) (0.091) (0.025) (0.194) (0.522) (0.417) (0.756) 
        -0.0674 0.4472 -4.0087*** -0.6363 0.6916 1.2172* -0.3143* -0.0646 
 
(0.781) (0.275) (0.000) (0.199) (0.166) (0.056) (0.072) (0.815) 
        0.3267 0.0939 0.6319 0.4455 0.7554** 0.5666 -0.0498 -0.2975 
 
(0.180) (0.751) (0.342) (0.528) (0.048) (0.129) (0.785) (0.231) 
          -0.0286 -0.0818 -0.1876 0.0153 -0.1014 -0.0921 -0.0019 -0.0810 
 
(0.810) (0.499) (0.426) (0.902) (0.698) (0.676) (0.968) (0.189) 
           0.0089 -0.0060 0.0286 0.0022 0.0075 -0.0220 0.0147* 0.0087 
 
(0.430) (0.513) (0.184) (0.860) (0.836) (0.450) (0.076) (0.214) 
              0.0034 0.0044 -0.0492 -0.0681 0.0220 0.0305* 0.0000 0.0006 
 
(0.776) (0.722) (0.420) (0.166) (0.264) (0.081) (0.997) (0.932) 
        0.1979 0.5661 3.7681*** 3.2887*** 0.8852 1.1335 -0.6248* -0.0393 
 (0.675) (0.161) (0.001) (0.000) (0.296) (0.147) (0.053) (0.889) 
         -0.2113 0.2763 -2.3272 0.5083 0.1841 0.6315 -0.3156 0.1008 
 (0.621) (0.443) (0.427) (0.705) (0.788) (0.305) (0.280) (0.696) 
          -0.2533 -0.2224 -0.3578 0.5468 0.2411 0.2642 -0.8262*** -0.7903*** 
 (0.553) (0.607) (0.487) (0.371) (0.727) (0.683) (0.000) (0.000) 
          -0.0717 0.0636 -0.1221 0.9922 -0.0650 0.1727 -0.1615 -0.0752 
 (0.768) (0.792) (0.880) (0.124) (0.862) (0.659) (0.359) (0.578) 
                  0.1691 -0.0435 -3.1832*** -1.3723** -0.3215 -0.4371 0.5485** 0.1180 
 (0.498) (0.869) (0.000) (0.012) (0.517) (0.405) (0.038) (0.603) 
                   0.1595 -0.0413 3.0086 1.3044 -0.0145 -0.1724 0.0473 -0.1712 
 (0.318) (0.813) (0.170) (0.166) (0.962) (0.533) (0.804) (0.413) 
                    0.1259 0.1477 0.1599 0.0607 -0.0825 -0.0402 0.3390*** 0.3310*** 
 (0.444) (0.376) (0.734) (0.888) (0.758) (0.872) (0.001) (0.001) 
                    -0.0132 -0.0310 -0.4430 -0.5939* -0.0138 -0.0498 0.0491 0.0220 
 (0.896) (0.740) (0.396) (0.084) (0.927) (0.738) (0.592) (0.786) 
                    0.0123 0.0350 0.0912 0.0218 0.0419 0.0452 -0.0053 0.0262 
 (0.734) (0.342) (0.313) (0.660) (0.581) (0.479) (0.691) (0.142) 
                  0.0745 0.0752 0.8153*** 0.1928 -0.1489 -0.0686 0.1112** 0.0695 
 (0.555) (0.440) (0.005) (0.372) (0.370) (0.634) (0.040) (0.388) 
                  -0.0504 -0.0177 -0.3571 -0.4060 -0.1456 -0.1313 -0.0016 0.0397 
 (0.560) (0.849) (0.209) (0.118) (0.250) (0.270) (0.981) (0.656) 
     0.2974 0.5348    0.8438 1.3174 -0.2138 -0.1679 
 (0.588) (0.335)    (0.329) (0.158) (0.581) (0.641) 
     -0.0957 -0.0248 0.5840 0.5579 -0.2937 -0.0830 0.1084 0.0804 
 
(0.726) (0.912) (0.503) (0.374) (0.456) (0.773) (0.523) (0.624) 
R2 within 0.0152 0.0773 0.5702 0.3430 0.0378 0.1519 0.0216 0.0573 
F-statistic 9.2683 19.5804 2852.9662 3812.6622 10.3674 3.8840 34.1293 26.4229 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0006 0.0000 0.0000 
Funds 3571 3571 183 183 1892 1892 1496 1496 
Observations 20985 20985 713 713 11574 11574 8698 8698 
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Table K2.B. Results for the equity fund samples with                       . The FTSE All Shares index is 
the benchmark. The panel observations have a quarterly frequency. The results are obtained using Driscoll-
Kraay standard errors and fund fixed effects. P-values are in parentheses (* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01). 
 
Sample Equity Emerging International UK 
Dependent RFund-RFTSE M2-FTSE RFund-RFTSE M2-FTSE RFund-RFTSE M2-FTSE RFund-RFTSE M2-FTSE 
Constant -0.0554 -0.2915 -0.0204 -0.6262 -0.8337 -2.3820* 0.7251 2.0747** 
 
(0.937) (0.714) (0.987) (0.649) (0.438) (0.055) (0.169) (0.040) 
          -0.0690 -0.0155 0.5992 0.0135 0.0081 0.2410 -0.1752 -0.1850 
 
(0.690) (0.933) (0.370) (0.979) (0.972) (0.335) (0.217) (0.281) 
        -0.3858 -0.0749 -4.2669*** -1.5010* -0.0617 0.2937 -0.3190 -0.4186 
 
(0.114) (0.837) (0.000) (0.057) (0.817) (0.549) (0.438) (0.518) 
        -0.1038 0.8396*** -0.6228 -0.0531 -0.0091 1.1301** -0.1934 0.5039 
 
(0.659) (0.000) (0.413) (0.939) (0.967) (0.011) (0.591) (0.228) 
          0.0858 -0.0265 0.2927 0.4134 0.0883 0.1405 0.0531 -0.2704 
 
(0.349) (0.843) (0.402) (0.334) (0.558) (0.314) (0.504) (0.294) 
           -0.0078 -0.0070 -0.0099 -0.0773*** -0.0194 -0.0262 -0.0025 0.0092 
 
(0.526) (0.566) (0.721) (0.003) (0.681) (0.536) (0.789) (0.533) 
              0.0015 0.0125 -0.0026 0.1288 0.0143 0.0743** 0.0011 -0.0163 
 
(0.904) (0.393) (0.982) (0.272) (0.678) (0.042) (0.922) (0.362) 
        0.5236 0.0289 4.0152** 7.2801*** 0.7444 0.2954 -0.1436 -1.1233 
 (0.290) (0.967) (0.012) (0.000) (0.297) (0.773) (0.661) (0.107) 
         -0.3430 0.4555 -1.9636 1.3343 -0.1412 1.3545* -0.2539 -0.4985 
 (0.510) (0.391) (0.436) (0.529) (0.826) (0.057) (0.466) (0.269) 
          0.0043 0.0903 0.6635 1.6386 0.5061 1.1824* -0.6706** -1.1382*** 
 (0.993) (0.862) (0.718) (0.277) (0.460) (0.091) (0.015) (0.003) 
          -0.0079 0.3976 -0.5016 0.0511 0.0999 0.8544* -0.2129 -0.0554 
 (0.977) (0.179) (0.721) (0.959) (0.801) (0.053) (0.217) (0.805) 
                  -0.2170 0.2090 -2.5036** -2.9002** -0.4620 0.2510 0.0662 0.2352 
 (0.324) (0.580) (0.014) (0.030) (0.179) (0.655) (0.751) (0.558) 
                   0.1634 -0.1619 2.4439 2.2099 0.0233 -0.5366 0.0052 -0.0541 
 (0.416) (0.496) (0.208) (0.197) (0.937) (0.149) (0.973) (0.817) 
                    -0.0016 0.0021 -0.0375 0.8278 -0.2565 -0.4194 0.2810*** 0.3330** 
 (0.993) (0.991) (0.964) (0.246) (0.327) (0.150) (0.007) (0.028) 
                    -0.0358 -0.1833* -0.0864 0.3209 -0.1026 -0.3201* 0.0836 -0.0683 
 (0.748) (0.099) (0.913) (0.620) (0.529) (0.071) (0.154) (0.571) 
                    -0.0265 0.0284 -0.1159 -0.1850 -0.0190 -0.0063 -0.0248 0.0823 
 (0.451) (0.553) (0.352) (0.211) (0.653) (0.886) (0.391) (0.286) 
                  0.0835 0.1604** 0.4605* 0.3022 -0.0500 0.2042 0.0903 -0.0082 
 (0.383) (0.044) (0.079) (0.176) (0.641) (0.100) (0.243) (0.920) 
                  0.0888 0.0248 0.2836 0.2584 0.1420* 0.0919 -0.0134 -0.1676 
 (0.167) (0.785) (0.319) (0.237) (0.056) (0.398) (0.842) (0.179) 
     0.3009 -0.1504    0.9074 0.6008 -0.2841 -1.0753* 
 (0.586) (0.793)    (0.271) (0.501) (0.504) (0.091) 
     0.0784 0.2683 0.7586 1.5160 -0.0732 0.1072 0.2120 0.4968 
 
(0.846) (0.543) (0.526) (0.139) (0.900) (0.865) (0.299) (0.202) 
R2 within 0.0050 0.0179 0.2652 0.0628 0.0085 0.0335 0.0102 0.0165 
F-statistic 1.4747 3.3145 6.9174 6.5537 1.0142 2.3114 3.1184 2.0629 
p-value 0.1071 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.4504 0.0034 0.0001 0.0100 
Funds 3617 3617 186 186 1918 1918 1513 1513 
Observations 82149 82149 2767 2767 45246 45246 34136 34136 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
240 
 
 
Table K3.A. Results for the equity fund samples with           √      
 . The FTSE All Shares index is the 
benchmark. The panel observations have a yearly frequency. The results are obtained using Driscoll-Kraay 
standard errors and fund fixed effects. P-values are in parentheses (* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01).  
 
Sample Equity Emerging International UK 
Dependent RFund-RFTSE M2-FTSE RFund-RFTSE M2-FTSE RFund-RFTSE M2-FTSE RFund-RFTSE M2-FTSE 
Constant -0.4561 -0.4893 -1.2229 -1.8032** -1.7363* -1.9474* 0.5536 0.5931 
 
(0.463) (0.440) (0.237) (0.037) (0.096) (0.071) (0.273) (0.213) 
          0.1942 0.0958 1.5624* 1.4897** 0.5595 0.2776 -0.1211 -0.0208 
 
(0.467) (0.758) (0.091) (0.024) (0.224) (0.555) (0.448) (0.909) 
        -0.1249 0.4000 -4.4638*** -0.7375 0.7580 1.2535* -0.3898* -0.1071 
 
(0.642) (0.352) (0.000) (0.233) (0.148) (0.061) (0.057) (0.727) 
        0.3394 0.0959 0.7181 0.5936 0.8006* 0.6252 -0.0437 -0.3177 
 
(0.225) (0.775) (0.352) (0.463) (0.068) (0.136) (0.836) (0.271) 
          -0.0321 -0.0862 -0.1089 0.0846 -0.1068 -0.0867 -0.0082 -0.0979 
 
(0.813) (0.536) (0.706) (0.559) (0.718) (0.731) (0.900) (0.201) 
           0.0087 -0.0067 0.0247 -0.0001 0.0060 -0.0245 0.0150* 0.0087 
 
(0.435) (0.466) (0.242) (0.994) (0.866) (0.391) (0.073) (0.226) 
              0.0038 0.0048 -0.0583 -0.0740 0.0240 0.0325* 0.0000 0.0005 
 
(0.754) (0.697) (0.365) (0.145) (0.213) (0.061) (0.996) (0.943) 
        0.0631 0.6398 6.5512*** 4.6034*** 1.2023 1.5185 -1.0960** -0.0636 
 (0.924) (0.313) (0.000) (0.000) (0.345) (0.230) (0.032) (0.884) 
         -0.3335 0.3276 -4.8036 -0.5400 0.2134 0.7703 -0.3509 0.2712 
 (0.532) (0.494) (0.318) (0.797) (0.812) (0.350) (0.410) (0.516) 
          -0.3243 -0.3030 -0.4649 0.5570 0.3416 0.3104 -1.0549*** -0.9987*** 
 (0.552) (0.583) (0.563) (0.551) (0.700) (0.709) (0.000) (0.000) 
          -0.0823 0.0672 0.1223 1.3468 -0.0911 0.1653 -0.1789 -0.0709 
 (0.783) (0.820) (0.914) (0.116) (0.841) (0.725) (0.437) (0.701) 
                  0.2760 -0.0742 -4.6430*** -2.0560*** -0.4930 -0.6774 0.8520** 0.1531 
 (0.485) (0.862) (0.000) (0.010) (0.534) (0.418) (0.040) (0.664) 
                   0.2505 -0.0619 4.7827 2.0924 -0.0076 -0.2549 0.0674 -0.2642 
 (0.289) (0.809) (0.165) (0.155) (0.987) (0.532) (0.813) (0.401) 
                    0.1814 0.2084 0.3647 0.1439 -0.1239 -0.0630 0.4809*** 0.4723*** 
 (0.452) (0.388) (0.614) (0.823) (0.756) (0.863) (0.001) (0.001) 
                    -0.0034 -0.0302 -0.5512 -0.7893 0.0096 -0.0454 0.0607 0.0262 
 (0.980) (0.813) (0.467) (0.103) (0.963) (0.821) (0.629) (0.816) 
                    0.0148 0.0410 0.0640 -0.0087 0.0487 0.0493 -0.0038 0.0353 
 (0.750) (0.392) (0.593) (0.889) (0.620) (0.553) (0.857) (0.157) 
                  0.1093 0.1045 1.0854*** 0.2483 -0.1911 -0.0910 0.1573** 0.0962 
 (0.514) (0.413) (0.006) (0.405) (0.385) (0.636) (0.031) (0.343) 
                  -0.0597 -0.0203 -0.4306 -0.5107 -0.1779 -0.1700 -0.0046 0.0520 
 (0.598) (0.868) (0.249) (0.133) (0.297) (0.288) (0.956) (0.650) 
     0.2882 0.5259    0.8285 1.3128 -0.2123 -0.1794 
 (0.605) (0.352)    (0.344) (0.164) (0.583) (0.618) 
     -0.1096 -0.0374 0.5292 0.5266 -0.3275 -0.0979 0.1103 0.0677 
 
(0.700) (0.875) (0.559) (0.413) (0.428) (0.750) (0.539) (0.690) 
R2 within 0.0152 0.0771 0.5667 0.3389 0.0376 0.1515 0.0217 0.0575 
F-statistic 7.4518 18.8468 21455.5117 2803.4231 11.9275 4.0058 26.9443 26.2938 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0005 0.0000 0.0000 
Funds 3571 3571 183 183 1892 1892 1496 1496 
Observations 20985 20985 713 713 11574 11574 8698 8698 
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Table K3.B. Results for the equity fund samples with           √      
 . The FTSE All Shares index is the 
benchmark. The panel observations have a quarterly frequency. The results are obtained using Driscoll-Kraay 
standard errors and fund fixed effects. P-values are in parentheses (* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01). 
 
Sample Equity Emerging International UK 
Dependent RFund-RFTSE M2-FTSE RFund-RFTSE M2-FTSE RFund-RFTSE M2-FTSE RFund-RFTSE M2-FTSE 
Constant 0.0272 -0.3389 -0.3580 -0.4508 -0.8288 -2.6245** 0.8993* 2.1567** 
 
(0.968) (0.642) (0.798) (0.739) (0.426) (0.029) (0.077) (0.025) 
          -0.1109 0.0054 0.8624 -0.1171 0.0055 0.3525 -0.2715 -0.2145 
 
(0.704) (0.986) (0.415) (0.884) (0.989) (0.398) (0.222) (0.419) 
        -0.4393 -0.1701 -4.5632*** -1.7216** -0.0219 0.1847 -0.3962 -0.4217 
 
(0.129) (0.662) (0.000) (0.043) (0.940) (0.724) (0.387) (0.535) 
        -0.1431 0.8380*** -0.8298 -0.2440 -0.0680 1.1001** -0.1909 0.6046 
 
(0.581) (0.001) (0.348) (0.755) (0.773) (0.020) (0.631) (0.207) 
          0.0832 -0.0216 0.3378 0.5101 0.0944 0.2055 0.0381 -0.3284 
 
(0.403) (0.875) (0.368) (0.278) (0.586) (0.182) (0.657) (0.212) 
           -0.0071 -0.0078 -0.0089 -0.0763*** -0.0191 -0.0305 -0.0014 0.0091 
 
(0.566) (0.539) (0.735) (0.002) (0.687) (0.476) (0.879) (0.528) 
              0.0013 0.0128 -0.0067 0.1285 0.0141 0.0766** 0.0012 -0.0158 
 
(0.918) (0.380) (0.953) (0.277) (0.686) (0.037) (0.910) (0.376) 
        0.6484 -0.1289 5.7328*** 8.9970*** 1.0750 0.0449 -0.2475 -1.2379 
 (0.233) (0.886) (0.002) (0.000) (0.183) (0.973) (0.565) (0.205) 
         -0.4961 0.5890 -4.1259 -0.8438 -0.1756 1.7089* -0.2829 -0.3793 
 (0.441) (0.380) (0.273) (0.793) (0.824) (0.066) (0.541) (0.526) 
          -0.0007 0.1143 0.4877 0.7064 0.6934 1.4503* -0.8802** -1.3052*** 
 (0.999) (0.856) (0.830) (0.709) (0.406) (0.094) (0.011) (0.005) 
          -0.0040 0.5142 -0.4907 -0.2849 0.1358 1.0396** -0.2633 0.0039 
 (0.990) (0.145) (0.795) (0.835) (0.774) (0.048) (0.217) (0.990) 
                  -0.3049 0.3266 -3.4750** -3.9055** -0.6801 0.4165 0.1175 0.3347 
 (0.358) (0.567) (0.018) (0.038) (0.198) (0.628) (0.703) (0.583) 
                   0.2531 -0.2366 3.8624 3.5601 0.0409 -0.7598 0.0088 -0.1111 
 (0.401) (0.504) (0.172) (0.156) (0.926) (0.172) (0.969) (0.751) 
                    -0.0034 -0.0048 0.0705 1.3416 -0.3758 -0.5890 0.4010*** 0.4547** 
 (0.989) (0.986) (0.954) (0.206) (0.338) (0.173) (0.006) (0.032) 
                    -0.0421 -0.2520 -0.0996 0.4810 -0.1287 -0.4369* 0.1100 -0.0947 
 (0.786) (0.105) (0.930) (0.605) (0.576) (0.081) (0.181) (0.586) 
                    -0.0287 0.0299 -0.1504 -0.2456 -0.0235 -0.0318 -0.0222 0.1150 
 (0.474) (0.576) (0.311) (0.174) (0.658) (0.548) (0.489) (0.196) 
                  0.1163 0.2185** 0.6404* 0.4372 -0.0737 0.2706 0.1370 -0.0069 
 (0.376) (0.043) (0.078) (0.158) (0.610) (0.106) (0.209) (0.949) 
                  0.1133 0.0255 0.4104 0.3751 0.1789* 0.1103 -0.0150 -0.2298 
 (0.198) (0.838) (0.306) (0.223) (0.080) (0.463) (0.872) (0.181) 
     0.3056 -0.1606    0.9102 0.5922 -0.2727 -1.0880* 
 (0.585) (0.782)    (0.272) (0.511) (0.525) (0.090) 
     0.0853 0.2607 0.7421 1.5700 -0.0706 0.0985 0.2252 0.4824 
 
(0.839) (0.568) (0.546) (0.134) (0.907) (0.880) (0.294) (0.225) 
R2 within 0.0049 0.0179 0.2653 0.0631 0.0084 0.0334 0.0100 0.0165 
F-statistic 1.4683 3.2634 7.0337 6.3757 0.9543 2.3322 3.4366 2.0935 
p-value 0.1097 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.5190 0.0031 0.0000 0.0088 
Funds 3617 3617 186 186 1918 1918 1513 1513 
Observations 82149 82149 2767 2767 45246 45246 34136 34136 
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L. Tables 4.3.A – 4.3.G and 4.4.A – 4.4.G (Chapter 4) 
Table 4.3.A. Correlation coefficient between independent variables. In bold are correlations with absolute value larger than 0.4 for variables that are used in the same 
specification. Internally managed all funds sample. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
All Funds (internal) 
 
 
 
                    √      
  √      
                                                                                                    
       
1 
                           
0.9339 1 
             √      
  0.9791 0.9869 1 
            √      
  0.9602 0.9966 0.9968 1 
                   
-0.0135 -0.0293 -0.0225 -0.0260 1 
                  
0.0504 0.0673 0.0610 0.0642 -0.4449 1 
                   
0.1692 0.1555 0.1640 0.1607 0.0083 0.0244 1 
                   
-0.0430 -0.0316 -0.0380 -0.0344 -0.0233 -0.0412 0.1592 1 
                     
-0.0527 -0.0423 -0.0490 -0.0453 0.0255 0.0156 -0.2408 0.1632 1 
              
-0.1634 -0.2073 -0.1910 -0.1993 -0.0183 -0.0407 -0.1609 -0.0514 0.1275 1 
              
-0.1512 -0.1357 -0.1458 -0.1414 -0.0209 -0.0271 -0.2122 -0.0361 0.1055 -0.0391 1 
              
-0.1170 -0.0774 -0.0963 -0.0876 0.0097 -0.0402 -0.2236 -0.0188 0.0699 -0.0526 -0.0742 1 
             
-0.0571 -0.0230 -0.0375 -0.0308 0.0344 -0.0131 -0.2104 -0.0151 0.0360 -0.0659 -0.0931 -0.1253 1 
       
0.1618 0.1825 0.1767 0.1797 0.0146 0.0937 0.1500 -0.0395 -0.0467 -0.3314 -0.2165 -0.0999 -0.0087 1 
      
0.1839 0.1196 0.1492 0.1360 0.1130 -0.0002 0.3671 -0.0381 -0.0327 -0.1944 -0.2691 -0.2245 -0.2096 0.2695 1 
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Table 4.3.B. Correlation coefficient between independent variables. In bold are correlations with absolute value larger than 0.4 for variables that are used in the same 
specification. Internally managed allocation funds sample. Note: there are no common observations for the lag of ABI’s share and PPPt. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Allocation Funds (internal) 
 
 
 
                    √      
  √      
                                                                                                    
       
1 
                           
0.9454 1 
             √      
  0.9810 0.9906 1 
            √      
  0.9644 0.9979 0.9973 1 
                   
0.0796 0.0576 0.0673 0.0629 1 
                  
-0.0514 -0.0459 -0.0481 -0.0481 -0.4805 1 
                   
0.2244 0.3120 0.2806 0.2972 -0.1392 0.1448 1 
                   
-0.0338 0.0151 -0.0041 0.0056 -0.1140 0.1683 0.4337 1 
                     
0.1838 0.1374 0.1558 0.1478 0.1116 -0.1337 -0.5076 -0.3245 1 
              
-0.1287 -0.1404 -0.1377 -0.1390 0.0171 -0.1020 -0.2984 -0.1470 0.4527 1 
              
-0.0321 0.0105 -0.0076 0.0015 0.0171 0.0132 -0.3026 -0.1687 0.3278 -0.0205 1 
              
-0.0941 -0.0958 -0.0961 -0.0955 0.1574 -0.1274 -0.4368 -0.2585 0.1024 -0.0375 -0.0375 1 
             
0.0479 -0.0341 -0.0008 -0.0180 0.2126 -0.1377 -0.2022 -0.1837 0.3286 -0.0322 -0.0322 -0.0590 1 
       
0.0816 0.1232 0.1066 0.1164 0.0274 0.0708 0.1399 0.1088 
 
-0.4436 0.0091 0.0166 0.0143 1 
      
0.0839 0.0682 0.0752 0.0720 0.0659 0.1178 0.3905 -0.0301 -0.3466 -0.4383 -0.2443 0.0301 0.0100 0.1944 1 
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Table 4.3.C. Correlation coefficient between independent variables. In bold are correlations with absolute value larger than 0.4 for variables that are used in the same 
specification. Internally managed fixed income funds sample. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fixed Income Funds (internal) 
 
 
 
                    √      
  √      
                                                                                                    
       
1 
                           
0.9372 1 
             √      
  0.9807 0.9872 1 
            √      
  0.9629 0.9965 0.9970 1 
                   
-0.0105 -0.0144 -0.0146 -0.0143 1 
                  
0.0764 0.1013 0.0929 0.0970 -0.3194 1 
                   
0.2374 0.2033 0.2221 0.2141 0.0108 -0.0305 1 
                   
-0.0676 -0.0393 -0.0540 -0.0465 -0.0072 -0.1168 0.2894 1 
                     
0.0368 0.0679 0.0544 0.0612 -0.0386 0.0731 -0.4899 -0.0540 1 
              
-0.1735 -0.2176 -0.2009 -0.2093 0.0302 -0.0719 -0.1955 -0.1339 0.2325 1 
              
-0.1757 -0.1528 -0.1669 -0.1607 0.0249 -0.0229 -0.2458 -0.0747 0.2435 -0.0458 1 
              
-0.1240 -0.0746 -0.0981 -0.0875 -0.0431 -0.0103 -0.2271 -0.0818 0.1432 -0.0562 -0.0814 1 
             
-0.0772 -0.0295 -0.0506 -0.0409 0.0442 0.0164 -0.1842 0.0538 0.1489 -0.0732 -0.1060 -0.1300 1 
       
0.1979 0.2044 0.2056 0.2051 -0.0356 0.1557 0.1822 -0.0349 -0.1515 -0.2831 -0.3023 -0.1516 0.0044 1 
      
0.1928 0.0851 0.1346 0.1120 0.0358 -0.1063 0.3226 -0.1579 -0.2808 -0.2089 -0.2660 -0.2027 -0.2241 0.3149 1 
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Table 4.3.D. Correlation coefficient between independent variables. In bold are correlations with absolute value larger than 0.4 for variables that are used in the same 
specification. Internally managed equity funds sample. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Equity Funds (internal) 
 
 
 
                    √      
  √      
                                                                                                    
       
1 
                           
0.9330 1 
             √      
  0.9785 0.9870 1 
            √      
  0.9593 0.9966 0.9968 1 
                   
-0.0049 -0.0300 -0.0186 -0.0245 1 
                  
0.0408 0.0543 0.0488 0.0516 -0.4965 1 
                   
0.1368 0.1277 0.1334 0.1314 0.0259 0.0199 1 
                   
-0.0347 -0.0280 -0.0321 -0.0294 0.0090 -0.0052 0.2829 1 
                     
-0.0412 -0.0511 -0.0499 -0.0496 0.0149 0.0123 -0.2322 -0.0371 1 
              
-0.1679 -0.2137 -0.1969 -0.2055 -0.0343 -0.0267 -0.1590 -0.0893 0.0776 1 
              
-0.1503 -0.1367 -0.1459 -0.1420 -0.0371 -0.0251 -0.2141 -0.0839 0.0765 -0.0404 1 
              
-0.1113 -0.0759 -0.0927 -0.0849 0.0206 -0.0408 -0.2326 -0.0544 0.0139 -0.0543 -0.0765 1 
             
-0.0508 -0.0232 -0.0346 -0.0294 0.0240 -0.0181 -0.2302 -0.0909 0.0112 -0.0683 -0.0961 -0.1290 1 
       
0.1585 0.1892 0.1789 0.1842 0.0277 0.0607 0.1480 -0.0206 -0.0490 -0.3648 -0.1739 -0.0521 -0.0200 1 
      
0.1963 0.1481 0.1707 0.1609 0.1397 0.0304 0.3950 0.0516 0.0374 -0.1874 -0.2800 -0.2225 -0.1789 0.2478 1 
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Table 4.3.E. Correlation coefficient between independent variables. In bold are correlations with absolute value larger than 0.4 for variables that are used in the same 
specification. Internally managed emerging equity funds sample. Note: no observations for PPPt=0 (i.e. there are no obs. before 1988) or for                         . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Emerging Equity Funds (internal) 
 
 
 
                    √      
  √      
                                                                                                    
       
1 
                           
0.9660 1 
             √      
  0.9870 0.9950 1 
            √      
  0.9754 0.9991 0.9981 1 
                   
-0.0509 -0.0915 -0.0762 -0.0840 1 
                  
0.3400 0.4088 0.3874 0.3974 -0.5016 1 
                   
0.6069 0.6203 0.6205 0.6188 -0.1384 0.4744 1 
                   
-0.3657 -0.2734 -0.3110 -0.2851 0.1385 -0.2597 -0.7239 1 
                     
-0.4500 -0.4867 -0.4755 -0.4784 0.3410 -0.3668 -0.7563 0.7899 1 
              
                        
-0.3791 -0.4670 -0.4352 -0.4523 0.4735 -0.2375 -0.4776 0.4124 0.8465 
 
1 
              
-0.4078 -0.2725 -0.3285 -0.2941 -0.0468 -0.3496 -0.4862 0.6753 0.2316 
 
-0.1741 1 
             
0.5622 0.5450 0.5574 0.5492 -0.0468 0.4623 0.1117 -0.1561 -0.1766 
 
-0.1741 -0.4545 1 
       
                    
0.6784 0.7501 0.7286 0.7403 -0.0565 0.5016 0.6934 -0.4689 -0.6681 
 
-0.4735 -0.2740 0.3676 
 
1 
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Table 4.3.F. Correlation coefficient between independent variables. In bold are correlations with absolute value larger than 0.4 for variables that are used in the same 
specification. Internally managed international equity funds sample. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
International Equity Funds (internal) 
 
 
 
                    √      
  √      
                                                                                                    
       
1 
                           
0.9406 1 
             √      
  0.9810 0.9885 1 
            √      
  0.9636 0.9971 0.9971 1 
                   
-0.0010 -0.0294 -0.0166 -0.0235 1 
                  
0.0194 0.0269 0.0235 0.0256 -0.4991 1 
                   
0.1272 0.1133 0.1204 0.1175 0.0146 0.0263 1 
                   
-0.0475 -0.0301 -0.0389 -0.0338 0.0151 0.0088 0.4557 1 
                     
-0.0861 -0.0591 -0.0729 -0.0650 -0.0047 0.0669 -0.2749 0.2024 1 
              
-0.1777 -0.2234 -0.2064 -0.2152 -0.0198 -0.0148 -0.1515 -0.1160 0.1376 1 
              
-0.1606 -0.1430 -0.1536 -0.1487 -0.0182 -0.0319 -0.2098 -0.1739 0.1416 -0.0380 1 
              
-0.1278 -0.0888 -0.1072 -0.0983 0.0024 -0.0140 -0.2440 -0.1847 0.0690 -0.0532 -0.0769 1 
             
-0.0274 0.0038 -0.0086 -0.0029 0.0013 -0.0256 -0.2348 -0.1891 -0.0414 -0.0630 -0.0910 -0.1277 1 
       
0.1573 0.1956 0.1814 0.1888 -0.0607 0.0746 0.1195 0.0347 -0.0382 -0.2746 -0.0671 -0.0783 -0.0650 1 
      
0.2377 0.1672 0.1997 0.1849 0.0996 0.0327 0.4125 0.1578 -0.0663 -0.1610 -0.2445 -0.2311 -0.2244 0.2018 1 
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Table 4.3.G. Correlation coefficient between independent variables. In bold are correlations with absolute value larger than 0.4 for variables that are used in the same 
specification. Internally managed UK equity funds sample. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
UK Equity Funds (internal) 
 
 
 
                    √      
  √      
                                                                                                    
       
1 
                           
0.9281 1 
             √      
  0.9774 0.9856 1 
            √      
  0.9570 0.9962 0.9965 1 
                   
-0.0090 -0.0300 -0.0205 -0.0250 1 
                  
0.0635 0.0844 0.0762 0.0800 -0.4929 1 
                   
0.1496 0.1441 0.1487 0.1474 0.0442 0.0070 1 
                   
0.0058 0.0001 0.0022 0.0020 -0.0004 -0.0074 0.2440 1 
                     
-0.0364 -0.0441 -0.0433 -0.0429 0.0308 -0.0112 -0.2542 -0.1330 1 
              
-0.1596 -0.2040 -0.1878 -0.1960 -0.0520 -0.0409 -0.1715 -0.0787 0.0513 1 
              
-0.1379 -0.1241 -0.1334 -0.1298 -0.0704 -0.0125 -0.2208 -0.0532 0.0406 -0.0440 1 
              
-0.0841 -0.0519 -0.0665 -0.0601 0.0483 -0.0702 -0.2165 -0.0592 0.0100 -0.0545 -0.0737 1 
             
-0.0797 -0.0615 -0.0695 -0.0659 0.0541 -0.0191 -0.2265 -0.0633 0.0352 -0.0750 -0.1014 -0.1256 1 
       
0.1632 0.1868 0.1800 0.1836 0.1128 0.0489 0.1829 -0.0719 -0.0132 -0.4458 -0.2767 -0.0338 0.0215 1 
      
0.1481 0.1202 0.1327 0.1281 0.1971 0.0205 0.3770 -0.0253 0.1020 -0.2226 -0.3247 -0.2129 -0.1369 0.3063 1 
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Table 4.4.A. Correlation coefficient between independent variables. In bold are correlations with absolute value larger than 0.4 for variables that are used in the same 
specification. Externally managed all funds sample. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
All Funds (external) 
 
 
 
                    √      
  √      
                                                                                                    
       
1 
                           
0.9222 1 
             √      
  0.9709 0.9878 1 
            √      
  0.9458 0.9976 0.9959 1 
                   
-0.0365 -0.0508 -0.0463 -0.0510 1 
                  
-0.0024 -0.0091 -0.0062 -0.0067 -0.4816 1 
                   
0.0229 0.0425 0.0340 0.0391 0.0533 -0.2564 1 
                   
0.0258 0.0433 0.0373 0.0411 -0.0475 0.0019 0.1395 1 
                     
-0.1214 -0.0868 -0.1028 -0.0934 0.0232 0.0588 -0.2993 -0.0643 1 
              
-0.1657 -0.1943 -0.1866 -0.1905 0.0150 0.0058 -0.3102 -0.0484 0.2916 1 
              
-0.1427 -0.1120 -0.1268 -0.1191 -0.0510 0.1101 -0.2550 0.0188 0.2017 -0.1467 1 
              
-0.0228 0.0195 0.0035 0.0115 0.0434 -0.1193 0.0593 0.0814 -0.0422 -0.1400 -0.2397 1 
             
0.1134 0.0967 0.1067 0.1015 0.0117 0.0381 -0.1636 0.0066 -0.0688 -0.1241 -0.2125 -0.2027 1 
       
0.0414 0.0509 0.0481 0.0497 0.0033 0.0351 0.0762 -0.0853 -0.0075 -0.2185 0.0230 0.0330 0.0293 1 
      
-0.1227 -0.1590 -0.1493 -0.1537 0.0751 -0.0125 0.3324 -0.2456 -0.0059 -0.1063 -0.0670 -0.1775 0.0034 0.2043 1 
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Table 4.4.B. Correlation coefficient between independent variables. In bold are correlations with absolute value larger than 0.4 for variables that are used in the same 
specification. Externally managed allocation funds sample. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Allocation Funds (external) 
 
 
 
                    √      
  √      
                                                                                                    
       
1 
                           
0.9269 1 
             √      
  0.9721 0.9890 1 
            √      
  0.9488 0.9978 0.9963 1 
                   
-0.0157 -0.0237 -0.0213 -0.0239 1 
                  
0.0192 -0.0017 0.0074 0.0025 -0.5561 1 
                   
0.0913 0.0857 0.0891 0.0871 0.0463 -0.2043 1 
                   
0.0486 0.0832 0.0711 0.0785 -0.0254 0.0854 -0.1023 1 
                     
-0.0853 -0.0369 -0.0576 -0.0450 0.0543 0.0329 -0.4136 0.2049 1 
              
-0.1828 -0.1970 -0.1954 -0.1958 0.0460 -0.0774 -0.3526 -0.1202 0.3557 1 
              
-0.1685 -0.1755 -0.1751 -0.1761 -0.1986 0.2848 -0.3261 0.0828 0.2083 -0.1601 1 
              
-0.1486 -0.1122 -0.1296 -0.1191 0.0666 -0.2704 0.1314 0.0311 -0.0233 -0.1859 -0.2795 1 
             
0.2340 0.2483 0.2485 0.2481 0.1012 0.0336 -0.1945 0.1645 -0.0091 -0.1185 -0.1782 -0.2070 1 
       
0.0457 0.0682 0.0603 0.0656 0.0011 -0.0033 0.0601 -0.0989 -0.0012 -0.1683 0.0269 0.0313 0.0199 1 
      
-0.0511 -0.0773 -0.0690 -0.0732 0.1181 0.0401 0.3621 -0.4816 -0.0129 -0.0965 -0.0400 -0.1483 -0.0504 0.1435 1 
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Table 4.4.C. Correlation coefficient between independent variables. In bold are correlations with absolute value larger than 0.4 for variables that are used in the same 
specification. Externally managed fixed income funds sample. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fixed Income Funds (external) 
 
 
 
                    √      
  √      
                                                                                                    
       
1 
                           
0.9022 1 
             √      
  0.9632 0.9848 1 
            √      
  0.9322 0.9969 0.9950 1 
                   
-0.0325 -0.0204 -0.0267 -0.0244 1 
                  
-0.0107 -0.0090 -0.0089 -0.0079 -0.3756 1 
                   
0.0325 0.0847 0.0645 0.0755 0.1599 -0.2863 1 
                   
-0.0173 0.0061 -0.0033 0.0018 -0.0534 0.0475 0.2365 1 
                     
-0.0766 -0.0553 -0.0658 -0.0594 0.0382 0.0149 -0.2936 0.0534 1 
              
-0.1395 -0.1849 -0.1708 -0.1787 0.0049 -0.0207 -0.3238 -0.0076 0.1508 1 
              
-0.1238 -0.1062 -0.1160 -0.1107 -0.0885 0.0531 -0.1188 0.2331 -0.0169 -0.1283 1 
              
-0.0569 0.0094 -0.0177 -0.0033 0.1058 -0.1296 0.2248 0.2565 0.1102 -0.1408 -0.2466 1 
             
0.0845 0.1064 0.1022 0.1044 -0.1193 0.2094 -0.2287 -0.0906 0.0496 -0.0836 -0.1464 -0.1607 1 
       
0.0275 0.0290 0.0292 0.0287 0.0310 0.0471 0.0737 -0.0590 0.0136 -0.1067 -0.0510 0.0324 0.0193 1 
      
-0.0906 -0.1395 -0.1247 -0.1323 0.0923 -0.1059 0.2925 -0.1909 -0.1525 -0.0682 -0.0214 -0.1351 -0.0989 0.2358 1 
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Table 4.4.D. Correlation coefficient between independent variables. In bold are correlations with absolute value larger than 0.4 for variables that are used in the same 
specification. Externally managed equity funds sample. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Equity Funds (external) 
 
 
 
                    √      
  √      
                                                                                                    
       
1 
                           
0.9249 1 
             √      
  0.9721 0.9882 1 
            √      
  0.9477 0.9977 0.9960 1 
                   
-0.0346 -0.0556 -0.0484 -0.0548 1 
                  
-0.0196 -0.0266 -0.0241 -0.0243 -0.4991 1 
                   
0.0318 0.0498 0.0420 0.0467 0.0432 -0.2509 1 
                   
0.0701 0.0978 0.0889 0.0946 -0.0396 0.0124 0.1436 1 
                     
-0.1398 -0.1107 -0.1249 -0.1164 0.0075 0.0571 -0.2867 -0.0139 1 
              
-0.1701 -0.1980 -0.1906 -0.1941 0.0099 0.0195 -0.3036 -0.0489 0.2905 1 
              
-0.1449 -0.1089 -0.1257 -0.1170 -0.0373 0.1036 -0.2670 -0.0399 0.2255 -0.1508 1 
              
-0.0006 0.0388 0.0246 0.0315 0.0304 -0.1008 0.0373 0.0203 -0.0582 -0.1378 -0.2415 1 
             
0.1198 0.0925 0.1065 0.0993 0.0199 0.0082 -0.1579 0.0784 -0.0961 -0.1294 -0.2268 -0.2072 1 
       
0.0449 0.0557 0.0524 0.0542 0.0001 0.0366 0.0786 -0.1260 -0.0104 -0.2447 0.0369 0.0337 0.0317 1 
      
-0.1330 -0.1656 -0.1575 -0.1610 0.0736 -0.0008 0.3383 -0.3633 0.0142 -0.1172 -0.0751 -0.1846 0.0251 0.2069 1 
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Table 4.4.E. Correlation coefficient between independent variables. In bold are correlations with absolute value larger than 0.4 for variables that are used in the same 
specification. Externally managed emerging equity funds sample. Note: no observations for PPP=0 (= no obs. before 1988). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Emerging Equity Funds (external) 
 
 
 
                    √      
  √      
                                                                                                    
       
1 
                           
0.9237 1 
             √      
  0.9697 0.9892 1 
            √      
  0.9434 0.9981 0.9956 1 
                   
-0.0567 -0.1031 -0.0885 -0.1037 1 
                  
-0.0022 0.0006 -0.0001 0.0038 -0.5529 1 
                   
-0.0216 -0.0536 -0.0431 -0.0475 0.0468 -0.2969 1 
                   
0.0671 0.0915 0.0831 0.0903 -0.0605 -0.0098 0.0995 1 
                     
-0.1538 -0.1029 -0.1255 -0.1110 -0.0386 0.0769 -0.3500 0.1527 1 
              
-0.1581 -0.1627 -0.1645 -0.1625 -0.0951 0.2676 -0.3531 -0.0484 0.5639 1 
              
-0.0694 -0.0219 -0.0409 -0.0313 0.0208 -0.0124 -0.2620 -0.0233 0.1943 -0.1459 1 
              
-0.0037 -0.0083 -0.0061 -0.0083 0.0612 -0.1577 0.1316 0.0683 -0.1207 -0.1451 -0.1861 1 
             
-0.0197 -0.0659 -0.0482 -0.0575 0.0224 -0.1492 0.0417 -0.1061 -0.2243 -0.1818 -0.2333 -0.2319 1 
       
                    
-0.1663 -0.19 -0.1856 -0.1875 0.0175 0.1754 0.2467 -0.3709 0.1021 0.0852 -0.012 -0.2046 -0.0755 
 
1 
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Table 4.4.F. Correlation coefficient between independent variables. In bold are correlations with absolute value larger than 0.4 for variables that are used in the same 
specification. Externally managed international equity funds sample. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
International Equity Funds (external) 
 
 
 
                    √      
  √      
                                                                                                    
       
1 
                           
0.9297 1 
             √      
  0.9746 0.9885 1 
            √      
  0.9519 0.9977 0.9962 1 
                   
-0.0384 -0.0631 -0.0541 -0.0611 1 
                  
-0.0176 -0.0167 -0.0174 -0.0158 -0.4884 1 
                   
0.0002 0.0141 0.0069 0.0114 0.0316 -0.2503 1 
                   
0.0562 0.0960 0.0819 0.0904 -0.0476 0.0182 0.1077 1 
                     
-0.1111 -0.0755 -0.0917 -0.0821 -0.0009 0.0794 -0.2819 0.0595 1 
              
-0.1828 -0.2119 -0.2038 -0.2077 0.0098 0.0432 -0.3090 -0.0672 0.2947 1 
              
-0.1619 -0.1287 -0.1449 -0.1367 -0.0475 0.1159 -0.2712 -0.0360 0.1984 -0.1433 1 
              
-0.0156 0.0292 0.0123 0.0205 0.0467 -0.1272 0.0484 0.0368 -0.0455 -0.1394 -0.2286 1 
             
0.1277 0.1005 0.1149 0.1076 0.0299 0.0276 -0.1504 0.1501 -0.0659 -0.1364 -0.2238 -0.2176 1 
       
0.0541 0.0667 0.0627 0.0649 -0.0218 0.0342 0.0897 -0.1231 -0.0402 -0.2740 0.0393 0.0382 0.0374 1 
      
-0.1241 -0.1759 -0.1598 -0.1675 0.0524 -0.0034 0.3778 -0.3603 -0.0452 -0.1050 -0.1212 -0.2063 0.0410 0.2105 1 
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Table 4.4.G. Correlation coefficient between independent variables. In bold are correlations with absolute value larger than 0.4 for variables that are used in the same 
specification. Externally managed UK equity funds sample. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
UK Equity Funds (external) 
 
 
 
                    √      
  √      
                                                                                                    
       
1 
                           
0.9181 1 
             √      
  0.9681 0.9880 1 
            √      
  0.9416 0.9977 0.9958 1 
                   
-0.0207 -0.0348 -0.0304 -0.0353 1 
                  
-0.0262 -0.0453 -0.0385 -0.0412 -0.5074 1 
                   
0.0797 0.1058 0.0966 0.1020 0.0616 -0.2484 1 
                   
0.0663 0.0815 0.0775 0.0804 -0.0201 0.0027 0.2021 1 
                     
-0.1484 -0.1338 -0.1425 -0.1373 0.0123 0.0380 -0.2940 -0.0505 1 
              
-0.1567 -0.1846 -0.1775 -0.1810 0.0237 -0.0457 -0.2926 -0.0270 0.2876 1 
              
-0.1206 -0.0848 -0.1007 -0.0924 -0.0333 0.1020 -0.2625 -0.0259 0.2388 -0.1602 1 
              
0.0240 0.0580 0.0469 0.0523 0.0061 -0.0592 0.0125 -0.0084 -0.0735 -0.1344 -0.2649 1 
             
0.1190 0.0981 0.1092 0.1034 0.0073 -0.0009 -0.1960 -0.0377 -0.0992 -0.1146 -0.2257 -0.1895 1 
       
0.0360 0.0451 0.0424 0.0441 0.0359 0.0436 0.0672 -0.1400 0.0254 -0.2178 0.0349 0.0293 0.0250 1 
      
-0.1261 -0.1279 -0.1315 -0.1286 0.1098 -0.0136 0.2964 -0.3602 0.0580 -0.1626 -0.0230 -0.1506 0.0155 0.2050 1 
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M. Summary statistics for the independent variables (Chapter 4) 
 
This Appendix shows the summary statistics for all individual explanatory variables used in specification (4). The statistics are 
sorted by fund type and management type. The columns under ‘Internal’ show the statistics for all observations in each 
internally managed sample. The columns under ‘External’ show the statistics for all observations in each externally managed 
sample. 
 
  
Internal 
 
External 
 Sample Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
All Funds 
       10.23 7.71 0.50 34.92 4.95 4.95 0.51 31.00 
             2.15 0.78 0.41 3.58 1.53 0.68 0.41 3.47 
√      
  2.95 1.23 0.71 5.91 2.01 0.95 0.71 5.57 
√      
  2.01 0.58 0.80 3.27 1.56 0.48 0.80 3.14 
        0.19 0.39 0.00 1.00 0.23 0.42 0.00 1.00 
        0.46 0.50 0.00 1.00 0.43 0.50 0.00 1.00 
          1.51 1.40 0.01 6.44 1.45 1.17 0.01 4.33 
           7.77 9.62 0.26 100.00 10.41 12.10 0.11 100.00 
              8.79 6.79 0.31 100.00 15.64 13.44 0.27 100.00 
        0.03 0.16 0.00 1.00 0.03 0.16 0.00 1.00 
         0.05 0.22 0.00 1.00 0.03 0.16 0.00 1.00 
          0.09 0.29 0.00 1.00 0.05 0.21 0.00 1.00 
          0.14 0.34 0.00 1.00 0.06 0.24 0.00 1.00 
     0.96 0.19 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.07 0.00 1.00 
     0.66 0.47 0.00 1.00 0.90 0.30 0.00 1.00 
Allocation 
Funds 
       7.58 5.20 0.51 22.93 5.10 4.84 0.51 30.54 
             1.95 0.67 0.41 3.18 1.56 0.69 0.41 3.45 
√      
  2.58 0.97 0.71 4.79 2.05 0.95 0.71 5.53 
√      
  1.85 0.48 0.80 2.84 1.58 0.48 0.80 3.13 
        0.16 0.36 0.00 1.00 0.26 0.44 0.00 1.00 
        0.55 0.50 0.00 1.00 0.47 0.50 0.00 1.00 
          1.34 0.54 0.01 2.01 1.29 1.02 0.01 4.33 
           5.76 3.29 0.61 23.53 9.98 8.46 0.31 41.67 
              10.94 11.10 1.61 50.00 16.51 14.84 0.87 100.00 
        0.02 0.14 0.00 1.00 0.02 0.14 0.00 1.00 
         0.02 0.14 0.00 1.00 0.04 0.19 0.00 1.00 
          0.06 0.25 0.00 1.00 0.06 0.24 0.00 1.00 
          0.05 0.21 0.00 1.00 0.07 0.26 0.00 1.00 
     1.00 0.06 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.05 0.00 1.00 
     0.90 0.30 0.00 1.00 0.87 0.33 0.00 1.00 
Fixed Income 
Funds 
       11.39 8.58 0.51 34.92 4.40 4.87 0.51 29.79 
             2.23 0.81 0.41 3.58 1.44 0.66 0.41 3.43 
√      
  3.10 1.32 0.71 5.91 1.89 0.91 0.71 5.46 
√      
  2.08 0.62 0.80 3.27 1.49 0.46 0.80 3.10 
        0.11 0.32 0.00 1.00 0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00 
        0.44 0.50 0.00 1.00 0.36 0.48 0.00 1.00 
          1.42 1.16 0.01 6.44 1.62 1.15 0.01 4.33 
           10.53 10.21 0.64 85.71 22.89 25.13 0.39 100.00 
              6.66 3.95 0.31 20.00 9.07 9.24 0.27 100.00 
        0.03 0.17 0.00 1.00 0.02 0.14 0.00 1.00 
         0.06 0.24 0.00 1.00 0.02 0.13 0.00 1.00 
          0.09 0.29 0.00 1.00 0.04 0.19 0.00 1.00 
          0.14 0.35 0.00 1.00 0.05 0.22 0.00 1.00 
     0.94 0.23 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.06 0.00 1.00 
     0.62 0.48 0.00 1.00 0.93 0.25 0.00 1.00 
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Internal 
 
 
External 
 
 
Sample Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Equity Funds 
       9.80 7.34 0.50 34.92 5.01 4.89 0.51 30.54 
             2.12 0.76 0.41 3.58 1.54 0.68 0.41 3.45 
√      
  2.89 1.19 0.71 5.91 2.03 0.94 0.71 5.53 
√      
  1.99 0.57 0.80 3.27 1.57 0.48 0.80 3.13 
        0.22 0.42 0.00 1.00 0.24 0.43 0.00 1.00 
        0.46 0.50 0.00 1.00 0.44 0.50 0.00 1.00 
          1.49 1.42 0.01 6.44 1.43 1.17 0.01 4.33 
           5.91 5.87 0.26 100.00 8.39 7.04 0.11 75.00 
              9.36 5.92 0.31 35.29 16.70 13.62 0.32 100.00 
        0.03 0.16 0.00 1.00 0.03 0.16 0.00 1.00 
         0.05 0.23 0.00 1.00 0.03 0.16 0.00 1.00 
          0.09 0.29 0.00 1.00 0.05 0.21 0.00 1.00 
          0.14 0.35 0.00 1.00 0.07 0.25 0.00 1.00 
     0.97 0.17 0.00 1.00 0.99 0.07 0.00 1.00 
     0.66 0.47 0.00 1.00 0.89 0.31 0.00 1.00 
Emerging 
Equity Funds 
       6.36 3.51 0.50 12.26 4.25 4.37 0.51 25.96 
             1.85 0.58 0.41 2.58 1.41 0.67 0.41 3.29 
√      
  2.40 0.77 0.71 3.50 1.86 0.89 0.71 5.09 
√      
  1.77 0.40 0.80 2.31 1.48 0.47 0.80 2.96 
        0.23 0.42 0.00 1.00 0.26 0.44 0.00 1.00 
        0.46 0.50 0.00 1.00 0.47 0.50 0.00 1.00 
          1.04 0.45 0.21 1.99 1.23 0.96 0.03 4.33 
           33.58 14.73 5.56 57.14 9.97 6.81 0.38 50.00 
              4.88 4.39 0.79 19.05 13.15 10.96 0.82 66.67 
        0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.09 0.00 1.00 
         0.06 0.24 0.00 1.00 0.02 0.15 0.00 1.00 
          0.31 0.47 0.00 1.00 0.04 0.20 0.00 1.00 
          0.31 0.47 0.00 1.00 0.03 0.18 0.00 1.00 
     1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
     0.77 0.42 0.00 1.00 0.94 0.24 0.00 1.00 
International 
Equity Funds 
       9.80 6.88 0.51 30.54 5.47 5.32 0.51 26.93 
             2.14 0.75 0.41 3.45 1.60 0.71 0.41 3.33 
√      
  2.91 1.15 0.71 5.53 2.11 1.01 0.71 5.19 
√      
  2.00 0.55 0.80 3.13 1.61 0.51 0.80 3.00 
        0.22 0.42 0.00 1.00 0.23 0.42 0.00 1.00 
        0.46 0.50 0.00 1.00 0.44 0.50 0.00 1.00 
          1.56 1.50 0.00 6.44 1.48 1.20 0.01 4.33 
           5.77 4.13 0.26 25.00 9.17 7.40 0.13 75.00 
              6.53 3.58 0.31 18.18 14.29 12.51 0.32 100.00 
        0.03 0.16 0.00 1.00 0.02 0.14 0.00 1.00 
         0.05 0.22 0.00 1.00 0.03 0.17 0.00 1.00 
          0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00 0.05 0.22 0.00 1.00 
          0.13 0.34 0.00 1.00 0.07 0.26 0.00 1.00 
     0.98 0.15 0.00 1.00 0.99 0.08 0.00 1.00 
     0.65 0.48 0.00 1.00 0.87 0.34 0.00 1.00 
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  Internal 
 
External 
 Sample Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
UK Equity 
Funds 
       9.86 7.96 0.51 34.92 4.49 4.24 0.52 30.54 
             2.10 0.78 0.41 3.58 1.49 0.63 0.42 3.45 
√      
  2.88 1.25 0.71 5.91 1.94 0.85 0.72 5.53 
√      
  1.98 0.59 0.80 3.27 1.53 0.44 0.80 3.13 
        0.22 0.42 0.00 1.00 0.25 0.43 0.00 1.00 
        0.46 0.50 0.00 1.00 0.44 0.50 0.00 1.00 
          1.46 1.31 0.01 6.44 1.38 1.14 0.01 4.33 
           5.68 6.42 0.28 100.00 7.18 6.35 0.11 50.00 
              13.09 6.23 0.50 35.29 20.31 14.45 0.54 100.00 
        0.03 0.17 0.00 1.00 0.04 0.19 0.00 1.00 
         0.06 0.23 0.00 1.00 0.03 0.16 0.00 1.00 
          0.08 0.28 0.00 1.00 0.04 0.20 0.00 1.00 
          0.15 0.35 0.00 1.00 0.06 0.24 0.00 1.00 
     0.96 0.20 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.06 0.00 1.00 
     0.68 0.47 0.00 1.00 0.92 0.28 0.00 1.00 
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N. Results with the linear, logarithmic, and cubic root age functions (Chapter 4) 
 
 
Table N1.A. Results for the internally managed all-funds sample. The PPB is the benchmark. The panel observations have a 
yearly frequency. The results are obtained using Driscoll-Kraay standard errors and fund fixed effects. P-values are in 
parentheses (* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01). 
 
                              √      
  
Dependent Sharpe RFund-RPPB M2 Sharpe RFund-RPPB M2 Sharpe RFund-RPPB M2 
Constant 0.1111 0.1786 0.1674 0.0801 0.2657 0.1244 0.0462 0.2919 0.0910 
 
(0.257) (0.589) (0.495) (0.503) (0.496) (0.702) (0.767) (0.497) (0.813) 
          0.0063 -0.0066 0.0049 0.0456 -0.0515 0.0530 0.0702 -0.0714 0.0721 
 
(0.618) (0.636) (0.752) (0.570) (0.650) (0.680) (0.567) (0.657) (0.692) 
        -0.4161*** 0.0583 0.0249 -0.3826*** -0.0302 -0.0260 -0.3764*** -0.0593 -0.0459 
 
(0.000) (0.473) (0.739) (0.000) (0.822) (0.817) (0.000) (0.700) (0.725) 
        0.2464*** 0.1753 0.0505 0.3650*** 0.2930* 0.1592 0.4214*** 0.3318* 0.1941 
 
(0.000) (0.110) (0.592) (0.000) (0.089) (0.279) (0.000) (0.096) (0.248) 
          -0.1012*** -0.0154 0.0199 -0.1750*** -0.0938 -0.0124 -0.2089*** -0.1029 -0.0109 
 
(0.001) (0.755) (0.702) (0.007) (0.238) (0.850) (0.010) (0.258) (0.888) 
           0.0000 -0.0005 -0.0011 -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0010 0.0001 -0.0000 -0.0010 
 
(0.994) (0.862) (0.750) (0.992) (0.989) (0.775) (0.934) (0.992) (0.777) 
              0.0047 0.0134** 0.0101* 0.0037 0.0128** 0.0091* 0.0038 0.0130** 0.0093* 
 
(0.272) (0.029) (0.057) (0.405) (0.044) (0.074) (0.397) (0.040) (0.069) 
        -0.0077 -0.0257 0.1737 -0.0419 -0.1797 0.2228 -0.0529 -0.3362 0.2668 
 (0.960) (0.942) (0.566) (0.837) (0.718) (0.601) (0.857) (0.655) (0.673) 
         -0.0369 -0.1615 -0.1629 -0.0520 -0.1779 -0.1550 -0.0671 -0.2000 -0.1894 
 (0.772) (0.545) (0.456) (0.764) (0.652) (0.630) (0.775) (0.695) (0.654) 
          -0.0437 -0.1091 0.0639 -0.0838 -0.2443 0.0970 -0.1159 -0.3168 0.1116 
 (0.619) (0.442) (0.663) (0.551) (0.270) (0.676) (0.526) (0.254) (0.694) 
          -0.0323 -0.0877 -0.0418 -0.0630 -0.2144 -0.0508 -0.0813 -0.2681 -0.0734 
 (0.566) (0.367) (0.635) (0.494) (0.214) (0.753) (0.480) (0.191) (0.698) 
                  0.0100 0.0317 -0.0043 0.0296 0.1986 -0.0468 0.0426 0.2973 -0.0731 
 (0.750) (0.740) (0.955) (0.802) (0.535) (0.859) (0.812) (0.542) (0.855) 
                   0.0083 0.0029 0.0129 0.0240 0.0344 0.0346 0.0379 0.0456 0.0578 
 (0.422) (0.919) (0.563) (0.778) (0.842) (0.809) (0.756) (0.854) (0.779) 
                    0.0096* 0.0104 -0.0027 0.0511 0.1216 -0.0262 0.0744 0.1651 -0.0346 
 (0.057) (0.316) (0.769) (0.420) (0.160) (0.758) (0.390) (0.170) (0.765) 
                    0.0051* 0.0080 0.0041 0.0337 0.1007 0.0232 0.0471 0.1336 0.0366 
 (0.098) (0.165) (0.387) (0.416) (0.114) (0.697) (0.387) (0.111) (0.634) 
                    0.0039** 0.0021 -0.0001 0.0492** 0.0384 0.0092 0.0676** 0.0468 0.0099 
 (0.017) (0.320) (0.970) (0.042) (0.128) (0.655) (0.039) (0.150) (0.717) 
                  -0.0011 0.0053 0.0037 -0.0197 0.0682 0.0424 -0.0240 0.0867 0.0549 
 (0.768) (0.207) (0.356) (0.457) (0.275) (0.492) (0.521) (0.255) (0.463) 
                  -0.0100*** -0.0072 -0.0065 -0.1025*** -0.0871 -0.0805 -0.1372*** -0.1126 -0.1034 
 (0.001) (0.161) (0.116) (0.003) (0.181) (0.139) (0.002) (0.173) (0.131) 
     -0.1025 -0.1460 -0.1729 -0.0911 -0.1633 -0.1733 -0.0956 -0.1613 -0.1741 
 (0.273) (0.615) (0.382) (0.224) (0.574) (0.372) (0.225) (0.580) (0.373) 
     -0.0198 0.0045 -0.0159 -0.0065 -0.0091 -0.0141 -0.0117 -0.0066 -0.0159 
 
(0.853) (0.959) (0.864) (0.932) (0.896) (0.852) (0.889) (0.929) (0.844) 
R2 within 0.3167 0.0119 0.0087 0.3160 0.0140 0.0097 0.3170 0.0136 0.0095 
F-statistic 69.8306 5.9332 21.2482 61.6661 6.5541 15.5310 62.3615 7.3728 16.0344 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Funds 933 933 933 933 933 933 933 933 933 
Observations 9756 9756 9756 9756 9756 9756 9756 9756 9756 
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Table N1.B. Results for the internally managed allocation funds sample. The PPB is the benchmark. The panel observations 
have a yearly frequency. The results are obtained using Driscoll-Kraay standard errors and fund fixed effects. P-values are in 
parentheses (* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01). 
 
                              √      
  
Dependent Sharpe RFund-RPPB M2 Sharpe RFund-RPPB M2 Sharpe RFund-RPPB M2 
Constant 0.1641 -0.3193 0.2573 0.0352 -0.9947 0.1123 -0.0604 -1.9380 -0.9292 
 
(0.781) (0.809) (0.860) (0.958) (0.610) (0.954) (0.933) (0.348) (0.702) 
          0.0028 0.1397 0.1549 0.1306 1.2388 1.2137 0.1490 1.7666 1.7265 
 
(0.937) (0.226) (0.195) (0.501) (0.141) (0.163) (0.604) (0.145) (0.171) 
        -0.3829** 0.8504** 1.1812* -0.0873 0.7561 1.7331 0.0064 0.8186 1.9763 
 
(0.035) (0.039) (0.057) (0.814) (0.430) (0.176) (0.989) (0.480) (0.203) 
        0.2855 1.0969* 1.4159* 0.6541** 1.6814 2.5125* 0.7994** 1.9134 2.9372* 
 
(0.101) (0.064) (0.093) (0.030) (0.108) (0.077) (0.026) (0.134) (0.090) 
          0.2334 1.3244 2.0817 0.1898 0.8260 0.6889 0.3384 1.6003 1.4959 
 
(0.612) (0.383) (0.282) (0.729) (0.516) (0.670) (0.639) (0.172) (0.466) 
           -0.0122 -0.1039 -0.1652 -0.0027 -0.0264 -0.0633 -0.0081 -0.0396 -0.0817 
 
(0.776) (0.201) (0.121) (0.926) (0.660) (0.319) (0.808) (0.437) (0.207) 
              -0.0227 -0.0535 -0.1157 -0.0277 -0.0749 -0.1554 -0.0251 -0.0725 -0.1480 
 
(0.534) (0.549) (0.124) (0.512) (0.596) (0.160) (0.526) (0.577) (0.137) 
        -0.3041 0.8236 0.6841 -0.5303 0.7927 0.0667 -0.8264 0.9372 0.1951 
 (0.552) (0.582) (0.665) (0.397) (0.580) (0.971) (0.381) (0.648) (0.942) 
         -1.7283** -3.5650 -2.7634* -3.5767** -6.6135* -5.2776* -4.8676** -8.9062* -7.0087* 
 (0.016) (0.123) (0.090) (0.038) (0.057) (0.058) (0.027) (0.060) (0.070) 
          -1.2384*** -2.3573** -2.6544*** -1.9932*** -2.9835*** -3.9530*** -2.4103*** -3.5605*** -4.6869*** 
 (0.003) (0.022) (0.005) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004) (0.001) (0.010) (0.005) 
          -0.2311 0.2552 -0.3331 -0.4324 0.7625 -0.2772 -0.5546 0.8851 -0.3600 
 (0.452) (0.708) (0.647) (0.407) (0.490) (0.815) (0.386) (0.509) (0.797) 
                  0.0621 -0.0028 -0.0489 0.3805 -0.0211 0.1294 0.5521 -0.0540 0.0926 
 (0.468) (0.989) (0.844) (0.335) (0.975) (0.905) (0.357) (0.959) (0.955) 
                   0.2792*** 0.5486* 0.4173 1.8955** 3.2594** 2.5445* 2.7170** 4.7827** 3.6898* 
 (0.009) (0.066) (0.118) (0.029) (0.031) (0.070) (0.022) (0.038) (0.077) 
                    0.0697** 0.1096 0.1313* 0.6721*** 0.7743** 1.1467** 0.9212*** 1.1298* 1.6013** 
 (0.011) (0.177) (0.094) (0.002) (0.046) (0.013) (0.002) (0.056) (0.014) 
                    0.0197 -0.0334 0.0088 0.1894 -0.3884 -0.0114 0.2607 -0.4706 0.0346 
 (0.287) (0.415) (0.791) (0.377) (0.404) (0.980) (0.354) (0.437) (0.952) 
                    -0.0038 -0.1193 -0.1144 -0.0332 -0.6097 -0.3088 -0.0760 -0.9782* -0.6210 
 (0.879) (0.156) (0.167) (0.860) (0.154) (0.615) (0.790) (0.084) (0.468) 
                  -0.0170 -0.0112 -0.0445 -0.2061 -0.0049 -0.4553 -0.2679 -0.0350 -0.6068 
 (0.220) (0.778) (0.373) (0.206) (0.993) (0.446) (0.205) (0.958) (0.428) 
                  -0.0308*** -0.0507 -0.0908 -0.2990** -0.4616 -0.8763 -0.3960** -0.6171 -1.1587 
 (0.009) (0.264) (0.142) (0.029) (0.427) (0.166) (0.023) (0.395) (0.160) 
                 
             
     0.0449 -0.4416 -1.2377 0.0288 -0.3217 -0.9646 0.0133 -0.3843 -1.0700 
 
(0.855) (0.520) (0.152) (0.896) (0.592) (0.179) (0.953) (0.516) (0.151) 
R2 within 0.4372 0.1198 0.1562 0.4603 0.1225 0.1634 0.4574 0.1218 0.1614 
F-statistic 8545.6762 457.2391 709.8012 3440.7314 415.9338 7491.7885 2685.3357 246.5365 2811.5659 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Funds 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 
Observations 248 248 248 248 248 248 248 248 248 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
261 
 
 
Table N1.C. Results for the internally managed fixed income funds sample. The PPB is the benchmark. The panel observations 
have a yearly frequency. The results are obtained using Driscoll-Kraay standard errors and fund fixed effects. P-values are in 
parentheses (* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01). 
 
                              √      
  
Dependent Sharpe RFund-RPPB M2 Sharpe RFund-RPPB M2 Sharpe RFund-RPPB M2 
Constant 0.2042 0.3733 0.4899** 0.2611 0.3715 0.4242** 0.2715 0.4982 0.6060*** 
 
(0.214) (0.333) (0.012) (0.218) (0.320) (0.021) (0.318) (0.232) (0.005) 
          -0.0023 -0.0247*** -0.0269*** -0.0346 -0.1114 -0.1199** -0.0414 -0.1907 -0.2201*** 
 
(0.905) (0.008) (0.000) (0.789) (0.300) (0.047) (0.832) (0.182) (0.008) 
        -0.2996*** -0.4111 -0.0710 -0.4092*** -0.6645 -0.1503 -0.4720*** -0.8195* -0.2329 
 
(0.001) (0.145) (0.345) (0.007) (0.120) (0.255) (0.003) (0.087) (0.112) 
        0.2860*** -0.0283 -0.0599 0.3359*** 0.0150 -0.0255 0.3662*** 0.0066 -0.0275 
 
(0.008) (0.769) (0.390) (0.004) (0.914) (0.803) (0.005) (0.967) (0.817) 
          -0.0617 0.0528 0.0229 -0.1316 0.1588 0.3131* -0.1481 0.2055 0.3221* 
 
(0.386) (0.519) (0.761) (0.271) (0.456) (0.052) (0.221) (0.359) (0.065) 
           0.0003 -0.0082** -0.0043 0.0004 -0.0076* -0.0054 0.0004 -0.0082* -0.0056 
 
(0.925) (0.048) (0.494) (0.932) (0.068) (0.421) (0.915) (0.054) (0.410) 
              -0.0044 0.0258 -0.0029 -0.0052 0.0307 0.0033 -0.0051 0.0302 0.0023 
 
(0.564) (0.292) (0.808) (0.549) (0.198) (0.774) (0.550) (0.210) (0.839) 
        -0.2268 0.0833 -0.2060 -0.3054 0.1644 -0.3377 -0.3772 0.1832 -0.6603 
 (0.373) (0.825) (0.668) (0.448) (0.788) (0.687) (0.508) (0.839) (0.613) 
         -0.1048 0.0635 -0.1389 -0.0498 0.2668 -0.1799 -0.0311 0.3628 -0.2700 
 (0.592) (0.819) (0.232) (0.868) (0.491) (0.352) (0.937) (0.448) (0.252) 
          -0.1641 0.0989 -0.0096 -0.2195 -0.0132 -0.2187 -0.2736 -0.0575 -0.3015 
 (0.163) (0.590) (0.934) (0.226) (0.962) (0.204) (0.232) (0.868) (0.172) 
          -0.1305 0.0514 0.0484 -0.1716 0.0474 -0.0049 -0.2074 0.0450 0.0041 
 (0.213) (0.316) (0.392) (0.356) (0.676) (0.961) (0.352) (0.712) (0.973) 
                  0.0304 -0.0332 0.0597 0.1142 -0.0484 0.3234 0.1617 -0.0826 0.5010 
 (0.520) (0.717) (0.646) (0.579) (0.892) (0.556) (0.611) (0.881) (0.557) 
                   -0.0015 -0.0344 -0.0007 -0.0347 -0.1649 0.0801 -0.0472 -0.2426 0.1151 
 (0.933) (0.211) (0.950) (0.800) (0.341) (0.341) (0.809) (0.330) (0.337) 
                    0.0120* -0.0042 0.0022 0.0769 0.0746 0.1412* 0.1100 0.0915 0.1817* 
 (0.093) (0.773) (0.808) (0.311) (0.474) (0.066) (0.286) (0.538) (0.091) 
                    0.0074 -0.0058* -0.0073 0.0535 -0.0071 0.0013 0.0751 -0.0130 -0.0090 
 (0.189) (0.083) (0.116) (0.474) (0.856) (0.976) (0.435) (0.785) (0.875) 
                    0.0028 -0.0021 -0.0015 0.0413 -0.0509 -0.1044** 0.0523 -0.0726 -0.1193* 
 (0.379) (0.587) (0.623) (0.299) (0.477) (0.040) (0.245) (0.386) (0.053) 
                  0.0106*** 0.0270** 0.0129*** 0.1024* 0.2490** 0.1021** 0.1400** 0.3427** 0.1497*** 
 (0.004) (0.017) (0.003) (0.068) (0.042) (0.029) (0.027) (0.028) (0.010) 
                  -0.0052 0.0004 -0.0000 -0.0488 -0.0182 -0.0177 -0.0668 -0.0155 -0.0176 
 (0.152) (0.916) (0.994) (0.232) (0.637) (0.595) (0.198) (0.759) (0.689) 
     -0.1171 0.1059 0.1864 -0.1056 0.0484 0.1246 -0.1085 0.0611 0.1410 
 (0.431) (0.737) (0.106) (0.405) (0.882) (0.289) (0.407) (0.850) (0.230) 
     -0.0610 0.0829 0.1005 -0.0590 0.0002 0.0233 -0.0605 0.0206 0.0482 
 
(0.744) (0.223) (0.142) (0.694) (0.998) (0.751) (0.704) (0.775) (0.505) 
R2 within 0.1892 0.0716 0.0635 0.1820 0.0645 0.0666 0.1840 0.0673 0.0677 
F-statistic 42.7118 27.2247 32.6605 89.7991 24.1259 31.3783 102.4564 25.4871 31.0116 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Funds 216 216 216 216 216 216 216 216 216 
Observations 2296 2296 2296 2296 2296 2296 2296 2296 2296 
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Table N1.D. Results for the internally managed equity funds sample. The PPB is the benchmark. The panel observations have 
a yearly frequency. The results are obtained using Driscoll-Kraay standard errors and fund fixed effects. P-values are in 
parentheses (* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01). 
 
                              √      
  
Dependent Sharpe RFund-RPPB M2 Sharpe RFund-RPPB M2 Sharpe RFund-RPPB M2 
Constant 0.0966 -0.1134 -0.0658 0.0169 -0.0877 -0.2725 -0.0308 -0.1438 -0.4315 
 
(0.231) (0.756) (0.834) (0.869) (0.846) (0.490) (0.819) (0.770) (0.338) 
          0.0073 0.0124 0.0314* 0.0818 0.0441 0.2254 0.1119 0.0806 0.3312 
 
(0.476) (0.362) (0.057) (0.251) (0.742) (0.137) (0.292) (0.659) (0.114) 
        -0.4235*** 0.1806 0.0766 -0.3607*** 0.2147 0.1282 -0.3366*** 0.2388 0.1366 
 
(0.000) (0.137) (0.395) (0.002) (0.308) (0.433) (0.006) (0.331) (0.483) 
        0.2417*** 0.3024** 0.0681 0.3570*** 0.5337** 0.2327 0.4116*** 0.6202** 0.3013 
 
(0.002) (0.030) (0.551) (0.000) (0.018) (0.197) (0.000) (0.017) (0.145) 
          -0.0171 -0.0327 0.0225 -0.0512 -0.1421 -0.0264 -0.0574 -0.1749 -0.0465 
 
(0.394) (0.622) (0.667) (0.197) (0.209) (0.713) (0.209) (0.177) (0.585) 
           0.0002 0.0052 -0.0001 0.0002 0.0054 -0.0011 0.0002 0.0054 -0.0008 
 
(0.883) (0.221) (0.981) (0.898) (0.222) (0.772) (0.869) (0.215) (0.818) 
              -0.0002 0.0236*** 0.0195*** -0.0008 0.0226*** 0.0187*** -0.0007 0.0226*** 0.0186*** 
 
(0.965) (0.001) (0.003) (0.880) (0.002) (0.004) (0.885) (0.002) (0.004) 
        0.0710 0.0114 0.5026 0.1139 -0.3000 0.6098 0.1431 -0.5027 0.8250 
 (0.541) (0.976) (0.128) (0.469) (0.599) (0.205) (0.527) (0.562) (0.259) 
         -0.0422 -0.1324 0.0852 -0.0170 -0.2310 0.2091 -0.0312 -0.2206 0.3281 
 (0.663) (0.660) (0.739) (0.901) (0.635) (0.599) (0.865) (0.724) (0.535) 
          -0.0582 -0.0939 0.2374 -0.0507 -0.2626 0.3694 -0.0796 -0.2964 0.4760 
 (0.413) (0.535) (0.140) (0.668) (0.311) (0.158) (0.607) (0.337) (0.136) 
          -0.0283 -0.0767 0.0989 -0.0326 -0.2625 0.1324 -0.0441 -0.3084 0.1586 
 (0.442) (0.459) (0.249) (0.607) (0.162) (0.399) (0.570) (0.154) (0.392) 
                  -0.0088 0.0591 -0.0324 -0.0446 0.2902 -0.2391 -0.0603 0.4337 -0.3566 
 (0.735) (0.618) (0.751) (0.650) (0.457) (0.466) (0.685) (0.464) (0.472) 
                   0.0058 0.0051 -0.0071 0.0056 0.0324 -0.1567 0.0164 0.0354 -0.2155 
 (0.562) (0.888) (0.824) (0.935) (0.877) (0.405) (0.866) (0.906) (0.427) 
                    0.0071 0.0092 -0.0111 0.0259 0.0987 -0.1494 0.0442 0.1273 -0.2042 
 (0.204) (0.376) (0.315) (0.639) (0.275) (0.129) (0.564) (0.296) (0.125) 
                    0.0022 0.0105* 0.0001 0.0140 0.1205* -0.0349 0.0213 0.1551* -0.0448 
 (0.408) (0.094) (0.977) (0.598) (0.065) (0.551) (0.552) (0.067) (0.556) 
                    0.0006 0.0036 0.0004 0.0143 0.0610* 0.0203 0.0183 0.0801* 0.0292 
 (0.417) (0.160) (0.866) (0.221) (0.077) (0.337) (0.230) (0.073) (0.310) 
                  -0.0045* -0.0037 -0.0006 -0.0481 -0.0330 -0.0271 -0.0636 -0.0471 -0.0323 
 (0.063) (0.562) (0.917) (0.136) (0.700) (0.757) (0.116) (0.665) (0.767) 
                  -0.0100*** -0.0152** -0.0118** -0.0989*** -0.1789** -0.1333** -0.1330*** -0.2341** -0.1759** 
 (0.000) (0.017) (0.020) (0.001) (0.025) (0.049) (0.000) (0.022) (0.038) 
     -0.0615 -0.1846 -0.2928 -0.0664 -0.1682 -0.2476 -0.0678 -0.1728 -0.2590 
 (0.500) (0.555) (0.315) (0.408) (0.589) (0.390) (0.413) (0.581) (0.371) 
     0.0002 -0.0981 -0.1302 -0.0050 -0.0544 -0.0706 -0.0062 -0.0624 -0.0866 
 
(0.999) (0.298) (0.332) (0.938) (0.550) (0.546) (0.928) (0.501) (0.476) 
R2 within 0.5100 0.0221 0.0292 0.5112 0.0248 0.0289 0.5112 0.0246 0.0295 
F-statistic 175.8943 7.1548 19.9664 121.9133 7.3997 16.8549 128.2827 6.9886 15.5187 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Funds 596 596 596 596 596 596 596 596 596 
Observations 6417 6417 6417 6417 6417 6417 6417 6417 6417 
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Table N1.E. Results for the internally managed international equity funds sample. The PPB is the benchmark. The panel 
observations have a yearly frequency. The results are obtained using Driscoll-Kraay standard errors and fund fixed effects. P-
values are in parentheses (* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01). 
 
                              √      
  
Dependent Sharpe RFund-RPPB M2 Sharpe RFund-RPPB M2 Sharpe RFund-RPPB M2 
Constant 0.0883 -0.3213 -0.0077 -0.0128 -0.1416 -0.0909 -0.0925 -0.1860 -0.2409 
 
(0.441) (0.377) (0.976) (0.929) (0.785) (0.781) (0.589) (0.744) (0.530) 
          0.0139 0.0118 0.0295* 0.1181* -0.0189 0.1647 0.1687* 0.0072 0.2599 
 
(0.157) (0.432) (0.081) (0.083) (0.902) (0.255) (0.094) (0.972) (0.199) 
        -0.3487*** 0.1679 0.0093 -0.3018*** 0.2261 0.0803 -0.2876** 0.2612 0.1139 
 
(0.000) (0.284) (0.941) (0.006) (0.365) (0.668) (0.018) (0.373) (0.609) 
        0.2740*** 0.2008 -0.0319 0.3943*** 0.4543* 0.1368 0.4516*** 0.5284* 0.2017 
 
(0.001) (0.145) (0.760) (0.000) (0.066) (0.347) (0.000) (0.064) (0.241) 
          -0.0077 -0.1177 -0.0453 -0.0317 -0.3145* -0.1575 -0.0409 -0.3762* -0.1961* 
 
(0.710) (0.224) (0.477) (0.424) (0.077) (0.123) (0.387) (0.060) (0.095) 
           -0.0005 0.0412** 0.0171 -0.0020 0.0427** 0.0146 -0.0017 0.0428** 0.0150 
 
(0.903) (0.023) (0.140) (0.618) (0.023) (0.239) (0.675) (0.022) (0.217) 
              0.0020 0.0056 0.0143 0.0007 0.0014 0.0127 0.0008 0.0016 0.0130 
 
(0.640) (0.746) (0.338) (0.872) (0.937) (0.345) (0.861) (0.927) (0.338) 
        0.1268 0.2362 0.8126 0.2028 -0.1526 0.9947 0.3034 -0.1202 1.5759 
 (0.368) (0.632) (0.100) (0.311) (0.842) (0.138) (0.320) (0.913) (0.120) 
         0.0348 0.1941 0.3998 0.0769 0.0445 0.5204 0.1069 0.1770 0.7863 
 (0.770) (0.581) (0.191) (0.623) (0.946) (0.265) (0.617) (0.832) (0.213) 
          0.0020 0.0706 0.4631** 0.0301 -0.1254 0.6796* 0.0507 -0.0686 0.9337** 
 (0.985) (0.749) (0.048) (0.856) (0.773) (0.061) (0.815) (0.895) (0.042) 
          0.0067 -0.1469 0.0178 0.0230 -0.5380 -0.1208 0.0395 -0.6120 -0.1130 
 (0.913) (0.378) (0.890) (0.822) (0.116) (0.604) (0.747) (0.109) (0.677) 
                  -0.0290 -0.0571 -0.1885 -0.1271 0.0602 -0.6448 -0.1856 0.0551 -1.0006 
 (0.491) (0.706) (0.217) (0.381) (0.903) (0.168) (0.395) (0.940) (0.155) 
                   -0.0011 -0.0248 -0.0432 -0.0370 -0.0443 -0.2659 -0.0510 -0.1146 -0.4169 
 (0.934) (0.586) (0.255) (0.601) (0.878) (0.230) (0.632) (0.779) (0.201) 
                    -0.0016 -0.0103 -0.0423** -0.0272 0.0281 -0.3092** -0.0365 0.0050 -0.4541** 
 (0.867) (0.538) (0.013) (0.719) (0.865) (0.035) (0.733) (0.982) (0.026) 
                    -0.0021 0.0153* 0.0028 -0.0205 0.2270** 0.0535 -0.0285 0.2851** 0.0597 
 (0.598) (0.093) (0.674) (0.580) (0.044) (0.516) (0.566) (0.045) (0.576) 
                    0.0004 0.0077* 0.0036 0.0106 0.1164** 0.0626** 0.0150 0.1531** 0.0838** 
 (0.606) (0.052) (0.193) (0.401) (0.034) (0.043) (0.370) (0.029) (0.041) 
                  -0.0023 -0.0063 -0.0056 -0.0306 -0.0562 -0.0592 -0.0398 -0.0773 -0.0794 
 (0.418) (0.451) (0.389) (0.396) (0.556) (0.478) (0.382) (0.534) (0.455) 
                  -0.0104*** -0.0129* -0.0113** -0.1025*** -0.1773* -0.1311* -0.1382*** -0.2263* -0.1719* 
 (0.001) (0.058) (0.027) (0.006) (0.069) (0.073) (0.004) (0.067) (0.059) 
     -0.1248 0.0965 -0.2501 -0.1251 0.0936 -0.2148 -0.1279 0.0923 -0.2235 
 (0.191) (0.743) (0.356) (0.141) (0.739) (0.405) (0.144) (0.745) (0.391) 
     -0.1047 -0.1172 -0.1239 -0.0892 -0.0379 -0.0442 -0.0952 -0.0518 -0.0639 
 
(0.229) (0.316) (0.320) (0.160) (0.708) (0.692) (0.160) (0.611) (0.576) 
R2 within 0.4450 0.0207 0.0388 0.4459 0.0262 0.0394 0.4465 0.0255 0.0400 
F-statistic 258.6443 7.7855 19.7963 89.8958 6.6436 12.9566 121.7960 6.4184 14.6109 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Funds 327 327 327 327 327 327 327 327 327 
Observations 3623 3623 3623 3623 3623 3623 3623 3623 3623 
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Table N1.F. Results for the internally managed UK equity funds sample. The PPB is the benchmark. The panel observations 
have a yearly frequency. The results are obtained using Driscoll-Kraay standard errors and fund fixed effects. P-values are in 
parentheses (* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01). 
 
                              √      
  
Dependent Sharpe RFund-RPPB M2 Sharpe RFund-RPPB M2 Sharpe RFund-RPPB M2 
Constant 0.0937 -0.1363 -0.1769 0.0759 -0.2774 -0.5290 0.0716 -0.3357 -0.6990 
 
(0.365) (0.800) (0.701) (0.541) (0.658) (0.364) (0.653) (0.624) (0.294) 
          -0.0033 0.0136 0.0365* 0.0239 0.1111 0.3020 0.0221 0.1525 0.4201 
 
(0.790) (0.499) (0.092) (0.755) (0.508) (0.133) (0.850) (0.520) (0.130) 
        -0.5668*** 0.2298* 0.1766 -0.4807*** 0.2398 0.1473 -0.4513*** 0.2565 0.1246 
 
(0.000) (0.084) (0.223) (0.000) (0.275) (0.479) (0.000) (0.318) (0.608) 
        0.1947** 0.4345* 0.1886 0.3048*** 0.6344* 0.3262 0.3561*** 0.7335* 0.3947 
 
(0.018) (0.063) (0.339) (0.001) (0.087) (0.303) (0.001) (0.083) (0.271) 
          -0.0332 0.0530 0.1063 -0.0808 0.1131 0.2098** -0.0774 0.1030 0.2047* 
 
(0.259) (0.416) (0.120) (0.159) (0.275) (0.033) (0.212) (0.384) (0.075) 
           0.0012 0.0020 0.0004 0.0017 0.0013 -0.0012 0.0016 0.0015 -0.0008 
 
(0.298) (0.757) (0.949) (0.274) (0.828) (0.818) (0.271) (0.811) (0.874) 
              -0.0058 0.0320*** 0.0214*** -0.0064 0.0319*** 0.0208*** -0.0063 0.0318*** 0.0206*** 
 
(0.399) (0.004) (0.010) (0.375) (0.003) (0.009) (0.383) (0.003) (0.009) 
        0.0137 -0.1817 0.1015 -0.0077 -0.4445 0.0227 -0.1102 -0.8868 -0.2515 
 (0.928) (0.717) (0.821) (0.968) (0.586) (0.976) (0.710) (0.488) (0.827) 
         -0.0773 -0.4259 -0.2562 -0.0799 -0.3704 -0.0510 -0.1350 -0.4042 -0.0425 
 (0.479) (0.195) (0.327) (0.604) (0.393) (0.899) (0.493) (0.458) (0.933) 
          -0.0966 -0.2056 -0.0260 -0.1332 -0.3476 0.0434 -0.2216 -0.4562 -0.0044 
 (0.264) (0.216) (0.884) (0.292) (0.209) (0.886) (0.161) (0.155) (0.990) 
          -0.0559 0.0257 0.1795 -0.1084 0.0411 0.3904* -0.1591 0.0362 0.4417* 
 (0.277) (0.809) (0.119) (0.223) (0.832) (0.085) (0.149) (0.866) (0.081) 
                  0.0175 0.1531 0.1375 0.1017 0.5066 0.2801 0.1638 0.7968 0.4773 
 (0.622) (0.326) (0.298) (0.461) (0.376) (0.579) (0.440) (0.365) (0.537) 
                   0.0071 0.0167 0.0250 0.0535 0.0015 -0.1058 0.0844 0.0243 -0.0985 
 (0.512) (0.642) (0.414) (0.455) (0.993) (0.550) (0.400) (0.921) (0.689) 
                    0.0152*** 0.0235** 0.0225** 0.1005** 0.1511 0.0074 0.1507** 0.2200* 0.0447 
 (0.006) (0.035) (0.038) (0.049) (0.104) (0.941) (0.030) (0.074) (0.731) 
                    0.0075* 0.0022 -0.0041 0.0708* -0.0035 -0.1376* 0.0994* -0.0005 -0.1679* 
 (0.081) (0.656) (0.498) (0.067) (0.955) (0.075) (0.058) (0.995) (0.081) 
                    0.0007 -0.0003 -0.0036 0.0177 -0.0194 -0.0548* 0.0191 -0.0187 -0.0611 
 (0.461) (0.912) (0.156) (0.227) (0.543) (0.052) (0.300) (0.646) (0.105) 
                  -0.0059** -0.0022 0.0051 -0.0642* -0.0158 0.0350 -0.0840** -0.0250 0.0498 
 (0.030) (0.753) (0.445) (0.050) (0.871) (0.755) (0.043) (0.837) (0.716) 
                  -0.0095*** -0.0174* -0.0117 -0.0940** -0.1758 -0.1226 -0.1262** -0.2371 -0.1642 
 (0.008) (0.075) (0.141) (0.022) (0.160) (0.247) (0.018) (0.132) (0.215) 
     0.0683 -0.4172 -0.4069 0.0410 -0.4023 -0.3564 0.0438 -0.4039 -0.3659 
 (0.559) (0.308) (0.266) (0.672) (0.331) (0.328) (0.663) (0.330) (0.316) 
     0.2057* -0.1342 -0.1884 0.1675 -0.1192 -0.1365 0.1737 -0.1207 -0.1492 
 
(0.085) (0.493) (0.331) (0.110) (0.446) (0.384) (0.107) (0.467) (0.367) 
R2 within 0.6350 0.0539 0.0556 0.6331 0.0533 0.0533 0.6335 0.0537 0.0541 
F-statistic 215.0657 22.2866 55.1449 67.3478 23.5072 149.4284 88.0467 24.9174 156.6593 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Funds 264 264 264 264 264 264 264 264 264 
Observations 2746 2746 2746 2746 2746 2746 2746 2746 2746 
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Table N2.A. Results for the externally managed all-funds sample. The PPB is the benchmark. The panel observations have a 
yearly frequency. The results are obtained using Driscoll-Kraay standard errors and fund fixed effects. P-values are in 
parentheses (* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01). 
 
                              √      
  
Dependent Sharpe RFund-RPPB M2 Sharpe RFund-RPPB M2 Sharpe RFund-RPPB M2 
Constant 0.0457 -0.0378 0.6180*** 0.0095 -0.3436 0.3498 -0.1007 -0.6083 0.1044 
 
(0.723) (0.879) (0.008) (0.960) (0.347) (0.316) (0.699) (0.231) (0.825) 
          0.0006 0.0277 0.0303 0.1328 0.3700* 0.3415 0.1744 0.5386* 0.4893 
 
(0.973) (0.278) (0.255) (0.329) (0.095) (0.143) (0.374) (0.098) (0.150) 
        -0.6144*** -0.0249 -0.1331* -0.5907*** -0.1213 -0.1956 -0.6102*** -0.1561 -0.2137 
 
(0.000) (0.483) (0.080) (0.000) (0.129) (0.190) (0.000) (0.152) (0.257) 
        0.0213 0.0465 -0.2168** 0.0853 0.1192 -0.1143 0.0884 0.1388 -0.0791 
 
(0.732) (0.609) (0.024) (0.308) (0.482) (0.554) (0.385) (0.509) (0.742) 
          0.0815* 0.1171* 0.0747 -0.1140 0.0575 -0.0183 -0.0602 0.0823 0.0062 
 
(0.067) (0.080) (0.299) (0.259) (0.460) (0.863) (0.534) (0.328) (0.957) 
           0.0016 0.0018 0.0009 0.0030*** 0.0021 0.0011 0.0027*** 0.0023 0.0012 
 
(0.200) (0.598) (0.800) (0.004) (0.522) (0.743) (0.010) (0.490) (0.736) 
              0.0006 0.0038 0.0020 0.0001 0.0032 0.0012 0.0003 0.0032 0.0013 
 
(0.409) (0.231) (0.351) (0.836) (0.246) (0.458) (0.702) (0.247) (0.444) 
        -0.0029 -0.0321 -0.2104 0.1965 0.3762 0.0379 0.1585 0.4667 0.0193 
 (0.983) (0.869) (0.192) (0.335) (0.276) (0.891) (0.528) (0.308) (0.961) 
         0.0551 0.1040 0.0106 0.1922* 0.3968 0.2474 0.2009 0.5507 0.3641 
 (0.503) (0.614) (0.936) (0.084) (0.172) (0.225) (0.100) (0.149) (0.211) 
          0.1295* 0.1462 0.0216 0.2826** 0.5139 0.3063 0.3032** 0.6625 0.4171 
 (0.059) (0.308) (0.832) (0.029) (0.112) (0.215) (0.047) (0.104) (0.201) 
          0.1140** 0.1183 0.0509 0.1892* 0.3008 0.2549 0.2013 0.3414 0.3003 
 (0.046) (0.242) (0.521) (0.095) (0.169) (0.181) (0.148) (0.185) (0.196) 
                  0.0170 0.0146 0.0493* 0.0144 -0.1449 -0.0195 0.0349 -0.1738 0.0156 
 (0.165) (0.441) (0.056) (0.832) (0.314) (0.889) (0.718) (0.389) (0.939) 
                   -0.0029 -0.0268 -0.0117 -0.0247 -0.2075* -0.1677 -0.0329 -0.2833* -0.2242 
 (0.687) (0.106) (0.519) (0.404) (0.084) (0.146) (0.423) (0.092) (0.173) 
                    -0.0069 -0.0204 -0.0124 -0.0590 -0.2360* -0.1861 -0.0764 -0.3167* -0.2457 
 (0.218) (0.146) (0.310) (0.186) (0.084) (0.128) (0.217) (0.087) (0.142) 
                    -0.0051 -0.0074 -0.0067 -0.0346 -0.1012 -0.1210 -0.0455 -0.1238 -0.1480 
 (0.303) (0.356) (0.411) (0.478) (0.233) (0.168) (0.484) (0.256) (0.192) 
                    -0.0026 -0.0100*** -0.0056 0.0534 -0.0432 -0.0050 0.0377 -0.0593* -0.0157 
 (0.387) (0.003) (0.205) (0.169) (0.120) (0.894) (0.369) (0.077) (0.734) 
                  0.0045 0.0045 0.0018 0.0066 0.0846* 0.0542 0.0175 0.1063 0.0650 
 (0.350) (0.454) (0.807) (0.878) (0.083) (0.427) (0.766) (0.126) (0.493) 
                  -0.0000 -0.0027 -0.0054 -0.0344 -0.0456 -0.0728 -0.0377 -0.0582 -0.0956 
 (0.994) (0.746) (0.550) (0.490) (0.531) (0.431) (0.568) (0.559) (0.441) 
     -0.0584 0.0754 -0.2866 -0.1165 0.0274 -0.3112* -0.1114 0.0179 -0.3175* 
 (0.553) (0.679) (0.104) (0.219) (0.885) (0.077) (0.246) (0.926) (0.079) 
     0.0367 -0.2101 -0.1917 -0.0057 -0.2446* -0.2044 -0.0060 -0.2578* -0.2150 
 
(0.678) (0.140) (0.269) (0.948) (0.067) (0.210) (0.947) (0.064) (0.205) 
R2 within 0.4632 0.0062 0.0372 0.4667 0.0110 0.0422 0.4654 0.0106 0.0416 
F-statistic 1169.6077 28.4795 68.2666 11009.3136 63.6305 54.7377 5982.2223 64.8134 132.7994 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Funds 3964 3964 3964 3964 3964 3964 3964 3964 3964 
Observations 18624 18624 18624 18624 18624 18624 18624 18624 18624 
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Table N2.B. Results for the externally managed allocation funds sample. The PPB is the benchmark. The panel observations 
have a yearly frequency. The results are obtained using Driscoll-Kraay standard errors and fund fixed effects. P-values are in 
parentheses (* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01). 
 
                              √      
  
Dependent Sharpe RFund-RPPB M2 Sharpe RFund-RPPB M2 Sharpe RFund-RPPB M2 
Constant 0.3058 -1.3812*** -0.5711 0.4427 -1.6282** -0.8584 0.3666 -1.7438** -1.0496 
 
(0.390) (0.006) (0.274) (0.367) (0.015) (0.203) (0.524) (0.045) (0.176) 
          -0.0206 -0.0141 0.0052 0.0219 0.2171 0.2698 0.0089 0.2605 0.3501 
 
(0.406) (0.768) (0.897) (0.896) (0.510) (0.296) (0.971) (0.602) (0.369) 
        -0.7437*** 0.2996*** -0.2319** -0.7654*** 0.4241* -0.2554 -0.7842*** 0.5543* -0.2007 
 
(0.000) (0.003) (0.040) (0.000) (0.060) (0.127) (0.000) (0.068) (0.326) 
        -0.0532 0.3351 -0.3320** -0.0441 0.5370 -0.3197 -0.0501 0.6663 -0.3272 
 
(0.639) (0.151) (0.013) (0.718) (0.191) (0.145) (0.728) (0.181) (0.226) 
          0.0574 0.3296* 0.1074 -0.4021 0.2304 -0.1062 -0.2686 0.3528 0.0088 
 
(0.679) (0.087) (0.540) (0.244) (0.653) (0.802) (0.424) (0.490) (0.984) 
           0.0003 0.0014 -0.0006 0.0064 0.0061 0.0028 0.0050 0.0053 0.0021 
 
(0.963) (0.892) (0.945) (0.374) (0.618) (0.763) (0.456) (0.655) (0.820) 
              0.0030 0.0097 0.0074 0.0015 0.0087 0.0058 0.0021 0.0090 0.0062 
 
(0.154) (0.123) (0.109) (0.360) (0.116) (0.159) (0.248) (0.114) (0.134) 
        -0.5056 -0.5961 -0.1762 -0.1094 -0.0592 0.4297 -0.2420 -0.4066 0.3143 
 (0.177) (0.221) (0.772) (0.808) (0.915) (0.524) (0.665) (0.569) (0.761) 
         -0.3901* -0.7400** -0.3025 -0.3994* -0.8246* -0.1253 -0.4394** -1.1055* -0.1460 
 (0.080) (0.040) (0.449) (0.084) (0.069) (0.783) (0.048) (0.070) (0.799) 
          0.0110 -0.1787 0.0493 0.2144 0.0328 0.5608 0.2419 0.0508 0.7072 
 (0.945) (0.484) (0.835) (0.304) (0.930) (0.141) (0.310) (0.910) (0.141) 
          0.1331 0.3226 0.1999 0.2261 0.4532 0.5618* 0.2650 0.5535 0.6731* 
 (0.488) (0.300) (0.312) (0.352) (0.250) (0.058) (0.372) (0.253) (0.067) 
                  0.0577 0.1108 0.1003 0.0748 0.2567 -0.0009 0.1337 0.4526 0.0606 
 (0.234) (0.222) (0.487) (0.620) (0.338) (0.998) (0.563) (0.278) (0.931) 
                   0.0034 0.0372 0.0084 0.1224** 0.3489 0.0082 0.1400 0.5118 0.0207 
 (0.772) (0.309) (0.787) (0.038) (0.168) (0.964) (0.108) (0.171) (0.938) 
                    -0.0208*** -0.0227 -0.0282* -0.0873 -0.0799 -0.3142** -0.1215 -0.1060 -0.4160** 
 (0.006) (0.223) (0.081) (0.160) (0.599) (0.038) (0.146) (0.628) (0.045) 
                    -0.0144 -0.0281 -0.0224 -0.0703 -0.1451 -0.2476** -0.1014 -0.2105 -0.3236** 
 (0.162) (0.164) (0.109) (0.336) (0.263) (0.026) (0.334) (0.263) (0.037) 
                    -0.0019 -0.0123 -0.0049 0.1489 -0.0537 0.0312 0.1137 -0.1080 -0.0099 
 (0.816) (0.309) (0.551) (0.197) (0.756) (0.815) (0.368) (0.576) (0.948) 
                  0.0016 -0.0307** -0.0162 0.0254 -0.1697 -0.0357 0.0351 -0.2520 -0.0705 
 (0.741) (0.041) (0.113) (0.537) (0.208) (0.681) (0.530) (0.175) (0.558) 
                  -0.0021 -0.0264 -0.0002 -0.0085 -0.2075 0.0015 -0.0081 -0.2890 0.0030 
 (0.759) (0.150) (0.984) (0.886) (0.210) (0.990) (0.914) (0.193) (0.984) 
     -0.0816 0.9866*** 0.5628 -0.1746 0.8868** 0.5558 -0.1590 0.8966** 0.5620 
 (0.624) (0.005) (0.189) (0.411) (0.013) (0.200) (0.447) (0.012) (0.200) 
     0.2159** 0.3000* 0.4450** 0.1465 0.1782 0.3859** 0.1493 0.1900 0.3893** 
 
(0.037) (0.099) (0.011) (0.145) (0.262) (0.011) (0.142) (0.253) (0.012) 
R2 within 0.5621 0.1064 0.1594 0.5619 0.1031 0.1607 0.5581 0.1032 0.1593 
F-statistic 4979.7664 216.8559 228.8303 10004.4592 128.0985 54.6815 10172.5112 138.8528 62.1945 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Funds 283 283 283 283 283 283 283 283 283 
Observations 1316 1316 1316 1316 1316 1316 1316 1316 1316 
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Table N2.C. Results for the externally managed fixed income funds sample. The PPB is the benchmark. The panel 
observations have a yearly frequency. The results are obtained using Driscoll-Kraay standard errors and fund fixed effects. P-
values are in parentheses (* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01). 
 
                              √      
  
Dependent Sharpe RFund-RPPB M2 Sharpe RFund-RPPB M2 Sharpe RFund-RPPB M2 
Constant -0.8609*** -1.2674 -0.8953 -0.7837* -1.3527 -0.9157 -1.1425** -2.0117 -1.3879 
 
(0.002) (0.251) (0.321) (0.057) (0.308) (0.377) (0.044) (0.235) (0.306) 
          0.0344 0.0874* 0.0611 0.3885 0.7302 0.5197 0.5556 1.0634 0.7595 
 
(0.423) (0.088) (0.191) (0.213) (0.173) (0.251) (0.222) (0.167) (0.243) 
        -0.3739*** 0.0987 0.2396* -0.4199*** -0.3745 0.1269 -0.4653*** -0.6174 0.0521 
 
(0.007) (0.617) (0.078) (0.001) (0.358) (0.647) (0.001) (0.297) (0.891) 
        0.0917 0.2644 0.1527 0.3393*** 0.7972** 0.5565* 0.4453*** 1.1554** 0.8556** 
 
(0.433) (0.114) (0.256) (0.001) (0.041) (0.055) (0.000) (0.022) (0.026) 
          0.2542** 0.3454 0.2584 -0.1097 0.0208 0.0337 -0.0114 0.2715 0.1942 
 
(0.036) (0.125) (0.214) (0.710) (0.932) (0.896) (0.971) (0.261) (0.502) 
           0.0070* 0.0035 0.0009 0.0067** 0.0027 0.0004 0.0067** 0.0027 0.0004 
 
(0.058) (0.573) (0.855) (0.035) (0.606) (0.917) (0.036) (0.610) (0.919) 
              0.0026* 0.0070*** 0.0056** 0.0022 0.0060** 0.0046* 0.0024 0.0065*** 0.0049* 
 
(0.070) (0.001) (0.016) (0.296) (0.018) (0.096) (0.225) (0.010) (0.067) 
        0.3972 0.7739 0.0793 0.6581 1.2792 0.2238 0.7516 1.4894 -0.0104 
 (0.313) (0.431) (0.924) (0.255) (0.390) (0.862) (0.357) (0.444) (0.995) 
         0.5680*** 0.5404 0.6806 0.7796*** 0.6632 0.9261 1.0083*** 0.7642 1.2478 
 (0.005) (0.474) (0.275) (0.006) (0.478) (0.276) (0.003) (0.458) (0.228) 
          0.3136** 0.1495 0.3882 0.4511* 0.4032 0.7491 0.4806 0.4041 0.9313 
 (0.026) (0.715) (0.314) (0.063) (0.438) (0.237) (0.117) (0.478) (0.219) 
          0.2148** 0.2331 0.2968 0.4101** 0.3838 0.5007 0.4969** 0.4965 0.6743 
 (0.026) (0.532) (0.300) (0.023) (0.537) (0.328) (0.030) (0.480) (0.252) 
                  -0.0079 -0.0101 0.1178 -0.0986 -0.2286 0.2859 -0.1515 -0.3670 0.4383 
 (0.902) (0.914) (0.380) (0.732) (0.676) (0.632) (0.729) (0.653) (0.631) 
                   -0.0707** -0.0453* -0.1032** -0.2754*** -0.1094 -0.3759 -0.4140*** -0.1729 -0.5789 
 (0.016) (0.057) (0.016) (0.006) (0.514) (0.145) (0.005) (0.431) (0.113) 
                    -0.0074 -0.0022 -0.0396* -0.0560 -0.0663 -0.2740 -0.0709 -0.0725 -0.3909 
 (0.574) (0.885) (0.065) (0.588) (0.520) (0.162) (0.620) (0.616) (0.146) 
                    -0.0202** -0.0327*** -0.0425*** -0.1586* -0.1552 -0.2367 -0.2130* -0.2301 -0.3461* 
 (0.040) (0.008) (0.002) (0.052) (0.374) (0.133) (0.055) (0.299) (0.092) 
                    -0.0110 -0.0373*** -0.0249* 0.0737 -0.0635 -0.0362 0.0406 -0.1818* -0.1122 
 (0.170) (0.007) (0.059) (0.454) (0.398) (0.689) (0.736) (0.057) (0.347) 
                  0.0113 0.0423 0.0149 0.0554 0.4277* 0.1079 0.0855 0.5801 0.1564 
 (0.102) (0.204) (0.394) (0.347) (0.083) (0.486) (0.301) (0.109) (0.476) 
                  -0.0180** -0.0675*** -0.0570*** -0.2111** -0.5573** -0.4454*** -0.2776** -0.7792*** -0.6302*** 
 (0.027) (0.001) (0.001) (0.010) (0.011) (0.007) (0.012) (0.007) (0.005) 
     0.0268 0.2192 0.1789 -0.1134 0.0531 0.0306 -0.1084 0.0640 0.0419 
 (0.896) (0.654) (0.655) (0.525) (0.912) (0.931) (0.556) (0.893) (0.907) 
     0.0709 0.2255 0.1666 0.0094 0.1512 0.0785 0.0043 0.1478 0.0795 
 
(0.732) (0.170) (0.413) (0.959) (0.319) (0.648) (0.982) (0.351) (0.662) 
R2 within 0.1325 0.0454 0.0582 0.1534 0.0565 0.0604 0.1492 0.0551 0.0606 
F-statistic 1121.9757 124.2664 304.8750 296.4016 54.9307 111.8041 303.0209 62.0126 128.6297 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Funds 489 489 489 489 489 489 489 489 489 
Observations 2055 2055 2055 2055 2055 2055 2055 2055 2055 
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Table N2.D. Results for the externally managed equity funds sample. The PPB is the benchmark. The panel observations have 
a yearly frequency. The results are obtained using Driscoll-Kraay standard errors and fund fixed effects. P-values are in 
parentheses (* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01). 
 
                              √      
  
Dependent Sharpe RFund-RPPB M2 Sharpe RFund-RPPB M2 Sharpe RFund-RPPB M2 
Constant 0.1689 0.2173 0.8857*** 0.1581 -0.0257 0.6318** 0.1346 -0.2129 0.4390 
 
(0.204) (0.267) (0.001) (0.282) (0.906) (0.026) (0.402) (0.433) (0.203) 
          -0.0101 0.0194 0.0268 0.0351 0.2550** 0.2748 0.0326 0.3845** 0.4014 
 
(0.384) (0.325) (0.206) (0.638) (0.045) (0.113) (0.759) (0.047) (0.113) 
        -0.6895*** -0.1705*** -0.2255*** -0.7023*** -0.3006*** -0.2987* -0.7462*** -0.3663*** -0.3301 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.009) (0.000) (0.001) (0.080) (0.000) (0.002) (0.126) 
        -0.0451 -0.0970* -0.3319*** -0.0439 -0.1249 -0.2802 -0.0791 -0.1721 -0.2827 
 
(0.463) (0.080) (0.001) (0.540) (0.188) (0.155) (0.324) (0.165) (0.257) 
          0.0347 0.0240 0.0055 -0.0973 -0.0162 -0.0493 -0.0612 -0.0341 -0.0623 
 
(0.292) (0.561) (0.929) (0.342) (0.898) (0.726) (0.507) (0.778) (0.650) 
           0.0003 0.0021 0.0025 0.0022 0.0022 0.0022 0.0018 0.0027 0.0025 
 
(0.851) (0.726) (0.646) (0.230) (0.697) (0.694) (0.320) (0.638) (0.649) 
              -0.0002 0.0031 0.0015 -0.0005 0.0025 0.0009 -0.0004 0.0025 0.0009 
 
(0.814) (0.343) (0.541) (0.551) (0.452) (0.727) (0.659) (0.449) (0.719) 
        -0.0207 0.0129 -0.1798 0.1393 0.3449* 0.0091 0.1140 0.5025* 0.0509 
 (0.771) (0.950) (0.404) (0.247) (0.091) (0.964) (0.466) (0.074) (0.853) 
         0.0141 0.1801 0.0011 0.1272* 0.4765*** 0.2137* 0.1145 0.6781*** 0.3301* 
 (0.752) (0.300) (0.994) (0.087) (0.008) (0.083) (0.140) (0.005) (0.052) 
          0.0618 0.1288 -0.0378 0.1637* 0.4044** 0.1471 0.1589* 0.5251* 0.2228 
 (0.108) (0.276) (0.663) (0.057) (0.049) (0.260) (0.085) (0.056) (0.207) 
          0.0699** 0.0485 -0.0219 0.1123* 0.1681 0.1235 0.1152 0.1717 0.1350 
 (0.025) (0.536) (0.652) (0.091) (0.186) (0.117) (0.174) (0.285) (0.212) 
                  0.0048 -0.0058 0.0264 -0.0018 -0.1990* -0.0769 0.0078 -0.2657 -0.0747 
 (0.699) (0.817) (0.238) (0.977) (0.092) (0.471) (0.930) (0.116) (0.636) 
                   0.0016 -0.0323* -0.0060 -0.0040 -0.2589*** -0.1633** -0.0011 -0.3613** -0.2158* 
 (0.804) (0.072) (0.687) (0.878) (0.009) (0.043) (0.977) (0.012) (0.071) 
                    -0.0015 -0.0130 -0.0043 -0.0205 -0.1816 -0.1211 -0.0228 -0.2414 -0.1552 
 (0.733) (0.374) (0.680) (0.521) (0.129) (0.165) (0.606) (0.147) (0.199) 
                    -0.0028 0.0012 0.0008 -0.0135 -0.0439 -0.0693 -0.0185 -0.0422 -0.0737 
 (0.485) (0.873) (0.908) (0.710) (0.493) (0.248) (0.708) (0.625) (0.349) 
                    -0.0006 -0.0047*** -0.0020 0.0408 -0.0214 0.0005 0.0313 -0.0169 0.0064 
 (0.733) (0.005) (0.569) (0.282) (0.598) (0.991) (0.407) (0.692) (0.904) 
                  0.0090** 0.0118* 0.0058 0.0431 0.1277** 0.0736 0.0691 0.1691** 0.0932 
 (0.042) (0.090) (0.517) (0.229) (0.015) (0.360) (0.161) (0.024) (0.404) 
                  0.0070* 0.0103 0.0022 0.0269 0.0592 -0.0154 0.0473 0.0882 -0.0147 
 (0.062) (0.124) (0.825) (0.463) (0.236) (0.876) (0.326) (0.210) (0.913) 
     -0.0173 0.0521 -0.3693** -0.0559 0.0357 -0.3685** -0.0521 0.0243 -0.3774** 
 (0.839) (0.772) (0.046) (0.478) (0.844) (0.041) (0.515) (0.894) (0.041) 
     0.0741 -0.2540** -0.2294 0.0391 -0.2529** -0.2095 0.0402 -0.2704** -0.2246 
 
(0.386) (0.028) (0.151) (0.640) (0.024) (0.175) (0.633) (0.018) (0.156) 
R2 within 0.5719 0.0114 0.0553 0.5715 0.0161 0.0595 0.5712 0.0158 0.0592 
F-statistic 696.4425 89.2812 80.1307 5970.0724 158.3321 59.9518 2641.4486 196.9188 69.1207 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Funds 2975 2975 2975 2975 2975 2975 2975 2975 2975 
Observations 14557 14557 14557 14557 14557 14557 14557 14557 14557 
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Table N2.E. Results for the externally managed equity funds sample. The PPB is the benchmark. The panel 
observations have a yearly frequency. The results are obtained using Driscoll-Kraay standard errors and fund 
fixed effects. P-values are in parentheses (* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01). 
 
                              √      
  
Dependent Sharpe RFund-RPPB M2 Sharpe RFund-RPPB M2 Sharpe RFund-RPPB M2 
Constant 0.0057 -0.6781* 0.5948 -0.0544 -1.2454** 0.4327 -0.2286 -1.7232** 0.3176 
 
(0.984) (0.055) (0.260) (0.846) (0.032) (0.503) (0.470) (0.041) (0.680) 
          0.0255 0.0777* 0.0109 0.1761 0.6744* 0.1997 0.2710 0.9887* 0.2670 
 
(0.290) (0.055) (0.834) (0.155) (0.056) (0.566) (0.153) (0.054) (0.602) 
        -0.8988*** -0.1713* -0.7615*** -0.9229*** -0.4661** -1.0330*** -0.9866*** -0.6437** -1.2595*** 
 
(0.000) (0.098) (0.000) (0.000) (0.021) (0.001) (0.000) (0.015) (0.003) 
        0.0623 0.4569 -0.1958 0.1828* 0.7873 0.0529 0.1893 0.8814 0.0378 
 
(0.274) (0.140) (0.545) (0.061) (0.122) (0.913) (0.148) (0.151) (0.948) 
          0.1544** 0.3880* 0.3401* -0.0505 0.3265 0.2254 -0.0273 0.4074 0.2798 
 
(0.025) (0.065) (0.091) (0.798) (0.226) (0.450) (0.888) (0.116) (0.386) 
           0.0023 -0.0203* -0.0060 0.0034 -0.0108 -0.0012 0.0031 -0.0107 -0.0020 
 
(0.734) (0.092) (0.665) (0.567) (0.503) (0.933) (0.613) (0.489) (0.888) 
              0.0007 0.0140 0.0061 -0.0013 0.0068 -0.0015 -0.0012 0.0069 -0.0009 
 
(0.866) (0.231) (0.574) (0.765) (0.454) (0.887) (0.771) (0.462) (0.929) 
        0.1653 -0.5476 -1.5240 0.0583 -0.4761 -1.8719** 0.0874 -0.4817 -2.4976*** 
 (0.462) (0.557) (0.125) (0.796) (0.490) (0.025) (0.729) (0.520) (0.006) 
         0.2394 0.2969 -1.0432 0.1801 0.7039 -1.2012* 0.1721 1.0740 -1.6257* 
 (0.249) (0.528) (0.212) (0.411) (0.197) (0.097) (0.491) (0.198) (0.061) 
          0.1821 0.6420 -0.2187 0.2108 1.0497** -0.0229 0.2410 1.2886** -0.0219 
 (0.221) (0.123) (0.731) (0.259) (0.013) (0.970) (0.286) (0.011) (0.977) 
          0.0375 0.3925 -0.4190 -0.0128 0.2898 -0.8701* -0.0534 0.2433 -1.2103** 
 (0.666) (0.100) (0.225) (0.902) (0.214) (0.065) (0.686) (0.367) (0.038) 
                  0.0140 0.1402** 0.2727*** 0.0358 0.1154 0.8004*** 0.0378 0.1519 1.2251*** 
 (0.653) (0.036) (0.002) (0.581) (0.744) (0.000) (0.705) (0.785) (0.000) 
                   0.0275 -0.0113 0.1743** 0.0486 -0.4097 0.5196** 0.0728 -0.6082 0.8130** 
 (0.158) (0.861) (0.029) (0.539) (0.354) (0.039) (0.515) (0.350) (0.025) 
                    0.0048 -0.0334 0.0191 -0.0181 -0.3004* -0.0154 -0.0295 -0.4314* -0.0148 
 (0.721) (0.251) (0.672) (0.815) (0.080) (0.948) (0.785) (0.075) (0.965) 
                    0.0147 0.0038 0.0719*** 0.0757 0.0929 0.5177*** 0.1034 0.1290 0.7289*** 
 (0.119) (0.798) (0.004) (0.137) (0.174) (0.006) (0.150) (0.163) (0.004) 
                    -0.0008 -0.0313*** -0.0098 0.0765 -0.1415 -0.0187 0.0738 -0.1957* -0.0433 
 (0.843) (0.006) (0.461) (0.287) (0.154) (0.901) (0.350) (0.052) (0.802) 
                  0.0181** 0.0295** 0.0456** 0.0860 0.3163*** 0.3500** 0.1246 0.4208*** 0.4858* 
 (0.046) (0.047) (0.033) (0.254) (0.003) (0.046) (0.252) (0.005) (0.052) 
                  0.0039 -0.0132 0.0124 -0.0582 -0.2486 -0.1198 -0.0629 -0.3085 -0.1116 
 (0.591) (0.558) (0.550) (0.378) (0.223) (0.532) (0.489) (0.254) (0.663) 
                 
             
     -0.0756 -0.2105 -0.3061 -0.0060 -0.1148 -0.2008 -0.0213 -0.1547 -0.2249 
 
(0.672) (0.512) (0.543) (0.965) (0.728) (0.691) (0.882) (0.643) (0.658) 
R2 within 0.8153 0.1210 0.2966 0.8205 0.1535 0.3225 0.8198 0.1482 0.3186 
F-statistic 1443.8194 614.9989 455.8180 85239.1685 2147.0361 2077.1566 66865.7468 1587.1394 1649.4255 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Funds 178 178 178 178 178 178 178 178 178 
Observations 664 664 664 664 664 664 664 664 664 
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Table N2.F. Results for the externally managed international equity funds sample. The PPB is the benchmark. 
The panel observations have a yearly frequency. The results are obtained using Driscoll-Kraay standard errors 
and fund fixed effects. P-values are in parentheses (* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01). 
 
                              √      
  
Dependent Sharpe RFund-RPPB M2 Sharpe RFund-RPPB M2 Sharpe RFund-RPPB M2 
Constant 0.1913 -0.0036 0.9160** 0.1298 -0.3442 0.6643 0.0708 -0.6401 0.4325 
 
(0.266) (0.993) (0.017) (0.477) (0.412) (0.106) (0.688) (0.193) (0.351) 
          -0.0012 0.0309 0.0202 0.0839 0.4004** 0.3178* 0.1055 0.5743** 0.4394* 
 
(0.925) (0.188) (0.353) (0.216) (0.013) (0.050) (0.300) (0.017) (0.066) 
        -0.5390*** -0.3676*** -0.4743*** -0.5530*** -0.4879*** -0.5533*** -0.5907*** -0.5834*** -0.6223*** 
 
(0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) 
        0.0408 -0.0864* -0.3242*** 0.0368 -0.0763 -0.2419** -0.0003 -0.1477 -0.2593 
 
(0.489) (0.069) (0.000) (0.572) (0.310) (0.047) (0.997) (0.195) (0.115) 
          0.0776* 0.1210** 0.1086** -0.0273 -0.0479 -0.1067 0.0102 -0.0151 -0.0583 
 
(0.058) (0.031) (0.038) (0.681) (0.661) (0.345) (0.891) (0.900) (0.627) 
           -0.0019 0.0009 -0.0038 -0.0008 0.0017 -0.0025 -0.0010 0.0017 -0.0028 
 
(0.457) (0.911) (0.658) (0.752) (0.837) (0.773) (0.671) (0.832) (0.750) 
              -0.0001 0.0018 -0.0006 -0.0002 0.0012 -0.0012 -0.0002 0.0013 -0.0011 
 
(0.922) (0.690) (0.854) (0.811) (0.777) (0.724) (0.854) (0.763) (0.748) 
        0.0200 0.3177 -0.0805 0.1816 0.8691*** 0.3041 0.1843 1.2357*** 0.4205 
 (0.807) (0.165) (0.755) (0.122) (0.004) (0.358) (0.189) (0.003) (0.354) 
         0.0604 0.2653 0.0790 0.1793* 0.6453*** 0.3652* 0.1863* 0.8216*** 0.4512* 
 (0.425) (0.183) (0.656) (0.064) (0.006) (0.063) (0.073) (0.003) (0.068) 
          0.0851* 0.1225 -0.0304 0.1989** 0.4631** 0.1650 0.2103*** 0.5359** 0.1737 
 (0.087) (0.430) (0.823) (0.010) (0.018) (0.375) (0.006) (0.017) (0.425) 
          0.1324*** 0.2000* 0.0926 0.1946*** 0.3929** 0.2567*** 0.2116*** 0.4097** 0.2644** 
 (0.010) (0.089) (0.193) (0.002) (0.014) (0.010) (0.002) (0.036) (0.048) 
                  0.0032 -0.0606 -0.0029 -0.0332 -0.4751*** -0.1953 -0.0369 -0.6748*** -0.2545 
 (0.824) (0.103) (0.940) (0.500) (0.005) (0.223) (0.617) (0.008) (0.290) 
                   0.0006 -0.0167 -0.0034 -0.0301 -0.2630*** -0.1468* -0.0358 -0.3484** -0.1894 
 (0.927) (0.375) (0.850) (0.348) (0.007) (0.073) (0.448) (0.014) (0.131) 
                    -0.0024 0.0001 0.0055 -0.0429 -0.1647** -0.0589 -0.0527 -0.1976** -0.0595 
 (0.522) (0.990) (0.620) (0.109) (0.022) (0.398) (0.147) (0.046) (0.543) 
                    -0.0047 -0.0019 -0.0012 -0.0371 -0.0883 -0.0706 -0.0497 -0.0980 -0.0774 
 (0.131) (0.818) (0.876) (0.127) (0.212) (0.258) (0.131) (0.302) (0.360) 
                    -0.0017 -0.0060** -0.0024 0.0246 0.0162 0.0531 0.0125 0.0046 0.0407 
 (0.245) (0.037) (0.480) (0.220) (0.615) (0.188) (0.618) (0.911) (0.402) 
                  0.0076 0.0186* 0.0131 0.0402 0.1517* 0.1091 0.0623 0.2098* 0.1495 
 (0.102) (0.062) (0.215) (0.234) (0.057) (0.222) (0.196) (0.062) (0.231) 
                  0.0072* 0.0154* 0.0044 0.0315 0.0595 -0.0209 0.0530 0.1014 -0.0131 
 (0.053) (0.056) (0.617) (0.286) (0.396) (0.805) (0.190) (0.289) (0.908) 
     -0.1053 0.2534 -0.3299 -0.1326 0.2250 -0.3657 -0.1297 0.2182 -0.3664 
 (0.342) (0.358) (0.206) (0.210) (0.399) (0.139) (0.227) (0.420) (0.145) 
     -0.0790 -0.4997** -0.3959*** -0.1031 -0.4994** -0.4066*** -0.1036 -0.5176*** -0.4175*** 
 
(0.479) (0.019) (0.007) (0.330) (0.011) (0.006) (0.334) (0.010) (0.005) 
R2 within 0.5169 0.0503 0.1005 0.5178 0.0573 0.1080 0.5174 0.0568 0.1068 
F-statistic 1682.5932 70.8619 189.6098 766.3768 49.7631 231.6894 1389.8427 65.4620 228.2318 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Funds 1565 1565 1565 1565 1565 1565 1565 1565 1565 
Observations 7938 7938 7938 7938 7938 7938 7938 7938 7938 
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Table N2.G. Results for the externally managed UK equity funds sample. The PPB is the benchmark. The panel 
observations have a yearly frequency. The results are obtained using Driscoll-Kraay standard errors and fund 
fixed effects. P-values are in parentheses (* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01). 
 
                              √      
  
Dependent Sharpe RFund-RPPB M2 Sharpe RFund-RPPB M2 Sharpe RFund-RPPB M2 
Constant -0.1613 0.8253* 1.0299*** -0.1316 0.7290 0.8193* -0.1301 0.7265* 0.7004 
 
(0.317) (0.071) (0.006) (0.526) (0.137) (0.056) (0.576) (0.088) (0.115) 
          -0.0210 0.0014 0.0407 0.0040 0.0089 0.1734 -0.0200 0.0533 0.2852 
 
(0.115) (0.969) (0.182) (0.966) (0.948) (0.387) (0.879) (0.811) (0.337) 
        -0.7981*** 0.0555 0.0921 -0.7574*** -0.0751 0.0366 -0.7554*** -0.1107 0.0363 
 
(0.000) (0.355) (0.569) (0.000) (0.360) (0.895) (0.000) (0.289) (0.914) 
        -0.1161* -0.1474 -0.3534** -0.0852 -0.2870** -0.3857 -0.0864 -0.3207** -0.3886 
 
(0.080) (0.169) (0.011) (0.314) (0.037) (0.124) (0.421) (0.045) (0.203) 
          -0.0130 -0.1218 -0.1686* -0.1791 0.0846 0.0234 -0.1353 -0.0019 -0.0603 
 
(0.816) (0.171) (0.062) (0.402) (0.798) (0.934) (0.499) (0.995) (0.826) 
           0.0053* 0.0108 0.0200** 0.0089*** 0.0082 0.0150* 0.0081*** 0.0097 0.0165* 
 
(0.059) (0.349) (0.037) (0.010) (0.403) (0.073) (0.009) (0.344) (0.057) 
              -0.0007 0.0015 -0.0005 -0.0013 0.0022 -0.0002 -0.0010 0.0018 -0.0005 
 
(0.596) (0.468) (0.872) (0.367) (0.292) (0.938) (0.461) (0.364) (0.817) 
        -0.1072 -0.3739 -0.1797 0.1014 -0.4106 -0.3756 0.0389 -0.4725 -0.3316 
 (0.330) (0.196) (0.469) (0.601) (0.203) (0.136) (0.880) (0.316) (0.359) 
         -0.0833 -0.0192 -0.0594 0.0589 0.1023 -0.0364 0.0099 0.3139 0.1581 
 (0.159) (0.930) (0.690) (0.565) (0.587) (0.740) (0.936) (0.287) (0.405) 
          0.0025 0.0879 -0.0330 0.0949 0.2031 0.0372 0.0511 0.3792 0.2029 
 (0.973) (0.603) (0.813) (0.496) (0.525) (0.885) (0.761) (0.429) (0.606) 
          -0.0274 -0.1298 -0.0631 0.0142 -0.0861 0.1071 0.0014 -0.0739 0.1757 
 (0.697) (0.154) (0.198) (0.909) (0.616) (0.484) (0.993) (0.753) (0.403) 
                  0.0065 0.0375 0.0242 0.0280 0.1192 -0.0074 0.0530 0.1884 0.0049 
 (0.701) (0.496) (0.592) (0.776) (0.623) (0.973) (0.711) (0.606) (0.988) 
                   0.0051 -0.0479 -0.0202 0.0301 -0.2286 -0.2178 0.0492 -0.3397 -0.3092 
 (0.551) (0.130) (0.426) (0.489) (0.172) (0.136) (0.435) (0.169) (0.149) 
                    0.0029 -0.0303 -0.0172 0.0259 -0.1842 -0.1903 0.0431 -0.2748 -0.2692 
 (0.707) (0.327) (0.508) (0.648) (0.433) (0.341) (0.592) (0.413) (0.348) 
                    -0.0006 0.0025 -0.0037 0.0067 -0.0257 -0.1473 0.0090 -0.0235 -0.1791 
 (0.920) (0.807) (0.680) (0.899) (0.799) (0.170) (0.902) (0.864) (0.205) 
                    0.0001 -0.0018 0.0003 0.0556 -0.0957 -0.0702 0.0446 -0.0711 -0.0437 
 (0.964) (0.556) (0.951) (0.474) (0.419) (0.521) (0.582) (0.571) (0.707) 
                  -0.0014 0.0056 0.0020 -0.0235 0.0959* 0.0359 -0.0264 0.1212 0.0390 
 (0.789) (0.258) (0.810) (0.627) (0.077) (0.721) (0.686) (0.100) (0.773) 
                  -0.0001 0.0047 0.0016 -0.0164 0.1011* 0.0275 -0.0170 0.1240* 0.0305 
 (0.987) (0.396) (0.850) (0.785) (0.053) (0.789) (0.833) (0.077) (0.825) 
     0.2719** -0.5071** -0.6047** 0.2087* -0.5022** -0.5342* 0.2141* -0.5132** -0.5475** 
 (0.047) (0.046) (0.027) (0.056) (0.030) (0.051) (0.056) (0.030) (0.049) 
     0.3633*** 0.0918 -0.0122 0.2969*** 0.1107 0.0794 0.3025*** 0.0970 0.0622 
 
(0.000) (0.797) (0.967) (0.003) (0.718) (0.768) (0.002) (0.758) (0.822) 
R2 within 0.6562 0.0323 0.0935 0.6552 0.0338 0.0936 0.6547 0.0330 0.0933 
F-statistic 2917.2045 289.7548 76.1099 38489.6499 225.8305 176.9818 18343.5590 198.9827 155.6259 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Funds 1232 1232 1232 1232 1232 1232 1232 1232 1232 
Observations 5955 5955 5955 5955 5955 5955 5955 5955 5955 
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